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1 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis contains the findings of an examination of the relationship between internal 
corporate governance structures and the financial performance of South African listed firms. 
Specifically, using a sample of 100 South African listed firms from 2002 to 2006 (a total of 
500 firm-year observations) and corporate governance data collected directly from company 
annual reports, the thesis seeks to ascertain whether better-governed listed firms tend to be 
associated with higher financial returns than their poorly-governed counterparts. Unlike prior 
studies, the internal corporate governance-financial performance nexus is investigated by 
applying both the compliance-index and equilibrium-variable research methodologies. 
 The results based on the compliance-index model suggest that there is a statistically 
significant and positive association between the quality of the sampled firms’ internal 
corporate governance structures and their financial performance. This finding is robust 
whether an accounting (return on assets) or a market (Tobin’s Q) based measure of financial 
performance is used. Distinct from prior studies, an analysis of the impact of complying with 
the South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance 
provisions on the financial performance of South African listed firms is also investigated. The 
results indicate that compliance with the affirmative action and stakeholder corporate 
governance provisions impacts positively on the performance of South African listed firms. 
By contrast, the results based on the equilibrium-variable model are generally mixed. 
First, regardless of the financial performance measure used, board diversity, the frequency of 
board meetings, and the establishment of board committees except the presence of a 
nomination committee seem to have no impact on firm financial performance. Second, board 
size is statistically significant and positively associated with Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), but 
statistically insignificant and negatively related to return on assets (ROA). Third, role or CEO 
duality is statistically significant and positively related to ROA, but statistically insignificant 
and negatively associated with the Q-ratio. Director shareownership is statistically 
insignificant and positively related to ROA, but statistically significant and negatively 
associated with the Q-ratio. Finally, the findings based on both the director shareownership 
squared and cubed do not support the statistically significant non-linear director 
shareownership-financial performance association reported by Morck et al. (1988). 
The findings from a series of robustness or sensitivity analyses carried out suggest that 
the empirical results reported are generally robust to potential endogeneity problems. 
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DEFINITION OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 Before progressing further, it is deemed appropriate to briefly define and explain some 
key terms and abbreviations that have been used throughout this thesis.  
Corporate governance is a very broad term. As will be explained further in chapter two, 
the study will concentrate only on ‘internal’ or ‘narrow’ corporate governance structures. As a 
result, corporate governance will be defined as “a system by which companies are directed 
and controlled”, (Cadbury Report, 1992, s.2.5). 
The term ‘shareholding’ will refer to the corporate governance model that is 
predominantly found in Anglo-American companies or firms that normally operate in 
countries, such as the UK and US with a common-law legal system. It assumes that a firm 
should be run to primarily advance the interests of its shareholders or owners. The terms 
‘shareholding’, ‘shareholder’ and ‘Anglo-American’ will be used interchangeably throughout 
this thesis. 
The term ‘stakeholding’ will refer to the corporate governance framework that is 
mainly found in Continental European and Asian firms or companies that usually operate in 
countries, like France, German, and Japan with civil-law legal system. Unlike the 
‘shareholding’ model, it assumes that the purpose of a firm is to maximise the welfare of a 
number of stakeholders of the firm, including shareholders, employees, and local communities, 
amongst others. Interchangeability between the terms ‘stakeholding’, ‘stakeholder’ and 
‘Continental European-Asian’ will be assumed throughout this thesis. 
The term ‘hybrid’ will refer to the ‘integrated’ or ‘inclusive’ form of corporate 
governance that has mainly been advanced by the King Reports on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa since 1994. It is described as a ‘hybrid’ because while it remains predominantly 
Anglo-American, substantial affirmative action and stakeholder demands are formally super-
imposed on firms to comply with. This compels listed firms to depict some of the key features 
of both the ‘shareholding’ and ‘stakeholding’ models of corporate governance. The main 
assumption underlying the ‘hybrid’ or ‘inclusive’ corporate governance model is that a firm 
should attempt to recognise the interests of a wider group of stakeholders without subverting 
the primary interests of shareholders as the residual owners of the firm. The terms ‘hybrid’, 
‘inclusive’ and ‘integrated’ will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
 ‘JSE Ltd’ or the ‘JSE’ is the name of the stock exchange in South Africa. It is the only 
stock market in South Africa. The abbreviation ‘SA’ will refer to the country, ‘South Africa’. 
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The term ‘King I’ will  refer to the 1994 King Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa, whilst ‘King II’ will refer to the 2002 King Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa. 
Finally, in this study, the corporate governance-financial performance relationship will 
be examined via two models: the compliance-index and the equilibrium-variable models.  In 
the case of the compliance-index model, corporate governance will be proxied by a 
compliance index, consisting of 50 corporate governance provisions based on the 2002 King 
Report on Corporate Governance  for South Africa (‘King II’), known as the South African 
Corporate Governance Index (the SACGI).  
The SACGI will further be split into two: the Social-SACGI and the Economic-SACGI. 
The Social-SACGI will contain 9 South African context specific affirmative action and 
stakeholder corporate governance provisions that are imposed on listed firms by King II. The 
Economic-SACGI will contain 41 conventional corporate governance provisions that are 
imposed on firms by King II. The relationships between the SACGI, the Social-SACGI and 
the Economic-SACGI and firm financial performance will then be investigated. 
With respect to the equilibrium-variable model, corporate governance will be proxied 
by 11 individual corporate governance variables, including board diversity, board size, role or 
CEO duality, the percentage of non-executive directors, the frequency of board meetings, the 
establishment of key board committees (namely, audit, nomination, and remuneration 
committees) and director shareownership. To replicate the statistically significant non-linear 
relationship between director shareownership and financial performance reported by Morck et 
al. (1988), director shareownership will further be squared and cubed. The association 
between these 11 single corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial performance 
will then be analysed.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis generally seeks to explore the relationship between internal corporate 
governance structures and firm financial performance. Specifically, using a sample of 100 
South African listed firms from 2002 to 2006 (a total of 500 firm-year observations), the thesis 
hopes to achieve five main objectives. First, the thesis attempts to assess the levels of 
compliance with the corporate governance provisions of the 2002 King Report on Corporate 
Governance for South Africa (‘King II’) among South African listed firms. Second, the study 
seeks to ascertain whether, on average, better-governed South African listed firms tend to be 
associated with higher financial returns than their poorly-governed counterparts. Specifically, 
it investigates whether better-governed firms based on the equilibrium-variable and 
compliance-index models will be associated with higher financial performance. Third, the 
thesis hopes to investigate the economic consequences of complying with the South African 
context specific affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions for South 
African listed firms. Fourth, the study intends to examine whether methodological choice can 
potentially influence research findings. Finally, the thesis seeks to assess the impact that the 
potential presence of endogeneity problems may have on research findings. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.1 briefly summarises the 
recent corporate governance reforms pursued in SA (South Africa) as a background to the 
study. Section 1.2 sets out the major motivations for the study. Section 1.3 summarises the 
research questions and contributions of the study. Finally, section 1.4 presents how the 
remaining nine chapters of the thesis are organised, as well as a summary of the content of 
each of the nine chapters.  
 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND: RECENT CORORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN SA 
 
 As will be discussed further in chapter three, South Africa underwent extensive social, 
economic and political reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s. An important part of the 
economic reform was an attempt to improve the way in which companies are governed. 
Domestic efforts at reforming corporate governance in South Africa also coincided with 
international attempts at enhancing the efficacy of corporate governance structures around the 
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world (e.g., Rossouw et al., 2002; Armstrong et al., 2006; West, 2006, 2009). These 
international attempts at reforming corporate governance had been preceded by well-
publicised cases of major corporate collapse mainly in a number of developed economies in 
the 1980s, especially in the UK and US (Barrier, 2003, p.73; Mallin, 2006, p.4, 2007, p.2). 
There were widespread suspicions that poor corporate governance practices had played a 
central role in causing these corporate failures (Cadbury Report, 1992, para. 1.9; Jones and 
Pollitt, 2004). The UK, for example, responded by establishing the Cadbury Committee in 
1991 and the publication of its recommendations of best corporate governance practices for 
UK listed firms in 1992.  
With increasing domestic and international interests in corporate governance, the King 
Committee on Corporate Governance was formed in 1992 as a voluntary initiative at the 
instigation of the Southern African Institute of Directors (Rossouw et al., 2002, p.296). The 
main purpose of the King Committee (named after its chair, Mervyn King), was to consider 
how to promote the highest standards of corporate governance in South Africa (King Report, 
2002, p.5).  
The King Committee published its final report in November 1994. In general, and as 
will be discussed in detail in chapter three, the 1994 King Report (hereafter also known as 
‘King I’) adopted many of the corporate governance standards and principles that had already 
been advocated in a plethora of national and international codes that were already in existence 
(e.g., Rossouw et al., 2002; Armstrong et al., 2006; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). In 
particular, the recommendations of the report were heavily informed by those of the UK’s 
Cadbury Report of 1992, especially regarding its suggestions on internal corporate governance 
structures (West, 2006, p.435, 2009, p.11). Principally, and in line with the influential 
Cadbury Report, King I adopted an Anglo-American style unitary board of directors, 
consisting of executive and non-executive directors, who are primarily accountable to 
shareholders. In addition, South African firms were required to split the roles of chairman and 
CEO, set-up audit and remuneration committees, and their boards must at least consist of two 
non-executive directors.  
Unlike the Cadbury Report, however, King I advocated for an ‘integrated’ approach to 
corporate governance (Barrier, 2003, p.69). It also went beyond the Cadbury Report’s main 
principles of accountability, integrity and openness to include fairness and responsibility, 
giving it a stakeholder rather than a shareholder orientation (e.g., West, 2006, 2009). This 
means that firms should go beyond the conventional financial and regulatory aspects of 
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corporate governance to taking into consideration the interests of a wider group of 
stakeholders (King Report, 2002, para. 5). Crucially, and in line with the Cadbury Report, 
King I was appended to the JSE’s Listing Rules in which listed firms were voluntarily 
expected to ‘comply’ with its provisions or ‘explain’ in case(s) of non-compliance (Armstrong 
et al., 2006, p.214).   
As will be evaluated in detail in chapter three, despite arguably formally 
institutionalising corporate governance in South Africa, and being instrumental in raising 
public consciousness about good corporate governance practices (Malherbe and Segal, 2003, 
p.193; Armstrong et al., 2006, p.215), King I was reviewed in 2002 for three main reasons. 
Firstly, King I was criticised for its own apparent weaknesses. For example, it was criticised 
for not enhancing the independence of corporate boards by abandoning the requirement for 
non-executive directors to be independent of management (Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.193). 
More importantly, King I was criticised for failing to directly and firmly relate its 
recommendations to the major South African contextual stakeholder issues of HIV/Aids, black 
economic empowerment, employment equity, and the enviroment (Rossouw et al., 2002, 
p.300; Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.195). 
Secondly, and domestically, a number of affirmative action and stakeholder laws had 
been passed since 1994, and needed to be incorporated into the governance of mainstream 
corporations (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabase, 2002, p.308). These included the Labour 
Relations Act 1995, the Employment Equity Act 1998, and the Black Economic 
Empowerment Act 2003, amongst others. They had been proposed by King I and were aimed 
at addressing the negative social and economic legacies of Apartheid (Murray, 2000, p.183; 
Swartz and Firer, 2005, pp.147, 158). In addition to legislative developments, South Africa 
had experienced a number of high profile domestic corporate failures since 1994. These 
included Macmed, Leisurenet, and Regal Treasury Bank (Sarra, 2004, p.10; Armstrong et al., 
2006, p.215). These corporate failures were mainly attributed to poor corporate governance 
practices among directors and senior management.  
Finally, and internationally, investors had lost billions of dollars during the 1997 and 
1998 Asian economic crisis. The crisis demonstrated that macro-economic difficulties could 
be worsened by systematic failure of corporate governance resulting from ineffective 
oversight by corporate boards and scant recognition of the rights of minority shareowners 
(King Report, 2002, para. 22). Also, during the intervening years, a number of key 
international corporate governance codes had been released. In the UK, the Combined Code 
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had been published in 1998. Similarly, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) that seeks to 
move corporate reporting from a conventional ‘single-bottom line’ (i.e., economic) to a ‘triple 
bottom line’ (i.e., economic, social and environmental) reporting had been published in 2000 
(King Report, 2002, p.275). Ostensibly, King I needed to be reviewed in the light of domestic 
and international developments since 1994. 
In response to these developments, and again under the auspices of the Southern 
African Institute of Directors, a second King Committee on Corporate Governance (hereafter 
also called ‘King II’) was formed in August 2000. The Committee published its 
recommendations in March 2002. Unlike King I, King II is comprehensive in the coverage of 
corporate governance issues, including: board and directors; risk management; internal audit; 
integrated sustainability reporting; accounting and auditing; and compliance and enforcement.  
Specifically, it builds on and expands King I’s fundamental corporate governance 
principles of accountability, fairness, responsibility and transparency to include discipline, 
independence and social responsibility (King Report, 2002, para.18). It also replaces King I’s 
‘integrated’ corporate governance approach with an ‘inclusive or instrumental’ corporate 
governance approach throughout the report (King Report, 2002, para. 5). As will be discussed 
further in chapter two, the ‘inclusive’ approach to corporate governance attempts to recognise 
the interests of a wider range of stakeholders without subverting the primary interests of 
shareholders as the residual owners of the firm.  
Specifically, and as will also be explained in detail in chapter three, while King II 
maintains and strengthens the Anglo-American features of King I, it explicitly super-imposes 
substantial affirmative action and stakeholder demands, such as HIV/Aids, black economic 
empowerment, and employment equity on firms to comply with. This compels South African 
firms to depict some of the key features of both the ‘shareholding’ (Anglo-American) and 
‘stakeholding’ (Continental European-Asian) models of corporate governance.  
Arguably, this makes the South African corporate governance model unique or a 
‘hybrid’ (Andreasson, 2009, pp.12, 18-27). In fact, King II has gained international 
recognition and received several endorsements from leading academics and policy-makers as 
an example of good corporate governance model in the world (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2006; 
Mallin, 2007; Andreasson, 2009; and West, 2006, 2009, amongst others). Mallin (2007, p.248), 
for example, states that “South Africa has a well-developed corporate governance code. In 
fact, its revised Code published in 2002 is the most comprehensive in the world, and leading 
edge in terms of its outlook and recommendations”. In line with Cadbury and King I, King II 
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has been appended to the JSE’s Listing Rules (JSE Listings Rules, 2007, subsections 3.84, 
7.F.5-6, 8.63). Listed firms are similarly expected to voluntarily ‘comply’ with its provisions 
or ‘explain’ in case(s) of non-compliance. 
 
 
1.2 THE MOTIVATION, PROBLEM AND THE NEED FOR THE STUDY 
 
The current study on South Africa is motivated by three major reasons. Firstly, and as 
has been briefly described above, South Africa arguably offers an interesting research context 
where the corporate governance-financial performance association can be empirically 
examined. Specifically, the South African corporate environment shares some level of 
similarities and differences with the UK corporate context.  
On the one hand, and unlike most African countries, South Africa appears to possess a 
relatively sound financial and corporate regulatory structure reminiscent of that of the UK. For 
example, and like the UK (see Mallin, 2006, pp.3 to 9 for a quick review of how corporate 
governance has evolved in the UK from the 1992 Cadbury Report to the 2005 Company Law 
Reform Bill), corporate governance seems to be fluidly developing. As has been explained 
above, a formal code of corporate governance was first introduced in November 1994 (King I), 
first reviewed in March 2002 (King II), and a second review is expected to be completed in 
July 2010 (King III) (Andreasson, 2009, pp.14, 21; West, 2009, p.10). In fact, according to 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009, pp.379-380), South Africa was the sixth nation in the 
world (coming after the US, 1978; Hong Kong, 1989; Ireland, 1991; UK, 1992; and Canada, 
1993), and the first developing country to issue a code of good corporate governance.  
Similarly, the South African Companies Act 1973 has received several amendments to 
bring it up-to-date with international corporate governance practices (Armstrong et al., 2006, 
p.214). The Act is also currently being fully reviewed, and is similarly expected to be 
completed in 2010 to coincide with the publication of King III (Andreasson, 2009, pp.15-16, 
21). To achieve greater supervision and monitoring of insider trading, rigorous insider trading 
law, the Insider Trading Act 1998 has been introduced, and enforcement is being strengthened 
(Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.199; Armstrong et al., 2006, p.214). The JSE introduced more 
rigorous listing rules in 1995, and has carried out regular reviews in 2000, 2003, 2005 and 
2007 to bring them in line with international standards (Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.195; 
Armstrong et al., 2006, p.214).  
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Also, and unlike most African countries, South Africa has deep equity culture 
comparable with those of other emerging and developed economies (Deutsche Bank, 2002, p.7; 
Malherbe and Segal, 2003, pp.174-180). For instance, South Africa was ranked as the 6th 
largest emerging stock market, and 19th largest in the world by market capitalisation in 2007 
(WFE, 2008). Similarly, market capitalisation to GDP ratio in 2007 for South Africa was 
293%, and this compares with 139% and 113% for the UK and US (WFE, 2008), respectively. 
Arguably, these similarities with the UK offer exciting research context, where the corporate 
governance-financial performance nexus can be empirically investigated. 
On the other hand, and as will be explained further below, the South African corporate 
landscape depicts significant differences with the UK corporate environment. However, and as 
has been briefly discussed above, like most developing Commonwealth countries, corporate 
governance structures and principles have mainly been borrowed from the UK. This brings 
into question as to the applicability of some of these corporate governance mechanisms to the 
South African corporate context. It also implies that the relationship between internal 
corporate governance structures and firm financial performance can be expected to be 
different from what has been reported for UK listed firms.  
For example, and as has also been briefly explained above, while the South African 
corporate governance model is predominantly Anglo-American, King II formally imposes 
substantial affirmative action and stakeholder demands on listed firms to comply with. This 
raises an important local policy question of whether the current South African corporate 
governance (‘hybrid’) framework is sufficiently robust to effectively pursue the contrasting 
agenda of maximising shareholder returns and providing a meaningful protection of the 
interests of a larger stakeholder group (Kakabase and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002, p.313; Spisto, 
2005, p.84; Andreasson, 2009, p.1).  
Similarly, as an emerging market, ownership of firms is relatively concentrated. As 
will be discussed further in chapter seven, block shareownership in this study, for instance, 
ranges from 7% to 99% with an average of 60%. Director shareownership is also between 0% 
and 94% with a mean of 20%. Also, a study by Barr et al. (1995, p.18) indicates that the use of 
complex cross-shareholdings and pyramidical structures are pervasive among South African 
listed firms.  
By contrast, UK firms have relatively dispersed ownership structure. For example, a 
recent study by Florackis and Ozkan (2009, p.505) suggests that the average UK block 
ownership is 29%, whereas the mean UK director ownership is 9%. This is very similar to the 
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average block (29%) and director (3%) ownership levels reported by Shabbir and Padget 
(2005, p.14) for a sample of UK listed firms. 
As has been suggested by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006, p.1035), this implies that unlike 
the UK, the market for corporate control and managerial labour through which non-
performing companies and managers are expected to be disciplined may not be effective in 
South Africa.  Further, and as a developing country, South Africa has a weak record of 
implementing and enforcing corporate regulations (Armstrong, 2003, p.2; IIF, 2007, p.7). This 
also raises an important international policy debate (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009, 
p.376), as well as serious doubts as to whether the current UK-style self-regulation or 
voluntary compliance regime (‘comply or explain’) rather than the US-style mandatory regime 
(‘comply or else’) will be effective in improving corporate governance standards among South 
African listed firms. 
 Also, even though South Africa accounted for more than 80% of African total 
continental stock market capitalisation in 2007 (WFE, 2008), for instance, it is considerably 
smaller compared with the UK. Specifically, it has fewer numbers of listed firms, lower 
liquidity, and smaller, but concentrated total market capitalisation in relation to the UK. For 
example, there were 411 firms listed on the JSE with a total market capitalisation of about 
$828 billion, and a liquidity ratio of 51% in 2007 (WFE, 2008). By contrast, 3,307 firms were 
listed on the London Stock Exchange with a total market capitalisation of about $4 trillion, 
and a liquidity ratio of 268% in 2007 (WFE, 2008). This implies that the impact of 
conventional UK-style corporate governance mechanisms on the financial performance of 
South African listed firms may be different from UK listed firms. 
The second major motivation for the current study on South Africa is that unlike most 
African countries, it is home to some of the world’s largest multinationals. For example, 
Forbes (2009) ranking of the largest 2000 companies by market value in the world suggests 
that over 30 are based in South Africa. Further, on average, South African companies attract 
over $6 billion in foreign direct investments annually, mainly from large UK and US 
institutional investors and pension funds (Armstrong et al., 2006, p.212). This means that 
unlike most African countries, any corporate governance failures may have serious 
implications far beyond South Africa and Africa. 
The third and final major motivation for this study is that despite arguably offering 
exciting research context, there is a dearth of rigorous empirical research that attempts to 
ascertain whether better-governed South African listed firms tend to be associated with higher 
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financial returns than their poorly-governed counterparts (Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003, 
p.2; Okeahalam, 2004, p.360; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008, pp.28, 42). The paucity of 
rigorous empirical corporate governance studies on South Africa arguably offers opportunities 
to make contributions to the extant literature.  
However, there are a limited number of cross-country studies whose samples include a 
number of South African listed firms that need to be acknowledged. These studies are: 
Klapper and Love (2004); Durnev and Kim (2005); Chen et al. (2009); and Morey et al. 
(2009). Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005) have used Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia’s (CLSA) 2000 subjective analysts’ corporate governance ratings to examine 
the corporate governance-financial performance association in a sample of emerging markets 
that include South Africa. Chen et al. (2009) have also used the same CLSA subjective 
analysts’ corporate governance rankings to investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance and cost of equity capital. Similarly, using a cross country sample that includes 
South Africa, Morey et al. (2009) have analysed the nexus between the AllianceBernstein’s 
subjective analysts’ corporate governance ratings and firm value. The results of these studies 
suggest that, on average, better-governed firms tend to be associated with higher financial 
returns or tend to have significantly lower cost of equity capital than their poorly-governed 
counterparts. 
As will be discussed further in chapter four, however, all four prior cross-country 
studies arguably suffer from a number of limitations. First, all four prior studies make use of 
subjective analysts’ corporate governance ratings. A major problem with subjective analysts’ 
corporate governance rankings is that they are based purely on analysts’ perceptions of 
corporate governance quality rather than on a direct examination of company annual reports 
(Beattie et al. 2004, p.210). Their findings may, therefore, be considered to be of limited 
evidential value. 
Crucially, prior research suggests that subjective analysts’ corporate governance 
ratings tend to be biased towards large firms (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Hassan and Marston, 2008). 
The CLSA 2000 corporate governance rankings that has mainly been used by prior studies, for 
example, includes only nine of the largest South African listed firms (CLSA, 2000, p.13). 
Arguably, this makes the sample used by prior studies to be less representative, and thus limits 
the generalisation of their findings for South African listed firms.  
Second, and as will be discussed further in chapter two, the extant literature suggests 
that corporate governance structures and systems vary across different countries (West, 2006, 
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p.433; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009, p.383; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009, p.262). 
However, subjective analysts’ corporate governance rankings are standardised such that they 
are unable to reflect institutional, cultural, and contextual differences in corporate governance 
structures across individual countries and systems. This implies that they are unable to assess 
how compliance with the South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder 
corporate governance issues impact on the financial performance of South African listed firms. 
Finally, despite increasing concerns that the presence of endogenous problems can 
confound research findings (e.g., Himmelberg et al. 1999; Chenhall and Moers, 2007a and b), 
with the exception of Durnev and Kim (2005), prior cross-country studies that include South 
Africa do not explicitly address potential problems that may be caused by the existence of an 
endogenous relationship between corporate governance and financial performance. This also 
brings into doubt the reliability of the results of these prior cross-country studies that include 
South Africa. 
 
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS  
  
Therefore, given the similarities and differences between the South African and UK 
corporate environments as outlined above, but a paucity of empirical studies on South Africa, 
this thesis seeks to empirically answer the following research questions. First, what is the level 
of compliance with the corporate governance provisions of King II among South African 
listed firms? Second, what is the relationship between internal corporate governance structures 
and the financial performance of listed firms in South Africa? Specifically, what is the 
relationship between better-governed firms based on the equilibrium-variable and compliance-
index models and the financial performance of listed firms in South Africa? Third, how does 
compliance with the South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder 
corporate governance provisions impact on the financial performance of listed firms in South 
Africa? Fourth, what impact does the potential presence of endogeneity problems have on 
research findings? Finally, does the use of the equilibrium-variable model or the compliance-
index model have the potential to influence research findings?  
By addressing the above research questions, this thesis hopes to make several new 
contributions, as well as extensions to the extant corporate governance literature. First, using a 
sample of 100 South African listed firms from 2002 to 2006 (a total of 500 firm-year 
observations) and corporate governance data collected directly from company annual reports, 
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the study aims to offer for the first time direct evidence on the relationship between internal 
corporate governance structures and firm financial performance in South Africa.  
As will be explained further in chapters four and five, unlike prior cross-country 
studies, the sample will be constructed in such a way that there will be a balance between large 
and small firms. This may enhance the generalisation of the findings. Similarly, the 
compliance-index that will be used - the South African Corporate Governance Index (the 
SACGI) will incorporate conventional, as well as stakeholder corporate governance provisions 
that are unique to the South African corporate context. Consistent with the results of prior 
studies, the findings based on the compliance-index will indicate that there is a statistically 
significant and positive relationship between the quality of the sampled firms’ corporate 
governance and their financial performance. By contrast, the results based on the equilibrium-
variable model will indicate either a statistically weak or no relationship between the eleven 
single corporate governance structures and firm financial performance.  
Second, the study seeks to offer for the first time evidence on the economic 
consequences of complying with the affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance 
provisions for South African listed firms. Contrary to theoretical expectations, the findings 
will suggest that compliance with the affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance 
provisions (the Social-SACGI) impact positively on the financial returns of South African 
listed firms. Third, the Institute of International Finance (IIF) 2007 report on corporate 
governance practices in South Africa suggests that even though the King Code is voluntary, no 
study has been done to ascertain the levels of compliance among listed firms. Specifically, it 
states “…However, to date, no study has been conducted to assess the level of compliance 
with corporate governance-related requirements among listed companies or to verify the 
reasons for non-compliance”, (IIF, 2007, p.1). Similar concerns have also been expressed by 
Malherbe and Segal (2003, p.193). 
As will be discussed further in chapter six, this study aims to fill this gap in the 
existing literature by offering for the first time direct evidence on the levels of compliance 
with the corporate governance provisions recommended by King II among South African 
listed firms. Specifically, the findings will show that while compliance with the 
recommendations of King II has generally improved, substantial variations in corporate 
governance standards still exist among South African listed firms. The findings will indicate 
further that the differences in the levels of compliance with the corporate governance 
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provisons of King II among South African listed firms can largely be explained by firm size, 
and moderately by industry. 
Fourth, the study hopes to make for the first time a comparison of research findings 
based on estimating a compliance-index (the Economic-SACGI) model and equilibrium-
variable model. Generally, the results will suggest that methodological choice can potentially 
influence research findings with important implications for future research. Specifically, while 
the results that will be based on the compliance-index (the Economic-SACGI) model will be 
conclusive, those that will be based on the equilibrium-variable model will be conflicting. 
Finally, and unlike most prior studies, problems that the potential presence of endogeneity 
may cause will be comprehensively addressed in chapter nine.  
These include estimating: a lagged corporate governance-financial performance 
structure; an instrumental variable model; a two-stage least squares model; and a changes 
model. This will arguably improve the reliability of the findings. The results from these 
sensitivity analyses that will be discussed in chapter nine will suggest that the findings that 
have been reported in chapter eight are generally robust to potential endogenity problems.   
 
 
1.4 THESIS ORGANISATION 
 
 The rest of the thesis is divided into nine chapters and organised as follows. As has 
been explained above, the study focuses on the impact of internal corporate governance 
structures on the financial performance of South African listed firms. However, corporate 
governance is broad. Chapter two will, therefore, seek to offer a working definition of 
corporate governance. As has been briefly described above, the current South African 
corporate governance framework possesses some of the features of both the ‘shareholding’ 
(Anglo-American) and ‘stakeholding’ (Continental European-Asian) models of corporate 
governance. Therefore, to facilitate a better appreciation of the South African corporate 
governance model, the chapter will also explore legitimate differences, such as theoretical 
assumptions, major features, and weaknesses between the ‘shareholding’ and ‘stakeholding’ 
corporate governance models. 
 Chapter three will contain a description and where applicable, a review of the South 
African corporate governance framework. Specifically, the external corporate governance 
environment and some of the challenges facing the regulatory system will first be briefly 
presented. The internal corporate governance landscape will then be described in detail. These 
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will include the South African Companies Act 1973, the Insider Trading Act 1998, the JSE’s 
2007 Listings Rules, as well as the 1994 (King I) and 2002 (King II) King Reports on 
Corporate Governance for South Africa. For each of these internal corporate governance 
legislation or code, and where applicable, its origins, corporate governance provisions, 
strengths, weaknesses and challenges will be comprehensively discussed. 
 A review of the theoretical and empirical internal corporate governance-financial 
performance relationship literature will be carried out in chapter four. Specifically, the chapter 
will be divided into two main parts. In the first part, a discussion of existing theories that 
attempt to link internal corporate governance structures to firm financial performance will be 
carried out. Recognising the often complex and multi-disciplinary nature of corporate 
governance (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009, pp.258-260), a multiple theoretical perspective will 
be adopted in constructing and explaining the complex relationship between internal corporate 
governance structures and firm financial performance. Similarly, much of the prior studies on 
the internal corporate governance-financial performance association have been conducted 
around agency theory (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009, p.258). Agency theory will, therefore, be 
adopted as the main theoretical framework for the study. However, and in line with recent 
calls (e.g., van Ees et al., 2009; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009), where appropriate, agency 
theory will be supplemented with information asymmetry and managerial signalling, 
stewardship, organisational, political cost, and resource dependence theories. 
The second part of chapter four will contain a discussion of the extant empirical 
literature that seeks to link internal corporate governance structures with firm financial 
performance. The discussion will centre on two main models: the equilibrium-variable and the 
compliance-index models. Under the equilibrium-variable model, the prior literature on 11 
corporate governance variables, including board diversity, board size, role or CEO duality, the 
percentage of non-executive directors, the frequency of board meetings, the establishment of 
key board committees (namely, audit, nomination, and remuneration committees), director 
shareownership, director shareownership squared, and cubed will be discussed. For each 
variable, the extant theoretical literature will first be discussed, followed by a review of the 
prior empirical literature. Hypotheses will then finally be developed on the basis of the review 
for each variable.  
With regard to the compliance-index model, prior studies that have examined the 
corporate governance-financial performance nexus using compliance or composite corporate 
governance indices will be discussed.  The South African Corporate Governance Index (the 
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SACGI) that will be used in this study contains 50 corporate governance provisions from the 
2002 (King II) Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa. Also, on the basis of the 
review, hypothesis eight will be developed for the SACGI. In chapter eight, the SACGI will 
further be split into Social-SACGI and Economic-SACGI. The Social-SACGI will contain 9 
affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions that are unique to the 
South African corporate context, while the Economic-SACGI will be made up 41 conventional 
corporate governance provisions.  
The review will indicate that irrespective of the context or model, the empirical 
literature is generally mixed. However, it will indicate that the mixed evidence is more 
pronounced with regard to the equilibrium-variable model than the compliance-index model. 
Also, it will show that whereas the compliance-index model literature is quite advanced in the 
US, the non-US evidence is very limited apparently due to lack of sufficient data. The 
literature regarding South Africa and Africa is virtually non-existent. It will, however, be 
argued that the dearth of prior empirical studies also offers an opportunity to make substantial 
contributions to the extant literature.  
Chapter five will discuss the research design, namely the sources of data and 
methodology that will be applied in the empirical parts of the thesis. As at 31/12/2006 when 
the data collection began, a total of 402 firms from 10 major industries were officially listed 
on the main board of the JSE. For regulatory and capital structure reasons, financial and utility 
firms will be excluded, leaving a total 291 firms to be sampled from 2002 (when King II first 
became applicable) to 2006 (when data collection first began). Firm-level corporate 
governance data will be collected from annual reports. Using the perfect information database 
and direct contacts, complete annual reports will be obtained for 169 firms from 2002 to 2006. 
One hundred (100) firms will be stratify sampled from 2002 to 2006 (a total of 500 firm-year 
observations) based on firm size and industry. Corresponding financial performance data will 
be collected from DataStream. 
Two models, the equilibrium-variable and the compliance-index models will be 
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression technique. Under the equilibrium-
variable model, the 11 corporate governance variables mentioned above will be estimated 
separately to explain two financial performance proxies, namely Tobin’s Q (a market based 
measure), and return on assets (an accounting based measure). The rationale for using two 
financial performance proxies will be to ascertain the robustness of the findings to both 
accounting (insiders like managers) and market (outsiders like investors) based measures of 
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financial performance. With respect to the compliance-index model, the SACGI containing 50 
corporate governance provisions (the provision will be binary scored such that the presence of 
an item is assigned a value of ‘1’ or ‘0’ otherwise) will also be estimated to separately explain 
Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio) and return on assets (ROA).  
To control for potential omitted variables bias, eight control variables, including firm 
size, capital structure, sales growth, capital expenditure, audit firm size, dual-listing, industry, 
and year dummies will be introduced in estimating both the equilibrium-variable and the 
compliance-index models. The robustness or sensitivity of the results to the potential presence 
of endogeneity problems will be addressed by estimating: a lagged corporate governance-
financial performance structure; an instrumental variable model; a two-stage least squares 
model; and a changes model. Finally, the chapter will discuss methodological limitations and 
data collection difficulties encountered in this study. These limitations will be discussed 
further in chapter 9. 
Chapter six will analyse the levels of compliance with the South African Corporate 
Governance Index (the SACGI) among the sampled firms. For the 50 individual corporate 
governance provisions, it will show that there are variations in the levels of compliance in 48 
(96%) of them. At the aggregate level, it will indicate that the corporate governance scores 
range from a minimum of 3 (6%) to a maximum of 49 (98%) with the average sampled firm 
complying with 30 (60%) of the 50 corporate governance provisions that will be examined. 
Further examination of the corporate governance scores will suggest that the variation in the 
levels of compliance can largely be explained by firm size, and moderately by industry. 
Analysis of the levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI (the nine South Africa context 
specific affirmative action and stakeholder provisions) will also indicate considerable amount 
of variability in the levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI. The aggregate scores will 
range from 0% (0 out of 9) to a maximum of 100% (9 out of 9) with the average sampled firm 
complying with 67% of the 9 South African context specific affirmative action and 
stakeholder provisions that will be investigated. 
Chapter seven will contain descriptive statistics, as well as test the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) assumptions. The chapter will be divided into two main parts. The first part of 
the chapter will present summary descriptive statistics of the dependent (financial 
performance), independent (corporate governance), and other independent (control) variables. 
Since OLS multivariate regression technique is used to test all the hypotheses that will be 
discussed in chapters four and five, the second part of chapter seven will test the OLS 
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assumptions of multicollinearity, autocorrelation, normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity. 
The analyses will generally indicate that there are no serious violations of the OLS 
assumptions, and thus statistically appropriate to carry out OLS regressions. 
Chapter eight will present the empirical results. The empirical results based on the 
equilibrium-variable model will first be discussed, followed by an analysis of the results based 
on the compliance-index model. For each model, results based on the accounting measure 
(ROA) of financial performance will first be presented, followed by results based on the 
market measure (Q-ratio) of performance. A comparison of the results based on the 
equilibrium-variable and compliance-index models will then be made. 
The results based on the compliance-index model will indicate that regardless of the 
financial performance measure used, there is a statistically significant and positive relationship 
between the quality of the sampled firms’ internal corporate governance (the SACGI) and their 
financial performance. Similarly, the results will suggest that irrespective of the financial 
performance proxy used, compliance with the South African context specific affirmative 
action and stakeholder provisions (the Social-SACGI) has a statistically significant and 
positive impact on the financial fortunes of the sampled firms.  
By contrast, the results based on the equilibrium-variable model will generally be 
mixed. Regardless of the financial performance measure used, board diversity, the frequency 
of board meetings, and the establishment of board committees except the presence of a 
nomination committee will seem to have no impact on firm financial performance. Board size 
will be statistically significant and positively associated with the Q-ratio, but statistically 
insignificantly and negatively related to ROA. Third, role or CEO duality will be statistically 
significant and positively related to ROA, but statistically insignificant and negatively 
associated with the Q-ratio. Director shareownership will be statistically insignificant and 
positively related to ROA, but statistically significant and negatively associated with the Q-
ratio. Finally, the findings based on both the director shareownership squared and cubed will 
not support the statistically significant non-linear director shareownership-financial 
performance association reported by Morck et al. (1988). 
Chapter nine will report results based on the robustness or sensitivity analyses. 
Specifically, the robustness or sensitivity of the results to the potential presence of 
endogeneity problems will be addressed by estimating: a lagged corporate governance-
financial performance structure; an instrumental variable model; a two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) model; and a changes model. The results based on a lagged corporate governance-
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financial performance structure and an instrumental variable model will suggest that the 
findings that have been presented in chapter eight are generally robust to the presence of any 
potential endogeneity problems. The results based on the two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
model will offer evidence of a statistically significant interdependences among alternative 
corporate governance mechanisms, as well as between the financial performance proxies and 
the corporate governance structures. Finally, the robustness or sensitivity results based on the 
changes model will generally suggest that an increase (a decrease) in the sampled firms’ 
corporate governance standards will be associated with a positive, but a statistically 
insignificant increase (decrease) in their reported financial performance.  
Chapter ten will present the conclusions of the thesis. Specifically, it will offer a 
summary of the key research findings and a discussion of the policy implications, 
recommendations, contributions, limitations, as well as potential avenues for future research 
and improvements. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
DEFINING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
 
2. INTRODUCTION 
 
 This chapter attempts to define corporate governance. Its central aim is to offer a 
working definition of corporate governance in addition to discussing the major corporate 
governance models found within the extant international governance literature and context. 
The main rationale is to paint the broader international corporate governance picture within 
which the South African corporate governance framework that will subsequently be discussed 
in chapter three can be better appreciated. The remainder of this chapter is organised as 
follows. Section 2.1 offers a working definition of corporate governance. Section 2.2 reviews 
the main corporate governance models as found within the international literature and context, 
while section 2.3 summarises the chapter. 
  
 
2.1 DEFINING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
The last three decades has seen the term ‘corporate governance’ emerged clearly as an 
independent field of study (e.g., Keasey et al., 1997; Denis, 2001). Its scope has also 
witnessed great expansion such that it is now an amalgam of different disciplines, including 
accounting, economics, ethics, finance, law, management, organisational behaviour, and 
politics, among others, with no universally accepted definition (Rwegasira, 2000, p.258; 
Mallin, 2007, p.11; Solomon, 2007, p.12). As a corollary, there exists a large number of 
definitions of corporate governance (e.g., Cadbury Report, 1992; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Denis and McConnell, 2003; OECD, 1999, 2004; and Solomon, 2007, amongst others).  
Despite the existence of heterogeneous definitions, however, researchers frequently 
classify the existing corporate governance definitions as either ‘narrow’ or ‘broad’. As a 
prelude, the narrow-broad dichotomisation is based on the extent to which a corporate 
governance regime essentially focuses on satisfying the parochial interests’ of shareholders 
(Sternberg, 2004, p.28; West, 2006, p.434) or meeting the broader interests of diverse societal 
stakeholder groups (Letza et al., 2004, p.243; Gillan, 2006, p.382). 
For example, corporate governance has narrowly been defined as “…the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”, 
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(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.737). This view considers a corporation as an extension of its 
owners, with a central aim of providing goods or services to customers, primarily to maximise 
the wealth of its owners (West, 2006, p.433). The Cadbury Report (1992, s.2.5) also narrowly 
defines corporate governance as being concerned with the “system by which companies are 
directed and controlled”. Similarly, it has been defined as “a system whereby directors are 
entrusted with responsibilities and duties in relation to the direction of a company’s affairs”, 
(Sheikh and Chatterjee, 1995, p.5) or “ways of ensuring that corporate actions, agents and 
assets are directed at achieving the corporate objective established by the corporation’s 
shareholders”, (Sternberg, 2004, p.28).  
These definitions suggest that in order to maximise the wealth of owners, three key 
corporate governance structures of the corporation emerge, namely; a general assembly of 
shareholders, a board of directors, and an executive management (Letza et al., 2004, p.243; 
West, 2006, p.434). In this case, the corporation is primarily accountable to shareholders, and 
as such they have the power to appoint directors and to satisfy themselves that the right 
governance mechanisms have been instituted (Cadbury Report, 1992, s.2.5; Rossouw et al., 
2002, p.290).  
Also, and at least in theory, the shareholders have the power to reject decisions of the 
board or remove them from office in a general meeting.  By contrast, the board of directors’ 
has the responsibility to ensure that the company is properly governed. These responsibilities 
include setting the company’s strategic aims, appointing or firing the management team, 
supervising the management team and reporting to the owners of the company on their 
stewardship (Cadbury Report, 1992, s.2.5; Rossouw et al., 2002, p.290).  
In short, a governance structure of a firm is considered as ‘narrow’ if it mainly 
concentrates on how key internal governance mechanisms interact to maximise its value 
primarily for the benefit of shareholders instead of enhancing the interests of other potential 
stakeholder, like customers, employees, creditors, suppliers and the local community, amongst 
others.   
Contributing to the foreword of the World Bank Report (1999, p.vii), Sir Adrian 
Cadbury defines corporate governance broadly as being “…concerned with holding the 
balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals…the 
aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations, and society”. 
Similarly, the OECD (2004, p.11) broadly defines corporate governance as “…a set of 
relationships between a company’s board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. It also 
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provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives, and monitoring performance, are determined” or “…the system of 
checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensures that companies 
discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in 
all areas of their business activity”, (Solomon and Solomon, 2004, p.14).  
These definitions imply that corporate governance goes beyond the immediate internal 
corporate structures to include external corporate governance mechanisms and stakeholders 
(OECD, 2004, p.12; Gillan, 2006, p.382; Mallin, 2007, 11). Typically, and as has been 
explained above, internal corporate governance structures may include the general assembly of 
shareholders, the board of directors, and the executive management. By contrast, the external 
corporate governance mechanisms may consist of the legal system, the market for managerial 
labour and corporate control, regulators, local communities, cultural, political, social and 
economic policies, and institutions within which corporations operate. 
In this case, the corporation is considered to be a social entity that has accountability 
and responsibility to a variety of stakeholders, encompassing shareowners, creditors, suppliers, 
customers, employees, management, government and the local community (Freeman and Reed, 
1983, p.89; West, 2006, p.434; Mallin, 2007, p.50). The aim of corporate governance is to 
facilitate the efficient use of resources by reducing fraud and mismanagement with the view 
not only to maximise, but also to align the often conflicting interests of all stakeholders 
(Cadbury, 1999, p.vii; King Report, 2002, p.5). 
In brief, and in contrast to the ‘narrow’ characterisation, a ‘broad’ corporate 
governance structure’s central pre-occupation is to examine how both external and internal 
governance mechanisms can be run to maximise firm value and/or performance for the mutual 
benefit of shareholders and other potential stakeholders. 
As a corollary, the extant literature has mainly theorised or described corporate 
governance in terms of these two presumably diametrically opposing models: the ‘narrow’ 
and ‘broad’ models (e.g., Rossouw et al., 2002; Agle et al., 2008). A ‘narrow’ corporate 
governance structure is also usually referred to as ‘shareholding’ because it considers 
companies to be primarily responsible and accountable to their shareholders. By contrast, a 
‘broad’ corporate governance structure is also normally called ‘stakeholding’ because it 
perceives firms to be responsible and accountable to all stakeholders of whom shareowners are 
merely one.   
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Of crucial note, the models have country and legal origins. Specifically, it has been 
suggested that the ‘shareholding’ model tends to be common in Anglo-American countries, 
such as the UK and US with common law origin, whilst the ‘stakeholding’ corporate 
governance structure is usually found in Continental Europe and Asia, like Germany and 
Japan with civil or Scandinavian law origin (Mallin, 2006, p.2; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2009, p.379). Further, and as will be discussed further below, the extant literature suggests that 
the two corporate governance models are based on legitimate differences in theoretical 
assumptions, major features, solutions and weaknesses (e.g., Weimer and Pape, 1999; Letza et 
al., 2004; Andreasson, 2009).  
South Africa arguably presents a unique corporate governance framework. Historically, 
South Africa has an Anglo-American or a common law origin (La Porta et al., 1998, p.1130; 
Mallin, 2007, p.249), with predominantly ‘shareholding’ corporate governance structures 
(Armstrong et al., 2006, p.210; West, 2009, p.11). However, and as will be explained further 
in subsection 3.3.2 of chapter three, recent corporate governance reforms (i.e., the 1994 and 
2002 King Reports) attempt to formally super-impose a number of affirmative action and 
stakeholder demands on listed firms. This has compelled listed firms to depict almost in equal 
measure, some of the major characteristics of both the ‘shareholding’ and ‘stakeholding’ 
corporate governance models (e.g., Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Spisto, 2005). 
Chapter three will also provide a detailed overview of the South African corporate 
governance framework and context. The subsequent subsections of this chapter will, therefore, 
explore apparent legitimate differences between the ‘shareholding’ and ‘stakeholding’ 
corporate governance models. The rationale is to aid a better appreciation of some of the 
specific South African corporate governance provisions, as well as the broader South African 
corporate governance framework that will subsequently be discussed in chapter three. 
 
 
2.2 THE MAIN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS 
 
This section discusses the main corporate governance models within the extant 
literature: the ‘shareholding’ and ‘stakeholding’ models. Specifically, the general theoretical 
assumptions, characteristics, solutions and weaknesses of the ‘shareholding’ and 
‘stakeholding’ models will be discussed. Table 1 below contains a summary of the theoretical 
assumptions, features and solutions underlying the ‘shareholding’ and ‘stakeholding’ models 
of corporate governance. For brevity and comparability purposes, they have been put together 
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and so will be referred to throughout the rest of the chapter. Subsection 2.2.1 will first 
examine the ‘shareholding’ model, whilst subsection 2.2.2 will present the ‘stakeholding’ 
model.  Also, for each model, the underlying theoretical assumptions, major features and 
proposed solutions will first be described. This will be followed immediately by an 
examination of their respective weaknesses as found within the extant literature. 
 
2.2.1 The Shareholding Model of Corporate Governance 
 
2.2.1.1 Theoretical Assumptions, Features, and Solutions of the Shareholding Model 
 
 To begin with, and as Table 1 shows, the shareholding corporate governance model is 
usually common in the UK, US and other commonwealth countries. Central to the 
shareholding corporate governance model is the doctrine of shareholder value and primacy 
(Schwartz, 1983, p.53). It suggests that a firm must be run to primarily advance the interests of 
its owners. This is based on a basic assumption that ownership is separate from control in an 
Anglo-American model (see Table 1; Berle and Means, 1932). That is, in this corporate 
governance system, the providers of capital (owners/shareholders) surrender the day-to-day 
management (control) of the business to a group of managers consisting of a ‘unitary’ board of 
directors and executive management, who are frequently not owners of the corporation 
themselves. Of close relevance is that through multiplicity of shareholders, ownership in this 
corporate governance model is quite often relatively widely diffused (see Table 1; Berle and 
Means, 1932).  
A major implication from dispersed ownership is that the power of shareholders to 
exercise control over the way their business is run is greatly impaired (see Table 1; Blair, 1995; 
La Porta et al., 1998). This raises serious agency problems (see Table 1; Letza et al., 2004), 
which is the central theoretical framework that underpins this thesis, and will be discussed in 
detail in chapter four. Briefly, however, the agency theory suggests that since shareholders 
(principals) have to delegate the control of their business to a few directors and managers 
(agents) to run the company on their behalf, there is a potential risk that directors and 
managers will pursue their own interests to the detriment of the eventual owners – 
shareholders (e.g., Smith, 1776; Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is 
also based on the premise that managers are both opportunistic and rational such that, on 
average, they are more likely to pursue their self-interests than those of shareholders (see 
Table 1; Weimer and Pape, 1999). 
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Table 1: Summary of the Theoretical Assumptions of the Shareholding and  
               Stakeholding Models of Corporate Governance 
Summary Shareholding Model Stakeholding Model 
Theoretical Assumptions: 
Purpose of corporation 
 
Problem of governance 
 
Cause of problem 
 
Background 
 
Assumptions about causation 
 
Type of economic organisation 
 
Proposition 
 
Rejection 
 
Source of discipline 
 
Major Features: 
Board structure 
 
 
Major source of finance 
 
Role of capital markets 
 
Role of banks 
 
Ownership concentration 
 
Regulatory orientation 
 
Legal system/origin 
 
 
Time horizon of economic 
benefits 
 
Major Solutions: 
Solution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maximisation of shareholder  
     Value. 
Agency problem. 
 
Shareholders do not have  
     enough control. 
Separation of ownership and  
     control. 
Self-interest human behaviour 
 
Rational economic unit with  
     profit motive. 
Market efficiency of economy. 
 
Any external interventions. 
 
External market forces. 
 
 
One-tier (executive and non- 
     executive board). 
 
Equity from the capital markets. 
 
High.  
 
Low. 
 
Low/Diffused. 
 
Self-regulation. 
 
Common law/Anglo-American: 
     UK, US/Commonwealth. 
 
Short-term 
 
 
 
 
Removing restrictions on  
     markets. Strengthening the   
     incentive system. Introduc- 
     ing a voluntary code of  
     governance. Introduction of  
     a combination of efficient  
     contracts. 
 
Maximisation of all  
     stakeholders' wealth. 
Absence of stakeholders’  
     participation. 
Governance failure to represent  
     stakeholders’ interests. 
Different style of capitalism. 
 
Traditional mentality of private  
     capitalism. 
Social economic unit with   
     stakeholder welfare motive. 
Social efficiency of economy. 
 
The principal-agent model. 
 
Internal social forces. 
 
 
Two-tier (executive and  
     supervisory boards). 
 
Debt from banks. 
 
Low. 
 
High. 
 
High/concentrated. 
 
Statutory regulation. 
 
Civil law/Continental Europe: 
     France, Germany and Japan. 
 
Long-term 
 
 
 
 
Trust and long-term contractual  
     associations between the  
     firm and stakeholders. Inter- 
     firm co-operation. Employee  
     participation. Introducing  
     business ethics. 
Sources: Compiled from Keasey et al., (1997); Weimer and Pape (1999); Letza et al., (2004).  
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In response, the shareholding model offers several solutions to the agency problem. 
Firstly, it suggests that restrictions on factor markets must be removed to encourage 
competition (Letza et al., 2004, p.246). Secondly, it calls for the introduction of a voluntary 
corporate governance code of ethics and conduct, which is usually underpinned by the 
universal business principles of accountability, discipline, fairness, independence, 
responsibility, and transparency to regulate director and managerial behaviour (see Table 1; 
Cadbury Report, 1992; King Report, 2002). Thirdly, it recommends the strengthening of the 
managerial incentive system by instituting performance-linked executive compensation 
schemes to help align shareholder-managerial interests (e.g., Weimer and Pape, 1999; King 
Report, 2002). Finally, it calls for the introduction of efficient contracts to govern the 
relationship between owners of capital and labour (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Letza et 
al., 2004).  
By contrast, the shareholding model rejects external interventions and additional 
obligations imposed on corporations by government and central authorities because it may 
distort free market operations (see Table 1; Hart, 1995). Rather, it sees a firm’s existing 
governance arrangements as the outcome of a bargaining process, which has been freely 
entered into by corporate insiders and outsiders (Keasey et al., 1997, p.3). More specifically, 
as a rational economic model, it assumes that factor markets (e.g., capital, managerial labour 
and corporate control) are efficient and subsequently, self-regulation backed by additional 
voluntary mechanisms, such as a voluntary corporate governance code are more effective in 
reducing divergent activities of managers (see Table 1; Keasey et al., 1997; Letza et al., 2004). 
The rejection of external interventions by central regulatory authorities, but heavy 
reliance on free market regulation, is also based on a core premise that the major source of 
finance to corporations is equity rather than debt. That is, equity capital is expected to be 
raised mainly from efficiently operated capital markets. In such a market, capital is assumed to 
freely move to investments that offer the highest risk-adjusted returns (see Table 1; Friedman, 
1962, 1970). 
Finally, and as a corollary, equity markets tend to be relatively better developed in 
Anglo-American countries, such as the UK and US than in Continental European countries 
like Germany and France (Weimer and Pape, 1999, p.155). This implies that shareholders can 
easily either transfer their capital from a poorly-governed company to a better-governed one or 
a poorly-governed company may be acquired by a better-governed firm through the inherent 
efficient markets for corporate control. Similarly, and at least in theory, poorly performing 
  
37 
managers can easily be fired and replaced with an efficient team, hence, providing the most 
effective restraints on managerial discretion.  
 
2.2.1.2 Major Criticisms of the Shareholding Model 
 
Despite its dominance as a major corporate form worldwide (Keasey et al., 1997, p.3; 
O’Sullivan, 2000, p.52), the shareholding model suffers from several weaknesses (e.g., Blair, 
1995; Gamble and Kelly, 2001; Vinten, 2001). These weaknesses generally concern 
shareholder power and democracy, stakeholder interests, social morality and ethics, efficient 
factor markets, and excessive short-termism, amongst others (e.g., Blair, 1995; Letza et al., 
2004; Sternberg, 1997, 2004).  
Firstly, it has been suggested that shareholders lack sufficient power to control 
management and prevent misuse of corporate resources as purported by the shareholding 
model (Blair, 1995, p.vi). As has been explained above, central to this model is the axiom of 
shareholder primacy, which presupposes that corporations should mainly be managed for the 
welfare of shareholders. Arising out of such a presupposition is that theoretically a residual 
power rests with the shareholders so that they can choose the persons to whom operational 
power is delegated (Schwartz, 1983, p.53; Sheikh and Chatterjee, 1995, p.5). It also entitles 
them to participate in major corporate decisions, including exercising the power of hiring or 
firing the board of directors, usually at an annual general meeting (AGM).  
In practice, however, it has been contended that the ability of shareholders to 
meaningfully exercise such control over the direction of their company is severely limited by 
the very procedures which govern such meetings and corporate officers elections (e.g., Blair, 
1995; Sternberg, 1997, 2004). For example, it is directors rather than shareholders that 
typically set the agenda of an AGM, and by implication directors determine the issues that 
come up for voting. By contrast, it has been shown that it is either difficult or impossible for 
shareholders to get binding resolutions of their own onto the agenda (Sternberg, 2004, p.82).  
 Secondly, and closely associated with the lack of real shareholder power, is that 
directors, who are expected to be the first line of defence for shareholders, also suffer from 
many defects (e.g., Denis and McConnell, 2003; Brennan, 2006). Sternberg (2004) suggests 
that because executive directors of a corporation are also normally its managers, they are less 
willing to recognise, criticise or correct their own mistakes. Non-executive directors’ 
accountability to shareholders is also usually impaired by the ways in which they are 
nominated, officially appointed and remunerated (e.g., Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 
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2002; Sternberg, 1997, 2004). In an Anglo-American model, the appointment procedure is 
such that most non-executive directors are nominated by the chief executive or by the board 
themselves (e.g., Vinten, 2001; Sternberg, 2004). This makes them insufficiently independent 
of management, and insufficiently accountable to shareholders. 
 It is, however, acknowledged that with the recent increase in the proliferation of codes 
of good corporate governance, especially among Anglo-American countries (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009, p.378), the procedures for board appointments are gradually improving.  
As will be discussed in detail in chapter three, like the UK’s 2006 Combined Code, for 
example, King II requires listed firms to establish independent nomination committees. It also 
requires the nomination committees to be constituted and chaired by independent non-
executive directors. Requirements of these nature imposed by codes of good governance on 
firms have generally improved board accountability, independence and monitoring of 
company executives and senior management (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009, p.262). 
Short-termism is a third criticism that has usually been levelled against the Anglo-
American corporate governance model. Opponents (e.g., Blair, 1995; Keasey et al., 1997; 
Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Letza et al., 2004) of the shareholding model contend 
that it is significantly flawed by its excessive fixation on short-term financial performance – 
short-term returns on investments, short-term corporate profits, short-term management 
performance, short-term share prices, and short-term expenditures, amongst others. This arises 
out of the substantial reliance on and the existence of efficient capital markets, which put huge 
pressure on managers.  
In principle, a higher short-term share return, for example, is preferred to a lower one 
in this corporate governance model. By contrast, a comparatively lower share price, for 
instance, makes a firm more vulnerable to receiving takeover bids, including hostile ones. This 
huge market pressure from investors and competitors leads to managerial preference for 
investments with shorter payback period in order to boost short-term profits, while 
disfavouring long-term capital investments, like research and development expenditure (e.g., 
Blair, 1995; Keasey et al., 1997).  
For example, anecdotal evidence within the popular media (e.g., Keller and Stocker, 
2008; Farrell, 2009; Parker and Thomas, 2009) and by recent reviews (Walker Review, 2009, 
p.8; Turner Review, 2009) suggest that the prevailing financial crisis (i.e., the so-called ‘credit 
crunch’) within the global financial markets has partly been caused by ‘reckless risk-taking 
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behaviour’ associated with pervasive ‘short-term bonus culture’ among senior executives of 
some major financial institutions, especially in the UK and US. 
Finally, and by far the most compelling attack and formidable challenge to the Anglo-
American model has come from stakeholder theorists (e.g., Freeman and Reed, 1983; Freeman, 
1984; Blair, 1995; Vinten, 2001; Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002). Generally, 
stakeholder theorists have criticised the shareholding model on two main grounds that: (1) it 
ignores the social, ethical and moral responsibilities of the corporation as an important societal 
institution; and (2) it offers a narrow definition of the stakeholders of the firm (e.g., Blair, 
1995; Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002).  
Firstly, the stakeholder theorists (e.g., Freeman and Reed, 1983; Hummels, 1998) 
argue that rather than running the firm to primarily maximise the wealth of shareholders (e.g., 
Berle and Means, 1932; Sheikh and Chatterjee, 1995), the firm should equally serve the 
interests of a wider stakeholder group. These may include employees, creditors, suppliers, 
customers and local communities that have long-term relationships with the firm, and thus 
affect its long-term success. As a result, it has been contested that the Anglo-American 
model’s exclusive emphasis on the powers and rights of shareholders results in the negligence 
of the interests of other legitimate stakeholders (Blair, 1995, p.vi).  
It must be pointed out, however, that like their counterparts operating in stakeholding 
countries, companies that operate in Anglo-American countries also contribute to social 
development. For example, and in practice, firms that operate in shareholder-oriented 
countries pay corporate taxes and offer employment opportunities to local communities, just 
like their stakeholding counterparts. In fact, according to West (2009, p.15), there has been 
substantial increase in corporate social responsibilities, especially responsibilities towards 
employees, customers, local communities, and the environment generally in Anglo-American 
countries over the last decade. Similarly, shareholders are also stakeholders of the firm. It has 
been argued, therefore, that by maximising shareholder value, societal value is similarly 
maximised (Mallin, 2007, p.6; Jensen, 2001, 2002). 
Secondly, a close criticism from stakeholding theorists is that the shareholding model 
lacks the capacity to give serious consideration to ethical and moral issues. A popular, but 
sometimes controversial ethical and moral criticism is that the Anglo-American governance 
model encourages excessive or even ‘obscene’ executive remuneration (Sternberg, 2004, 
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p.68) 1 . It is reported, for example, that the average CEO of a medium-sized American 
corporation earns 531 times as much in pay, bonuses and stock options as the average factory 
worker (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002, p.314). It has been argued, however, that 
good corporate governance is expected to empower the weaker sections of society (Kakabadse 
and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002, p.305).  
In this case, the shareholding governance model is criticised for ‘unethically’ 
strengthening further the already rich and powerful societal segments – shareholders and 
managers rather than empowering the weaker sections of society – lower level employees, 
local communities, the poor, women and children. Again, the on-going financial crisis within 
the global financial markets offers classic anecdotal examples. In spite of receiving 
multibillion-pound British Government bailouts (e.g., Farrell, 2008; Bradley, 2009; Neligan 
and Slater, 2009; Turner Review, 2009), and reported record of multibillion-pound losses at 
some major British Banks, including the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group, 
reports within the popular media suggest that senior executives continue to pay themselves 
millions of pounds of bonuses (e.g., Keller and Stocker, 2008; Farrell, 2009; Parker and 
Thomas, 2009; Walker Review, 2009). Arguably, this may further transfer wealth from 
ordinary taxpayers to already rich senior corporate bank executives. 
Due to the above weaknesses, stakeholder governance theorists purport to offer a better 
alternative to the shareholding governance model. The next subsection, therefore, will discuss 
the stakeholding corporate governance concept. Again, the rationale is to facilitate a better 
understanding of the South African governance framework that will subsequently be discussed 
in chapter three. For purposes of comparison, Table 1 will be referred to throughout the next 
subsections. Specifically, subsection 2.2.2.1 will present theoretical assumptions and solutions, 
whilst subsection 2.2.2.2 will examine the major weaknesses of the stakeholding model.                                                         
 
 
 
                                                 
1There may be some problems with this literature that need to be highlighted. First, there may be a problem with 
defining what constitutes ethical or moral behaviour. For example, there may be difficulties with defining what 
constitutes adequate or excessive executive compensation. Second, the so-called excessive executive 
remuneration may not necessarily be limited to Anglo-American countries alone. The 2009 Mercer Global 
Executive Remuneration Survey, for example, suggests that executive remuneration is not only high in 
conventional shareholding countries, such as the UK and Ireland, but also in traditional stakeholding countries, 
like France and Germany. Similarly, with increased globalisation, greater integration of global stock markets 
through cross-listing, and the proliferation of national and trans-national codes of good governance, convergence 
in corporate governance practices is improving (e.g., Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Filatotchev and Boyd, 
2009; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). As will be explained further in subsection 2.2.2, this implies that some of 
the criticisms discussed in this subsection may not necessarily be limited to the shareholding model alone.  
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2.2.2 The Stakeholding Model of Corporate Governance 
 
2.2.2.1 Theoretical Assumptions, Features and Solutions of the Stakeholding Model 
 
To start with, and as Table 1 suggests, the stakeholding model of corporate governance 
is often found in France, Germany, Japan and other European or Asian countries. A central 
underlying assumption of the stakeholding corporate governance model is that the purpose of 
the corporation is to maximise the welfare of a number of stakeholders of the firm rather than 
those of shareholders alone (see Table 1; Blair, 1995). That is, unlike the shareholding model 
that encourages firms to ‘exclusively’ advance the interests of shareholders, it suggests that 
companies should ‘inclusively’ pursue the interests of a group of identifiable stakeholders who 
may either directly or indirectly be affected by or can affect the success of the firm.  
Past stakeholder theorists have offered classical exposition of the ‘inclusive’ 
governance concept (e.g., March and Simons 1958; Hill and Jones, 1992; Jensen, 2001, 2002). 
They suggest that a firm consists of social groups in which each group can be seen as 
supplying the firm with important resources (contributions) and in return expects its interests 
to be promoted (inducements).  
For example, it is suggested that shareholders supply the firm with capital. In exchange, 
they expect to maximise the risk-adjusted return on their investments. Creditors provide the 
firm with loans. In return, they expect their loans to be repaid on time. Local communities 
supply the firm with location and local infrastructure. In exchange, they expect the firm to 
improve their quality of life. Managers and employees provide the firm with time and skills. In 
return, they expect to receive a sustainable income, and this has been argued to be true for 
every reasonably conceivable constituency of the firm (e.g., Hill and Jones, 1992; Jensen, 
2001, 2002).  
 As a result, and unlike the shareholding model, the stakeholding governance model 
presupposes that the governance problem arises out of the absence of broader stakeholder 
participation in the running of public corporations (see Table 1; Letza et al., 2004). Like the 
shareholding model, however, it subscribes to the idea that the separation of ownership and 
control in modern public corporations creates a governance problem (see Table 1; Keasey et 
al., 1997). It also concurs with the shareholding model’s assumption that the resulting agency 
conflicts may be reduced by the firm through a nexus of contracts between the various 
stakeholders of the firm, and that the firm should be run rationally in economic terms to 
broadly maximise its wealth (see Table 1; Hill and Jones, 1992).  
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By contrast, it rejects the assumption that shareholders and managers are the only 
important participants in such a relationship (see Table 1; Blair, 1995). Further, while it shares 
the assumption that markets can be efficient (see Table 1; Fama, 1965, 1970), it also 
recognises the existence of short to medium-run market inefficiencies. This implies that there 
may be a need for occasional external interventions, including statutory legislations to 
establish equilibrium in order to maximise the broader societal wealth (see Table 1; Hill and 
Jones, 1992; Weimer and Pape, 1999). 
 In response, the stakeholding model offers several solutions. Firstly, it proposes a two-
tier corporate board structure as a way of achieving a broader representation of the interests of 
a larger group of stakeholders of the firm (see Table 1; Schilling, 2001; Mallin, 2007). Thus, 
in a typical stakeholder governance framework, like in Germany, companies will normally 
have a dual board structure: (1) a supervisory board, and (2) a management one. The 
supervisory board is usually constituted by many stakeholders, including investors 
(shareholders and creditors/banks), employees (union groups), suppliers, customers, and 
government appointees representing broader segments of society (e.g., Schilling, 2001; West, 
2006, 2009). In this case, it mandates the managing board to run the company in the best 
interests of a number of stakeholders. This implies that the interests of shareholders should 
only be pursued to the extent that they are not detrimental to the interests of the other 
stakeholders of the firm (see Table 1; Schilling, 2001; Mallin, 2007). As will be discussed 
further in chapter three, rather than having a loose definition of stakeholders, King II, for 
instance, requires every firm to explicitly identify its own relevant stakeholders.   
Secondly, it encourages corporate management to focus on building trust and long-
term contractual relationships between the firm and its stakeholders (see Table 1; Letza et al., 
2004). In particular, it supports inter-firm co-operation, including cross-shareholdings 
(especially in Japan) and employee participation in decision-making through the supervisory 
board (particularly among German firms). Similarly, it encourages closer contact between 
shareholders, creditors, managers, employees and suppliers, as well as the integration of 
business ethics as a solution to achieving a balance among the various stakeholder interests 
(see Table 1; Rwegasira, 2000). 
One consequence of the stakeholding model’s insistence on balancing the interests of 
the various stakeholders is that it may render it less appealing to equity investors. As such, 
companies tend to rely heavily on debt rather than equity as a major source of finance (see 
Table 1; Weimer and Pape, 1999). The corollary as Table 1 shows is that equity markets 
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(stock exchanges) tend to be underdeveloped relative to the debt markets (banks) with 
relatively high level involvement by credit granting banks in providing capital for public 
corporations.  
Finally, block shareholdings from the various stakeholders, such as employee unions, 
government and banks, lead to a situation in which ownership is often highly concentrated 
(see Table 1; Rwegasira, 2000). Concentrated ownership and close managerial monitoring, 
especially from the supervisory board reduce agency costs. Concentrated ownership may also 
be associated with weak investor protection, particularly minority investors, which could 
normally be explained by the legal system of countries often associated with the stakeholder 
governance framework (see Table 1; La Porta et al., 1998).  
Specifically, La Porta et al. (1998) demonstrate that there is a negative relationship 
between ownership concentration and investor protection, which can be explained by legal 
origin. They show that Anglo-American countries (common law family, like the UK and US) 
have dispersed ownership with higher investor protection in comparison with Continental-
European-Asian (civil and Scandinavian law origin, such as France, Germany, and Japan) 
countries, which tend to have relatively high ownership concentration with weaker investor 
protection. 
As has been briefly explained above, however, it should be pointed out that it is 
increasingly becoming difficult in recent times to find a corporate governance system, which 
is purely shareholder-oriented or stakeholder-oriented as have been presented in the preceding 
two main subsections. First, through increased globalisation, greater market liberalisation and 
stock market integration through cross-listing, corporate governance practices are increasingly 
converging (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009, p.259). For example, stock markets in Japan, a 
traditional stakeholder governance model, are well-developed as their counterparts in the UK 
and US, which have historically been based on shareholder governance framework (e.g., 
Hawley and Williams, 1997; Weimer and Pape, 1999; WFE, 2008). Second, the emergence of 
powerful international institutional investors, and greater investor activism, seem to have also 
accelerated the convergence of corporate governance systems, especially towards the Anglo-
American model (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009, p.381). 
Third, and as has been mentioned above, the proliferation of national (like the Cadbury 
and King Reports) and trans-national (such as by the OECD, Latin American countries, World 
Bank, and the Global Reporting Initiative) codes of corporate governance appears to have 
improved convergence in corporate governance practices (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009, 
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p.381; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009, p.262). For example, in reviewing 196 distinct codes of 
governance from 64 2  countries, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009, p.377) identify six 
recommendations that are common to all countries, regardless of their shareholding or 
stakeholding origins.  
These include: (1) a balance of executive and non-executive directors; (2) splitting the 
positions of chairman and CEO; (3) provision of quality and timely information to board 
members; (4) following transparent procedures for appointing new directors; (5) objective and 
comprehensible financial reporting; and (6) keeping an effective system of internal controls. 
As has been noted above, increasing similarities and improving convergence of governance 
practices, imply that the criticisms of the shareholding model described above, and the 
weaknesses of the stakeholding model presented below, may not necessarily be limited to the 
shareholding model or the stakeholding model, respectively, alone.   
 
2.2.2.2 Major Criticisms of the Stakeholding Model 
 
The stakeholding governance model has also received several criticisms. These include 
its incompatibility with the concepts of business, governance and private property rights, 
among others (e.g., Argenti, 1993; Sternberg, 1997, 2004; O’Sullivan, 2000; Letza et al., 2004; 
Solomon, 2007).  
Firstly, a central criticism of the stakeholder governance model is that it is not 
compatible with the concept of business (e.g., Sternberg, 1997, 2004; Letza et al., 2004). It 
proposes that corporations must strive to achieve a fair balance in distributing the benefits of 
the firm to a number of stakeholders, and as such prevents the firm from pursuing a single 
objective function that favours particular groups (e.g., Sternberg, 1997; Jensen, 2001; 2002). 
This is, however, not consistent with the notion of business, which involves the investment of 
one’s capital in a commercial firm to primarily maximise its long-term value (e.g., Letza et al., 
2004; Sternberg, 2004). Jensen (2001, 2002) suggests that if a business is prevented from 
operating efficiently by focusing on maximising owners’ profits (purposeful behaviour), it will 
simply collapse in the long-run. This will negatively affect social value and welfare of all 
stakeholders. 
Secondly, the definition of stakeholders appears to be vague sometimes. Since 
stakeholders are all those who can affect or are affected by the business, the number of people 
                                                 
2This implies that some of the countries examined have more than one distinct code. The UK and US, for 
example, have 25 distinct codes each (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009, pp.378-380). 
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whose benefits need to be taken into account is simply infinite (e.g., Freeman, 1984; Hummels, 
1998; Sternberg, 1997, 2004). This means that stakeholders by definition could be anybody or 
anything from anywhere or everywhere, and as such could range from employees, creditors, 
government to terrorists, corporate armed-robbers, and the sea, amongst others. Yet, it 
mandates that a balance be struck in the distribution of benefits to all stakeholders, but 
ambiguous stakeholder definition means that balancing divergent stakeholder interests is also 
an unworkable objective (e.g., Sternberg, 1997, 2004; Jensen, 2001, 2002).  
Thirdly, the stakeholding governance model is incompatible with the notion of 
corporate governance. A key corporate governance concept is accountability: the 
accountability of directors to shareholders; the accountability of managers to directors; and the 
accountability of corporate employees and other corporate agents to shareholders through 
managers and directors (e.g., Sternberg, 1997; 2004; Rossouw et al., 2002; Solomon, 2007). 
Stakeholding, however, suggests that firms should be accountable to all their stakeholders 
rather than to their shareholders alone (e.g., Friedman and Reed, 1983; Letza et al., 2004). By 
contrast, it has been argued that multiple accountability works if the purpose is unambiguous 
to everyone involved (e.g., Sternberg, 1997, 2004; Gamble and Kelly, 2001). In fact, the 2002 
King Report suggests that an organisation that is accountable to everyone is actually 
accountable to no one. Thus, accountability that is diffuse is effectively non-existent and 
unworkable in governance terms. 
Finally, an associated criticism is that the stakeholder model provides no effective 
objective standard against which corporate agents can be judged (e.g., Sternberg, 1997, 2004; 
Letza et al., 2004). Corporate agents are mandated to run the business primarily to balance all 
stakeholders’ interests. It is, however, contested that it does not serve as an effective objective 
performance measure because it allows corporate agents responsible for its interpretation and 
implementation, excessive freedom to pursue their own narrow interests, including perquisites 
consumption and other private benefits of control (e.g., Argenti, 1993; Sternberg, 1997, 2004).  
Similarly, hiding behind the vague notion of maximising and balancing all 
stakeholders’ interests, unruly corporate agents are able to effectively resist takeover bids (i.e., 
the market for managerial and corporate control is usually effectively weakened or even non-
existent) that would benefit shareholders, and often allows the pursuit of costly and 
unprofitable empire-building acquisitions instead (e.g., Preston and Sapienza, 1990; Letza et 
al., 2004).  
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2.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
  
 This chapter has attempted to define corporate governance. The central rationale has 
been to paint the broader corporate governance picture within which the South African 
corporate governance framework and context that is subsequently presented in chapter three 
could easily be understood. This is because while South Africa has historically had an Anglo-
American governance model with predominantly ‘shareholding’ governance features, recent 
governance reforms (i.e., the 1994 and 2002 King Reports) attempt to explicitly impose 
substantial affirmative action and stakeholder demands, forcing firms to depict almost in equal 
measure, some of the key features of both the ‘shareholding’ and ’stakeholding’ corporate 
governance models. Arguably, this makes the South African corporate governance framework 
and environment unique. 
In this regard, the chapter began by offering a working definition of corporate 
governance. While it acknowledged that corporate governance has no universally accepted 
definition, it suggested that the existing numerous definitions can be classified into two groups: 
narrow and broad. At the narrow level, it defined corporate governance as referring to internal 
governance structures, such as the executive management, the board of directors and the 
general assembly of shareholders, by which companies are directed and controlled. At the 
most expansive form, however, it contended that corporate governance goes beyond 
immediate internal governance mechanisms to include external structures and stakeholders, 
such as the legal system, the efficient factor markets, local communities, the regulatory system, 
as well as the political, cultural and economic institutions within which companies operate.  
Overall, the chapter identified two major types of corporate governance within the 
international literature and context: the ‘shareholding’ and ‘stakeholding’ models. In simple 
terms, it suggested that the shareholding model refers to the narrow definition of corporate 
governance, in which the interests of shareholders are considered as paramount, and is usually 
found in Anglo-American countries, such as the UK and US. In contrast, the stakeholding 
model refers to the broader definition of corporate governance, which attempts to equally cater 
for the interests of a number of stakeholders of the firm, and is normally predominant in 
Continental European and Asian countries, like Germany and Japan. It also acknowledged, 
however, that the shareholding and stakeholding dichotomisation of modern corporate 
governance systems might be an over-simplification. This is because due to increased 
globalisation, greater global stock market integration through cross-listing, and the 
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proliferation of national and trans-national codes of corporate governance, amongst others, 
corporate governance practices are increasingly converging across different countries and 
systems.  
Further, for each corporate governance model, the underlying theoretical assumptions, 
major features and proposed solutions as found within the international corporate governance 
literature were discussed. Of crucial relevance is that the extant literature shows that both 
models suffer from several weaknesses. This raises an important question as to whether it will 
be valuable to formally combine some of the main features of the ‘shareholding’ and 
‘stakeholding’ models to form a ‘hybrid’ corporate governance model that will be capable of 
addressing their current respective weaknesses. 
 In this regard, the South Africa governance framework and recent reforms appear to 
offer an interesting, and arguably a unique context in which these issues can be further 
examined. Specifically, and as has been pointed out in chapter one, the corporate governance 
reforms that have been pursued so far in South Africa ostensibly attempt to transform the 
South African governance framework from a predominantly Anglo-American model to an 
‘integrated’ or ‘inclusive’ model that explicitly combines the features of the ‘shareholding’ 
and ‘stakeholding’ models. However, and despite receiving several commendations as an 
example of a good governance model in the world (Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.193; 
Armstrong et al., 2006, p.214; Mallin, 2007, pp.57, 248; Andreasson, 2009, p.10), there is an 
active on-going normative debate and serious reservations among practitioners, policy makers 
and academics (e.g., Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Rossouw et al., 2002; Rossouw, 
2005a and b; Spisto, 2005; IIF, 2007; West, 2006, 2009), as to whether it is an appropriate 
corporate governance model for South Africa or will be able to achieve its sharply contrasting 
objectives.  
Therefore, chapter three (the next chapter) will consider the South African corporate 
governance framework and context – the major legal frameworks, its origins, its 
internal/narrow and external/broad governance structures, as well as the nature of the major 
governance reforms pursued so far.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
3. INTRODUCTION  
 
 This chapter discusses corporate governance in South Africa.  The main objective is to 
provide a comprehensive description and where applicable, a review of the South African 
corporate governance framework. Specifically, it examines the internal and external corporate 
governance structures in South Africa. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 
3.1 describes the general South African corporate governance landscape. Section 3.2 discusses 
the external South African corporate governance environment. Section 3.3 examines the 
internal South African corporate governance environment, while section 3.4 summarises the 
chapter. 
   
 
3.1 THE SOUTH AFRICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LANDSCAPE 
 
 Following the two major corporate governance models described in chapter two, the 
current South African corporate governance landscape can similarly be classified into two 
major groups: broad or external and narrow or internal.  
 Briefly, external corporate governance refers to the control that is exercised over 
companies from the outside. In South Africa, this group consists of major financial regulatory 
and enforcement bodies or stakeholders. They are generally charged with the formulation, 
implementation and enforcement of statutory, as well as voluntary corporate policies and laws 
(e.g., Rossouw et al., 2002; FSB, 2008). These include the Ministry of Finance, the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Registrar of Companies, the Financial Services 
Board (FSB), the JSE Ltd, and the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), amongst others.  
 By contrast, internal corporate governance refers to the way in which firms are 
governed from within. This group consists of statutory and voluntary corporate laws and codes 
of conduct, which South African companies are required to comply with. These include the 
South African Companies Act of 1973, the Insider Trading Act of 1998, the JSE’s Listings 
Rules of 2007, and the 1994 and 2002 King Reports on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa.  
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 This study focuses on internal corporate governance structures. Section 3.3 will 
discuss in detail the internal or narrow corporate governance environment. However, to 
facilitate a better appreciation of the broader South African corporate governance landscape, 
section 3.2 will provide a brief overview of the external or broad South African corporate 
governance environment. 
 
 
3.2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
      ENVIRONMENT  
 
 This section describes the external corporate governance environment. Specifically, it 
describes the main stakeholders charged with the responsibility of formulating and 
implementing policies, as well as supervising and regulating the external governance 
environment. It also points out some of the challenges that the system faces. 
  
3.2.1 Overview of the External Corporate Governance System 
 
Figure 1 below depicts the external corporate governance system (the whole financial 
regulatory system) in South Africa. Generally, it shows three major parts (Rossouw et al., 
2002, p.294). Firstly, it shows the regulation of financial instruments (i.e., stocks, bonds and 
derivatives). Secondly, it depicts the regulation of the markets in which these instruments are 
traded (i.e., the JSE Ltd [JSE], the Bond Exchange of South Africa [BESA] and the South 
African Future Exchange [SAFEX]). Finally, it shows the regulation of the market participants 
(i.e., stock brokers, portfolio or fund managers, companies, banks, insurers and pension funds).  
Figure 1 also shows that the South African Ministry of Finance remains at the apex of 
the broad corporate regulatory structure. It oversees the statutory regulation of all financial 
intermediaries and advisers in South Africa. The ministry has the overall responsibility to 
develop, implement and supervise the corporate and the financial governance superstructure in 
South Africa (e.g., Bamber et al., 2001; Rossouw et al., 2002). It carries out its functions 
through four major statutory bodies: the Financial Services Board (FSB), the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB), the Registrar of Companies and the South African Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) (Rossouw, et al., 2002, p.294). 
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Figure 1: The External Corporate Governance Framework of South Africa, Source: Rossouw et al. (2002, p.295). 
 
The Financial Services Board (FSB) has regulatory powers over all non-bank financial 
institutions, as well as acts in an advisory capacity to the Minister of Finance (e.g., Financial 
Services Board Act, 1990; FSB, 2008). The FSB is also assisted by the Insider Trading 
Directorate (ITD), the Advisory Board on financial markets, as well as the Advisory 
Committees on long- and short-term financial instruments (Rossouw, et al., 2002, p.294). In 
contrast, the Appeals Board serves as the official adjudicator of all conflicts emanating from 
the whole financial system: the FSB, the Advisory Committees and the South African Reserve 
Bank (SARB) (e.g., Bamber et al., 2001; Rossouw et al., 2002). 
The FSB’s functions are further delegated to four subordinated statutory bodies, 
namely: the financial markets, unit trusts, insurers and financial advisors boards (Rossouw, et 
al., 2002, p.294). The Financial Markets Board is responsible for the supervision and issuance 
of licenses for the operation of securities markets, such as stock, bond and financial futures 
markets. The Board has supervisory powers over the JSE Ltd (JSE), the Bond Exchange of 
South Africa (BESA) and the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX).  
Among them, the JSE is of direct relevance to this study. The JSE is the only formal 
stock market in South Africa. It provides a platform for the listing and trading of all corporate 
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shares (JSE Listings Rules, 2007). It has its own Listings Rules. More importantly, it appends 
the provisions of the 1994 and 2002 King Reports on Corporate Governance to its Listings 
Rules. It expects all listed firms to comply with the provisions of the King Report or explain, 
in case(s) of non compliance. The constructed South African Corporate Governance Index (the 
SACGI) that will subsequently be used in examining the corporate governance-financial 
performance link is based on the 2002 King Report. These reports will be discussed in detail 
in section 3.3. 
 
3.2.2 Some of the Challenges Facing the South African Regulatory System 
 
The South African financial regulatory system faces a number of challenges (e.g., 
Bamber et al., 2001; Rossouw et al., 2002; Armstrong, 2003; CLSA, 2000; IIF, 2007; FSB, 
2008). A major regulatory challenge is that the FSB is financed by the financial services 
industry through levies and fees, with no contributions from central government (e.g., Bamber 
et al., 2001; Rossouw et al., 2002; FSB, 2008). This raises the question of whether the FSB as 
the main financial services industry regulator can be truly independent of the market 
participants that it is expected to regulate. This lack of independence creates serious 
compliance and enforcement problems, especially within a legal framework that heavily relies 
on self-regulation (Armstrong, 2003, p.2). For example, the Registrar of Companies 
responsible for administering and supervising the Companies Act has been shown to have 
limited capacity for enforcement (e.g., Deutsche Bank, 2002; Armstrong, 2003; IIF, 2007).   
Similarly, the financial regulatory system also faces the challenge of keeping up with 
and adapting to the impact of domestic competition and global competitive pressures (e.g., 
Bamber et al., 2001; Rossouw et al., 2002). These include frequent changes in international 
financial regulations and standards, new technology, as well as the fast-evolving strategic 
objectives of financial institutions.  
Finally, it has been suggested that as an emerging economy, the South African 
regulatory system is still evolving or in a transitional stage (e.g., Bamber et al., 2001; 
Rossouw et al., 2002). This sometimes makes it difficult to identify the major changes that 
need to be instituted. For example, there is an on-going debate as to whether South Africa 
should set a super-regulatory body like the Financial Services Authority (FSA) of the UK or 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the US to be in charge of the whole 
financial regulatory system (e.g., Bamber et al., 2001; Armstrong, 2003). 
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3.3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
      ENVIRONMENT 
 
 This section discusses the South African internal corporate governance environment. 
As has been pointed out in section 3.1, the internal corporate governance environment is 
constituted by a group of statutory and voluntary corporate laws and codes of conduct that 
attempt to regulate the internal control of companies. The South African Companies Act of 
1973 and the Insider Trading of 1998 are statutory. By contrast, the JSE’s Listings Rules and 
the 1994 and 2002 King Reports on Corporate Governance for South Africa are voluntary3. 
In subsection 3.3.1, the various parts of the JSE’s Listings Rules and the Companies 
and Insider Trading Acts that relate to internal corporate governance structures will be briefly 
described. Subsections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 will then discuss in detail the 1994 (‘King I’) and 2002 
(‘King II’) King Reports, respectively. The King Reports will be discussed in detail for two 
reasons. Firstly, they contain all the relevant provisions covered by the JSE’s Listings Rules, 
as well as the Companies and Insider Trading Acts. Secondly, and as has been explained 
above, they represent the main Code of Conduct on which this study is based.   
   
3.3.1 The South African Companies Act, Insider Trading Act, JSE’s Listings  
         Rules and Internal Corporate Governance Structures 
 
 This subsection briefly discusses the relevant internal corporate governance structures 
that are instituted by the South African Companies Act, the JSE’s Listings Rules and the 
Insider Trading Act. Specifically, subsection 3.3.1.1 will discuss the internal corporate 
governance structures that are established by the Companies Act, whilst subsection 3.3.1.2 
will describe those instituted by the JSE’s Listings Rules and the Insider Trading Act.  
 
3.3.1.1 The Companies Act and Internal Corporate Governance Structures 
 
The South African Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973 (first enacted in 1861) is the main 
statutory commercial law that controls internal operations of companies in South Africa. It is 
administered and supervised by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) through the 
                                                 
3As will be noted further in chapter ten, the JSE’s Listings Rules and the King Reports are voluntary because 
their corporate governance provisions are not enforceable in the law courts. Listed firms that do not comply with 
their provisions may only be suspended or de-listed from the JSE. Listed firms are also not officially punished for 
non-compliance if they are able to offer a reasonable explanation(s) for not complying with a particular corporate 
governance provision or provisions. Non-listed firms are expected to voluntarily comply only with the corporate 
governance provisions of the King Code (King Report, 2002, para. 1.1).  
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Registrar of Companies. The Act sets out several structures that govern the internal 
relationships between the firm, directors and shareholders. 
 Focusing first on the firm, under schedule 3 of the Act, a firm has the right to appoint 
qualified directors, auditor(s) and a secretary. The company must organise and notify members 
of all meetings, including annual general and extra ordinary meetings (see sections 179-186). 
It must also keep proper accounting records (see section 284) and comply with formal 
financial accounting standards (see section 285A). Finally, under schedule 5.28 of the Act, the 
company must prepare and present its annual report to members and file with the Registrar of 
Companies all annual returns (see section 176). As will be discussed in chapter five, the study 
relies on company annual reports as the main source of data for the internal corporate 
governance variables. It will be argued in subsection 5.2.1 of chapter five that the mandatory 
or statutory nature of annual reports makes them a more credible source of data in comparison 
with other sources. 
With regards to directors, under section 208 of the Act, every public company must 
have a unitary board of at least two directors. Board size and the percentage of non-executive 
directors will be used as corporate governance variables in investigating the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial performance in chapter five. Schedule 2 of the 
Act grants directors the following powers: direction and control, management, voting, and 
representing the firm. Schedule 2 of the Act also offers directors a right to adequate 
remuneration for services offered. As will be discussed in subsection 3.3.3, the 2002 King 
Report requires directors’ remuneration to be determined by a remuneration committee that 
consists only of independent non-executive directors.  
Also, and as will be described in chapter five, the constructed South African Corporate 
Governance Index (the SACGI) includes whether a remuneration committee is present or not. 
Finally, under section 140A of the Act, directors and officers have a duty to disclose in the 
annual report any direct or indirect beneficial interest in the firm’s securities. In chapter five, 
the percentage of director ownership will be used as one of the internal governance 
mechanisms in examining the governance-performance link.  
With respect to the company secretary, section 268A of the Act mandates public 
companies to appoint a secretary. As will be discussed later, the King Reports also recognise 
company secretary as an important internal corporate governance mechanism. Similarly, and 
as will be specified in chapter five, the constructed South African Corporate Governance 
Index (the SACGI) includes whether a firm has a formally appointed company secretary or not. 
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Under section 268G of the Act, the secretary has a duty to provide directors of a company 
collectively and individually with guidance as to what their duties are, as well as their 
responsibilities and powers. More importantly, the secretary must also certify in the annual 
financial statements of the company that the company has lodged with the Registrar of 
Companies all such returns as are required of a public company and that such returns are true 
and correct. 
Regarding auditing, section 269A of the Act stipulates that every company must 
appoint an audit committee. It must be composed of at least two independent non-executive 
directors. Similarly, and as will be explained below, the King Reports also consider the audit 
committee as an important internal corporate governance structure. Also, and as will be 
discussed further in chapter five, the constructed South African Corporate Governance Index 
(the SACGI) includes whether an audit committee is present or not. Under section 270A of the 
Act, the audit committee must nominate for appointment an independent auditor for the 
company and determine the fees to be paid to the auditor. Finally, it must handle complaints 
relating to accounting practices, internal audit and the content of its financial statements. 
Focusing finally on shareholders, they are required to provide the capital of the 
company with their liabilities limited to the amount of capital invested (see sections 19; 59-66; 
and 86, amongst others). As residual investors and risk bearers of the firm, the Act grants 
shareholders several rights and powers. Sections 219 and 220 of the Act state that by a 
resolution at a general meeting, shareholders have the power to remove directors from office 
before the expiration of their term or can go to court for the enforcement of such a resolution. 
Under sections 146A and 90 of the Act, shareholders are entitled to receive payments in the 
form of dividends or capital redistributions and have pre-emptive right to rights issues. Finally, 
according to sections 179 and 180-186 of the Act, shareholders have the right to call for, to 
receive adequate notice, to attend and to vote at general meetings.  
These sections of the Act are important because they are the distinguishing features 
that underlie any typical ‘shareholding’ or Anglo-American corporate governance model that 
has been discussed in chapter two. They demonstrate further that the interests of shareholders 
within this model are supreme, backed by extensive legal rights and powers. Similarly, it is 
expected that the extensive control powers granted shareholders will ensure that voluntary or 
self-regulation operates effectively without state or external intervention. The Act does not, 
however, explicitly recognise the interests or rights of any group of stakeholders, such as 
employees. By contrast, the ‘stakeholding’ corporate governance model tends to formally 
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recognise the rights of other stakeholders. For example, the right of employees to be 
represented on the supervisory board of German companies is explicitly enshrined in German 
company law (Mallin, 2007, p.16). 
 
3.3.1.2 The JSE’s Listings Rules, Insider Trading Act and Internal Corporate  
            Governance Structures 
 
 Apart from the Companies Act and the King Reports that will be discussed below, the 
JSE’s 2007 Listings Rules and the Insider Trading Act of 1998 are the other corporate 
governance reforms that regulate internal corporate governance in South Africa.  
The JSE’s 2007 Listings Rules are important because they append the relevant internal 
governance provisions of the Companies Act, the Insider Trading Act and the 2002 King 
Report to its Listings Rules. Specifically, the Listings Rules are specified in a voluminous 
document consisting of a practice note, 25 schedules and 21 sections dealing with a variety of 
issues ranging from application for listing new applicant, corporate governance, and the 
authority of the JSE to issues regarding pyramidical and concentrated ownership structures. 
This subsection, therefore, briefly highlights the relevant internal governance provisions that 
are not covered by the Companies Act or the King Reports. 
The main aim of the JSE’s Listings Rules is to ensure the existence of an efficient 
market for raising and trading of capital with strong emphasis on investor protection (JSE 
Listings Rules, 2007, intro. para.). Under subsection 14.6, the listing of pyramid4 companies is 
prohibited. The JSE, however, has a discretionary right to allow a pyramid company to list on 
the proviso that it will ‘unbundle’ or engage in an ‘unbundling’ process within an agreed time 
period. This rule is an important corporate governance issue because historically pyramidical 
ownership structures have been pervasive and problematic in South Africa (e.g., Barr et al., 
1995; Malherbe and Segal, 2003; Armstrong et al., 2006). Theoretically, it is expected that a 
reduction in pyramidical and concentrated ownership structures within a relatively developed 
stock market in South Africa, will make voluntary or self-regulation more effective. As will be 
noted further below, Armstrong et al. (2006, p.221) report, for example, that the introduction 
of more rigorous listings rules have caused a marked shrinkage in the number of companies 
listed on the JSE, falling from 668 companies in 1998, for instance, to 426 in January 2004. 
                                                 
4A pyramid company is one which: (1) may exercise, or cause the exercise, of 50% or more of the total voting 
rights of the equity securities of a listed company (“listed controlled company”); and (2) derives 75% or more of 
its total attributable income before tax from such listed controlled company, or the value of its shareholding in the 
listed controlled company represents 50% or more of its gross assets, with both measured, as far as possible, at 
fair value (see subsection 14.4, JSE Listings Rules, 2007). 
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Subsections 3.59-3.84 and the whole of sections 7 and 10 deal with the duties, 
responsibilities, powers, and rights of directors, shareholders, the company secretary, and 
auditors as discussed in the Companies Act. Similarly, subsections 3.63-3.74 deal with the 
prohibition of insider trading by directors, officers and employees of listed companies. Insider 
share dealings are also covered by the Insider Trading Act, section 440F of the Companies Act 
and subsection 2.9 of the 2002 King Report. The relevant sections of the Insider Trading Act 
1998 will be briefly discussed below. The whole recommendations of the 2002 King Report 
are also covered under sections 7 and 8.  
However, there are two areas where the Listings Rules differ from the 2002 King 
Report and the Companies Act. Firstly, under subsection 10.23, the Listings Rules suggest that 
every listed company’s board must consist of at least four directors. The Companies Act 
requires a minimum of two, whilst the 2002 King Report does not specify any number. None 
of them sets a maximum number of directors. Secondly, subsection 10.59 prohibits life 
directorships, but the 2002 King Report and Companies Act permit a staggered rotation of 
board members to ensure board continuity.  
Finally, under subsections 7.F.5 and 8.63, every listed company is expected to provide 
two statements. Firstly, companies are required to provide a statement of how it has applied 
the principles set out in the 2002 King Code. In particular, they must give explanation(s) that 
enable(s) its shareholders to evaluate how the principles have been applied. Secondly, a 
positive statement that addresses the extent to which the company has complied with the King 
Code and the reason(s) for non-compliance with any of the principles must be provided.  
With respect to the Insider Trading Act of 1998, it prohibits individuals from dealing 
in such securities or financial instruments in South Africa based on inside information5 . 
Specifically, the Act provides criminal and civil law penalties for insider dealing. For example, 
under sections 2 and 5 of the Act, any insider who is convicted of a direct or indirect insider 
trading is liable to a criminal fine not exceeding R2m or imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding 10 years, or both.  
Finally, and more importantly, the Act grants the Financial Services Boards (FSB) a 
wide range of statutory powers, including the power to investigate, summon, institute, 
                                                 
5The Act defines ‘inside information’ as specific or precise information which has not been made public and 
which: (a) is obtained or learned as an insider; and (b) if it were made public would likely have a material effect 
on the price or value of any securities or financial instrument. ‘Insider’ is also defined by the Act as an individual 
who has inside information: (a) through being a director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of securities or 
financial instruments to which the inside information relate and through having access to such information by 
virtue of his or her employment, office or profession; and/or (b) where such individual is directly or indirectly 
related to an insider (see section 1, Insider Trading Act, 1998). 
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interrogate and prosecute offenders. In this regard, and under sections 6 and 11-12, it 
establishes a fully-fledged directorate within the FSB, the Insider Trading Directorate (see 
Figure 1 above) to purely investigate and institute civil proceedings against offenders. The 
constructed South African Corporate Governance index (the SACGI) that will be discussed in 
subsection 5.2 of chapter five, includes the disclosure of a policy that prohibits directors from 
dealing in a firm’s shares within their own clearly pre-specified window, as recommended by 
the 2002 King Report.  
The next subsections will discuss recent corporate governance reforms that have been 
pursued in South Africa. Specifically, subsections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 will examine the origins and 
the internal corporate governance structures imposed by the 1994 and 2002 King Reports on 
Corporate Governance for South Africa, respectively. Also, Table 2 will present the main 
recommendations of the King Reports. To facilitate comparison, the recommendations of the 
now influential 1992 Cadbury Report have also been presented, and so will be referred to 
throughout the next subsections. 
 
3.3.2 The 1994 King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (‘King I’) 
 
3.3.2.1 Origins/Background  
 
As has been noted above, legislation regulating the behaviour of companies, their 
directors and officers has existed in South Africa in the form of the 1861 Companies Act, no. 
23 (DTI, 2004, p.13). However, there is a consensus that, in a narrow sense, corporate 
governance in South Africa was formally institutionalised by the publication of the first King 
Report on Corporate Governance (hereafter also known as ‘King I’) in November 1994 (e.g., 
King Report, 2002; Rossouw et al., 2002; Armstrong et al., 2006; and West, 2006, 2009, 
amongst others).  
  The publication of King I was preceded by important domestic and international 
developments. Domestically, it coincided with an unprecedented deep-seated social and 
political transformation in South Africa. South Africa was preparing to hold its first multi-
racial elections in 1994 following the collapse of Apartheid. Internationally, corporate 
governance had become an issue of great international concern, preceding well-publicised 
cases regarding the collapse of major international corporations, such as Bank of Credit and 
Commerce and the Maxwell Communications Corporation, in the UK and elsewhere (e.g., 
Barrier, 2003; Mallin, 2006, 2007; Solomon, 2007).  
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There were widespread suspicions that poor corporate governance practices had played 
a central role in causing these corporate failures (e.g., Cadbury Report, 1992; Jones and Pollitt, 
2004; Solomon, 2007). This ignited major reforms that influenced the way corporations were 
governed worldwide. The UK, for example, responded by establishing a Corporate 
Governance Committee in 1991 to prepare a Code of Best Corporate Practice for UK listed 
firms. In 1992, the recommendations of the UK Cadbury Report on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance were published. The recommendations focused on the control and 
division of responsibilities among top management, and on the role of auditors. 
With increasing domestic and international interests in corporate governance, the King 
Committee on Corporate Governance was formed in 1992 as a voluntary and private initiative 
at the instigation of the Southern African Institute of Directors (e.g., Rossouw et al., 2002; 
Armstrong et al., 2006). The main purpose of the King Committee (named after its chair, 
Mervyn King), was to consider how to promote the highest standards of corporate governance 
in South Africa (King Report, 2002, p.5). Specifically, the Committee was required to make 
recommendations on a Code of Practice in terms of the financial, ethical and environmental 
aspects of corporate governance in South Africa (e.g., Malherbe and Segal, 2003; Rossouw et 
al., 2002).  
After extensive deliberations, the Committee published its final report in November 
1994. In general, King I adopted many of the corporate governance standards and principles 
that had already been advocated in a plethora of national and international codes that were 
already in existence (e.g., Rossouw, et al., 2002; Armstrong et al., 2006; Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009). In particular, the recommendations of the report were heavily informed by that 
of the UK’s Cadbury Report of 1992, especially regarding its suggestions on internal corporate 
governance structures (see Table 2; West, 2006, 2009).  
Unlike Cadbury, however, it advocated an ‘integrated’ approach to corporate 
governance. It also went beyond Cadbury’s main principles of accountability, integrity and 
openness to include fairness and responsibility. This gives King I a stakeholder rather than 
shareholder orientation (see Table 2; West, 2006, 2009). This means that firms should go 
beyond the financial and regulatory aspects of corporate governance to taking into 
consideration the interests of a wide range of stakeholders (King Report, 2002, para. 5).  
  
59
Table 2: A Comparison of Internal Corporate Governance Provisions of the Cadbury, King I and II Reports 
Internal Governance Provisions 1992 Cadbury Report 1994 King Report (King I) 2002 King Report (King II) 
Board and Directors: 
Board structure 
     Non-executive directors 
Independent non-exec. directors 
     Role duality 
Chairperson independence 
     Board meetings 
Board committees 
     Director/insider share dealings 
 
Unitary board 
     At least three 
At least two 
     Split chairperson and CEO 
Non-executive director 
     Frequently/Regularly 
Audit, remuneration & nomination 
Not specified  
 
Unitary board 
     At least two 
Not specified 
     Split Chairperson and CEO 
Non-executive director 
     At least once every quarter 
Audit & Remuneration 
     Not specified 
 
Unitary board 
     Majority of board members 
Majority of non-executive directors 
     Split Chairperson and CEO 
Independent non-executive director 
     At least once every quarter 
Audit, remuneration & nomination 
     Prohibits insider trading 
Risk management, internal audit 
and control: 
   Risk management 
        Internal audit 
   Internal control system 
 
 
Not covered 
     Establish internal audit function  
Establish internal control system 
 
 
Not covered 
     Establish internal audit function 
Establish internal control system 
 
 
Risk management/committee 
     Establish internal audit function 
Establish internal control system 
Accounting and Auditing: 
   Auditing 
       Accounting/financial reporting 
 
Audit committee/auditors 
     Accounting standards (GAAP) 
 
Audit committee/auditors 
     Accounting standards (GAAP) 
 
Audit committee/internal auditor 
      Accounting standards/IFRS 
Integrated sustainability Reporting: 
   Ethics 
        Environment 
  Health and safety 
       Affirmative/employment equity 
  Black empowerment 
      HIV/AIDS 
 
Code of ethics 
     Not covered 
Not covered 
     Not covered 
Not covered 
     Not covered 
 
Code of ethics 
     Environment 
Health and safety 
     Affirmative action 
Not covered 
     Not covered 
 
Code of ethics 
     Environment 
Health and safety 
     Employment equity 
Black empowerment 
     HIV 
Compliance and enforcement: Board, institutional/shareholders   
     and auditors  
Board, institutional/shareholders  
     and Auditors 
Board, institutional/shareholders,  
     auditors, the courts, financial   
press, and peer pressure  
Code Principles: Openness, integrity and    
     Accountability 
Accountability, fairness,  
     Responsibility and transparency 
Accountability, discipline, fairness,  
     independence, responsibility, 
social responsibility & transparency  
Kind of Corporate Governance: Financial aspects of governance Integrated corporate governance Inclusive corporate governance 
Compliance or Regulation: Voluntary or self-regulation Voluntary or self-regulation Voluntary or self-regulation 
Sources: Compiled from the 1992 Cadbury Report; 1994 and 2002 King Reports.   
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In particular, the code tasked South African companies to take into account the current 
circumstances that existed in South Africa. It urged South African companies to morally and 
ethically recognise the unique socio-economic and political context (in an environment of 
mass unemployment, AIDS epidemic and stark poverty), within which they operate (e.g., 
Rampersad, 2006; Vaughn and Ryan, 2006). Further, it also proposed that companies should 
consider stakeholder reporting without lowering the quality thereof, while facilitating the entry 
of business leaders from previously disadvantaged communities (e.g., Rossouw et al., 2002; 
West, 2006, 2009). 
In the next subsection, the specific internal corporate governance structures imposed 
by King I will be discussed. Comparisons will be drawn with the provisions of the 1992 
Cadbury Report.  
 
3.3.2.2 Corporate Governance Structures Imposed on Companies by King I 
 
 This subsection describes the internal corporate governance structures imposed by the 
1994 King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (King I). Specifically, the 
structures are divided into six main parts. They include board and directors, risk management, 
internal audit and control, accounting and auditing, integrated sustainability reporting/non-
financial information, and compliance and enforcement. The six structures will subsequently 
be evaluated at subsection 3.3.2.3.   
   
i) Board and Directors 
 
 King I recommended that every South African company should be headed by an 
effective board. Consistent with the Cadbury Report (1992, hereafter also called ‘Cadbury’), it 
advocated an Anglo-American style unitary board of executive and non-executive directors, 
who are primarily responsible for directing and controlling the corporation (see Table 2; King 
Report, 1994, para. 2.1). They are also severally and jointly accountable to shareholders.  
It recognised the key role that company chairpersons play in securing good corporate 
governance. This includes ensuring that non-performing directors are not re-elected and have 
their services terminated (King Report, 1994, para. 4.3). Due to their immense role and in line 
with Cadbury, King I suggested that the positions of chairman and CEO of South African 
companies should be held by different persons (see Table 2; Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 
2002). It argued that such a separation was necessary for the achievement of clear division of 
responsibilities at the head of the company. It will also result in a considerable reduction in the 
  
61 
concentration of power and authority such that no one individual has unbridled power in 
company decisions.  
Like Cadbury, it emphasised the special importance of non-executive directors in 
setting and maintaining high standards of corporate governance (see King Report, 1994; 
Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002). In particular, it noted the independence and 
experience that non-executive directors bring to issues of strategy, performance, resources, 
major appointments and standards of conduct (King Report, 1994, para. 4.1). Unlike Cadbury, 
but in line with the South African Companies Act, it recommended that company boards 
should have at least two rather than three non-executive directors of adequate calibre and 
independence. This will ensure that their opinions will carry weight in board decisions (see 
Table 2; King Report, 1994, para. 2.2). Also, and unlike Cadbury, which specified that at least 
two of the non-executive directors should be independent, King I did not define any number of 
independent non-executive directors. Like Cadbury, however, it did not also specify whether 
the chairman should be independent non-executive director or not. 
With regards to board sub-committees, it recognised the crucial role that they play in 
achieving efficient and effective corporate boards. Similar to the Cadbury Report, King I 
suggested that every board should have remuneration and audit committees (see Table 2; King 
Report, 1994, para. 6.1). Also, and in line with the South African Companies Act, it suggested 
that the audit and remuneration committees must consist of at least two non-executive 
directors, with a majority of its members, including the chairman of the committees, being 
non-executive directors.  
Unlike Cadbury, however, it suggested that the selection and appointment of directors 
should be matters for the board as a whole. As such, King I did not recommend the 
establishment of nomination committees (see Table 2; King Report, 1994, para. 5.1). Similarly, 
while Cadbury recommended that the majority of the audit committee members should be 
independent non-executive directors, King I did not specify any number. 
Finally, King I expressed concerns as to whether there were sufficient pool of 
candidates in South Africa with the necessary skills and knowledge to fill directors’ positions 
(Rossouw et al., 2002, p.297). As a solution, it proposed that new board appointees go through 
a period of training and induction with regard to the company’s business, resources, systems 
and management structure. It also noted that the existence of pyramidical structures and large 
family controlled companies that were listed on the JSE may also hinder compliance. Overall, 
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King I acknowledged that, because of specific circumstances prevailing in South Africa, some 
of the principles might not be adhered to in some cases (Rossouw et al., 2002, p.297).  
 
ii) Risk Management, Internal Audit and Control 
  
Similar to Cadbury, and under section 10, King I placed emphasis on the need for 
companies to have a well-resourced internal audit and control units. It pointed out that internal 
auditors are complementary to, but different from, that of the outside auditors. As such, it 
encouraged companies to establish internal audit functions to undertake regular monitoring of 
key controls and procedures. For example, and under paragraph 10.2, King I urged internal 
audit units to undertake investigations on behalf of the audit committee and to follow up any 
suspicion of fraud. Further, to maintain their independence, King I suggested that the heads of 
internal audit should have unfettered access to the chairman of the audit committee. 
With regard to internal controls, King I accepted the principle laid down by Cadbury that 
an effective internal control system is an essential part of the efficient management of a 
company. In this case, King I granted directors two mandates. Firstly, and in line with the 
South African Companies Act, it mandated directors to maintain a system of internal control 
over the financial management of the company, including procedures to reduce the incidence 
of fraud. Secondly, and distinct from the South African Companies Act, it mandated directors 
to report on the effectiveness of their system of internal control. External auditors should also 
express their ‘true and fair’ view on the directors’ statement in the annual report. Like 
Cadbury, King I did not explicitly specify how issues of risks should be addressed or 
integrated in the company. 
 
iii) Accounting and Auditing 
 
 Similar to Cadbury, and under section 10, King I made several recommendations 
regarding accounting and auditing for South African firms to follow. With reference to 
accounting, King I suggested that South African firms should prepare their financial reports in 
line with Generally Accepted Accounting Practices as recommended by the JSE’s Listings 
Rules and the South African Accounting Standards Board. In this regard, it placed four main 
responsibilities on directors. Firstly, it mandated directors to prepare financial statements for 
every financial year which give true and fair view of the state affairs of the company (or 
group).  
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Secondly, and similar to the South African Companies Act, directors must maintain 
adequate accounting records. Thirdly, they must confirm that suitable accounting policies and 
standards have been consistently applied in preparing the financial reports. Also, in applying 
accounting standards, substance should always take precedence over form. In particular, it 
must be easily comprehensible, transparent and maintain the integrity of financial reports.  
Finally, directors must express their opinion as to whether the business will continue to 
operate as a ‘going-concern’ for the foreseeable future. In this case, the board is expected to 
fully state the facts and assumptions used in their assessment of the ‘going-concern’ status of 
the company at the end of a financial year. This should also help the external auditor in 
forming his/her ‘true and fair’ view of the company’s ‘going-concern’ status. This is expected 
to help in generating serious deliberation in board meetings, bearing in mind the liabilities that 
inappropriate assessment or misreporting of the company’s financial position could incur. 
 In this respect, King I suggested that the audit committee must play a critical role in 
ensuring the integrity of the financial reports. Firstly, and as described above, the audit 
committee must be composed in a way that enables non-executive directors to contribute 
independent judgement. Secondly, the committee must review the financial statements. 
Thirdly, the finance director and the head of internal audit must attend the audit committee 
meetings to answer questions on any issues of concern that are raised. Finally, the external 
auditor must also have unrestricted access to the board chairman, management, the audit 
committee and the chairman of the audit committee.  
 
iv) Integrated Sustainability Reporting/Non-financial Information 
 
 The explicit requirement for firms to engage in stakeholder reporting is what 
distinguishes King I from Cadbury or other Anglo-American corporate governance codes (e.g., 
Armstrong et al., 2006; West, 2006, 2009). Under sections 12 and 13, King I made several 
recommendations regarding affirmative action and stakeholder rights. Stakeholder issues 
covered include contribution to the community, health and safety, environment and fair 
employment practices (see Table 2; King Report, 1994, para. 12.1). It must be emphasised that 
these stakeholder provisions were largely aspirational with no legal backing. In line with 
Cadbury, and under section 13, King I also made recommendations with regard to 
organisational ethics. It did not, however, address black economic empowerment, HIV/Aids, 
and employment equity issues. 
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 With respect to investment in local communities, it tasked firms to assess the peculiar 
needs of the communities within which they operate. The identified needs must then be 
‘integrated’ into the companies’ policies and goals. These contributions could be in the form 
of improving access to portable water. In consultation with local communities’ leaders, they 
may, for example, decide to construct or renovate local schools and health centres. They may 
also contribute to charitable courses that will benefit local communities. For example, they can 
make donations to local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that offer essential services, 
like affordable housing. 
 With reference to fair employment practices, King I suggested that the firms should 
work towards addressing historical racial imbalances in the workplace. These include 
contributing to employee skills developments and upholding labour and employee rights. In 
particular, they must avoid discrimination and harassment across a range of issues, such as 
ethnicity, religion and gender.  
In relation to health and safety, King I recommended that every company must provide 
safe and healthy working environment. For example, training, tools and protective gadgets 
must be provided to reduce workplace accidents and fatalities. In connection with the 
environment, King I suggested that sustainable development requires a constant awareness and 
respect for the conservation of the environment. In this regard, it suggested that companies 
should carry out regular environmental impact assessments to identify and adequately address 
any negative consequences of their operations. More importantly, King I proposed that the 
government can introduce more detailed legislation with regards to labour relations, health and 
safety, the environment, and issues of transformation that will be legally binding on firms. 
Finally, and with reference to ethics, King I urged every firm to prepare a Code of Ethics 
to guide the dealings of directors, management and all employees. Such a Code should be 
based on the principles of accountability, fairness, responsibility and transparency. Under 
subsection 13.2, King I sets four main criteria to be satisfied. Firstly, the Code must commit 
the firm to the highest standards of behaviour. Secondly, it must be developed in such a way 
as to involve all its stakeholders so that it can be infused into its culture. In this respect, it must 
define its obligations towards employees, owners, creditors, suppliers, customers and local 
communities. Thirdly, the Code must receive total commitment from the board and CEO of 
the company. Finally, it must be sufficiently detailed as to give a clear guide to the expected 
behaviour of all employees.  
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v) Compliance and Enforcement 
 
 Similar to Cadbury, King I also supported the principle of self-regulation or voluntary 
compliance (see Table 2; King Report, 1994, para. 9.2). Specifically, it suggested that the 
responsibility for putting the Code into practice laid directly with boards of directors of listed 
firms, but indirectly with auditors and shareholders. That is, King I charged corporate boards 
with the responsibility of ensuring that their firms comply with all applicable laws, regulations, 
rules, and standards. As has been pointed out above, the Code was appended to the JSE’s 
Listings Rules, which required directors of listed firms to make a positive statement on the 
level of compliance. The board of directors must also identify and explain any areas of non-
compliance. External Auditors are expected to offer their fair view on the extent to which the 
provisions of King I have been applied.  
King I also suggested that shareholders, and especially local and foreign institutional 
shareholders, as primary stakeholders, should actively seek to positively influence their 
companies to comply with the Code. In this regard, companies are encouraged to enter into a 
sustainable dialogue, based on constructive engagement and the mutual understanding of 
objectives, with institutional investors. They must also seek to enforce their rights as enshrined 
under the South African Companies Act, such as attending, voting and asking pertinent 
questions at annual general meetings. Finally, to strengthen voluntary compliance, the JSE 
revised its Listings Rules in 1995 and 2000 to encourage diffused ownership of listed firms 
(Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.195; Armstrong et al., 2006, p.214). This was intended to 
strengthen the markets for corporate control and managerial labour. 
 
3.3.2.3 Evaluation: Major Achievements and Weaknesses of King I 
 
It has been widely acknowledged that King I was instrumental in raising the awareness 
of what constitutes good corporate governance in South Africa (e.g., King Report, 2002; 
Malherbe and 2003; Armstrong et al., 2006). In particular, it has been argued that it offered 
companies, for the first time, a coherent corporate governance framework that was 
comparatively relevant to the unique South African context (Armstrong et al., 2006, p.214). 
King I was able to differentiate itself from the existing Anglo-American corporate governance 
codes by going beyond traditional financial aspects of corporate governance to covering non-
financial issues, such as ethics and the environment (King Report, 2002, para. 4; West, 2009, 
p.12). However, and as will be discussed in the next subsection, the non-financial issues were 
covered in far less detail or with less clarity (Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.193). Despite being 
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less detailed in its coverage of non-financial issues, King I still represented an early attempt to 
explicitly adopt the integrated approach and require firms to engage in stakeholder reporting 
among the Anglo-American countries (Mallin, 2007, p.57). In fact, according to Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2009, pp.379-380), King I was the sixth code of corporate governance in the 
world (coming after the US, 1978; Hong Kong, 1989; Ireland, 1991; UK, 1992; and Canada, 
1993), and the first of its kind in the developing world. 
More importantly, and as will also be described in the next subsection, its suggestions 
helped in bringing about substantial future corporate structural and affirmative action 
legislative reforms (e.g., King Report, 2002; Rossouw et al., 2002). It helped to improve 
standards of corporate governance among South African firms. For example, Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia (CLSA) conducted a survey of corporate governance standards of 495 firms in 
25 emerging markets in 2000. The survey ranked South Africa as the fifth emerging market 
with good corporate governance structures (King Report, 2002, para.15; CLSA, 2000, p.69). 
As will be discussed further in subsection 3.3.3.3, it also encouraged the JSE to introduce 
more rigorous Listings Rules, especially regarding director remuneration and ownership of 
listed firms, including the requirement for director interests, remuneration, and 
shareownership to be fully disclosed in the annual report (JSE Listings Rules, 2007, 
subsections 3.83, 4.25-8, 7.A.23-7, 7.B.18-21).  
Despite these achievements, King I suffered from several weaknesses and deviations 
from Cadbury. Firstly, and unlike Cadbury, while King I recognised the importance of board 
subcommittees, it failed to recommend for the establishment of a nomination committee (see 
Table 2; Rossouw et al., 2002, p.297). Such a committee would have nominated new 
independent directors for appointment to the board, which would have arguably improved 
board independence. This undermined board functions where true independence from 
management was required (Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.193).  
Secondly, King I was unable to insist on a truly independent non-executive director to 
chair South African corporate boards (see Table 2; Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.193).  This 
deviation from Cadbury also impaired board independence and increased potential conflicts of 
interests (Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.192). Similarly, King I did not address the crucial 
issues of risk management and insider trading among directors and officers. 
Thirdly, while King I called for the establishment of a remuneration committee, it 
failed to establish the economic rationale or specific rules that should guide firms in 
determining the level of their directors’ remuneration. In this case, it failed to sway away the 
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concerns of shareholders and the general public about director and executive remuneration 
(Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002, p.306; Sarra, 2004, pp.8-10).  
Fourthly, while King I recognised the need for effective corporate boards, however, it 
was unable to determine a coherent framework for objectively evaluating, reporting and 
improving the effectiveness of corporate boards and their sub-committees. Similarly, non-
executive directors are valued for their independence in business judgement and protection of 
shareholder interests (Cadbury Report, 1992, para. 4.12). However, and unlike Cadbury, King 
I neither sets out a test for determining independence nor provides a clear classification of 
non-executive directors. 
Fifthly, King I purported to promote the so-called ‘integrated’ approach to corporate 
governance. However, it could not clearly articulate in philosophical and theoretical terms the 
type of corporate governance model that the ‘integrated’ approach is (e.g., Kakabadse and 
Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Spisto, 2005). Like Cadbury, King I placed continuous emphasis on 
the need for companies and directors to be primarily accountable and responsible to 
shareholders. Distinct from Cadbury, it also formally encouraged them to be sensitive to the 
interests of wider stakeholder groups, such as employees and local communities. This suggests 
that King I attempted to advance the ‘instrumental or inclusive’ stakeholding corporate 
governance model as has been described in chapter two.  
The consequence of King I’s inability to clearly articulate that it was promoting the 
‘inclusive’ corporate governance model is that it was unable to directly relate its 
recommendations to the South African context as it sought to do. For example, it could not 
firmly relate its recommendations to the major contextual issues of HIV/AIDS, black 
economic empowerment, and employment equity (see Table 2; Rossouw et al., 2002). Finally, 
King I was criticised for having extensive non-corporate governance content, and sometimes 
vague stipulations on employee participation, stakeholder engagement, and a code of ethics 
(Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.193). According to Malherbe and Segal (2003, p.193), the 
extensive non-corporate governance content of King I might have resulted in the slow 
adoption of its provisions among listed firms. 
As a result of these limitations and other international and local developments, the 
2002 King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (King II) was introduced as an 
improvement on King I. In the next subsections, the origins and internal corporate governance 
provisions, especially with respect to improvements on King I will be described.   
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3.3.3 The 2002 King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (‘King II’) 
 
3.3.3.1 Origins/Background 
 
Similar to King I, both domestic and international developments since its release in 
November 1994 prompted the revision of corporate governance in South Africa. The revision 
resulted in the publication of a second King Report (‘King II’) on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa in March 2002. 
 
i) Domestic Developments 
 
Domestically, since 1994, South Africa had experienced a second peaceful election 
and inaugurated its second president with official parliamentary opposition. This showed that 
South Africa had truly embraced a vibrant multiracial and multiparty political democracy (e.g., 
Rossouw et al., 2002; Malherbe and Segal, 2003). Contrary to genuine pre-transition anxieties 
of corporate South Africa about the future status of the market economy, a free market 
economic model had been firmly endorsed by the new government through its neo-liberal 
economic policy of encouraging growth, employment, and redistribution (the GEAR strategy) 
(e.g., Malherbe and Segal, 2003; Armstrong et al., 2006). As the promotion of a market 
economy took centre stage, a new breed of local shareholders emerged. Weaknesses in 
corporate governance, including visible omissions in King I, were identified and criticised 
(Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.162).   
Also, a number of affirmative action and stakeholder laws had been introduced. These 
included the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1993, Labour Relations Act 1995, Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act 1997, National Environmental Management Act 1998, 
Employment Equity Act 1998, and later the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 
2003 (King Report, 2002, para. 10). These had been proposed by King I and were aimed at 
addressing some of the negative social and economic legacies of Apartheid in South Africa.  
As has has been explained above, the Insider Trading Act of 1998 had also been 
introduced to offer a more rigorous regulation of directors’ and officers’ share dealings. These 
legislative changes needed to be incorporated into the governance of mainstream corporations. 
In addition to legislative developments, South Africa had experienced a number of high profile 
domestic corporate failures. These included Macmed, Leisurenet and Regal Treasury Bank 
(e.g., Sarra, 2004; Armstrong et al., 2006). These corporate failures were mainly attributed to 
poor corporate governance practices of directors and senior management.  
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ii) International Developments 
 
Internationally, investors had lost billions of dollars during the 1997 and 1998 Asian 
economic crisis. The crisis demonstrated that macro-economic difficulties could be worsened 
by systematic failure of corporate governance resulting from ineffective oversight by 
corporate boards and scant recognition of the rights of minority shareowners (King Report, 
2002, para. 22). Similarly, with South Africa’s increasing participation in the global economy, 
international investors’ returned. Upon their return, investors and especially foreign 
institutional investors heavily criticised poor corporate governance structures (Malherbe and 
Segal, 2003, p.162). Similarly, in a survey conducted by the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia, 
South Africa did well in overall corporate governance, but rated poorly in terms of disclosure 
and transparency (King Report, 2002, para.15; CLSA, 2000, p.69). 
Also, during the intervening years, a number of key international corporate governance 
codes had been released. In the UK, the Combined Code was published in 1998. It addressed 
board issues, remuneration, the role of shareholders and financial reporting, but did not cover 
stakeholder issues, such as worker participation and employment equity. The Commonwealth 
Association for Corporate Governance (CACG) published its Principles of Corporate 
Governance in the Commonwealth aimed at facilitating best business practices and behaviour 
(CACG, 1999). In the same year, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) published its Principles of Corporate Governance.  
Finally, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) also launched an exposure draft of its 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines in 1999 and the first full version in 2000. The GRI is an 
international reporting guideline that seeks to move corporate reporting from a conventional 
‘single-bottom line’ to a ‘triple bottom line’ reporting (King Report, 2002, p.275). It required 
economic (financial), social and environmental (non-financial) reporting to multi-stakeholders, 
including shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, government and local 
communities, amongst others.  
 
iii) The King II Committee and Mandate   
 
In response to these developments, and again under the auspices of the Southern 
African Institute of Directors, a second King Committee on Corporate Governance (King II) 
was formed in August 2000. It was also supported by the JSE, the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa and the major accounting firms, amongst others.  The Committee’s main 
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mandate was to review corporate governance standards and practices in the light of domestic 
and international developments since 1994 for South Africa. 
Five major specialist task teams, comprising of individuals representing a cross-section 
of South African business and society were established to deal with (1) boards and directors, 
(2) accounting and auditing, (3) internal audit, control and risk management, (4) integrated 
sustainability reporting, and (5) compliance and enforcement (King Report, 2002, para. 30). A 
draft copy was first issued in July 2001 for public debate and consultation. A final copy was 
issued in March 2002. 
 
iv) The General Scope of King II  
 
King II is a 354 page comprehensive document divided into six broad sections, 
including board and directors, risk management, internal audit, integrated sustainability 
reporting, accounting and auditing, and compliance and enforcement. It builds on and expands 
King I’s fundamental corporate governance principles of accountability, fairness, 
responsibility and transparency to include discipline, independence and social responsibility 
(King Report, 2002, para.18).  
It replaces King I’s ‘integrated’ corporate governance approach with an ‘inclusive or 
instrumental’ corporate governance approach throughout the report (King Report, 2002, para. 
5). As has been discussed in chapter two, the inclusive approach to corporate governance 
attempts to recognise the interests of a wider range of stakeholders without subverting the 
primary interests of shareholders as the residual owners of the firm. In this respect, King II 
tasks company boards to consider not only the regulatory aspects, but also investors, media, 
customers, suppliers, consumers, employees and local communities, amongst others (King 
Report, 2002, para. 5.2).  
Unlike King I, King II offers a clear guideline as to how the ‘inclusive’ corporate 
governance can be implemented in practice (King Report, 2002, para. 6). Firstly, the purpose 
of the company must be defined. Secondly, the values by which the company will carry out its 
daily activities should be identified and communicated to all stakeholders. Finally, the 
stakeholders relevant to the company’s business should also be identified. As a practical guide, 
it appends with permission, the Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) as a yardstick by which 
companies may measure the extent to which the ‘inclusive’ approach has been applied in their 
operations.  
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Another expansion on King I is that King II encourages South African firms to ensure 
that their governance structures reflect the value system of African societies and personality 
(King Report, 2002, para. 38). As will be noted further below, these include spiritual 
collectiveness over individualism, consensus building rather than dissension, humility and 
helpfulness over criticism and the spirit of “ubuntu” (humanity, peaceful co-existence and 
brotherliness), amongst others. King II points out that this is an attempt to recognise the 
diversity that exists in South Africa in relation to culture, religion and ethnicity. Companies 
and boards operating in South Africa need to take into account when defining their internal 
and external corporate ethos and conduct.  
 
3.3.3.2 Corporate Governance Structures Imposed on Companies by King II 
 
 This subsection describes the internal corporate governance structures imposed by the 
2002 King Report (King II). Specifically, the structures are divided into six main parts. They 
include board and directors, risk management, internal audit and control, accounting and 
auditing, integrated sustainability reporting, and compliance and enforcement. Also, only 
improvements on King I will be described. The challenges facing King II will be finally 
discussed in subsection 3.3.3.3.   
 
i) Board and Directors 
 
King II proposes several changes with regards to board composition. Firstly, instead of 
two non-executive directors, King II recommends that the board should preferably consist of a 
majority of non-executive directors. A majority of the non-executive directors should also be 
independent of management so that shareholders interests (including minority interests) can be 
better protected (see Table 2; King Report 2002, para. 2.2). The board must be of sufficient 
size and diversity in terms of skills (profession, occupation, and experience), as well as 
demographics (age, race, ethnicity, and gender) to improve its effectiveness. Secondly, to 
ensure balance of power and authority in company decision-making, the chairman of the board 
should be an independent non-executive director (see Table 2; King Report, 2002, para. 2.3).  
Thirdly, a nomination committee, in addition to remuneration and audit committees, 
must be formed. A related departure from King I is that all three sub-board committees must 
be chaired by independent non-executive directors. Unlike King I, King II recommends that 
the remuneration committee must consist entirely of independent non-executive directors. The 
nomination committee must also consist of a majority of independent non-executive directors. 
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Similar to King I, the board must meet regularly, at least once a quarter. Also, individual 
director’s membership and attendance of all board and subcommittees meetings must be fully 
disclosed in the annual report (King Report, 2002, para. 2.1 and 2.2).  
Fourthly, the chairman, the chief executive officer, the subcommittee chairpersons, as 
well as the individual directors’ performance must be independently assessed on an annual 
basis. Unlike King I, King II offers a clear classification of directors into executive, non-
executive and independent non-executive directors with a strict definition 6  of director 
independence (King Report, 2002, para. 2.4).  
 Fifthly, the remuneration, interests and share options of every director, as well as the 
formal rationale and philosophical basis for director and executive remuneration must be fully 
disclosed.  The general principle is that remuneration levels should be sufficient to attract, 
retain and motivate directors and executives of the quality required by the board. Specifically, 
firms are encouraged to ensure that the performance-related elements of directors’ 
remuneration constitute a substantial part of their remuneration package. This will help in 
aligning their interests with shareholders.  
Any award of share options to directors, however, must be subject to the approval of 
shareholders at an annual general meeting. Finally, King II recommends that every listed 
company should have a practice of prohibiting dealings in its securities by directors, officers 
and other selected employees. This should be for a designated period preceding the 
announcement of its financial results or any other price sensitive information (see Table 2; 
King Report, 2002, para. 2.9). 
 
ii) Risk Management, Internal Audit and Control 
 
The introduction of risk management represents the main improvement of King II over 
King I under this section. King II offers clear-cut guidelines which place the responsibility for 
the total process of risk management under the remit of the board of directors (see Table 2; 
King Report, 2002, para. 3.1). The guidelines also charge the board to develop their risk 
                                                 
6Briefly, an executive director is an individual who is involved in the day-to-day management and/or is in full-
time salaried employment of the company or its subsidiaries. A non-executive director is an individual not 
involved in the day-to-day management and not full-time salaried employee of the company or its subsidiaries. 
Independent director is a non-executive director who: (1) is not a representative of a shareholder; (2) has not been 
employed in any executive capacity for the preceding three financial years; (3) is not a member of the immediate 
family of an individual who is, or has not been employed by the company in an executive position in the past 
three financial years; (4) is not a professional advisor to the company; (5) is not a significant supplier to or 
customer of the company; (6) has no significant contractual relationship with the company, as well as (7) is free 
from any business or other relationship which could be seen to materially interfere with the individual’s capacity 
to act in an independent manner (King Report, 2002, para. 2.4). 
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strategies and policies in conjunction with executive directors and senior management. In 
contrast, management is responsible for implementing and monitoring the process of risk 
management and integrating it into the day-to-day activities of the company.  
The board must set out the company’s risk tolerance level, and assesses its current and 
future risks profile on the basis of various categories. These include physical, technology, 
credit, market, operational, human, resources, regulatory and legal risks. A major departure 
from King I is that a risk management committee consisting of executive and non-executive 
directors, and chaired by a non-executive director should be appointed. The committee should 
help the board in reviewing the risk management process and the significant risks facing the 
company. Further, in addition to the company’s other compliance and enforcement activities, 
the board should establish a confidential reporting process (whistle-blowing) covering fraud 
and other risks. Finally, it requires firms to provide a comprehensive disclosure regarding the 
assessment of current and future risks in their annual reports.  
 
iii) Accounting and Auditing 
 
With regard to accounting and auditing, King II recommended three main improvements 
in King I. Firstly, it raised or elevated the profile and the powers of the audit committee 
chairman. The chairman of the audit committee should be an independent non-executive 
director. The independent chairman of the audit committee must also not be the chairman of 
the main board. The audit committee must consist of a majority of independent non-executive 
directors. The majority of the members of the audit committee should also be financially 
literate. Like the chairpersons of the nomination and remuneration committees, the audit 
committee chairman must attend the company’s annual general meeting to answer questions 
from shareholders (King Report, 2002, para. 2.7).  
Secondly, it calls for companies to disclose any non-audit or consulting services rendered 
by its external audit firm, so that it can be examined for any potential conflict of interests 
(King Report, 2002, para. 6.1). Finally, and with regards to financial reporting, King II 
suggests that South African firms should prepare towards adopting the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) as may be recommended by the JSE’s Listings Rules. South 
Africa and the JSE formally adopted the IFRS framework in 2005 (Armstrong et al., 2006, 
p.219). However, listed firms have up to the end of 2007 financial year to fully adopt the IFRS 
framework (JSE Listings Rules, 2007, subsections 8.3, 8.62, 8.7, 8.10). 
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iv) Integrated Sustainability Reporting 
 
Similar to King I, the requirement for firms to report on an integrated sustainability 
basis has been acknowledged as what truly distinguishes King II from similar Anglo-
American corporate governance codes (e.g., Armstrong, 2006; Vaughn and Ryan, 2006; 
Andreasson, 2009; West, 2006, 2009)7.  King II suggests several important improvements on 
King I in terms integrated sustainability reporting (see Table 2; King Report, 2002, para. 5).  
Firstly, in addition to health and safety, the environment and ethics, King II recommends that 
every firm must report on the nature and extent of progress made on employment equity, 
HIV/AIDS, social investment and transformation (black economic empowerment) (King 
Report, 2002, para. 5).  
Secondly, and unlike King I which did not specify any time-frame for reporting, King 
II suggests that reporting must be done at least once a year. In this respect, King II sets three 
levels of reporting in the annual report by directors. First, directors must disclose the policies 
and practices they have in place. Second, they must disclose how they are implementing the 
disclosed policies and practices. Finally, the disclosure must demonstrate the resultant changes 
and benefits to their stakeholders.  
Thirdly, apart from setting out the general framework for reporting on each stakeholder 
issue, King II requires companies to refer to the relevant stakeholder and affirmative action 
legislation for detailed guidelines. With respect to employment equity, King II mandates every 
firm to invest in human capital. This must be targeted at achieving equity and diversity in 
terms of staff numbers, training, age, ethnicity and gender (King Report, 2002, para. 5.1.4). In 
particular, every company should address issues that create conditions and opportunities for 
previously disadvantaged individuals (especially women) an equal opportunity to reach 
executive levels in the company.  
In this case, every firm is required to comply with provisions of the Employment 
Equity Act 1998. Generally, the Act aims to identify and eliminate all employment barriers, 
including unfair discrimination, which adversely affect people from designated groups 8 . 
Specifically, the Act prohibits direct or indirect unfair discrimination on any grounds, 
                                                 
7 Despite the evidence that reporting on corporate social responsibilities in Anglo-American countries has 
experienced a substantial increase over the past decade (West, 2009, p.15), the London Stock Exchange, for 
example, has strongly opposed requiring UK listed firms to formally report on corporate social responsibility 
(LSE, 2007, pp.98-99). The LSE has argued that making corporate social responsibility reporting mandatory will 
be an excessive cost burden for listed firms. 
8The Act defines designated groups as black people, women and people with disabilities. ‘Black people’ is a 
generic term which means Africans, Coloureds and Indians. A designated employer is a person or an organisation 
that employs 50 or more employees (see section 1, Employment Equity Act, 1998). 
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including race, sex, HIV status, religion, disability, pregnancy and language, amongst many 
others.  
The Act also allows firms to distinguish, exclude or prefer any person on the basis of 
an inherent requirement of a job. For example, under section 15, every designated employer 
must work towards achieving a balance between their non-white and white workforce across 
all levels of the organisational hierarchy. Crucially, the Act requires designated employers to 
submit progress reports annually to the Department of Labour. A firm can be subjected to 
criminal prosecution if it breaches the Act. 
In connection with transformation, the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Act 2003 proposes seven ways by which economic transformation can be achieved. These 
include equity ownership, management control, employment equity, skills development, 
preferential procurement, enterprise development and social investment. Firstly, the Act 
requires firms to encourage blacks or designated blacks to directly or indirectly acquire equity 
ownership. A general target for firms is that 25% of their equity should be held by designated 
black groups. However, targets differ on industrial basis. Currently, mining, media, forestry 
and construction have developed their own empowerment charters and scorecards (JSE 
Listings Rules, 2007, subsection 8.63, 12). Secondly, to address the low participation of blacks 
in executive management, the Act encourages firms to appoint qualified blacks into positions 
of influence.  
Thirdly, the Act empowers firms to engage in preferential procurement of raw 
materials and inputs from black enterprises9. They are allowed to acquire raw material from 
black enterprises even at higher costs than they may be acquired from white run enterprises. 
Finally, the Act encourages companies to directly invest in black enterprises and communities. 
They should also invest in skills development of their black employees by creating special 
training and mentoring opportunities. Similarly, every firm is required to submit an annual 
progress report to the Department of Trade and Industry. Unlike the Employment Equity Act, 
a firm cannot be prosecuted if it breaches the Act. This makes the provisions of the Act 
aspirational or voluntary rather than mandatory for companies to comply with.  
With regard to HIV/AIDS, there is no formal legislation. However, King II 
recommends that every firm should adopt plans and policies to explicitly address the potential 
impact of HIV/AIDS on its activities (King Report, 2002, para. 5.1.4). This may take the form 
                                                 
9The Act defines black enterprise as an enterprise that is at least 50.1% beneficially owned by Black People and 
which Black People have substantial management control. Such beneficial ownership may be held directly or 
indirectly through other black enterprises (see section 1, Black Economic Empowerment Act, 2003).  
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of encouraging voluntary staff testing to ascertain the prevalence rate among their workforce. 
It can also take the form of on-site health clinics to offer medical and psychological support, 
as well as educational campaigns to improve awareness. 
With respect to the environment and health and safety, King I mandates firms to 
comply with provisions of the National Environmental Management Act 1998 and 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1993, respectively. The Occupational Health and Safety 
Act requires firms to reduce workplace accidents and fatalities. They must set safety targets 
and work consistently towards reducing health and safety incidents. The National 
Environmental Management Act 1998 sets out good environmental standards and practices 
that firms are encouraged to comply with. In particular, the Act requires firms to conduct 
environmental impact assessment where potential negative consequences can be identified and 
addressed. Finally, and with regards to organisational ethics, King II did not make any visible 
changes over King I.  
Unlike King I, and as has been pointed out above, King II urges companies to report 
along the lines of the Global Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) triple-bottom reporting as a practical 
guide as to how the ‘inclusive’ stakeholder corporate governance can be implemented. 
 
v) Compliance and Enforcement 
 
Consistent with King I, King II also shares the Cadbury Report’s principle-based and 
qualitative approach to achieving compliance and enforcement of its corporate governance 
provisions (King Report, 2002, para. 2.2).  
In this regard, King II expands the compliance and enforcement stakeholders from the 
board of directors, auditors and shareholders to include the financial media, peer pressure and 
the existing legal system (King Report, 2002, para. 6). It calls on the investigative media, and 
in particular the financial press, to actively encourage compliance through constant monitoring 
of corporate conduct. This can be done through the revelation of corporate fraud, corruption 
and cronyism. They can also help in “naming and shaming” consistent violators of the Code. 
Companies are expected to contribute to the development of financial journalism, such as 
supporting training workshops and conferences for financial journalists. The Standard Bank of 
South Africa Ltd, for example, has been lauded by King II for running courses aimed at 
educating journalists in financial matters.  
Peer pressure can also be exerted from organised business in conjunction with the 
financial press against delinquent directors and managers as way a of promoting high 
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corporate governance standards. In fact, King II is meant to supplement rather than substitute 
the existing legal framework. In this regard, King II expects the existing legal and regulatory 
system to encourage compliance with the code. It calls on the conventional courts to enforce 
existing remedies for breaches of statutory laws, such as the Companies Act by delinquent 
directors and officers. Consistent with King I, King II was appended as part of the JSE’s 
Listings Rules for which all listed firms are expected to voluntarily comply or explain, in case 
of non-compliance (JSE Listings Rules, 2007, subsections, 3.84, 7.F.5-6; 8.63).  
 
3.3.3.3 Evaluation: Challenges of King II and the Shareholder Value Debate 
 
Despite gaining global recognition and receiving several endorsements from leading 
academics and policy-makers as an example of good corporate governance model in the world 
(e.g., Malherbe and Segal, 2003; Armstrong et al., 2006; Mallin, 2007; Andreasson, 2009), 
King II has been criticised. Most prominently, critics of King II argue that its insistence on 
South African companies to adopt the Anglo-American model, but equally tasking boards with 
meeting demanding stakeholder requirements, raises serious challenges (Kakabadse and 
Korac-Kakabadse, 2002, p.312; Spisto, 2005; West, 2006, 2009). At the centre of this local 
policy debate is whether this so-called hybrid10 corporate governance model is sufficiently 
robust to effectively pursue the contrasting agenda of maximising shareholder value and 
providing a meaningful protection of the interests of a larger stakeholder group (Kakabadse 
and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002, p.313; Spisto, 2005; Andreasson, 2009).  
For example, it has been suggested that the stakeholders’ requirements that King II 
imposes on firms, such as the promotion of black empowerment and employment equity can 
be more easily accommodated by a continental European-Asian model of corporate 
governance (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002, p.312). As has been discussed in chapter 
two, in a typical continental Europian-Asian corporate governance model, business and 
organisational issues are the remit of the executive board, while the broader stakeholder 
interests fall under the umbrella of the supervisory board. Spisto (2005) has also offered 
similar criticisms of King II. These criticisms may, however, be legitimate. This is because 
with increasing voluntary corporate social responsibilities reporting in Anglo-American 
                                                 
10It is described as a ‘hybrid’ corporate governance model because while it remains predominantly Anglo-
American, King II imposes substantial social, environmental, and ethical demands, compelling firms to depict 
some of the features of both the ‘stakeholding’ and ‘shareholding’ corporate governance models (e.g., Kakabadse 
and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Spisto, 2005; Andreasson, 2009; West, 2006, 2009). 
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countries, South Africa is likely to loose its uniqueness unless it adopts stakeholder corporate 
board structures (West, 2009, p.15). 
There are also serious concerns as to whether corporate and ownership structures are 
diffused enough to permit effective and efficient operation of factor markets in order to 
achieve voluntary compliance or self-regulation. Okeahalam (2004, p.7) points out, for 
example, that as a result of rigorous listings requirements11, ownership is now more dispersed. 
However, control of companies still remains fairly concentrated in the hands of the traditional 
founding families of Oppenheimer, Rupert Gordon, and Mennel and Hersov of large 
companies. 
 In addition to challenges regarding its effectiveness given the South African corporate 
context, King II has also received further criticisms. It has been criticised for inconsistencies 
and ambiguities in some aspects of its corporate governance proposals (e.g., Sarra, 2004; West, 
2006). Given its core objective of promoting the highest international corporate governance 
standards in South Africa (King Report, 2002, p.5), it is still unclear why King II calls for the 
exposition of African values and personality12, most of which are neither compatible with 
international corporate governance standards nor with the Anglo-American model (King 
Report, 2002, para. 18; Sarra, 2004; West, 2006). West (2006, p.441) argues, for example, that 
the African value of collectiveness and communal rights conflicts with the individual right to 
private property that is fundamental in a typical Anglo-American model. Similarly, the value 
of consensus building in decision-making also conflicts with corporate structures where 
directors are appointed by only one party (shareholders) and whose interests are typically 
elevated above those of other stakeholders (West, 2006, p.441).  
Recent empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that concerns raised by critics of 
King II, especially regarding its effectiveness in achieving some of the stakeholder objectives 
it sets out, may be right. In the case of black economic empowerment, for example, an 
emerging consensus is that it is not working as originally expected (e.g., Murray, 2000; Sarra, 
2004; Russell, 2007). Anecdotal evidence (e.g., Sarra, 2004; Russel, 2007) suggests that while 
                                                 
11As has been noted above, more rigorous listings requirements (there has been revisions in 1995, 2000, 2003, 
2005, and 2007) and corporate governance rules have caused a marked shrinkage in the number of companies 
listed on the JSE, falling from 668 companies in 1998, for example, to 426 in January 2004 (Armstrong et al., 
2006, p.221).  
12 As has been explained above, these African values include: spiritual collectiveness over individualism; 
consensus building rather than dissension; humility and helpfulness over criticisms; the spirit of ‘ubuntu’ 
(humanity, peaceful co-existence, and brotherliness); hierarchical political structure based on an inclusive system 
of consultation and respect for authority at various levels; and perpetual optimism due to the strong belief in a 
superior being in the form of the creator of mankind, and inherent trust and belief in fairness over discrimination 
and prejudice; amongst others (King Report, 2002, para. 38.1). 
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black empowerment has helped in creating a coterie of “rich black elite” usually with good 
connections to the ruling African National Congress, it has not addressed in any meaningful 
way the welfare of the vast majority of black people in South Africa. Similarly, in a study of 
three large black economic empowerment companies and five top South African companies, 
Murray (2000) reports that top business remains predominantly white, with few signs of black 
integration into top management or ownerships.  
Overall, the major challenge or weakness of King II is its proposition of a corporate 
governance model, in which companies need to satisfy shareholders’ demands by their ability 
to harness market forces, while by social and political dictates, require them to satisfy the 
interests of a wider stakeholder group (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002, p.312; Spisto, 
2005; West, 2006). While critics have called for a fundamental change, King II insists good 
corporate governance embraces both performance and conformance. It suggests that the 
challenge for South African companies is to seek the appropriate balance between the results 
of good entrepreneurship and enterprise (performance – corporate profitability) and constraints 
on corporate activity (conformance – corporate governance rules), which takes into account 
the expectations of shareholders and legitimate stakeholders alike (King Report, 2002, para. 
7.2).  
However, notwithstanding the South African context and given that King II is 
predominantly Anglo-American with emphasis on shareholder primacy, the a priori 
theoretical expectation will be that ‘better-governed’ firms should be associated with higher 
financial value than their ‘poorly-governed’ counterparts (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Black et al., 2006a). This is the central thesis underlying this study. It seeks to empirically 
ascertain whether South African listed firms that comply better with King II tend to be 
associated with higher financial performance than those that do not. 
 
 
3.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
 This chapter has focused on corporate governance in South Africa. The central 
objective has been to provide a comprehensive description of the South African corporate 
governance framework. Following existing literature, it classified the South African corporate 
governance landscape into two: external and internal. The external corporate governance is 
made up of major financial regulatory and enforcement bodies which are generally charged 
with the formulation, implementation and enforcement of statutory and voluntary corporate 
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laws. These include the Ministry of Finance, the Department of Trade and Industry, the 
Registrar of Companies, the Financial Services Board, the JSE Ltd, and the South African 
Reserve Bank.  
By contrast, the internal corporate governance environment consists of statutory 
corporate laws and voluntary corporate Codes of conduct that govern firms from within. These 
include the South African Companies Act 1973, the Insider Trading Act 1998, the JSE’s 
Listings Rules 2007 and the 1994 and 2002 King Reports on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa. For each of these internal corporate governance legislation or Code, and where 
applicable, its origins, provisions, strengths, challenges and weaknesses were comprehensively 
discussed. 
 The overall picture that emerged is that corporate governance is fluidly developing 
within the South African context. In this regard, the King Reports have played a significant 
role in formally institutionalising corporate governance in South Africa. They have helped in 
raising the awareness of what constitutes good corporate practice both among listed and non-
listed firms. More importantly, they have helped in promoting a unique corporate governance 
model, which takes into account the interests of a wider stakeholder group, but equally 
recognises that it is important for firms to be economically profitable.  
However, it also raises serious problems. This is because, while South Africa appears 
to have a well-established financial regulatory structure, it faces significant operational, 
enforcement and financial challenges. Crucially, the South African corporate governance 
model is predominantly Anglo-American. Critics suggest, however, that super-imposing social 
and environmental demands onto a corporate governance model that is predominantly Anglo-
American, raises substantial room for conflicts.  
It is suggested, however, that ignoring the South African context and given that King II 
is predominantly Anglo-American with emphasis on shareholder primacy, the a priori 
theoretical expectation will be that ‘better-governed’ firms tend to be associated with higher 
financial value than their ‘poorly-governed’ counterparts. This is the central thesis underlying 
this study. It seeks to empirically ascertain whether South African listed firms that comply 
better with King II tend to be associated with higher financial performance than those that do 
not. 
Therefore, in the next chapter, the theoretical and empirical literature that attempts to 
link internal corporate governance structures with firm financial performance will be 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
4. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the extant theoretical and empirical literature on internal 
corporate governance. Specifically, it seeks to achieve two main overarching goals. Firstly, it 
attempts to offer a review of the existing theoretical literature that tries to link internal 
corporate governance structures to firm financial performance. The central aim is to describe 
the theoretical blocks on which the study is based. The second objective of this chapter is to 
carry out a comprehensive review of the empirical literature on internal corporate governance 
structures and firm financial performance. Specifically, it traces the extant internal corporate 
governance-financial performance relationship literature to develop hypotheses among the 
variables examined in this study. The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections. Section 
4.1 reviews the theoretical literature on internal corporate governance structures and firm 
financial performance. Section 4.2 looks at the empirical literature on internal corporate 
governance structures and firm financial performance, while section 4.3 summarises the 
chapter. 
 
 
4.1 A REVIEW OF THE THEORTICAL LITERATURE ON INTERNAL  
 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
 This section discusses the relevant extant theories that attempt to link internal 
corporate governance structures and firm financial performance. As has been explained in 
chapter two, theories underlying corporate governance have been drawn from a variety of 
disciplines, such as accounting, economics, finance, and law, amongst others (e.g., Rwegasira 
2000; Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 2007; Durisin and Puzone, 2009). As a result, past studies have 
adopted several theoretical perspectives. Common among them include agency, resource 
dependence, managerial signalling, legitimacy, organisational, political costs, stakeholder, 
stewardship and transaction cost economies theories. Clarke (2004) offers a detailed overview 
of most of these corporate governance theories. 
 In this study, and as in many others that will be reviewed in section 4.2, corporate 
governance is approached from a finance perspective, using a quantitative research 
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methodology. Central to corporate governance reforms pursued in South Africa and discussed 
in chapter three is an attempt to improve the agency relationship between managers and 
owners of firms (King Reports, 1994, 2002; Armstrong et al., 2006). In fact, much of the prior 
research on corporate governance has been carried out based on agency theory (Filatotchev 
and Boyd, 2009, pp.258, 260). Agency theory is, therefore, adopted as the principal underlying 
theory. However, given the complex nature of corporate governance, and in line with both 
prior studies (e.g., Nicholson and Kiel, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), as well as recent 
calls for the adoption of multiple-theoretical approach to corporate governance research (van 
Ees et al., 2009, pp.307-310; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009, p.259), where applicable, agency 
theory is complemented with information asymmetry and managerial signalling, 
organisational, political costs, stewardship, and resource dependence theories. This gives the 
study a multiple-theoretical orientation. 
 In the next subsection, agency theory will be discussed in detail. Specifically, the 
general principal-agent construct will be first presented in subsection 4.1.1.1. Subsection 
4.1.1.2 will describe its direct application to the shareholder-manager relationship in modern 
corporations. Finally, the supporting theories of information asymmetry and managerial 
signalling, stewardship, and resource dependence will be briefly described in subsection 4.1.2. 
 
4.1.1 Agency Theory 
4.1.1.1 The General Principal-Agent Construct 
An agency relationship is defined as “one in which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 
p.308). This relationship is shown to be bedeviled with two major interdependent problems: (1) 
information asymmetry between the principal and the agent, which will be dealt with in 
subsection 4.1.2.1; and (2) the possibility of conflicts or divergence of interests between the 
principal and the agent (Hill and Jones, 1992, p.132). 
 The latter agency problem arises out of three major assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed 
that the principal and the agent may have different attitudes toward risk-bearing (Eisenhardt, 
1989, p.58). Secondly, the principal and the agent may intrinsically have different goals and 
interests (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.58). Finally, both parties to the relationship are assumed to be 
utility maximisers (opportunistic) to the extent that even if their goals or risk preferences were 
not to inherently differ, ceteris paribus, there would be a compelling reason to believe that a 
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rational agent would not always act in the best interests of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976, p.308).  
Agency theory is generally concerned with aligning the conflicting interests of 
principals and agents (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). Specifically, it suggests 
that the principal can limit divergences from his/her interests by establishing appropriate 
incentives or control mechanisms to limit the incidence of opportunistic action by the agent 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.308). Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that establishing 
these control mechanisms unavoidably generates three major costs. Firstly, the principal can 
expend resources to design a monitoring system (monitoring costs) aimed at reducing the 
aberrant activities of the agent. This may include efforts on the part of the principal to control 
the behaviour of the agent through contractual agreements regarding budget restrictions, 
compensation policies, and operating rules, amongst others.  
Secondly, the principal may require the agent to spend resources (bonding costs) to 
guarantee that he/she will not take certain actions that would harm the principal. That is, the 
agent may ex-ante incur bonding costs in order to win the right to manage the resources of the 
principal (Hill and Jones, 1992, p.132). Finally, despite instituting monitoring and bonding 
mechanisms (governance structures), there will still be some divergence between the agent’s 
decisions and those decisions which will maximise the welfare of the principal, defined as 
residual loss. In short, the sum of the principal’s monitoring expenditures, the agent’s bonding 
expenditures, and any remaining residual loss is known as agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976, p.308). 
The next subsection will examine how this general principal-agent construct directly 
applies to the shareholder-manager relationship within modern corporations. 
  
4.1.1.2 The Shareholder-Manager Relationship in Modern Corporations 
The recognition of the shareowner-managerial conflicts arising from the internal 
organisation of modern corporations in which ownership and control is separate, by 
economists, dates as far back as the eighteen century (see Smith, 1776). Smith (1776, p.700) 
notes, for example, that “the directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the 
managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that 
they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
copartnery frequently watch over their own. …Negligence and profusion, therefore, must 
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always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company”, cited in 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.305).  
In response, Jensen and Meckling (1976) formally developed agency theory aimed at 
bringing the interests of managers (agents) of modern corporations into alignment with those 
of shareholders (principals). They identify four major ways by which utility or self-interests 
maximising managers can incur costs that may minimise the wealth of shareholders. Firstly, 
managers may expropriate corporate resources by awarding themselves overgenerous 
remuneration (pecuniary) packages (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.312). Secondly, they may 
expropriate corporate wealth by electing to consume more perquisites (non-pecuniary), which 
maximise their own utility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, pp.312, 314).  
Thirdly, managers may choose to invest excess cash flows (the free cash flow problem) 
over paying dividends even in the absence of profitable investment opportunities (Jensen, 
1986, p.323). Finally, managers may either choose to devote less time, effort, personal skill 
and/or ingenuity to value-maximising activities, such as looking for new profitable investment 
opportunities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.313). 
To limit divergence of managerial interests from shareholders and reduce the above 
agency costs, agency theory suggests the establishment of internal and external mechanisms 
through what is known recently as corporate governance (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1034). 
Internally and by incurring monitoring costs, agency theory recommends the institution of 
several internal corporate governance structures via a set of legal contracts by shareholders to 
monitor managers. As will be discussed further below, these internal corporate governance 
structures may either be behaviour-oriented (i.e., board and auditing structures) or outcome-
oriented (i.e., salaries, stock options, and shareholding) (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.58). 
Firstly, shareholders can institute a set of hierarchical board structure variables to 
monitor the behaviour of managers (Fama, 1980, p.293). Secondly, shareholders can impose 
formal internal control systems, like auditing and budget restrictions to control managerial 
misbehaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.308). Thirdly, shareholders can also design 
incentive remuneration systems which serve to more closely align managers’ interests with 
theirs, including rewarding managers on the basis of their performance (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976, p.308).  
Finally, by incurring bonding costs, managers can be urged to sign contractual 
guarantees that insure shareholders against malfeasance on their part (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976, p.308). These may include: (1) having the financial accounts audited by independent 
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public auditors; (2) appointing independent non-executive directors to monitor managers; and 
(3) imposing minimum managerial shareholding to align interests with shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976, pp.323, 325). For greater effectiveness, shareholders must achieve an 
optimal balance between instituting behaviour-oriented internal structures (i.e., board and 
auditing structures) and outcome-oriented contracts (i.e., salaries, stock options, and 
shareholding) (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.58).  
Internally, agency theory focuses on writing efficient contracts and implementing 
effective monitoring and bonding to secure shareholders’ interests (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.58). 
Externally, it relies on efficient factor markets (i.e., corporate control and managerial labour) 
to govern or discipline internal managerial misbehaviour (Fama, 1980, p.294). Firstly, there 
exists efficient internal and external managerial labour markets, which exert pressures on 
firms to rank and remunerate managers according to their performance (Fama, 1980, p.294). 
Fama (1980, p.293) contends that internally there is usually competition among top managers 
to become ‘boss of bosses’. There is also competition between top managers and lower 
managers who think they can gain by replacing shirking or less competent managers above 
them. This creates intrinsic vertical and horizontal monitoring of managers by managers 
themselves.  
Externally, each manager’s current and future outside opportunity wage is determined 
by the current and future successes or failures of the managerial team (Fama, 1980, p.292). 
This means that each manager has an interest in the performance of the manager above and 
below him/her. As a consequence, each manager undertakes some amount of monitoring in 
both directions. This serves as a restraint on managers who may have incentive to expropriate 
shareholders wealth (Fama, 1980, p.293). Secondly, and as has been explained in chapter two, 
there exists efficient market for trading capital and corporate control. This means poorly 
performing firms may be easily acquired by their better-governed counterparts. Crucially, it 
offers owners of capital (shareholders) the opportunity to hedge against the failings of any 
particular firm by diversifying their holdings across different firms. This makes the separation 
of ownership and control in modern corporations an efficient form of economic organisation13 
(Fama, 1980, p.291). 
                                                 
13Denis and McConnell (2003, p.1) argue that there are benefits to separating ownership and control; otherwise 
such economic structure is highly unlikely to have persisted as it has. This is because it is extremely difficult to 
find individuals who are endowed with both managerial talent and financial capital. Therefore, the ability to 
separate ownership and control enables the holder of either type of endowment to earn a return on it. Also, the 
ability to raise capital from outside investors allows firms to take advantage of the benefits of size, despite 
managerial wealth constraints or managerial risk aversion. 
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To sum up, agency theory posits that a net reduction in agency costs (i.e., monitoring, 
bonding, and residual loss) arising from the institution of these internal corporate governance 
structures should help increase firm value and/or improve financial performance (Shabbir and 
Padget, 2005, p.3). This is the overriding theory underlying the recommendations of a raft of 
corporate governance reports in many countries (e.g., Cadbury, 1992; OECD Principles, 1999; 
King Reports, 1994, 2002). It has also been the major motivation behind an established body 
of empirical research that attempts to link internal corporate governance structures with firm 
financial performance either through the use of empirical econometric models based on some 
equilibrium assumptions (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996; Weir et al., 2002; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; and Guest, 2009, amongst others) or recently through the 
construction of composite corporate governance indices (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Beiner et 
al., 2006; Black et al., 2006a; Henry, 2008; and Chen et al., 2009, amongst others).  
In the next subsection, and given the complex nature of corporate governance, 
information asymmetry and managerial signaling, stewardship, and resource dependence 
theories will be briefly discussed as supporting theories to agency theory. Firstly, these 
theories are selected because they are closely related to agency theory. This means that they 
may help in shedding more theoretical insights into the agency relationship between 
shareholders and managers of firms. Secondly, and as will be discussed below, past studies 
(e.g., Donaldson and Davis, 1991, 1994; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) 
that have positively approached the subject of corporate governance from a finance 
perspective have also relied on these theories14 as complementary to agency theory.  
 
4.1.2 Internal corporate governance and financial performance: Supporting Theories 
4.1.2.1 Information Asymmetry and Managerial Signalling Theory 
Prior studies have relied on information asymmetry and managerial signalling as a 
supporting theory to explain the link between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents) 
in modern corporation (e.g., Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Black et al., 2006a). It suggests that 
managers as insiders typically have much more information, including private information, 
                                                 
14The discussions on the three supporting theories below will be relatively brief. At this stage, they are meant to 
give brief insights on their core arguments with regards to the shareholder-managerial relationship within modern 
firms. In reviewing the empirical literature in section 4.2, these supporting theories will further be fully integrated 
into the central arguments. Also, political costs and organisational theories will be explained and incorporated 
into the discussion in section 4.2.  
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about their companies than shareholders or prospective shareholders (e.g., Healy and Palepu, 
2001; Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007).  
In this regard, and in making portfolio decisions, prospective shareholders in particular 
face two problems. Firstly, potential investors face the problem of selecting firms with the 
most capable management (adverse selection) (Rhee and Lee, 2008). Secondly, and just as it 
is with agency theory, they are confronted with the problem of ensuring that managers do not 
use their superior information to extract excessive perquisites or invest in unprofitable projects 
(moral hazard) (Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007). Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Mishkin 
(1997) suggest that faced with asymmetric information and market uncertainty, rational 
prospective shareholders have two possible options. Firstly, they may either choose to take 
into consideration the potential costs of adverse selection and moral hazard in pricing a 
security of a firm. Secondly, they may also choose not to make the investment altogether.  
In this case, whichever option prospective shareholders choose is likely to have a 
negative impact on the cost of outside equity capital for firms. To minimise the selection 
dilemma facing investors, better-governed firms (i.e., firms with the least adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems) will have to find ways by which they can credibly signal their 
quality to prospective shareholders15. A major way by which firms can creditably signal their 
quality to the market or prospective shareholders is to adopt good corporate governance rules.  
In theory, by electing to comply with the recommendations of a code of good corporate 
practices, a firm will essentially be signalling to investors that it is better-governed. This 
suggests insiders will behave well with their investment, and by implication work in the 
interest of shareholders. As a corollary, investors will bid-up share prices because with better 
corporate governance, they are likely to receive a greater portion of their firms’ profits as 
opposed to being expropriated by managers (e.g., La Porta et al., 2002; Beiner et al., 2006). 
As equity values appreciate, the cost of outside equity capital can be expected to fall (e.g., 
Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Black et al., 2006a; Chen et al., 2009).  
For example, by appointing independent non-executive directors to the board, a firm 
signals to potential investors of its intentions of treating them fairly, and for that matter the 
safety of their investment. In this regard, by signalling (disclosing) its better governance 
qualities to investors, a firm reduces information asymmetry. This is likely to lead to an 
                                                 
15To be able to signal their quality, better-governed firms will have to incur signaling costs (i.e., agency costs) 
(e.g., Spence, 1973; Core, 2001). These include information production and dissemination costs of hiring 
professional accountants, auditors, and lawyers (Hassan and Marston, 2008, p.5). They also include potential 
exposure to litigation and competition, incentive for private information, and proprietary costs that are typically 
associated with increased disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 1993, p.247; Core, 2001, p.443). 
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increase in share price and firm value for existing shareholders due to the potential increase in 
the demand for its shares (e.g., Deutsche Bank, 2002, p.5; Black et al., 2006a and b). 
Equivalently, an increase in a firm’s share price should, ceteris paribus, results in a reduction 
in the cost of outside equity capital (e.g., Botosan, 1997; CLSA, 2000, p.1). 
 
4.1.2.2 Stewardship theory 
Contrary to agency, information asymmetry and signaling theories that place emphasis 
on managerial opportunism and monitoring, stewardship theory posits that executive managers 
are intrinsically trustworthy individuals (Nicholson and Kiel, 2003, p.588). As such, managers 
should be fully empowered to run firms because they are good stewards of the resources 
entrusted to them (Letza et al., 2004, p.244). Further, stewardship theory makes several 
assumptions about the behaviour of senior managers. Firstly, it assumes that since top 
managers usually spend their entire working lives in the company they govern, they are more 
likely to understand the businesses better than outside directors and so can make superior 
decisions (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, p.52). Secondly, executive managers possess superior 
formal and informal information and knowledge about the firm they manage, which can aid 
better decision-making (Donaldson and Davis, 1994). Finally, competitive internal and 
external market discipline and the fear of damaging their future managerial capital ensure that 
agency costs are minimised (e.g., Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a). As a result, 
proponents of stewardship theory contend that better financial performance are likely to be 
associated with internal corporate governance practices that grant managers greater powers, 
such as combining the positions of company chairman and CEO (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, 
1994).  
 
4.1.2.3 Resource Dependence Theory  
Resource dependence theory is the final supporting theory of corporate governance 
that this study relies on. It suggests that the institution of internal corporate governance 
structures, such as board of directors is not only necessary for ensuring that managers are 
effectively monitored, but also they serve as an essential link between the firm and the critical 
resources that it needs to maximise financial performance (Pfeffer, 1973, p.350). Firstly, the 
board and non-executive directors in particular can offer essential resources, such as expert 
advice, experience, independence, and knowledge (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, p.319). 
Secondly, they can bring to the firm reputation and critical business contacts (Haniffa and 
  
89 
Hudaib, 2006, p.1039). Thirdly, the board can facilitate access to business/political elite, 
information and capital (Nicholson and Kiel, 2003, p.589). Finally, the board provides a 
critical link to a firm’s external environment and significant stakeholders, such as creditors, 
suppliers, customers, and competitors. As a result, it has been argued that greater level of links 
to the external environment is associated with better access to resources (Nicholson and Kiel, 
2003, p.589). This can impact positively on firm financial performance. 
 To summarise, this section has attempted to describe the theoretical motivations of the 
study. Following prior studies and suggestions, as well as given the complex nature of 
corporate governance, the study adopts a multiple-theoretical perspective. These theories 
include agency, information asymmetry and managerial signaling, stewardship, and resource 
dependence. Positively approaching the subject of corporate governance from a finance 
viewpoint, these theories are relevant and closely related. As will be discussed in section 4.2, 
together, they will help in explaining the often complex agency relationship between owners 
and managers in modern firms. 
Briefly, agency theory suggests that due to the separation of ownership and control in 
modern firms, rational managers are less likely to always work in the interests of owners. To 
limit divergence of managerial interests, shareholders will have to institute internal corporate 
governance mechanisms to monitor managers. This will result in agency costs being incurred, 
including monitoring, bonding and residual loss. All else equal, the institution of effective 
corporate governance structures will reduce agency costs. This is likely to increase firm value 
and/or financial performance. Information asymmetry and managerial signaling theory takes 
similar view to agency theory. It suggests that by incurring signaling costs, better-governed 
firms can increase their value by signaling their better quality to prospective investors. By 
contrast, stewardship theory suggests that due to their information and knowledge advantages, 
better financial performance is likely to be associated with greater managerial trust and powers. 
Finally, resource dependence theory indicates that internal corporate governance structures 
like the board of directors help to link the firm to critical business inputs needed for higher 
financial performance. 
The next section of this chapter will review the empirical literature on internal 
corporate governance and firm financial performance. In reviewing the empirical literature, 
and as has already been pointed out, the theories discussed above will be fully integrated into 
the central arguments.  
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4.2 A REVIEW OF THE PRIOR EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON INTERNAL 
      CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
 Following the implications of agency theory, prior literature has attempted to establish 
an empirical association between internal corporate governance structures and firm financial 
performance. This has been done mainly through two major competing models: an 
equilibrium-variable model and a compliance-index model. The next subsection will briefly 
set out the central theoretical arguments underlying both models. At this stage, the rationale 
will be to help guide the review of the empirical literature and hypotheses development. In 
subsection 5.2 of chapter five, the underlying theories and potential weaknesses of the two 
models will be described in detail. 
 
4.2.1 The Equilibrium-Variable Model versus the Compliance-Index Model 
The equilibrium-variable model assumes that there is an endogenous relationship 
between the institution of internal corporate governance structures and firm financial 
performance (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; John and Senbet, 1998). That is, it assumes 
that every firm has its own optimal governance structure, and as such each firm should have 
the freedom to make its own governance choices without any external interference (i.e., a 
firm’s governance structure is internally determined) (Danielson and Karpoff, 1998, p.348). 
As a result, a firm will continue to establish governance structures to the point where the cost 
of instituting an additional governance structure is at least equal to the marginal increase in its 
financial performance or to the point where the firm is in equilibrium16 with respect to its 
governance choices (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Himmelberg et al., 1999).  
In this regard, while the presence of a nomination committee, for example, may be 
effective in helping one firm to reduce agency costs and increase its value, it may not 
necessarily be effective for another firm due to differences in ownership, size, and industry, 
amongst other firm-level characteristics. It is the oldest approach within the literature (e.g., 
Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), and was popularised before the 
worldwide proliferation of good corporate governance codes in the 1990s (e.g., Danielson and 
Karpoff, 1998; Black et al., 2006a; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). 
                                                 
16As will be clarified further in subsection 5.2 of chapter five, while it may be theoretically possible for a firm to 
be in equilibrium with respect to its governance choices, it is extremely difficult to achieve that in practice. 
Arguably, this makes the equilibrium assumption unrealistic. 
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 By contrast, the compliance-index approach explicitly appeared in the corporate 
governance literature after the diffusion of corporate governance codes around the world in the 
early 2000s (e.g., Black, 2001; Gompers et al., 2003; Morey at al., 2009). This approach 
assumes that a company’s governance mechanisms are externally imposed, and as such firms 
tend to choose governance structures as a set (e.g., Danielson and Karpoff, 1998; Shabbir and 
Padget, 2005). Specifically, it posits that a company’s financial performance is likely to be 
influenced by a number of agency mechanisms with potential interactive effects in an 
integrated framework rather than as independent structures. As a consequence, instead of 
looking at one single corporate governance mechanism in isolation, this model recommends 
the construction of a compliance or composite governance index, encapsulating a 
comprehensive set of corporate governance provisions to examine the corporate governance-
performance link (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006; Bebchuk et al., 2009).  
As will be discussed in detail in subsection 5.2 of chapter five, prior studies have 
mostly used one model or discounted the other purely on the basis of perceived theoretical 
strengths or weaknesses (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner at al., 2006). However, it is 
contended that such a crucial methodological choice ought to be based on their respective 
theoretical and empirical validity rather than on their theoretical appropriateness alone. 
Therefore, using the same dataset and research context, both models will be estimated in this 
study. The empirical rationale is to ascertain whether different research conclusions may be 
reached depending on the model used. This may inform methodological choices of future 
researchers.  
In the following two subsections, the extant literature regarding these two competing 
models will be reviewed. Specifically, the first subsection will draw on the extant literature to 
develop hypotheses of the relationship between firm financial performance and specific 
internal corporate governance structures as found both in the prior literature and King II.  
The second subsection will review prior studies that focus on the construction of a 
compliance or composite corporate governance index and firm financial performance. Also, 
due to the fact that the African corporate governance and performance literature is still in its 
infancy (Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003, p.2; Okeahalam, 2004, p.360; Mangena and 
Chamisa, 2008, p.28), a separate subsection will not be devoted to prior South African or 
African studies. Instead, where applicable, the limited available South African or African 
corporate governance studies will be reviewed as part of the mainstream international 
corporate governance literature.  
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4.2.2 Internal Corporate Governance Structures and Firm Financial Performance: 
         The Equilibrium-Variable Model  
 
4.2.2.1 Board Structure Variables 
 
As has been discussed above, a theoretical consensus is that good internal corporate 
governance structures, such as board of directors and internal controls help in aligning 
managerial interests with those of shareholders by reducing agency costs (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Netter et al., 2009). Of these, corporate board of directors is 
seen as a central part or the ‘apex’ of any internal corporate governance structure (e.g., Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1992; John and Senbet, 1998; Fillatotchev and Boyd, 2009). The board’s main 
role is to ensure conformance and performance of the firm’s management. This normally 
implies five functions: direction (advice), executive action (strategy), service and resource 
support (resource dependence), supervision (monitoring), and accountability (Rossouw et al., 
2002, p.289; Brennan, 2006, p.580).  
However, it has been suggested that to be able to protect shareholders’ interests, 
corporate boards must be effective and efficient in performing their functions (e.g., Jensen, 
1993; Brennan, 2006). Past evidence suggests that effective and efficient board performance is 
influenced by several factors, such as board diversity, composition, and size, amongst others 
(e.g., Yermack, 1996; Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009).  
Therefore, following prior literature and the provisions of King II, the next subsections 
will review studies on a set of 11 internal corporate board structure variables that have been 
found to influence financial performance of firms. These include board diversity, corporate 
board size, role or CEO duality, the percentage of non-executive directors, the frequency of 
board meetings, the presence of key internal board committees (namely, audit, nomination, 
and remuneration committees), director shareownership, director shareownership squared, and 
director shareownership cubed17. 
For each of the 1118 board structure variables, the review will be divided into four parts. 
First, the prior theoretical links between a particular board structure variable and firm financial 
                                                 
17Subsection 5.2 of chapter five and Appendix 4 will set out in detail the way each of these board structure 
variables will be operationalised in this study. Also, Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio) and return on assets (ROA) will be used 
as proxies for firm financial performance in this study. Similarly, subsection 5.2 discusses the rationale for their 
selection and how they will be measured in this study.  
18 The prior literature relating to the presence of the three key board committees (audit, nomination, and 
remuneration committees), and director shareownership variables (director shareownership, director 
shareownership squared, and director shareownership squared) will be reviewed together, respectively. This will 
mean that seven main hypotheses will be developed and tested for the equilibrium-variable model.  
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performance will be presented. Second, the corresponding prior empirical evidence regarding 
the variable will be reviewed. Third, the provisions of King II and other relevant South 
African corporate governance rules relating to the variable will be described. Finally, and on 
the basis of the review, research hypotheses will be then developed for the variable. 
 
4.2.2.2 Board Diversity 
 
i) The Theoretical Link between Board Diversity and Financial Performance 
 
One of the most significant internal corporate governance issues currently facing 
companies in South Africa is board diversity and its impact on corporate performance. Board 
diversity has broadly been defined as the various attributes that may be represented among 
directors in the boardroom in relation to board process and decision-making, including age, 
gender, ethnicity, culture, religion, constituency representation, independence, knowledge, 
educational and professional background, technical skills and expertise, commercial and 
industry experience, career and life experience (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003, p.219). There 
are mixed theoretical propositions as to the impact of board diversity on shareholder value: 
those who argue for more diversity in boardrooms and those who are in favour of corporate 
monoculture and boardroom uniformity. 
Proponents of diversity in corporate boardrooms usually base their arguments on 
agency, resource dependence, signalling, and stakeholding theories (e.g., Goodstein et al., 
1994; Carter et al., 2003). Firstly, agency theory suggests that boards of diverse backgrounds 
rather than homogenous elite groups with similar socio-economic backgrounds, increases 
board independence and improves executive monitoring (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003, 
p.219). Secondly, it brings diversity in ideas, perspectives, experience, and business 
knowledge to the decision-making process in boardrooms (Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009, 
p.715). This can aid better appreciation of the complexities of the corporate external 
environment and marketplace. It can also increase creativity and innovation in boardrooms 
due to diversity in cognitive abilities, which can also facilitate effective decision-making 
(Carter et al., 2003, p.36) 
Thirdly, resource dependence theory indicates that board diversity helps to link a firm 
to its external environment and secure critical resources, including skills, business contacts, 
prestige and legitimacy (Goodstein et al., 1994, p.241). Fourthly, Rose (2007, p.405) argues 
that a higher degree of board diversity may serve as a positive signal to potential job 
applicants. This will help to attract well qualified persons outside the circles where board 
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candidates are usually recruited from. This can also generate healthy competition within the 
firm’s internal labour market. This is because women and ethnic minorities, for example, will 
realise that they are not excluded from the highest positions within the firm.  
Finally, corporate boards of qualified individuals of diverse backgrounds and 
constituencies can help provide a better link with a firm’s stakeholders, such as consumers and 
the local community. This can improve a firm’s reputation and commercial opportunities 
(Shrader et al., 1997, p.355). Carter et al. (2003, p.36) suggest, for example, that by matching 
the diversity of a company’s board to the diversity of its customers and suppliers, it can 
significantly increase its ability to penetrate competitive markets.  
However, relying on agency and organisation theories, opponents contend that board 
diversity can impact negatively on firm performance. Firstly, it has been suggested that a more 
diverse board may not necessarily result in more effective monitoring and decision-making. 
This is because diverse board members may be appointed as a sign of tokenism, and as such 
their contributions may be marginalised (Rose, 2007, p.406). Secondly, organisation theory 
indicates that diversity within the board may significantly constrain its efforts to take decisive 
action and initiate strategic changes, especially in times of poor corporate performance and 
environmental turbulence (Goodstein, et al., 1994, p.243).  
Thirdly, diverse board members may bring their individual and constituencies’ 
interests and commitments to the board (Baysinger and Butler, 1985, p.110). The greater the 
diversity of these interests, the greater the potential for conflicts and factions to emerge 
(Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009, p.725). This can inhibit boardroom cohesion and performance 
(Goodstein, et al., 1994, p.243). Finally, Rose (2007, p.405) argues that the suggestion that 
company boards should be constituted to necessarily reflect all their important stakeholders 
and society as a whole is incompatible with the notion of business. This is because if board 
members are not appointed on the basis of merit or their ability to contribute meaningfully to 
the decision-making process in the boardroom, ceteris paribus, will result in the creation of 
diverse but comparatively ineffective larger boards. This can impact negatively on firm 
financial performance.  
 
ii) The Empirical Literature on Board Diversity and Financial Performance 
Board diversity is one of the under researched board structure variables (Carter et al., 
2003). Also, the limited extant literature mainly focuses on American firms with conflicting 
results (e.g., Carter et al., 2003; Shrader et al., 1997; Francoeur et al., 2008). This makes it a 
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fertile area for further research, especially in South Africa where there is a dearth of board 
diversity studies. 
 Using a small sample of 25 American Fortune 500 firms, Adler (2001) finds a positive 
correlation between firms that employ higher percentage of women in top management and a 
raft of accounting measures of performance, including ROA, ROE, ROI and ROS. Adler’s 
study has received criticisms for its small sample, focusing mainly on large firms, as well as 
for using only accounting measures of performance (see Francoeur et al., 2008). Carter et al. 
(2003) also report a positive relationship between board diversity (measured by gender and 
ethnicity) and market measure of performance (proxied by Tobin’s Q) using a larger sample of 
638 American Fortune 1000 firms in 1997. This suggests that US firms with higher proportion 
of women and ethic minorities on their boards generate higher financial performance. They 
demonstrate further, through the use of two stage least squares, that the positive association 
persists after controlling for endogenity and firm specific characteristics.  
Consistent with prior evidence, Francoeur et al. (2008) examine whether the 
participation of women in a firm’s board and senior management enhances financial 
performance in a sample of 230 of the 500 largest Canadian listed firms from 2001 to 2004. 
Applying Fama and French three factor model, they report that firms operating in complex 
environments do generate positive and significant abnormal returns when they have a higher 
proportion of women officers.  
Of direct relevance to this study, and using a cross-sectional sample of 117 South 
African listed firms in 2003, Swartz and Firer (2005) report a statistically significant and 
positive association between the percentage of ethnic members (non-whites) on corporate 
boards’ and intellectual capital performance. In this study, board diversity is defined in 
broader terms to cover gender and ethnicity with different performance proxies: Tobin’s Q and 
ROA. It is argued that if diverse boards perform better than their non-diverse counterparts, it 
should ultimately reflect in their financial bottom line. To capture the impact of possible 
changes in board diversity over time, the sample period used in this study is also longer: 2002-
2006. The analysis in this study may provide new valuable insights into the board diversity 
and financial performance relationship literature.  
 In contrast, but consistent with the conflicting nature of prior board diversity theory, 
the findings of other researchers report that board diversity rather impacts negatively on 
financial performance. Goodstein et al. (1994) investigate the impact of board diversity on a 
firm’s ability to initiate strategic changes in a total of 335 American firms from 1980 to 1985. 
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They find that firms with diverse boards are less likely to initiate strategic changes than those 
with homogenous boards. This suggests that board diversity generates conflicts, which limit 
the board’s ability to initiate timely strategic changes.  
Shrader et al. (1997) examine the association between the percentage of female board 
members and two accounting measures of financial performance (ROA and ROE) for a 
sample of 200 American Fortune 500 firms in 1992. Their results suggest a statistically 
significant and negative relationship between the percentage of women on the board and firm 
performance. They explain the negative relationship by the theory of social margianalisation 
and exclusion. Specifically, Shrader et al. (1997) argue that while the views of women on the 
board may be marginalised, their presence may also have financial costs implications to the 
firm. This means that while they will presumably not be making any meaning contributions to 
corporate board decisions, they will still be paid their financial emoluments. This may impact 
negatively on firm financial performance, and thus helps in explaining the negativer female 
board members-financial performance link. 
 In a departure, using a sample of 95 American listed firms, Zahra and Stanton (1988) 
find no significant relationship between the percentage of ethnic minority directors and several 
accounting measures of performance, including ROE and EPS. Similarly, Rose (2007) 
investigates whether female board representation influence firm performance using a sample 
of Danish listed firms over the period 1998-2001. Consistent with the evidence of Zahra and 
Stanton (1988), he finds no significant link between firm performance as measured by Tobin’s 
Q and female board representation. 
 To sum up, and consistent with the mixed nature of the extant board diversity 
theoretical literature, the prior empirical evidence is equally conflicting. Specifically, and as 
has been discussed above, there are three strands of empirical evidence. These studies include 
those that report: (1) significant positive; (2) significant negative; and (3) no significant 
relationships between board diversity and firm performance. The conflicting international 
evidence may partly be explained by the fact that prior studies use different board diversity 
and performance proxies, sample periods and estimation techniques. However, it may also be 
explained by country and contextual differences.  
In this regard, South Africa offers an interesting research context to explore the impact 
of board diversity on firm performance. It has ethnically diverse populace (i.e., made up of 
people from almost every part of the world, including European Whites or Caucasians, 
Chinese, Indians, Mixed Race and Black Africans).  As has been discussed in chapter three, 
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affirmative action laws meant to address the negative social and economic legacies of 
Apartheid have been introduced since 1994. Central to the affirmative action legislation is 
ensuring that non-whites, especially black men and women, are appointed to positions of 
significance in South African companies. Examining board diversity under this context can 
arguably bring new insights that may enrich the board diversity-performance literature. 
 
iii) Recommendations of King II, Employment Equity Act and the JSE’s Listings Rules 
With respect to this study, board diversity is defined on the basis of gender and 
ethnicity. Specifically, and as will be discussed in chapter five, board diversity is measured by 
a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if a board consists of a white, a black, a 
male and a female, zero otherwise19. As has been discussed in chapter three, the South African 
Employment Equity Act 1998 stipulates that every firm with more than 100 employees should 
ensure that its labour force, including top management is constituted by a balance between 
non-whites and whites. Among the non-whites, black men and women are expected to be 
given special preference.  
By contrast, King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules do not set any specific targets for 
firms. However, they suggest that every company should consider whether its board is diverse 
enough in terms of skills (profession and experience) and demographics (age, ethnicity and 
gender). This is expected to ensure that the composition of South African corporate boards 
reflect the diverse South African context, as well as make them effective. They also encourage 
firms to comply with the provisions of the Employment Equity Act. This indicates that King II 
expects board diversity to have positive impact on the financial performance of firms.  
Swartz and Firer (2005) report that South African listed firms significantly enhance 
their intellectual capital performance by having ethnically diverse board of directors. If diverse 
boards perform better than homogenous boards, then they are likely to generate significantly 
higher financial performance. However, given the mixed prior international evidence, both the 
null and alternate hypotheses are tested. Thus, the respective first null (1) and alternate 
hypotheses to be tested in this study are that: 
                                                 
19As will be explained further in chapter eight, defining board diversity separately on the basis of gender or 
ethnicity does not lead to any significant difference in the research results. Board diversity could also have been 
measured in percentages rather as dummy variable. However, and as will be discussed further in subsection 6.6 of 
chapter six (see Tables 4 and 11), board members from diverse backgrounds (gender and ethnicity) is very small 
and unevenly distributed among the sampled firms. To avoid having a lot zero observations or small percentages, 
board diversity will be measured as a dummy variable rather than as a continuous variable. This will be 
acknowledged as a weakness of this study in section 10.4 of chapter ten, and will also be identified as an avenue 
for improvement for future research in chapter ten.  
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 :0H  There is a statistically significant positive relationship between board diversity 
and firm financial performance, as measured by both ROA and the Q-ratio. 
 :1H  There is no statistically significant positive relationship between board 
diversity and firm financial performance, as proxied by both ROA and the Q-
ratio. 
 
4.2.2.3 Corporate Board Size 
i) The Theoretical link between Board Size and Financial Performance 
Corporate board size is considered to be one of the most important board structure 
variables. As a corollary, the extant literature has sought to provide a theoretical and empirical 
nexus between corporate board size and firm financial performance with mixed results (e.g., 
Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996).  
One theoretical (agency theory) proposition is that larger boards are bad, while smaller 
boards are good and effective at improving financial performance (e.g., Lipton and Lorch, 
1992; Sonnenfeld 2002, p.108). Firstly, this is because while they plan, organise, direct and 
control the business of the organisation, the size of the board has also got financial costs 
implications. That is, ‘ceteris paribus’ larger boards consume more pecuniary and non-
pecuniary company resources in the form of remuneration and perquisites than smaller boards. 
Secondly, Jensen (1993, p.865) argues that when a board gets too big, it does not only become 
difficult to co-ordinate, but also comparatively easier to control by a dominant CEO due to 
associated director shirking and free-riding.  
More specifically, Lipton and Lorsch (1992, p.67) suggest that corporate board size 
must preferably fall between eight and nine directors. They argue that as corporate board size 
goes beyond a maximum number of ten directors, additional costs of having larger boards 
typically associated with slow decision-making are higher than any marginal gains from 
intense monitoring of management’s activities. Thirdly, it is contended that smaller boards are 
more likely to be cohesive, and to have more effective discussions. This is because all 
directors are able to candidly contribute and express their ideas and opinions within the limited 
time available (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, p.68)20. Finally, Yawson (2006, p.77) argues that 
                                                 
20It is worth reminding that the proponents of smaller corporate boards (e.g., Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 
1993; Yermack, 1996), mainly draw their inspiration from organisational theory, which posits that as groups 
increase in size they become less effective because the associated coordination problems tend to outweigh the 
benefits gained from having a larger pool of talented individuals to draw from (e.g., Steiner, 1972; Pfeffer, 1973; 
Hackman, 1990). 
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larger boards suffer from higher agency problems and are far less effective than smaller boards. 
Thus, limiting corporate board size may improve efficiency. 
A contrary theoretical view (agency and resource dependence) is that larger boards 
may possibly be better for corporate financial performance (e.g., John and Senbet, 1998; 
Yawson, 2006). Firstly, larger boards are associated with diversity in skills, business contacts, 
and experience that smaller boards may not have, which offers greater opportunity to secure 
critical resources (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1038). Similarly, larger boards offer greater 
access to their firm’s external environment, which reduces uncertainties and also facilitates 
securing critical resources, such as finance, raw materials, and contracts (e.g., Pearce and 
Zahra, 1992; Goodstein et al., 1994). Secondly, larger boards enhance the knowledge base on 
which business advice can be sought, which increases managerial ability to make important 
and better business decisions (Yawson, 2006, p.76). Finally, a corporate board’s monitoring 
capacity is demonstrated to be positively related with board size (John and Senbet, 1998, 
p.385). This is because a larger number of people with varied expertise will be better placed to 
subject managerial decisions to greater scrutiny and monitoring (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003, 
p.194).  This will help balance the power of otherwise a dominant CEO.  
 
ii) The Empirical Evidence on Board Size and Financial Performance 
Empirically, the evidence regarding the association between board size and firm 
financial performance is conflicting (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Adams and Mehran, 2005; Beiner 
et al., 2006; Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009). Yermack (1996) is one of the first to investigate the 
relationship between board size and financial performance in a sample of 452 large US 
industrial corporations between 1984 and 1991. Generally, he reports an inverse relationship 
between corporate board size and performance (Tobin’s Q). He demonstrates that his evidence 
is robust to firm specific characteristics like size, growth potential, board composition (% of 
outside directors), director ownership and industry. Specifically, Yermack’s results show that 
investors valuation of companies’ declines steadily over a range of board sizes between 4 and 
10. Beyond a board size of 10, he finds no relationship between board size and market 
valuation. Yermack’s results support prior theoretical suggestions (e.g., Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992; Jensen, 1993).  
Recent US evidence (e.g., Vefeas, 1999a and b; Cheng, 2008; Cheng et al., 2008; 
Coles et al., 2008) and non-US evidence (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1998; Bozec, 2005; Guest, 
2009) are largely consistent with those of Yermack that, on average, smaller boards tend to 
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perform better than larger ones. Eisenberg et al. (1998, p.35) criticise Yermack (1996) for 
focusing purely on large firms, and as such his results cannot be extended to smaller firms, as 
well as firms operating in different legal and cultural environments. On this basis, Eisenberg et 
al. (1998) examine the association between board size and performance in a sample of 879 
small and medium size Finnish firms from 1992 to 1994. Consistent with Yermack (1996), 
they report a negative correlation between firms’ profitability, measured by industry-adjusted 
return on assets (ROA) and board size.  
Also, Dahya et al. (2002) find a negative relationship between performance-related 
top-management turnover and board size in a sample of 460 UK listed firms from 1988 to 
1996. Similarly, using a large sample of 2,746 UK listed firms from 1981 to 2002, Guest 
(2009) report a statistically significant and negative relationship between board size and 
performance, as proxied by Tobin’s Q, ROA, and share returns. The findings of these studies 
generally offer empirical support to the theory that smaller boards are more likely to permit: 
candid evaluation of managerial performance; effective managerial monitoring; and faster 
decision-making (e.g., Lipton and Lorch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). Finally, Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) report a negative relationship between board size and financial performance, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q, in a sample of 347 Malaysian listed firms. This also offers empirical 
support to the conclusions of prior studies that larger boards are not only perceived by 
investors as ineffective at monitoring managers, but also consume more managerial perquisites 
than smaller ones (e.g., Yermack 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998).  
 By contrast, using a sample of 35 US listed Banking firms from 1959 to 1995, Adams 
and Mehran (2005) report a statistically significant and positive relationship between board 
size and Tobin’s Q. They demonstrate that the positive relationship remain unchanged after 
accounting for potential endogeneities between board size and the Q-ratio. Beiner et al. (2006) 
and Henry (2008) have independently reported similar statistically significant and positive 
relationship between board size and the Q-ratio for a sample of Swiss and Australian listed 
firms, respectively.  
Also, Sanda et al. (2005) find a positive correlation between board size and 
profitability, as proxied by return on equity (ROE), in a sample of 93 Nigerian listed firms 
from 1996 to 1999. This is in line with the theory that larger boards offer greater access to 
their firm’s external environment, which reduces uncertainties and also facilitates securing 
critical resources, such as finance, raw materials, and contracts (e.g., Pearce and Zahra, 1992; 
Goodstein et al., 1994). Similarly, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), employing an accounting 
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measure of performance, as proxied by ROA, find a positive relationship between board size 
and performance. This was in contrast with the negative relationship that they found between 
board size and Tobin’s Q. This suggests that differences exist between investors and 
companies in their perception of the relevance of larger boards.  
Theoretically, the finding of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) implies that larger boards 
enhance the knowledge base on which business advice can be sought, which increases 
managerial ability to make important and better business decisions (Yawson, 2006, p.76). 
Further, Kiel and Nicholson (2003), Beiner et al. (2006), and Coles et al. (2008) offer recent 
evidence for Australian, Swiss, and US listed firms, respectively, which is entirely in line with 
those of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006).  
Using a sample of 72 Zimbabwean listed firms from 2002 to 2004, Mangena and 
Tauringana (2008) also report a positive nexus between board size and performance in an 
environment of severe political and economic uncertainty. Mangena and Tauringana (2008) 
demonstrate that the tenor of their results remain unchanged whether historical or inflation 
adjusted data is used. This implies that the market perceives larger boards as providing more 
effective monitoring and wider contacts in a period of severe political and economic 
uncertainty.  
Of direct importance to this study, and using a sample of 84 South African listed firms 
in 1998, Ho and Williams (2003)21 report no significant link between the efficiency of value 
added by a firm’s physical and intellectual capital and board size. Similarly, Mangena and 
Chamisa (2008) examine the relationship between board size and the incidences of listing 
suspensions by the JSE Ltd. Using a sample of 81 South African listed firms from 1999 to 
2005, they document no significant link between board size and incidences of listing 
suspension by the JSE.  
                                                 
21This study differs from prior South African studies of Ho and Williams (2003) and Mangena and Chamisa 
(2008) in several important respects. As has been explained above, Ho and Williams’ (2003) study focuses on 
ascertaining the association between internal corporate governance structures, such as board size and a firm’s 
physical and intellectual capital performance, using a cross-sectional sample of 84 South African firms in 1998. 
However, given that South African firms predominantly have shareholding-orientation (see section 2.1 of chapter 
two and subsection 3.3.3.3 of chapter three), it is persuasive to argue that they are likely to be more concerned 
with their overall long-term financial performance than physical and intellectual capital performance alone. 
Moreover, if better-governed South African firms tend to be associated higher intellectual capital performance, it 
can be expected to ultimately reflect in higher financial performance. Therefore, conventional financial 
performance proxies, namely, Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA) are used in this study. Also, since the effects 
of better corporate governance practices can be expected to change over time, the sample period examined in this 
study is longer: 2002-2006. These improvements may uncover new insights that can potentially enrich the 
internal corporate governance-performance literature. With regard to Mangena and Chamisa (2008), the focus of 
their study is entirely different from this study. While they examine whether South African firms that are better-
governed are less likely to be suspended from the JSE Ltd, this study sets out to ascertain whether better-
governed South African firms are more likely to be associated with higher financial performance. 
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iii) Recommendations of the Companies Act, the JSE’s Listings Rules and King II 
According to the South African Companies Act 1973, all pubic companies must have a 
minimum of two directors, while the JSE’s Listings Rules mandate listed firms to have a 
minimum of four directors. None of them sets a maximum board size.  
King II also does not specify the exact number of directors that should form a board. 
However, it sets out a general principle that every board must consider whether its size makes 
it effective. This suggests that even though King II admits that a company’s board size may 
probably affect its performance, it leaves the option of determining the actual board size for 
the companies themselves to decide. A plausible explanation for not prescribing a specific 
board number is to avoid a tacit conclusion that it is possible to adopt a “one size fits all” 
approach to corporate management (MacNeil and Xiao, 2006, p.486).  
As has been discussed above, the results of Ho and Williams (2003) find no significant 
relationship between a firm’s physical and intellectual capital performance and board size in a 
sample of 84 South African listed firms. Similarly, and using a sample of 81 South African 
firms, Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report no significant link between the incidences of 
listing suspensions by the JSE and board size. Together, they suggest that board size may not 
be an important driver of financial performance in South African listed companies. However, 
given the mixed international evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. 
Hence, the respective second (2) null and alternate hypotheses to be tested in this study are 
that: 
:0H  There is a statistically significant positive relationship between board size  
 and firm  financial performance, as proxied by both ROA and the Q-ratio. 
:1H  There is no statistically significant positive relationship between board  
 size and firm financial performance, as measured by both ROA and the Q-ratio. 
 
4.2.2.4 Role or CEO Duality 
i) The Theoretical Link between Role or CEO Duality and Financial Performance 
Another board structure variable that has the potential of increasing or reducing the 
agency problem is role or CEO duality. It refers to a board leadership structure in which one 
person undertakes the combined roles of chief executive officer (CEO – management) and 
chairman (control) of the board. The chairman of the board is responsible for managing the 
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board. These may typically include nominating new board members, reviewing the 
performance of senior management, setting agenda for board meetings, and settling conflicts 
which may arise within the board (Laing and Weir, 1999, p.458). In contrast, the CEO is 
responsible for the day-to-day management of the company, including implementing board 
decisions.  
There are three theoretical propositions regarding role or CEO duality: stewardship, 
resource dependence, and agency theories. Stewardship and resource dependence theories 
suggest that role duality can have a positive impact on firm financial performance. Firstly, 
Weir et al. (2002, p.585) contend that as an insider, the CEO tend to have greater knowledge, 
understanding and experience of the strategic challenges and opportunities, which the 
company faces, than a non-executive chairman.  
Secondly, it has been argued that role duality grants a charismatic CEO the opportunity 
to have a sharper focus on firm objectives (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1040).  This implies a 
visionary CEO will have the chance to shape the long-term fortunes of a firm with minimum 
board interference (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, p.321). This may lead to improved performance 
due to the rapid management decision-making that arises from the provision of clear and 
unambiguous corporate leadership (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1040). Thirdly, Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998, p.389) suggest that role duality avoids extra compensation to the chairman, 
which can results in a reduction in managerial remuneration. Finally, Bozec (2005, p.1927) 
argues that unified firm leadership associated with role duality improves managerial 
accountability as it makes it easier to charge the blame for poor performance.  
Another stream of the theoretical (agency) literature suggests that role or CEO duality 
can impact negatively on firm performance (e.g., Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). 
According to Jensen (1993, p.866) the function of the chairman is to run board meetings and 
oversee the process of hiring, firing, evaluating and remunerating the CEO. Due to this, Jensen 
(1993) contends that role or CEO duality increases agency problems by compromising the 
board’s effectiveness in monitoring the CEO. As a corollary, agency theorists argue that 
separating the two roles will help increase board independence by providing effective checks 
and balances over managerial behaviour (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, p.72; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002, p.321). It has been suggested, for example, that separating the two roles will make it 
easier for the board to remove a non-performing CEO (Jensen, 1993, p.866; Monks and 
Minow, 2001, p.208). This can help in preventing managers from pursuing goals that advance 
their self-interests to the disadvantage of shareholders.  
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ii) The Empirical Evidence on the Role or CEO Duality and Firm Financial Performance 
Empirically, the evidence regarding the relationship between role or CEO duality and 
firm financial performance is mixed (e.g., Rechner and Dalton 1991; Brickley et al., 1997; 
Weir et al., 2002). Rechner and Dalton (1991) investigate the relationship between role or 
CEO duality and three accounting measures of financial performance (ROE, return on 
investment and profit margin) of 141 large American corporations (Fortune 500 firms) from 
1978 to 1983. They report that companies with separate board chairpersons consistently 
outperformed those with role or CEO duality.  
However, the results of Rechner and Dalton (1991) have been criticised on several 
grounds. Firstly, they focus purely on large American firms. Secondly, they rely purely on 
accounting-based performance measures. Thirdly, they fail to control for firm specific 
characteristics, such as firm size and industry (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, p.53). As result, 
using a sample of UK listed firms, Dahya et al. (1996) investigate whether the stock market 
prefers companies to combine or split the roles of company chairman and CEO. Consistent 
with the evidence of Rechner and Dalton (1991), their results suggest that the market responds 
favourably to the separation of the two roles and unfavourably to their fusion.  
Of particular interest to this study, and using a sample of 84 South African listed firms, 
Ho and Williams (2003) report a statistically significant and negative link between a firm’s 
physical and intellectual capital performance and role or CEO duality. This indicates that the 
role or CEO duality-financial performance nexus is also likely to be negative among South 
African listed firms. Similarly, in a sample of 347 Malaysian listed firms, Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) report that firms that separated the two roles performed financially (ROA) better than 
those that vested the two roles in one person. This indicates that monitoring by the board 
improves when the roles of CEO and chairman are split. Finally, Chahine and Tohmé (2009) 
investigate the relationship between role or CEO duality and initial underpricing using a 
sample of 127 initial price offerings (IPOs) firms’ from 12 Middle East and North African 
countries22. They report that underpricing is significantly higher in firms that have role or 
CEO duality. This suggests the market perceives role or CEO duality as an undesirable 
development. 
                                                 
22These countries are: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates.  
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By contrast, a group of researchers report that role or CEO duality impacts positively 
on firm financial performance (e.g., Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Boyd, 1995; Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003). Firstly, Donaldson and Davis (1991) examine the effects of role or CEO 
duality on shareholder returns in a sample of 321 US firms from 1985 to 1987. They report 
that companies with role or CEO duality have superior financial performance to those that 
separate the two roles. Unlike Rechner and Dalton (1991), they demonstrate that the tenor of 
their results remain unchanged after controlling for firm-specific features, such as firm size 
and industry.  
Similarly, Boyd (1995) investigates the association between role or CEO duality and 
financial performance, as proxied by five year average returns on investment (ROI) in a 
sample of 192 American firms selected from 12 industries from 1980 to 1984. Consistent with 
the evidence of Donaldson and Davis (1991), he reports that firms with role or CEO duality 
consistently outperformed their counterparts with independent board leadership structure. This 
is consistent with the view that role or CEO duality enhances decision-making by permitting a 
sharper focus on company objectives. Finally, using a sample of 348 of Australia’s largest 
publicly listed firms in 1996, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) investigate the role or CEO duality-
performance relationship. They report that role or CEO duality impacts positively on the 
financial performance (Tobin’s Q) of Australian listed firms. 
A third stream of empirical papers suggests that role or CEO duality has no impact on 
financial performance. Using a small sample of 25 Canadian firms from 1976 to 2000, Bozec 
(2005) reports that role or CEO duality has no impact on return on sales, sales efficiency and 
assets turnover. Similarly, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) report a statistically insignificant 
relationship between Tobin’s Q and role duality in a sample of 347 Malaysian listed firms. 
This is consistent with the results of previous studies (e.g., Baliga et al., 1996; Brickley et al., 
1997; Rhoades et al., 2001; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Laing and Weir, 1999; Weir and 
Laing, 2000; Sanda et al., 2005), which suggest that role or CEO duality has no impact on 
financial performance. Of close relevance to this study, Mangena and Chamisa (2008) 
investigate the relationship between role or CEO duality and the suspension of listed firms by 
the JSE Ltd. Using a sample of 81 South African listed firms from 1999 to 2005, they find no 
significant link between role duality and incidences of listing suspension by the JSE.  
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iii) Recommendations of King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules  
King II and JSE Listings Rules state explicitly that the positions of the chairman and 
the CEO should not be held by the same individual. Also, it states that the chairman must be 
independent as defined in subsection 3.3.3.2 of chapter three by the Code, who bears the 
responsibility for the running of the board, while the CEO is responsible for the day-to-day 
running of the company’s business. This suggests that King II recognises role or CEO duality 
as an undesirable development, while role separation is seen as good corporate governance 
practice.  
However, the prior South African evidence is mixed. Ho and Williams (2003) report a 
statistically significant and negative role or CEO duality-performance link. In contrast, 
Mangena and Chamisa (2008) find no significant association between role or CEO duality and 
incidences of listings suspension by the JSE. Given the mixed evidence, both the null and 
alternate hypotheses are tested. Therefore, the respective third (3) null and alternate 
hypotheses to be tested in this study are that: 
:0H  There is a statistically significant negative relationship between role or CEO 
duality and firm financial performance, as proxied by both ROA and the Q-
ratio. 
:1H  There is no statistically significant negative relationship between role or CEO 
duality and firm financial performance, as measured by both ROA and the Q-
ratio. 
 
4.2.2.5 Percentage of Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) 
i) The Theoretical Link between the Percentage of NEDs and Financial Performance 
One of the internal corporate governance mechanisms that the theoretical literature 
suggests can be used in reducing agency and information asymmetry problems in modern 
corporations is the appointment of non-executive directors (NEDs) (e.g., Fama 1980; Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). In this study, NEDs refer to the ratio of the number of non-
executive directors to the total number of directors of a firm and expressed as a percentage. 
There are two theoretical views with regards to NEDs: those who are in favour of more NEDs 
on corporate boards and those who prefer more executive directors.  
Those who support more NEDs on the board usually base their arguments on three 
theories: agency, resource independence, and information asymmetry & signalling. 
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Conventional agency theory suggests that boards dominated by executive directors (insiders) 
are less accountable (Fama, 1980, p.293; Sonnenfeld, 2002, p.108). In contrast, NEDs possess 
three main features. First, they bring independent judgment to board decisions (e.g., Cadbury 
Report, 1992; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009). Second, they offer the firm resources in the 
form of experience, expertise, business contacts and reputation (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, 
p.1039; Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009, p.715). 
Third, the existence of competitive and efficient managerial labour markets both within 
and outside the firm ensures that NEDs perform their monitoring function effectively (Fama, 
1980, pp.292-294; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, p.315). Fama (1980, p.293) and Fama and Jensen 
(1983a, p.313) argue that once top internal management gains control of the corporate board, 
they are more likely to connive and collude among themselves to expropriate shareholders’ 
wealth. It also reduces healthy competition among managers for improved performance.   
In line with the above view, Fama (1980, p.293) suggests that the possibility of such 
internal managerial connivance might be reduced, and the viability of the board as a market-
induced mechanism for low-cost transfer of control might be enhanced, by the addition of 
NEDs. Jensen (1993, p.863) suggests that their independence help NEDs to avoid politeness 
and courtesy at the expense of truth, frankness, and constructive criticisms of executive 
management in the boardroom without fear of victimisation.  
Finally, it has been argued that the appointment of independent NEDs helps in 
reducing information asymmetry by credibly signalling insiders’ intent to treat outside or 
potential shareholders fairly, and by implication, the safety of their investment (Black et al., 
2006a, p.184). It also signals to the market insiders’ intent to rely on decision experts, as well 
as their appreciation of the importance of separating the decision-making and control functions 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983a, p.315). As a result, proponents of this view believe that a higher 
percentage of NEDs on corporate boards will improve financial performance.  
However, relying on stewardship theory, opponents argue that corporate boards 
dominated by NEDs may impact negatively on performance (Baysinger and Hookisson, 1990, 
p.74; Weir and Laing, 2000, p.267; Bozec, 2005, p.1927). Weir and Laing (2000, p.267) 
contend that NEDs often command less knowledge about the business and find it too difficult 
to understand the complexities of the company. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that 
outside directors are usually part-timers who normally also sit on boards of other companies 
(Bozec, 2005, p.1927; Jiraporn et al., 2009, p.819). This leaves them with too little time to 
devote to their monitoring and advisory duties. 
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By contrast, high levels of executive directorships are associated with high access to 
information, which leads to high quality decision-making (Nicholson and Kiel, 2003, p.588). 
This can impact positively on financial performance. Crucially, outside directors would 
usually not have the same access to informal sources of information and knowledge within the 
firm. As a result, decisions made by a board dominated by NEDs would be of a lower quality, 
and this would in turn lead to low firm performance.  Further, it has been argued that corporate 
boards dominated by outside directors tend to stifle managerial initiative and strategic actions, 
which arise from excessive managerial supervision (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1039).  
 
ii) The Empirical Evidence on the Percentage of NEDs and Financial Performance 
 
Consistent with the conflicting nature of the theoretical literature on NEDs, prior 
empirical evidence regarding the relationship between the percentage of NEDs and firm 
financial performance is mixed. A strand of the empirical literature reports that boards 
dominated by NEDs deliver higher performance. Using a sample of 311 UK listed firms from 
1994 to 1996, Weir et al. (2002) report a positive relationship between the percentage of 
NEDs and performance (Tobin’s Q). Gupta and Fields (2009) examine a US sample of 744 
independent NED resignations from 1990 to 2003 to ascertain the value that the market places 
on board independence. They report that, on average, the announcement of independent NED 
resignations result in 1.22% loss in a firm’s market value. This suggests that investors value 
board independence as independent boards are associated with greater monitoring of 
managerial behaviour.  
Of close importance to this study, Ho and Williams (2003) find a statistically 
significant and positive link between the percentage of outside directors and a firm’s physical 
and intellectual capital performance in 84 South African listed firms in 1998. Consistent with 
the evidence of Ho and Williams (2003), Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report a negative 
association between the percentage of NEDs and the incidences of firm suspensions from the 
JSE in a sample of 81 firms from 1999 to 2005. This suggests that South African listed firms 
with a higher percentage of NEDs are less likely to be suspended from the stock exchange. 
Recently, El Mhendi (2007) and Mangena and Tauringana (2008) report evidence, which is 
entirely consistent with prior research that boards dominated by NEDs perform better for a 
sample of Tunisian and Zimbabwean listed firms, respectively. 
By contrast, a group of researchers reports that the percentage of NEDs is negatively 
correlated with performance (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Laing and 
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Weir, 1999; Bozec, 2005). In a sample of 25 Canadian firms from 1976 to 2005, Bozec (2005) 
finds that the relationship between the percentage of NEDs and performance is negative. 
Similarly, Sanda et al. (2005) report that Nigerian firms with a low percentage of outside 
directors performed better than those with more NEDs. This suggests that whilst NEDs can 
bring independence, objectivity and experience to bear upon board decisions, the may also 
stifle managerial initiative through excessive monitoring. 
A third stream of empirical papers (e.g., Vefeas and Theodorou 1998; Weir and Laing, 
2000; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), indicates that the presence of NEDs has no impact on 
performance. For example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) report no link between board 
composition and performance for a sample of 142 US listed firms. UK studies by Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998) and Weir and Laing (2000) find that the wealth effects of outside directors 
are statistically insignificant. Further, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) report a statistically 
insignificant relationship between the percentage of NEDs and performance for a sample of 
347 Malaysian listed firms.   
 
iii) Recommendations of South African Companies Act, King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules 
 
Section 269A of the South African Companies Act 1973 requires every public 
company to appoint at least two independent NEDs. King II and the JSE Listings Rules also 
require South African corporate boards of directors to consist of a majority of NEDs. King II 
further requires that the majority of the NEDs be independent of management to ensure that 
minority interests are adequately protected. This suggests that King II expects firms with more 
NEDs on their boards to perform financially better than those with less NEDs.  
As has been discussed above, the past South African evidence also indicates that a 
greater percentage of NEDs on corporate boards may be associated with higher financial 
performance. Ho and Williams (2003) find a statistically significant and positive association 
between the percentage of NEDs and intellectual capital performance. Mangena and Chamisa 
(2008) report that the incidence of listing suspensions from the JSE significantly reduces with 
an increase in the number of NEDs. However, given the mixed international evidence, both 
the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. Therefore, the fourth (4) respective null and 
alternate hypotheses to be tested in this study are that: 
:0H  There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the percentage of 
NEDs and firm financial performance, as measured by both ROA and the Q-
ratio. 
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:1H  There is no statistically significant positive relationship between the percentage 
of NEDs and firm financial performance, as proxied by both ROA and the Q-
ratio. 
 
4.2.2.6 Frequency of Board Meetings (FBMs) 
i) The Theoretical Link between the Frequency of Board Meetings and Performance 
The association between the frequency of board meetings and firm financial 
performance is another internal corporate governance issue that gives rise to concern for 
policy-makers and researchers. There are two theoretical views on this issue: those who are in 
favour of higher frequency of board meetings and those who are not (e.g., Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992; Jensen, 1993). 
One theoretical proposition is that the frequency of board meetings measures the 
intensity of a board’s activities, and the quality or effectiveness of its monitoring (Vefeas, 
1999a, p.116; Conger et al., 1998, p.142). All else equal, a higher frequency of board meetings 
will result in a higher quality of managerial monitoring, which can impact positively on 
financial performance. It has been contended that regular meetings allow directors more time 
to confer, set strategy, and to appraise managerial performance (Vafeas 1999a, p.118). It can 
help directors to remain informed and knowledgeable about important developments within 
the firm. This will place the directors in a better position to timely address emerging critical 
problems (Mangena and Tauringana, 2006, p.12). In fact, Sonnenfeld (2002, p.107) suggests 
that regular meeting attendance is considered a hallmark of the conscientious director. Also, 
frequent meetings intermingled with informal sideline interactions can create and strengthen 
cohesive bonds among directors (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, p.69).  
An opposing theoretical view is that board meetings are not necessarily beneficial to 
shareholders. Firstly, Vefeas (1999a, p.114) argues that normally the limited time directors 
spend together is not used for the meaningful exchange of ideas among themselves. Instead, 
routine tasks, such as presentation of management reports and various formalities absorb much 
of the meetings. This reduces the amount of time that outside directors would have to 
effectively monitor management (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, p.64). Secondly, board meetings 
are costly in the form of managerial time, travel expenses, refreshments and directors’ meeting 
fees (Vafeas 1999a, p.118).  
In fact, Jensen (1993, p.866) contends that boards in well-functioning companies 
should be relatively inactive and exhibit little conflicts. He suggests that rather than 
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necessarily organising frequent board meetings, it will be more profitable for corporate boards 
to establish a system that is responsive to their specific challenges. For example, directors can 
increase the frequency of meetings during crisis or when shareholders’ interests are visibly in 
danger, such as when replacing the CEO or fighting hostile takeovers. Consistent with 
Jensen’s (1993) suggestions, Vafeas (1999a, p.118) argues that companies that are efficient in 
setting the right frequency of board meetings, depending on its operating context, will enjoy 
economies of scale in agency costs.  
 
ii) The Empirical Evidence on the Frequency of Board Meetings and Performance 
Firstly, there is limited evidence on the relationship between the frequency of board 
meetings and firm financial performance. Secondly, the limited evidence is also conflicting, 
which makes the frequency of board meetings-financial performance assciation a ripe area for 
further research.  
For 307 US listed firms over the 1990-1994 period, Vafeas (1999a) reports a 
statistically significant and negative association between the frequency of board meetings and 
financial performance, as proxied by Tobin’s Q. By contrast, he finds that operating 
performance significantly improves following a year of abnormal board activity. This suggests 
that while directors who confer more regularly can make better decisions and engage in active 
monitoring, the potential benefits of such intense monitoring are expected to reflect in future 
years’ performance. That is, board decisions may have gestation period within which their full 
benefits may be realised. This may also suggests the presence of endogeneity problems in the 
association between the frequency of board meetings and firm financial performance. For 
example, it is possible for firm financial performance to improve, following increased 
frequency of board meetings, but such increased board activity might have been triggered by 
poor firm financial performance. As will be indicated below, section 5.3 of chapter five and 
the whole of chapter nine will address potential endogeneity problems in this research. 
Similarly, using a sample of 258 of the Fortune 1000 companies, Carcello et al. (2002) 
establish a positive relationship between the amount of audit fees paid and the frequency of 
audit committee meetings. This means that audit committees that meet more frequently pay 
higher audit fees, which reduces financial performance23. Recently, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) 
                                                 
23It is also possible for a firm to incur higher auditing costs as a result of increased monitoring of management by 
the audit committee. This can potentially introduce endogenity problems into the frequency of board meetings-
performance nexus. As has been indicated above, subsection 5.3 of chapter five and chapter nine will discuss how 
issues of endogenity have been addressed in this study.  
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offer evidence, which is in line with the results of prior research that boards that meet more 
frequently are valued less by the market in a sample of 508 US listed firms from 1989 to 1995.  
On the contrary, using a sample of 275 US listed firms from 1995 to 2000, Karamanou 
and Vafeas (2005) find a positive association between board meeting frequency and the 
accuracy of management earnings forecasts. Also, Mangena and Tauringana (2006) report a 
positive relationship between the frequency of board meetings and firm performance for a 
sample of 157 Zimbabwean listed firms over the period 2001-2003. Their results support the 
proposition that monitoring becomes more intense in periods of crisis, and companies whose 
board meet more frequently perform better. In contrast, El Mehdi (2007) finds that the 
frequency of board meetings has no association with economic performance in a small sample 
of 24 Tunisian listed firms from 2000 to 2005. He suggests that financial performance, which 
is tied most closely to the quality of the day-to-day management of the company, is likely to 
be less affected by the frequency of board meetings. 
 
iii) Recommendations of King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules 
King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules task South African listed firms to establish a 
policy for the frequency, purpose, conduct and duration of their boards of directors and board 
subcommittees’ meetings. Specifically, King II recommends that all corporate boards should 
meet regularly, at least once a quarter, which must be disclosed in their annual reports.  This 
implies that King II expects a higher frequency of board meetings to impact positively on firm 
financial performance. However, given the conflicting international empirical evidence, both 
the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. Hence, the respective fifth (5) null and alternate 
hypotheses to be tested in this study are that: 
 :0H  There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the      
frequency of board meetings and firm financial performance, as measured by 
both ROA and the Q-ratio. 
 :1H  There is no statistically significant positive relationship between the      
frequency of board meetings and firm financial performance, as proxied by 
both ROA and the Q-ratio. 
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4.2.2.7 Presence of Key Internal Board Committees 
i) The Theoretical Link between Board Committees and Financial Performance 
Prior literature suggests that board committees help improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of corporate boards (Jiraporn et al., 2009, p.820). According to Harrison (1987, 
p.109) there are two generic types of board committees: monitoring or oversight and 
management supporting or operating. Operating board committees advise management and 
the board on major business decision. Their monitoring counterparts are intended to protect 
shareholder interests by providing objective, independent review of corporate executives and 
affairs. Agency theory suggests that a central monitoring function of the board is to ensure that 
corporate activities are properly audited, (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen 
1983a). It also includes ensuring that directors and senior management are adequately 
remunerated, and to nominate qualified individuals for appointment to fill director and top 
management positions (e.g., Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009; Jiraporn et al., 2009). 
As a corollary, there has been a dramatic increase in the use of monitoring board 
committees over the last three decades (Harrison, 1987, p.109). Key among them are auditing, 
remuneration or compensation and nomination committees. In fact, almost every corporate 
governance code of the modern era has called for the institution of these board committees 
(see Cadbury Report, 1992; UK Combined Code, 1998, 2006; King Reports, 1994, 2002; and 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002, amongst others). 
Despite their increasing popularity, however, there are still conflicting theoretical 
propositions as to the nexus between monitoring board committees and financial performance. 
One line of the theoretical literature suggests that the establishment of these committees can 
impact positively on performance (e.g., Harrison, 1987; Wild, 1994; Sun and Cahan, 2009). 
Firstly, unlike the main board or operating committees (e.g., finance/executive), monitoring 
board committees24 are usually entirely composed of independent NEDs, making them better 
placed to protect shareholders’ interests by effectively scrutinising managerial actions (e.g., 
Klein, 1998; Vefeas, 1999b). 
 Secondly, by their relative small size, board committees are able to meet more 
frequently. This provides sufficient time for meaningful dialogue and in reaching consensus 
                                                 
24As has been discussed in chapter three, King II recommends, for example, that the remuneration committee 
should be formed entirely by independent NEDs. Audit and nomination committees should be constituted by a 
majority of independent non-executive directors. All three board committees must also be chaired by independent 
NEDs. 
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decisions quicker (Karamanou and Vefeas, 2005, p.458). Thirdly, by their composition25, 
board committees help in bringing individual director’s specialist knowledge and expertise to 
bear on the board decision-making process (Harrison, 1987, p.111). This also allows the main 
board to devote attention to specific areas of strategic interests and responsibility.  
Finally, board committees enhance corporate accountability, legitimacy and credibility 
by performing specialist functions (Weir et al., 2002, p.585). The principal function of the 
audit committee, for example, is to meet regularly with the firm’s external and internal 
auditors to review the company’s financial statements, audit process and internal accounting 
controls. This helps reduce agency costs and information asymmetry by facilitating timely 
release of unbiased accounting information by managers to shareholders (Klein, 1998, p.279). 
Also, effective monitoring by the audit committee may help minimise financial fraud and 
increase firm value.  
The remuneration committee determines and reviews the nature and amount of all 
compensation for directors and senior officers of the firm. This also helps in reducing the 
agency problem by constructing and implementing remuneration schemes and incentives 
designed to better align the interests of managers and shareholders (Klein, 1998, p.279; Weir 
and Laing, 2000, p.268). The nomination committee is responsible for nominating candidates 
for appointment to the board. This minimises the agency conflict by improving board 
independence and the quality of appointed directors (Vefeas and Theodorou, 1998, p.390; 
Vefeas, 1999b, p.199).  
By contrast, others suggest board committees can impact negatively on performance. 
Firstly, the establishment of board committees imposes extra costs in terms of managerial time, 
travel expenses and additional remuneration for the members of the committees (Vefeas, 
1999a, p.118). Secondly, it can result in excessive managerial supervision, which can inhibit 
executive initiative and vision (e.g., Goodstein, et al., 1994; Conger et al., 1998; Vefeas, 
1999a and b). Thirdly, it may also result in duplicating corporate board duties and 
responsibilities. This will have additional costs implications for firms. Finally, by creating 
generalists and specialists among board members, board committees have the potential of 
generating conflicts in ideas and impairing boardroom cohesion. 
 
                                                 
25Unlike the main board, directors with specialist knowledge and expertise normally constitute board committees. 
King II suggests, for example, that a majority of the audit committee members must be financially literate and 
preferably with practical financial management experience.  
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ii) The Empirical Literature on Board Committees and Financial Performance 
 The empirical literature regarding the association between the presence of board 
committees and financial performance is still at its embryonic stage (Dalton et al., 1998; Laing 
and Weir, 1999, p.460). The little available evidence also largely focuses on developed 
markets, such as the UK and the US. This makes generalisation difficult. Further, the limited 
evidence also offers contradictory results. This makes board committee structures a fertile area 
for further research, especially within a developing country context. It may help shed 
additional insights on the board committees-performance relationship. The results can also be 
compared with previous international studies on board committees.  
In line with the theoretical literature, a strand of the empirical literature suggests a 
positive board committees-performance relationship (e.g., Wild, 1994; Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein, 2009; Sun and Cahan, 2009). Wild (1994) examines market reaction before and 
after the establishment of audit committees by a sample of 260 US firms from 1966 to 1980. 
He reports a statistically significant improvement in share returns following the establishment 
of audit committees, which suggests that the presence of audit committees can enhance 
managerial accountability to shareholders. Recent evidence by Vefeas and Karamanous (2005) 
in 275 Fortune 500 firms is consistent with prior research that the presence of audit 
committees is positively associated with firm financial performance. 
Using a sample of 606 large US listed firms, Vefeas (1999b) documents a positive 
relationship between the establishment of nomination committees and the quality of new 
director appointments26. This implies that nomination committees can improve board quality, 
which may ultimately improve the effectiveness with which the board carries out its 
monitoring and advisory roles. In separate studies, but using samples of US listed firms, 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and Sun and Cahan (2009) report a significant decrease in 
CEO compensation for US firms with independent compensation committees compared with 
those without compensation committees. This suggests that the establishment of independent 
compensation committees is associated with better monitoring of managerial compensation.  
Of special interest to this study, Mangena and Chamisa (2008) find in a sample of 81 
South African listed firms that the presence of an audit committee significantly reduces the 
possibility of a firm being suspended from the stock exchange. This indicates that the presence 
                                                 
26According to Vefeas (1999a), the quality of a director is defined by his or her independence from the appointing 
body. In this case, an independent non-executive director as has been defined in chapter three by King II, for 
example, is considered to be of a higher quality in comparison to a non-executive director. 
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of audit committees improve internal monitoring, reduce internal fraud and enhance 
compliance with corporate regulations.  
 By contrast, others have offered evidence, which shows that the presence of board 
committees impact negatively on performance (e.g., Main and Johnston, 1993; Vefeas, 1999a). 
In a sample of 220 large British listed firms, Main and Johnston (1993) examine the role of 
remuneration committees in British boardrooms. They report that the presence of a 
remuneration committee is associated with higher executive pay, which reduces shareholder 
value. Similarly, using 307 US listed firms from 1990 to1994, Vefeas (1999a) reports a 
negative relationship between the establishment of board committees (namely, audit, 
remuneration, and nomination) and firm value.  
 A third stream of papers suggest no empirical relationship between board committees 
and performance (e.g., Klein, 1998; Vefeas and Theodorou, 1998; Laing and Weir, 1999). 
Using a sample of 486 US firms over the period 1992-1993, Klein (1998) examines the 
association between the presence of audit, compensation, and nomination committees and 
financial performance, but finds no statistically significant relationship. Further, she 
demonstrates that her result is robust irrespective of the changes in the composition of the 
committees’ membership. Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) investigate the impact of audit, 
remuneration and nomination committees on the performance of 250 UK listed firms in 1994. 
They find no evidence in favour of the idea that the existence of the three board committees 
significantly affected firm financial performance. Recently, Weir and Laing (2000), Weir et al. 
(2002), Dulewicz and Herbert (2004), and Bozec (2005) provide evidence, which shows that 
the establishment of the three board committees has no significant impact on financial 
performance. 
 
iii) Recommendations of the Companies Act, King II and the JSE’s Listings Requirements 
 Section 269A of the South African Companies Act 1973 requires every public 
company to establish an audit committee, which must consist of at least two independent 
NEDs. Similarly, King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules require South African listed firms to 
institute audit, remuneration, and nomination committees. They specify that each committee 
should be chaired by an independent NED. They must also be composed either entirely of 
independent NEDs (in the case of the remuneration committee) or by a majority of 
independent NEDs (in the case of audit and nomination committees). Further, the audit 
committee members must be financially literate and should be chaired by a person other than 
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the chairman of the board. This suggests that King II expects that the establishment of board 
committees may directly or indirectly impact positively on firm financial performance.  
As has been discussed above, Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report that South African 
listed firms with audit committees are less likely to be suspended from the JSE than those 
without audit committees. This suggests that the presence of audit committees can improve 
managerial monitoring. This can also impact positively on firm financial performance. 
However, given the mixed board committees-performance evidence, both the null and 
alternate hypotheses are tested. Therefore, the respective sixth (6) null and alternate 
hypotheses to be tested in this study are that: 
 :0H  There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the presence of 
audit, remuneration and nomination committees and firm financial 
performance, as proxied by both ROA and the Q-ratio. 
 :1H  There is no statistically significant positive relationship between the presence 
of audit, remuneration and nomination committees and firm financial 
performance, as measured by both ROA and the Q-ratio. 
 
4.2.2.8 Director Shareownership 
 
iii) The Theoretical Link between Director Shareownership and Financial Performance 
Director ownership of shares is another important internal corporate governance 
mechanism that has been proposed as a possible solution to the agency problem. There are two 
contrasting theoretical propositions: convergence-of-interests and entrenchment. 
Agency theory suggests that director shareownership helps in reducing the conflicts of 
interest that exist between shareholders and managers (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 
1980; Jensen, 1993). This convergence-of-interests model maintains that as the proportion of 
equity owned by directors increases, their interests and those of shareholders become more 
aligned and the incentive to indulge in opportunistic behaviour diminishes. This is because the 
greater their financial stake in the form of shareownership, the greater the costs they will incur 
for not maximising shareholders wealth. Consequently, directors who own large blocks of 
shares have additional incentive to actively monitor managerial actions that can help reduce 
agency costs and increase firm financial performance. 
However, another strand of the theoretical literature suggests director entrenchment as 
an alternative hypothesis to convergence-of-interests (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and 
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Servaes, 1990; Short and Keasey, 1999). The entrenchment hypothesis proposes that at low 
levels of director shareownership, the competitive internal and external market forces 
(discipline) can help align the interests of directors with those of shareholders. However, it 
contends that at high levels of shareholding, directors may hold sufficient voting power to 
protect themselves against such disciplinary forces, and as such directors will prefer to pursue 
non-wealth maximising goals. This is because the private benefits in the form of perquisites 
consumption, such as guaranteed employment with an attractive salary that will accrue to 
directors are greater than the utility that they will obtain from pursuing optimal projects that 
will increase the wealth of all shareholders. This results in director entrenchment in which 
other shareholders are unable to remove or influence the actions of the managing directors, 
even in the face of serious under performance or misbehaviour. In this case, the director 
shareownership-performance relationship is expected to be negative. 
Further, the theoretical literature suggests that combining the convergence-of-interests 
hypothesis with the entrenchment hypothesis gives rise to a non-linear director 
shareownership-performance relationship (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 
1990). This means that at low levels of director shareownership, interests’ alignment may help 
increase firm financial performance. However, at high levels of director shareownership, 
director entrenchment impedes beneficial takeovers, and thus decreases firm value. 
 
ii) The Empirical Literature on Director Shareownership and Financial Performance 
 Consistent with the conflicting nature of the theoretical literature, the empirical 
evidence on director shareownership-performance relationship is mixed. Specifically, a group 
of researchers reports positive relationship, another documents negative association, while a 
third group finds a non-linear relationship between director shareownership and financial 
performance. 
 Morck et al. (1988) investigate the relationship between director shareownership and 
firm value, as proxied by Tobin’s Q using a cross-sectional sample of 371 Fortune 500 US 
firms in 1980. They report a non-monotonic relationship between director shareownership and 
firm value. This suggests market value of firms’ first increases, then declines, and finally 
increases slightly, as ownership by directors increases. Specifically, Morck et al. (1988) 
document a statistically significant and positive director ownership-performance link at lower 
levels (0% to 5% - interests convergence), a statistically significant and negative relationship 
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at moderate levels (5% to 25% - entrenchment), and additionally a statistically significant and 
positive association at higher levels (above 25% - interests convergence) of director ownership.  
Their evidence suggests that at low levels of director ownership, interests alignment 
help increase firm value, while at high levels, director entrenchment negatively affects 
financial performance. Recent US and UK studies by McConnell and Servaes (1990), 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Short and Keasey (1999), Weir and Laing (2000), and Davies 
et al. (2005) have supported the non-monotonic director shareownership-performance 
relationship. 
 By contrast, using a sample of 49 listed Zimbabwean firms in 1994, Owusu-Ansah 
(1998) report that director shareownership impacts positively on mandatory disclosure. 
Consistent with the evidence of Owusu-Ansah (1998), Mangena and Tauringana (2008) 
document a positive association between director shareownership and financial performance, 
as measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA in a sample of 72 Zimbabwean listed firms over the 
period 2002-2004. This suggests that the market perceives director shareownership serving as 
an extra incentive to enhance shareholder value. The results of recent studies by Krivogorsky 
(2006), and Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) have supported the positive relationship for a 
sample of 87 European and 175 Greek listed firms, respectively. 
 In contrast, but of particular importance to this study, Ho and Williams (2003) find that 
director ownership is negatively related to a firm’s physical and intellectual capital 
performance in a sample of 84 South African listed firms. This implies that the director 
shareownership-financial performance relationship can also be expected to be negative for 
South African listed firms. Sanda et al. (2005) report an inverse relationship between director 
shareownership and a raft of financial performance measures, including ROA, ROE, Tobin’s 
Q and P/E ratio in a sample of 93 Nigerian listed firms from 1996 to 1999. The negative 
relationship between director shareownership and financial performance has also been 
supported by the findings of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) in a sample of 347 Malaysian listed 
firms over the period 1996-2000.  
A fourth stream of empirical papers documents no relationship between director 
shareownership and performance. For example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) report no cross-
sectional relationship between accounting rates of return and insider shareholding for 511 US 
listed firms from 1984 to 1989. Re-examining previous US evidence using a sample of 600 
listed firms from 1984 to 1992, Himmelberg et al. (1999) report a spurious correlation 
between director shareownership and Tobin’s Q. They find that a large fraction of the cross-
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sectional variation in managerial ownership is explained by firm-level characteristics like size, 
cash flow, capital, and advertising intensity, amongst others. They suggest that director 
shareownership is rather endogenous in performance regressions, casting serious doubts on 
prior US evidence that indicates that managerial ownership is exogenously related to 
performance.  
Similarly, and of close relevance to this study, Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report a 
positive, but statistically insignificant relationship between director shareownership and the 
incidences of listing suspension from the South African stock exchange in a sample of 81 
South African listed firms. This suggests that director ownership has no impact on the 
likelihood that a firm will be suspended from the JSE. In separate studies, Vefeas and 
Theodorou (1998) and El Mehdi (2007) provide evidence which is consistent with the view 
that director shareownership has no impact on firm financial performance in samples of 250 
UK and 24 Tunisian listed firms, respectively. 
 
iii) Recommendations of the Companies Act, King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules 
 The South African Companies Act 1973 requires every director to hold a symbolic one 
share of the company for which he or she is a director. King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules do 
not set any ownership requirements for directors. However, King II suggests that the 
performance-related elements of directors’ remuneration, such as stock options should 
constitute a substantial portion of their total remuneration package in order to align their 
interests with those of shareholders. It should also be designed to provide incentives to 
directors to perform at the highest operational levels. This indicates that King II expects 
director shareownership to have a positive impact on firm financial performance.  
However, and as has been discussed above, prior South African studies report mixed 
results. Ho and Williams (2003) find a statistically significant and negative link between 
director ownership and a firm’s physical and intellectual capital performance. By contrast, 
Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report a positive, but statistically insignificant relationship 
between director shareownership and the incidences of listing suspensions on the JSE. Given 
the mixed prior evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. Hence, the 
respective seventh (7) null and alternate hypotheses27 to be tested in this study are as follows: 
                                                 
27As will be discussed in chapters seven and eight, to replicate the results of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell 
and Servaes (1990), director shareownership will be squared and cubed to test for the existence of non-linear 
director shareownership-performance relationships. 
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 :0H  There is a statistically significant positive relationship between director 
shareownership and firm financial performance, as proxied by both ROA and 
the Q-ratio. 
:1H  There is no statistically significant positive relationship between director 
shareownership and firm financial performance, as measured by both ROA and 
the Q-ratio. 
 
4.2.3 Internal Corporate Governance Structures and Firm Financial Performance: 
         The Compliance-Index Model 
 
 In a significant departure from the equilibrium-variable model that has been discussed 
above, a different line of corporate governance-financial performance research has recently 
emerged. This new line of corporate governance research contends that a company’s financial 
performance is likely to be influenced by a number of agency mechanisms with potential 
interactive effects in an integrated framework rather than as independent structures (e.g., 
Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Beiner at al., 2006). As a consequence, instead of looking at one 
single corporate governance mechanism in isolation, this model recommends the construction 
of a compliance or composite corporate governance index, encapsulating a comprehensive set 
of corporate governance provisions to investigate the corporate governance-performance 
nexus.  
 This subsection will discuss the limited empirical evidence in this new line of 
corporate governance research that focuses on both developed and emerging markets. Also, 
while the limited African studies focus on corporate governance and disclosure, they will be 
briefly discussed for their contextual and methodological relevance.  
 
4.2.3.1 Compliance Governance Indices, Financial Performance, and Developed Markets 
 
 Gompers et al. (2003) are among the pioneers to investigate the corporate governance-
financial performance link using a compliance or composite corporate governance index. 
Specifically, Gompers et al. examine how shareholder rights vary across firms and their 
impact on financial performance. Using the incidence of 2428 corporate governance rules, they 
                                                 
28They divided the 24 corporate governance rules into four main subgroups: delay, protection, voting, and other. 
The delay subgroup is made up of blank check, classified board, special meeting, and written consent. The 
protection subgroup consists of compensation plans, contracts, golden parachutes, indemnification, liability, and 
severance. The voting subgroup comprises of bylaws, charter, cumulative voting, secret ballot, supermajority, and 
unequal voting. The other subgroup includes antigreenmail, directors’ duties, fair price, pension parachutes, 
poison pill, and silver parachute. They constructed a non-compliance corporate governance index. That is, for 
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construct a non-compliance composite index to proxy for the level of shareholder rights for 
1,500 large US listed firms over the period 1990-1998. They report that an investment strategy 
that buys firms in the lowest decile of the index (strongest rights) and sells firms in the highest 
decile of the index (weakest rights) can earn a statistically significant abnormal returns of 8.5 
percent per year during the sample period. They also find that firms with stronger shareholder 
rights have higher firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q and higher accounting profits. 
Further, they report that firms with stronger shareholder rights also have higher sales growth, 
lower capital expenditures, and make fewer corporate acquisitions.  
Using Gompers et al.’s non-compliance corporate governance index, Cremers and Nair 
(2005) provide evidence which is in line with the results of Gompers et al. that US firms with 
better corporate governance generate superior share returns and are valued higher by the 
market. Similarly, Bebchuk et al. (2009) investigate the relative importance of the 24 
corporate governance provisions followed by Gompers et al. (2003) by extending the data 
from 1990 to 2003. They report that increases in their non-compliance corporate governance 
index level are associated with economically significant reductions in firm value, as measured 
by Tobin’s Q, as well as large negative abnormal stock returns. Recent US and cross-country 
studies by Gillan et al. (2003), Larcker et al. (2005), Aggarwal et al. (2007), Bruno and 
Claessens (2007), and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) have provided further empirical 
support for the results of Gompers et al. (2003) and Cremers and Nair (2005).  
By contrast, Core et al. (2006), and Bhagat and Bolton (2008) have cast serious doubts 
on the validity of prior US evidence that establishes a positive link between better composite 
corporate governance indices and financial performance. Core et al. (2006) extends Gompers 
et al.’s (2003) corporate governance index to 1999 to re-examine the finding that firms with 
weak shareholder rights exhibit significant stock market underperformance. After controlling 
for takeover activity, their results reject the hypothesis that weak corporate governance causes 
poor stock returns. Consistent with Core et al. and after taking into account the potential 
endogenous link between corporate governance and performance, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) 
find no significant correlation between Gompers et al.’s (2003) composite corporate 
governance index and market performance. 
 In the UK and the larger continental Europe, due to limited availability of sufficient 
data, very little research has been done that examines the relationship between a compliance or 
                                                                                                                                                         
every firm they award one point for the presence of any of these 24 corporate governance provisions that restricts 
shareholder rights, zero otherwise. 
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composite corporate governance index and financial performance. Baur at al. (2004), Drobetz 
at al. (2004), Shabbir and Padget (2005), Beiner et al. (2006), and Arcot and Bruno (2007) are 
rare exceptions. Shabbir and Padget (2005) use 1229 corporate governance provisions from the 
1998 UK Combined Code to develop a non-compliance corporate governance index for a 
sample of 122 FTSE 350 firms over the period 2000-2003 to investigate the corporate 
governance-performance relationship. Consistent with the US evidence, they report that their 
non-compliance corporate governance index is inversely related to total shareholder return, 
(TSR), return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE). This implies that more compliant 
UK listed firms enjoy higher TSR, ROA and ROE over the sample period.  
Beiner et al. (2006) construct a compliance composite corporate governance index 
based on 38 provisions from the Swiss Code of Best Practice in a 2002 cross-sectional sample 
of 109 Swiss listed firms to examine the corporate governance-performance link. They divided 
38 corporate governance provisions into five main subgroups. These are: corporate 
governance commitment, shareholders’ rights, transparency, board of directors and executive 
management, and reporting and auditing. In constructing their compliance composite 
corporate governance index, every firm is awarded a point for the presence of any of the 38 
good corporate governance practices, zero otherwise. Consistent with Shabbir and Padget, 
they find a positive relationship between the quality of corporate governance and firm value, 
as measured by Tobin’s Q.   
Arcot and Bruno (2007) also use 830 corporate governance provisions from the 1998 
UK Combined Code to construct a non-compliance composite corporate governance index for 
a larger sample of 245 UK listed firms from 1998 to 2003 to examine the link between 
corporate governance and financial performance. In contrast to Shabbir and Padget, they 
report that adherence to best practice does not always lead to superior financial performance, 
as measured by ROA.  
 
                                                 
29The 12 corporate governance provisions include independent NED chairperson, a senior independent NED 
other than the chair, one third of the board members are NEDs, majority of the NEDs are independent, the board 
has audit, nomination, and remuneration committees, each board committee is chaired by an independent NED, 
the remuneration committee is composed entirely of independent NEDs, the audit committee is composed of 
NEDs only with a majority independent NEDs, and the nomination committee is chaired by an independent NED. 
Similar to Gompers et al (2003), they construct a non-compliance corporate governance index, in which the 
presence of any of the 12 provisions is awarded a value of one, zero otherwise. 
30 The 8 corporate governance provisions they examined include separation of chairperson and CEO, 
identification of a senior NED, the number of NEDs, the proportion of independent NEDs, director service 
contracts’ notice period, audit, nomination, and remuneration committees. Each of the eight corporate governance 
provisions was binary scored. That is, the presence of any of the eight provisions was awarded a value of one, 
zero otherwise.  
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4.2.3.2 Compliance Governance Indices, Financial Performance, and Emerging Markets  
In contrast to the mixed findings observed in developed markets, there is more 
consistent evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between compliance 
or composite corporate governance indices and firm financial performance in emerging 
markets. Black (2001) is among the first to examine the correlation between the level of a 
compliance or composite governance index and financial performance in an emerging market 
context. Using a corporate governance ranking developed by a Russian Investment Bank for 
21 Russian listed firms in 1999, he finds a strong and statistically significant positive 
correlation between good corporate governance and firm value.  
Henry (2008) uses eight31 corporate governance provisions from the 2003 Australian 
Stock Exchange corporate governance rules to construct a compliance composite corporate 
governance index for a sample of 116 Australian listed firms from 1992 to 2002 to examine 
the corporate governance-performance link. Consistent with the results of Black (2001), he 
reports a statistically significant and positive link between the constructed good composite 
corporate governance index and firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q. Recent studies by 
Baek et al. (2004), Black et al. (2006a and b), Cheung et al. (2007), Cui et al. (2008), and 
Garay and González (2008) for South Korea, Russia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Australia and 
Venezuela, respectively, have corroborated the results of prior emerging markets research that 
better-governed firms tend to be associated with higher financial performance than their 
poorly-governed counterparts. 
 As has been explained in section 1.2 of chapter one, of close interest to this study, 
however, are four major cross-country studies conducted by Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev 
and Kim (2005), Chen et al. (2009) and Morey et al. (2009) in emerging markets. Klapper and 
Love (2004) use subjective analysts’ corporate governance rankings constructed by Credit 
Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA)32  for a cross-sectional sample of 374 companies in 14 
emerging countries, including South Africa in 2000 to investigate the link between firm-level 
                                                 
31The 8 corporate governance provisions are: board dependence, CEO-chairperson duality, board size, board 
remuneration, options issued to executive directors, the existence of audit, nomination, and remuneration 
committees. Each of the eight corporate governance provisions was binary scored. That is, the presence of any of 
the eight provisions was awarded a value of one, zero otherwise.  
32The CLSA corporate governance index that Klapper and Love used is based on a questionnaire of 57 qualitative 
corporate governance provisions or questions. The provisions are divided into seven broad subcategories. These 
are: management discipline with 9 provisions, transparency with 14 questions, independence with 12 provisions, 
accountability with 6 provisions, responsibility with 5 questions, fairness with 7 provisions, and social awareness 
with 4 questions. The questionnaire was completed by CLSA analysts in each of the 25 emerging countries for 
the 495 companies covered. CLSA asked its analysts to award a binary number of one for the presence of each of 
the 57 provisions, zero otherwise. Each firm’s total score is then expressed as a percentage of the possible 57.  
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corporate governance and financial performance. They report that the sampled firms’ quality 
of corporate governance is positively correlated with better operating performance, as proxied 
by ROA, and market valuation, as measured by Tobin’s Q. Further, the positive relationship is 
stronger in countries with weaker legal environments. This suggests that corporate governance 
matters more in countries with poor legal regimes and weaker investor protection. 
Similarly, using a combined corporate governance rankings developed by CLSA and 
S&P33 for a larger cross-sectional sample of 1,067 firms from 27 countries, including South 
Africa, Durnev and Kim (2005) report that firms with better corporate governance structures 
receive higher market valuation, as measured by Tobin’s Q. Similarly, they also report that the 
corporate governance-performance relationship is more pronounced in countries with poor 
legal standards. Chen et al. (2009) have also used the same CLSA 2000 subjective analysts’ 
governance rankings used by Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005) to 
examine the nexus between corporate governance and the cost of equity capital. They report a 
statistically significant and negative relationship between the quality of a firm’s corporate 
governance and its cost of equity capital. 
Finally, Morey et al. (2009) investigate the corporate governance-performance link 
using the AllianceBerstein composite index 34  for 200 firms from 21 emerging markets, 
including South Africa from 2001 to 2006. Consistent with the results of Klapper and Love 
(2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005), they report that there is generally a positive and 
significant relationship between corporate governance and firm valuation, as measured by 
Tobin’s Q and the price per share to book value per share ratio.  
Arguably, and as has been discussed in section 1.2 of chapter one, all four prior studies 
seem to suffer from several limitations. Firstly, a major problem with all cross-country studies 
is that they appear to suffer from sample selection bias. This is because all four studies use 
sample firms rated by analysts. However, and as will be discussed in detail in chapter five, 
prior literature suggests that analysts corporate governance ratings tend to be biased towards 
                                                 
33The combined CLSA/S&P corporate governance rankings used by Durnev and Kim are based on the same 57 
provisions and seven broad subcategories used by Klapper and Love (2004). The questions were also filled in by 
analysts by awarding a binary number of one if any of the 57 provisions is present, zero otherwise. The main 
difference between the two studies is that Durnev and Kim (2005) examine a larger number of countries (27) and 
companies (1,027). 
34AllianceBernstein corporate governance index used by Morey et al. is based on a questionnaire of 60 corporate 
governance questions. The questions are divided into seven subcategories. These are: information disclosure with 
8 questions, management access and fair disclosure with 5 questions, representation of data with 10, value 
creation with 9 questions, board and shareholder structure with 12 questions, capital management with 7 
questions, and social responsibility with 9 questions. The questions were answered by analysts by awarding a 
value of 5 for the presence of any of the 60 corporate governance questions, zero otherwise. 
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larger firms (CLSA, 2000, p.1; Botosan, 1997; Hassan and Marston, 2008). The CLSA 
corporate governance index used by Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2005) and 
Chen et al. (2009) for example, includes only the largest35 9 South African listed firms36. This 
means that the sample firms used by previous studies are less representative of the population 
of South African listed firms than the sample used in this study. This raises questions with 
respect to the generalisation of the findings of prior research for South African listed firms.  
Secondly, the extant literature suggests that corporate governance structures and 
systems vary across different countries (West, 2006, p.433, 2009, p.10; Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009, p.383; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009, p.262). However, subjective analysts’ 
corporate governance rankings are standardised such that they are unable to reflect 
institutional, cultural, and contextual differences in corporate governance structures across 
individual countries and systems. This implies that they are unable to assess how compliance 
with South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder provisions impact on 
the financial performance of South African listed firms. 
Thirdly, despite the increasing concerns that the presence of endogenous problems 
could confound research findings (e.g., Himmelberg et al. 1999; Chenhall and Moers, 2007a 
and b), with the exception of Durnev and Kim (2005)37, none of them attempt to directly 
address problems that may be caused by the existence of an endogenous relationship between 
corporate governance and performance. This also raises questions with respect to the 
reliability of the results of prior studies. Finally, with the exception of Morey et al. (2009), all 
the prior studies use only cross-sectional data. This means they are unable to ascertain whether 
the observed cross-sectional corporate governance-performance relationship holds over time. 
The current study on South Africa overcomes these limitations in prior studies in 
several ways. Firstly, and as will be discussed in detail in chapter five, to reduce potential 
sample selection bias and achieve sufficient cross-sectional variation in the sample firms, the 
                                                 
35Specifically, the average firm in the CLSA 2000 sample was 9.4 billion US dollars (CLSA, 2000, p.9). 
36These firms are: Anglo American, De Beers, Dimension Data, First Rand, M-Cell, NEDCOR, Old Mutual, 
South African Brewery, and Standard Bank Investment (CLSA, 2000, p.63). Further, four out of these 9 firms 
included in the CLSA 2000 subjective analysts’ governance rankings, namely Old Mutual, First Rand, NEDCOR 
and Standard Bank Investment are financial institutions (CLSA, 2000, p.13). As will be discussed further in 
chapter five, due to regulatory and capital structure reasons, and in line with much of the prior literature (e.g., 
Yermack, 1996; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Chen et al., 2008; Guest, 2009), financial and utility firms will be 
excluded from the sample.  
37Durnev and Kim (2005) explicitly attempt to address problems that may be caused by the existence of an 
endogenous nexus between corporate governance and performance. However, Black et al. (2006a, p.369) suggest 
that the industry instruments that they used in addressing potential endogeneity problems are somewhat suspect. 
This is because Durnev and Kim (2005, p.1484) assume that industry does not affect a firm’s corporate 
governance choices. Separate research conducted by Gillan et al. (2003) and Black et al. (2006a), however, 
indicates that industry does influence a firm’s corporate governance choices. 
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sample will be constructed in such a way that there will be a balance between large and small 
firms. Secondly, and unlike prior studies, the sample size used in this study will be reasonably 
large, consisting of 50 large and 50 small firms. This can arguably enhance generalisation of 
the results. 
 Thirdly, and as will be discussed in detail in chapters five and nine, problems that may 
be posed by the potential existence of endogeneities will be directly addressed in this study. 
Fourthly, the corporate governance index used in this study is a researcher-constructed 
instrument. Unlike subjective analysts’ rankings, it has the advantage of ensuring that unique 
and pressing South African contextual corporate governance provisions, such as employment 
equity, black economic empowerment, and HIV/Aids are incorporated into the methodology. 
Finally, since the quality of a firm’s corporate governance structures may arguably change 
over time, this study will examine the corporate governance-performance link using a five-
year panel data with both cross-sectional and time series properties. This may ensure that the 
effects of both cross-sectional and time changes in corporate governance on financial 
performance may be appropriately captured in this study. Arguably, these improvements are 
likely to provide new insights, which may enrich the corporate governance-performance 
literature.  
 
4.2.3.3 Compliance Governance Indices, Company Disclosure, and African Markets 
 Apart from Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2005), Chen et al. (2009), and 
Morey et al. (2009)  whose cross-country samples include South Africa, very little is known 
about the empirical relationship between a compliance or composite corporate governance 
index and financial performance among African listed firms. However, a limited number of 
papers, including Firer and Meth (1986), Wallace (1988), Owusu-Ansah (1998), April et al. 
(2003), Barako et al. (2006a and b), and Mangena and Tauringana (2007), have examined the 
nexus between a constructed corporate governance index and the degree of company 
disclosure. 
 Firer and Meth (1986) examine the information requirements of South African 
investment analysts and compare them with their UK counterparts. Using a disclosure index of 
49 voluntary items for 36 listed South African firms from 1979 to 1983, they report low levels 
of voluntary disclosure among South African firms in comparison with their UK counterparts. 
Owusu-Ansah (1998) investigates the quality of corporate governance and mandatory 
disclosure for 49 Zimbabwean listed firms in 1994. Using a disclosure index of 214 mandatory 
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items, he reports that company size, ownership structure, and profitability have a statistically 
significant and positive effect on mandatory company disclosure. 
  Barako et al. (2006a and b) both examine factors influencing voluntary corporate 
disclosure by 43 Kenyan listed companies using 47 voluntary disclosure items over the period 
1992-2001. Consistent with the results of Owusu-Ansah, they report that corporate governance 
attributes, such as ownership structure, the presence of audit committee and foreign ownership 
have a positive impact on voluntary disclosure. Finally, Mangena and Tauringana (2007) 
construct a voluntary disclosure index using 87 items for 67 Zimbabwean listed firms from 
2003 to 2004 to investigate the relationship between voluntary disclosure and foreign 
shareownership. Consistent with prior African evidence, they report that the quality of 
voluntary disclosure, proportion of NEDs, institutional shareownership, and the independence 
of audit committees are all positively associated with foreign shareownership.   
 
4.2.3.4 Recommendations of King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules 
 As has already been discussed in chapter three, King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules 
set out six broad areas of good corporate governance practices, including the board and 
directors, accounting and auditing, internal audit, control and risk management, integrated 
sustainability reporting, and compliance and enforcement that South African listed firms are 
expected to comply with or identify and explain any areas of non-compliance. The constructed 
South African Corporate Governance Index (SACGI) contains 50 provisions, which cover all 
six aspects of King II.  
Briefly, and as has been discussed in section 4.1, agency theory indicates that 
compliance with good corporate governance practices can reduce agency costs and increase 
shareholder returns. Information asymmetry and managerial signalling theory suggests that 
compliance with codes of good corporate governance standards is essentially a major way by 
which a firm can signal that it is better-governed. By revealing its better governance qualities, 
a firm may increase demand for its shares (increase firm value), but can reduce its cost of 
equity capital. Also, political costs theory indicates that the political system has the power (i.e., 
through taxation, regulations, nationalisation, expropriations, and break-ups) to redistribute 
wealth between various societal groups (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, p.115; Andreasson, 
2009, p.22). In this regard, companies, especially large corporations, are particularly suscetiple 
to wealth redistributions. 
  
129 
 This implies that compliance with good corporate governance practices, especially the 
South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder provisions may not only be a 
major way by which listed firms can decrease political costs, but also an opportunity for them 
to gain greater access to resources (resource dependence theory), such as tax holidays, 
subsidies, and government contracts. Therefore, in theory, South African listed firms that 
comply more with the provisions of King II can be expected to be associated with higher 
financial performance than those that do not, ceteris paribus.  
Similarly, and as has been discussed above, prior cross-country studies whose sample 
include a number of South African listed firms by Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim 
(2005), and Morey et al. (2009) suggest a significant positive relationship between good 
corporate governance practices and firm financial performance. Further, opinion-based 
surveys conducted by CLSA (2000), McKinsey & Co. (2002), and Deutshe Bank (2002) 
among global institutional investors, including South African institutional investors, indicate 
that investors are willing to pay a higher premium for shares in firms with good corporate 
governance practices than their counterparts with poor corporate governance practices. This 
also suggests a positive relationship between good corporate governance and financial returns. 
Therefore, the respective final (8) null and alternate hypotheses to be tested in this study are 
that:  
 :0H  There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the South 
African Corporate Governance Index (SACGI) and firm financial performance, 
as measured by both ROA and the Q-ratio. 
 :1H  There is no statistically significant positive relationship between the South 
African Corporate Governance Index (SACGI) and firm financial performance, 
proxied by both ROA and the Q-ratio. 
 
  
4.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has focused on the extant theoretical and empirical internal corporate 
governance-financial performance relationship literature. Its objective has been twofold. 
Firstly, it sought to review existing theories that attempt to link internal corporate governance 
structures with firm financial performance. Recognising the complex and multi-disciplinary 
nature of corporate governance, and also in line with the prior literature, multiple-theoretical 
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perspectives is adopted in constructing and explaining the complex relationship between 
internal corporate governance structures and firm financial performance.  
In line with this view, the agency problem is identified as the main theoretical 
framework for the study, while information asymmetry and managerial signalling, 
stewardship, resource dependence, political cost, and organisational theories of corporate 
governance are relied on by this study as providing additional theoretical insights into 
developing the often complex nexus between certain specific internal corporate governance 
structures and firm financial performance. For each internal corporate governance mechanism 
examined in this study, and also in line with previous studies, the existing positive theoretical 
link(s) is(are) sharply juxtaposed with a competing theoretical view(s), further signifying and 
corroborating the conflicting, as well as the complex nature of the internal corporate 
governance structures-firm financial performance relationship. 
 With regard to the agency theory, it is argued that the agency problem is general and 
that agency costs unavoidably arise in any situation involving cooperative effort by two or 
more people in which the principal-agent relationship can be invoked even if not explicitly 
defined. Applying the classical principal-agent construct to the shareholder-manager 
relationship that arises as a result of the internal organisation of modern corporations in which 
ownership is separate from control, it is pointed out that the main concern has been about how 
shareholders (owners) of the firm could reduce agency costs and any additional potential 
divergences of managerial interests from theirs through the establishment of the appropriate 
monitoring and bonding framework (internal corporate governance structures) so as to 
improve firm financial performance.  
Also, as a result of information asymmetry between shareholders and managers, the 
latter may need to signal their intentions in order to reduce the adverse selection and moral 
hazards problems that shareholders face by instituting certain internal corporate governance 
structures. Further, resource dependence theory contended that the institution of such 
corporate governance structures, as the board of directors is not only meant to monitor 
managers, but also help in securing critical resources for the firm. In contrast, stewardship 
theory assumed a different nature of managerial behaviour and argued that managers are 
trustworthy and so should be fully empowered to run the affairs of the firm with less external 
monitoring.  
 The second major objective of the chapter has been to review the extant empirical 
literature on the link between internal corporate governance structures and firm financial 
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performance. In this regard, two main empirical models were identified within the literature: 
the equilibrium-variable and the compliance-index approaches. As will be discussed in detail 
in chapter five, prior studies have so far only used one model or discounted the other purely on 
the basis of perceived theoretical strengths or weaknesses. However, it is contended that such 
a crucial methodological choice ought to be based on their respective theoretical and empirical 
validity rather than on their theoretical appropriateness alone. Therefore, focusing on both 
empirical models within the same study and context, offers a unique opportunity to provide 
first time comparative evidence as to their respective empirical strengths, which may inform 
methodological choices of future researchers.  
 In line with the theoretical literature, irrespective of the context or model reviewed, the 
empirical literature is generally mixed. However, the mixed evidence is more pronounced with 
regard to the equilibrium-variable model than the compliance-index approach. Also, even 
though the evidence regarding the compliance-index is conflicting within the context of 
developed markets, it is more conclusive with regard to emerging markets. Further, whilst the 
compliance-index model literature is quite advanced in the US, due to the lack of sufficient 
data, the non-US evidence is very limited. Finally, and as has been discussed in chapter three, 
while some African countries, such as South Africa offer an interesting research context for 
corporate governance, the dearth of empirical evidence on emerging African markets is 
evident throughout the review. Arguably, this offers an opportunity to make substantial 
contributions to the extant literature. 
 In the next chapter, the research design will be set out. Specifically, it will describe 
how the sample and data were collected, the research methodology used, and the extent to 
which the obtained empirical results are robust or sensitive to alternative estimations and 
explanations.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
5. INTRODUCTION 
 
 This chapter discusses the research design. It hopes to achieve four main interrelated 
objectives. Firstly, it attempts to provide a comprehensive description of the data and research 
methodology used in this study. The significance is that every scientific work has to be 
replicable, and this can easily be achieved if the researcher provides a clearly laid down 
procedure as to how the study is carried out (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). The second objective 
of the chapter is to clearly explain the rationale for the various data and methodological 
choices made at every stage of the study. The third aim of the chapter is to point out the 
strengths and weaknesses of the various data and methodological choices that have been made 
throughout the study. Finally, it aims to provide an explicit indication of how sensitive or 
robust the obtained empirical results from the various data and methodological choices that 
have been made are to alternative estimations and explanations. The remainder of this chapter 
is organised as follows. Section 5.1 describes the sample selection procedure and the data. 
Section 5.2 discusses the research methodology. Section 5.3 examines at a variety of 
robustness or sensitivity analyses, while section 5.4 summarises the chapter. 
 
 
5.1 SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA 
 
 This section describes the sample selection procedure, the types of data used, and the 
sources of the data used in carrying out this study. Specifically, the section is divided into four 
subsections. Subsection 5.1.1 will describe the sample selection procedure, subsection 5.1.2 
will present the types and sources of data used. Subsection 5.1.3 will describe the criteria for 
selecting the final sample, whilst subsection 5.1.4 will discuss the reasons for selecting the 
final stratified sample of 100 companies. 
 
5.1.1 Sample Selection 
 
The sample firms used in examining the internal corporate governance-financial 
performance link were drawn from companies listed on the JSE Ltd, South Africa. As at 31 
December 2006, a total of 402 companies were officially listed on the main board of the JSE. 
  
133 
Firms listed on the Alternative Exchange (AltX) were not considered because they are subject 
to different listings, financial reporting, and corporate governance requirements. The official 
list of all the main board listed firms with their respective industrial classifications was 
obtained directly from the Market Information Department of the JSE. The list was also cross-
checked against the list provided on the JSE’s official website, which is available at: 
http://www.jse.co.za, accessed in December 2006. 
In total, there are ten major industries, including basic materials, consumer goods, 
consumer services, financials, health care, industrials, oil and gas, technology, 
telecommunications, and utilities. Table 3 presents a summary of the sample selection 
procedure. Panel A of Table 3 shows the industrial composition of all companies that were 
listed on the main board of the JSE as at 31 December 2006. Panels B, C, and D present the 
industrial composition of listed firms available to be sampled, sampled firms with full data, 
and the final 100 stratify sampled firms, respectively. Panel A indicates that the market is 
dominated by financials, industrials, basic materials, and consumer services industries. 
Together, the four industries account for approximately 79% of the entire JSE population of 
listed firms.   
To begin with, the financials industry with 109 firms, and utilities industry with 2 firms, 
which together accounts for approximately 28% of the entire population were excluded from 
being sampled for three well-known reasons. Firstly, financial and utility firms are heavily 
regulated, which may impact differently on their governance structures and financial 
performance (Yermack, 1996, p.189; Cheng et al., 2008, p.126; Guest, 2009, p.390). For 
example, section 3 of the South African Companies Act 1973 states that the provisions of the 
Act do not apply to financial firms, such as banks, insurance companies, and pension funds, 
which are governed by special statutory legislations. Banks are, for instance, specially 
governed by the Banks Act (No. 94 of 1990) in addition to regulations from the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
134 
Table 3: Summary of the Sample Selection Procedure 
 
Panel A: Industrial Composition of all   No. in each     Percentage(%)  
   Listed firms on the JSE as at 31/12/2006  Industry of population 
 
Financials            109   27.1 
Industrials              81   20.1  
Basic Materials             67   16.7 
Consumer Services             62   15.4 
Consumer Goods             36     9.0 
Technology              31     7.7 
Health Care                7     1.7 
Telecommunications               4     1.0 
Oil and Gas                3     0.8 
Utilities                2     0.5 
Total population           402            100.0 
 Less: Financials, and        109 
          U tilities             2       111   27.6  
Total sampled firms           291   72.4  
 
Panel B: Industrial composition of    No. in each      Percentage 
   Firms available to be sampled   Industry        of sample  
 
Industrials              81   27.8 
Basic Materials             67   23.0 
Consumer Services             62   21.3  
Consumer Goods             36   12.4  
Technology              31   10.7  
Health Care                7     2.4        
Telecommunications               4     1.4  
Oil and Gas                3     1.0 
Total Firms Available to be sampled         291                  100.0 
       Less:  Firms with no year’s data available        28     
                 Firms with some years’ data missing      94      122   41.9  
Total sampled firms with full data         169   58.1 
 
Panel C: Industrial composition of    No. in each      Percentage  
  Sampled firms with full data    Industry      of sample  
 
Industrials (2 email and 2 postal copies of annual reports)        51   30.2 
Consumer Services             35   20.7 
Basic Materials (2 website copies of annual reports)         33   19.5  
Consumer Goods             24   14.2  
Technology (2 website and 1 email copies of annual reports)      19   11.2  
Health Care                3     1.8        
Telecommunications (1 postal copy of annual report)          3     1.8  
Oil and Gas                1     0.6 
Total Sampled Firms with full data         169                       100.0 
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Continuation: Table 3 
 
Panel D: The final 100     No. in each    Final no. of     Percentage of         Percent. of 
    Stratified     Industry   Stratified    the final Indus-        Industrial 
    Sampled firms     Sample    trial sample(169)    Sample(291) 
 
Industrials            51          20               39.2                     24.7 
Consumer Serv./Health Care          38          20               52.6                     29.0 
Basic Materials/Oil and Gas          34          20               58.8                     28.6 
Consumer Goods            24          20               83.3                     55.6 
Technology/Telecoms.          22          20               90.9                     57.1 
Total sample                     169        100               59.2                     34.4 
 
Sources: The JSE Ltd – Panel A; Author’s Compilation – Panels B, C and D. In total, full five years (2002 - 2006) 
annual reports totalling 845 were collected for the final 169 firms in Panel C. 835 (98.8%) of the annual reports 
were collected from Perfect information. As Panel C indicates, the remaining 10 (1.2%) annual reports were 
collected as follows: 3 postal copies, 3 email copies, and four company website copies. 
 
 
Secondly, financial firms have unique capital structure (i.e., highly geared), which can 
impact on financial performance differently (Lim et al., 2007, p.562)38. Finally, excluding 
financial and utility companies can help facilitate comparisons with prior studies (e.g., Ho and 
Williams, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008), who also exclude 
such firms. All the remaining 291 firms constituting 72.4% of the entire JSE population were 
then sampled for possible inclusion. Panel B of Table 3 presents the industrial composition of 
the remaining 8 industries that were sampled as at 31 December 2006. 
The remainder of this section is divided into three. The next subsection will describe 
the types and sources of data used in this study, while subsections 5.1.3, and 5.1.4 will present 
the criteria, and reasons for selecting the final 100 stratify sampled firms used in this study, 
respectively. 
 
5.1.2 Data and Sources 
Two main types of data are used in examining the relationship between internal 
corporate governance structures and financial performance of South African listed firms. The 
first category consists of internal corporate governance variables. All the internal corporate 
governance variables were manually extracted from the annual reports of the sampled 
companies. The annual reports were mainly obtained from the Rest of the World Filings of the 
Perfect Information Database in electronic format. Considerable amount of efforts were put in 
                                                 
38The recent globall financial crisis in which banks and other financial institutions (BOFIs) have particularly been 
affected negatively worldwide offers anecdotal support to this argument (see Turner Review, 2009; Walker 
Review, 2009). 
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to maximise the sample size, as much as possible. As a result, for companies with a particular 
year’s annual report missing or not available in Perfect Information, they were either directly 
contacted via telephone or e-mail or their websites were scanned if they had websites for hard 
or electronic copies.  
As Panel C of Table 3 indicates, and as will be further explained below, in total, ten 
company annual reports that were not found in Perfect Information forming approximately 
1.2% of the total 845 annual reports obtained (i.e., 169 firms over five firm years each) were 
received as follows: three postal copies, three e-mail electronic versions, and four reports were 
obtained from company websites. The remaining 835 (i.e., 98.8%) company annual reports 
were all obtained from Perfect Information. Company annual stock market and financial 
accounting performance variables constitute the second type of data used in this study. These 
were all collected from DataStream. 
 
5.1.3 The Criteria for Selecting the Final Sample 
To be included in the final sample, a firm has to meet the following two criteria: (1) a 
company’s full five-year annual reports from 2002 to 2006 inclusive must be available either 
in Perfect Information or via other media used, such as e-mail, company official website and 
postal delivery, as described above; and (2) its corresponding five-year stock market and 
financial accounting information must also be available in DataStream. These criteria were 
imposed for several reasons.  
Firstly, the criteria helped in meeting the requirements for a balanced panel data 
analysis, which favours, including only firms with several consecutive years of data (Yermack, 
1996, p.189; Cheng et al., 2008, p.126). There are advantages for using panel data. By 
combining time series of cross-sectional observations, balanced panel data provides: (i) more 
degrees of freedom; (ii) less collinearity among variables; (iii) more cross-sectional and time 
series variability; (iv) more asymptotic efficiency; (v) more informative data; and (vi) account 
more for observable and unobservable firm-level heterogeneity in individual-specific variables 
(Gujarati, 2003, p.637).  
It is also a timely response to recent calls for the use of panel data in corporate 
governance research as a way of minimising inherent statistical problems, such as endogeneity 
(Börsch-Supan and Köke, 2002, p.301; Larcker and Rusticus, 2007, p.208). A potential 
weakness is that it introduces survivorship bias into the sample selection process. However, 
and as will be discussed further below, the criteria generated comparatively larger sample size 
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in relation to those of prior South African studies to the extent that the generalisability of the 
research results may not be substantially impaired. Secondly, it is in line with previous 
corporate governance researchers who have used panel data (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Gompers et 
al., 2003; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008), and specifically five-year balanced panel (e.g., Boyd, 
1995; Gani and Jermias, 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Thirdly, using a five-year data is 
also generally in line with conventional capital markets-based research (Fama, 1965; Strong, 
1992, p.538; Kothari, 2001, p.186).  
Fourthly, contrary to much of the existing literature that uses one year cross-sectional 
data, analysis of five-year data with both cross-sectional and time series properties may help in 
ascertaining whether the observed cross-sectional internal corporate governance structures-
performance link also holds over time. Fifthly, and as will be discussed further in subsection 
5.3, the five-year panel ensured that sufficient series are obtained to permit carrying out 
proposed statistical and robustness analyses, such as endogeneity test. Sixthly, the sample 
begins from the 2002 financial year because it is the year King II came into force in which JSE 
listed firms were required to comply with its provisions or explain in the case of non-
compliance (King Report, 2002, pp.20-21, 41). Finally, the sample ends in 2006 because it is 
the most recent year for which data was available at the time of data collection.  
Using the above criteria, and as Panel B of Table 3 shows, the full data required is 
obtained for a total of 169 (58.1%) out of the 291 firms constituting the remaining eight 
industries. For 94 of the remaining 122 firms, two or more years of financial performance data 
and/or annual reports could not be found in DataStream and Perfect information, respectively 
or via other media, such as company websites, and direct e-mail or telephone contacts. For the 
remaining 28 firms, neither financial performance data nor full annual reports are available in 
DataStream and Perfect Information, respectively or the other media used.  
The sample of 169 firms is still large when compared with previous South African 
studies (e.g., Firer and Meth, 1986; April et al., 2003; Ho and Williams, 2003; Mangena and 
Chamisa, 2008). For example, in investigating corporate governance and incidences of listing 
suspension by the JSE, Mangena and Chamisa (2008) obtained full annual reports data on 81 
out of a possible 538 suspended firms identified over the period 1999-2005. Similarly, using 
various techniques – direct contact, database, and websites searches, Ho and Williams (2003) 
were able to obtain a useable cross-sectional sample of 84 annual reports for South African 
listed firms for the 1998 financial year to examine the association between board structure and 
the efficiency of value added by a firm’s physical and intellectual capital resources. Firer and 
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Meth (1986) obtained only 36 annual reports for studying information requirements of 
investment analysts in South Africa, while April et al. (2003) received only 20 annual reports 
for examining intellectual capital disclosures among South African mining firms. 
Panel C of Table 3 contains the industrial composition of the 169 firms for which a full 
five-year data is available. The industrials/manufacturing sector remains the largest with 51 
firms out of the total 169 firms, accounting for 30.2%. By contrast, health care, oil and gas, 
and telecommunications industries together accounts for a meagre 4.1% of the total 169 
sampled firms. This is consistent with the composition of the natural population. Due to the 
small number of observations in three industries, namely; health care, oil and gas, and 
telecommunications with three, one, and three listed firms, respectively, were merged with the 
closest remaining five major industries. As a result (see Panel D of Table 3), the three health 
care companies were included in the consumer services industry; the one oil and gas firm was 
added to the basic materials industry, while the three telecommunications companies were 
also shared out to the technology industry. 
 Finally, and the rationale for which will be explained in subsection 5.1.4, a stratified 
sample of 100 firms out of the total 169 companies, consisting of 20 firms each from the five 
main remaining industries were taken. This is achieved by first ranking all the firms in each 
industry by their five-year average (i.e., from 2002 to 2006 inclusive) market capitalization, as 
a proxy for size39. Using the five-year average market value in ranking the firms is in line with 
prior research (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, p.1164).  Crucially, it is found to be more powerful 
in capturing the actual size of the firms over the five-year period than using the market value 
of a single financial year for example. In each industry, the largest40  10 ranked companies and 
smallest 10 ranked firms are then selected to form a group of 20 firms in each industry.  
Panel D of Table 3 contains the breakdown of the remaining five industries, as well as 
the final 100 stratified sample firms. As can be observed from Panel A of Table 3, a notable 
limitation of selecting equal number of firms from each industry is that the composition of the 
final sample will not be representative of the natural JSE population of 402 or the possible JSE 
                                                 
39With the recent significant increase in the value of corporate intangibles, especially among telecommunications 
and technology firms (Brand Finance, 2006, pp.6-8; Holland, 2006, pp.281-282; Ghosh and Wu, 2007, pp.216-
218), market value is considered to be a more germane and objective size measure. Also, experiments with other 
potential size measures, such as total assets and sales yielded similar results. For example, the correlation 
between market value and total assets is 0.948, while the correlation between market value and total sales is 
0.896.  
40For five companies, one from the basic materials, three from the industrials, and one from the consumer 
services, they were large instead of the largest ranked companies. These five firms were used in conducting the 
initial pilot test for the study and have been retained in the final sample. 
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sample of 291. However, as Panel D shows, with the exception of the industrials sector, the 
final stratified sample of 20 firms in each industry forms more than 50% of the final useable 
industrial sample. Also, the total selected 100 firms from the five industries accounts for close 
to 60% of the useable sample of 169 (i.e., firms with full data available). Similarly, apart from 
the industrials, the final stratified sample of 20 companies in each industry constitutes more 
than 25% of the original industrial population. In total, the final 100 stratified sample for the 
five industries also forms close to 25% of the entire JSE population of 402 listed firms. 
Appendix 1 contains a list of the names and industries of the sample of 100 firms used in this 
study. 
 
5.1.4 Reasons for Selecting the Final 100 Stratified Sample  
         Several theoretical, empirical, and practical reasons motivated the selection of the 100 
firms on the basis of size and industry. Firstly, a considerable and well-established theoretical 
and empirical accounting disclosure literature exists, which suggests that company size and 
industry matter (e.g., Cerf, 1961; Verrecchia, 2001; Beattie et al., 2004; and Hassan and 
Marston, 2008, amongst others). Specifically, Lang and Lundholm (1993, p.246) provide US 
evidence, which suggests that accounting disclosure is positively correlated with firm size.  
The positive relationship between size and disclosure can be explained by several 
factors. Firstly, accounting compliance and disclosure have cost implications that smaller 
firms may struggle to afford in comparison with their larger counterparts (Lang and Lundholm, 
1993, p.252). Secondly, larger firms are exposed to greater public scrutiny, analysts and 
financial press following, which compels them to disclose more (Lang and Lundholm, 1993, 
pp.249-251). Thirdly, larger firms are more complex with respect to the scope of their 
business operations, segments, products, markets and geographical locations (Marston and 
Shrives, 1991, p.205), and therefore have more to disclose. For example, it can be argued that 
a multinational multi-product company would have more to disclose than a small locally listed 
company.  
Fourthly, larger firms are more likely to be cross-listed41 (Marston and Shrives, 1991, 
p.206; Melvin and Valero, 2009, p.66) and be subject to additional corporate governance 
disclosure requirements (CLSA, 2000, p.1; Deutsche Bank, 2002, pp.9-10, 30). Fifthly, prior 
literature suggests that the political costs of stringent regulations, nationalisation, taxation, and 
break-ups, amongst others, are positively associated with firm size (Watts and Zimmerman, 
                                                 
41As will be discussed in subsection 5.2, cross-listing will be used as one of the control variables in this study. 
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1978, p.115; Andreasson, 2009, p.22). As a result, larger firms have additional incentives of 
reducing political costs of strict central regulation or even nationalisation through increased 
disclosure, especially with respect to affirmative action and social disclosures (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978, p.115; Marston and Shrives, 1991, p.205). Finally, prior literature suggests 
that larger firms have greater agency problems and a higher need to attract new external 
capital (Jensen, 1986, p.323; Core, 2001, p.443; Beiner et al., 2006, pp.250, 253).  This means 
that larger firms may have to disclose more in order to reduce the twin information 
asymmetric problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Recent studies by Botosan (1997), Clarkson and Satterly (1997), Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002), Jiang and Kim (2004), and Mangena and Tauringana (2007), amongst others, offer 
evidence, which shows that, on average, larger firms tend to disclose more than smaller firms. 
As a corollary, the top and the bottom ten firms in each industry ranked by their five-year 
average market capitalisations are sampled. The rationale is to achieve a fair balance between 
larger and smaller firms. As has been discussed in chapter four, unlike previous studies, this 
will help to achieve sufficient cross-sectional variation in corporate governance disclosure 
levels, and improve generalisation of the research results. 
Secondly, the same accounting disclosure literature indicates that different industries 
depict different patterns of corporate governance disclosure (Botosan, 1997, p.327; Deutsche 
Bank, 2002, p.6; Gillan et al., 2003, pp.1-2). Lang and Lundholm (1993, p.251) suggest, for 
example, that biotechnology firms appear to disclose more voluntary information because of 
the severe information asymmetry between managers and investors. In contrast, Botosan 
(1997, p.327) reports that pharmaceutical firms tend to disclose more about their research and 
development activities than do firms in other industries.  
Of particular interest to this study, opinion-based surveys conducted by CLSA (2000) 
and Deutsche Bank (2002) in emerging markets, including South Africa indicate that 
corporate governance standards vary across different industries. The results of the Deutsche 
Bank (2002, p.6) survey, for example, suggests that corporate governance standards were 
highest among energy or consumer services firms, whilst good corporate governance practices 
were weakest among technology firms. As a result, to prevent one industry from dominating 
the sample, and crucially, to maximise the generalisability of the results, equal number of 20 
firms from each of the five major remaining industries is sampled.  
Thirdly, the final 100 stratified sampled firms, which generated a total of 500 firm-year 
observations, form a significant percentage of the total possible sample, as well as the JSE 
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population. It constitutes approximately 60% and 34% of the useable final sample of 169 and 
the possible JSE sample of 291 firms, respectively, which statistical sampling (central limit 
theorem) theory suggests is a sufficiently large sample (Whatsham, and Parramore, 1997, 
pp.136-140; Anderson et al., 2007, pp.239-241). Finally, for practical considerations, the 
sample was restricted to 100 companies. In particular, the corporate governance variables were 
manually extracted, which is a highly labour-intensive activity (Hussainey et al., 2003, p.276; 
Beattie et al., 2004, pp.232-233). As a result, practical limitations of time, effort and finance 
meant that the sample had to be reduced to a number that is statistically large enough to make 
a significant contribution, while at the same time ensuring that the study is completed within 
the scheduled time-frame of a PhD. 
 
 
5.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This section considers the research methodology. Specifically, subsection 5.2.1 will 
attempt to explain the theoretical underpinnings, potential weaknesses and the rationale for 
examining the two major competing positive corporate governance models within the extant 
literature in the current study. Subsection 5.2.2 will discuss the compliance-index model. The 
issues that will be covered include how the South African corporate governance index (the 
SACGI) (i.e., the main independent variable with regard to the compliance-index model) is 
constructed, and proxies that will be used as control, and financial performance (dependent) 
variables. Finally, subsection 5.2.3 will discuss the equilibrium-variable model. The issues 
that will be covered include proxies that will be used as independent, control and dependent 
variables.  
  
5.2.1 The Equilibrium-Variable and the Compliance-Index Models and their 
         Theoretical Underpinnings  
 
As has briefly been explained in chapter four, there are two major competing positive 
theoretical and empirical internal corporate governance models (positive methodologies42) 
within the extant corporate governance literature: the equilibrium-variable and the 
compliance-index. While some researchers have examined the internal corporate governance-
                                                 
42A third strain of the positive corporate governance literature adopts conventional event study methodology to 
estimate the stock market reaction to the adoption of certain corporate governance structures by publicly traded 
firms (e.g., DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; Lambert and Larcker, 1985; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Wild, 1994; Fox 
and Opong, 1999; Black et al., 2007; and Huang et al., 2008, amongst others). The event study methodology is 
not adopted or considered in this study because firm-level data of corporate governance adoption dates are not 
available. 
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performance link by following the equilibrium-variable model (e.g., Demtz and Lehn, 1985; 
Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; and Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; amongst others), others have 
done so using the compliance-index approach (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Shabbir and Padget, 
2005; and Cheung et al., 2007, amongst others).  
An important methodological issue, however, is that the two models are based on 
contrasting theoretical assumptions (e.g., Demtz and Lehn, 1985; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, 
Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006c). The equilibrium-variable model, for example, is 
based on distinct assumptions. Firstly, it assumes that the extent to which individual internal 
corporate governance mechanisms, such as director shareownership and the proportion of non-
executive board members are used, is mainly determined within the firm (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996, p.378). Secondly, it assumes that some corporate governance mechanisms are 
more important than others (e.g., Barako et al., 2006a and b; Hassan and Marston, 2008). 
Thirdly, there are no mandatory or statutory corporate governance provisions43 for 
firms to comply with (Danielson and Karpoff, 1998, pp.348, 355-356), which was largely the 
case before the worldwide proliferation of corporate governance codes in the late 1980s 
(Black et al., 2006a, p.367). As a result, a firm’s internal governance choices are assumed to 
be an endogenous response to: (1) specific firm needs or business purposes, including 
preventing hostile takeovers, the desire to attract qualified independent directors, and 
shareholder pressure; (2) important court rulings or decisions; (3) professional business and 
legal advice; (4) peer behaviour in which a firm copies provisions used by competitors or 
common provisions within the industry; and (5) its investment opportunities, information, and 
regulatory environment (Danielson and Karpoff, 1998, pp.355-356; Gillan et al., 2003, p.1-2).  
Fourthly, it assumes that agency problems vary across firms due to differences in 
ownership, size, complexity of operations, and industry, amongst other firm-level features 
(Marston and Shrives, 1991, pp.196-197; Gillan et al., 2003, pp.1-2). Fifthly, firms’ external 
corporate governance mechanisms, such as the market for corporate control, investor 
monitoring, legal, and regulatory rules are exogenously determined, in which variations across 
firms’ external environments may either help maximise or destroy firm value (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996, p.379; Gillan et al., 2003, p.1).  
                                                 
43This is still partially true for South Africa and all countries that follow UK’s principle of encouraging listed 
firms to qualitatively comply with corporate governance codes by ‘complying’ or ‘explaining’ themselves in case 
of non-compliance with the provisions. This is because while compliance with corporate governance codes in 
such countries is voluntary, they are usually appended to Stock Exchange listings rules for which consistent non-
compliant listed firms may face serious sanctions, such as suspension or de-listing (e.g., Malherbe and Segal. 
2003; Armstrong et al., 2006; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008).  
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Finally, it assumes that the use of individual internal corporate governance structures 
are not necessarily complementary such that where one corporate governance mechanism is 
used more, others may be used less, leading to equally good performance (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996, p.378; Danielson and Karpoff, 1998, pp.347, 368). This suggests that there is 
an optimal relationship between the use of corporate governance mechanisms and financial 
performance in which a firm will continue to institute governance structures until marginal 
costs are equal to marginal gains (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, p.1155; Core, 2001, p.442-444).  
As a result, an equilibrium-variable model researcher will typically search in a cross-
sectional sample of listed firms for links between performance and greater use of one or 
several corporate governance mechanisms on the basis of some endogenous assumptions 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.378; Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.6)44. A major theoretical 
implication is that if all firms are in equilibrium with respect to their governance choices, then 
a carefully specified cross-sectional regression should find no link between performance and 
the use of those internal corporate governance mechanisms (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, 
pp.381-382; Shabbir and Padget, 2005, pp.5-6). If this equilibrium assumption were to be 
realistic, then that in itself could technically introduce the problem of endogeneity45 into the 
specified structural equations (Black et al., 2006a, p.367; Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, p.183). 
By contrast, the compliance-index model assumes that internal corporate governance 
mechanisms are externally imposed, and so firms tend to choose governance structures as a set 
(Danielson and Karpoff, 1998, p.367-368; Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.7). This is particularly 
true for listed firms in the US where compliance with corporate governance rules, such as 
those of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, are backed by statutory legislation. Specifically, it 
assumes that a firm’s financial performance is likely to be influenced by a number of agency 
mechanisms with possible interactive effects in an integrated framework (Gillan et al., 2003, 
p.1; Beiner et al., 2006, p.249).  
Also, due to the existence of alternative corporate governance mechanisms, there may 
be possibilities of interdependence among the variables (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.378). 
As a result, instead of looking at single corporate governance mechanisms in isolation, this 
model calls for the construction of a compliance-index, containing a comprehensive set of 
                                                 
44As will be pointed out below, the equilibrium assumption is highly unrealistic. For example, one possible way 
of achieving equilibrium is if every firm in a sample were to make use of the same corporate governance 
mechanisms. Arguably, this is highly unlikely in practice.  
45Potential econometric problems of endogeneity in this study will be addressed in subsection 5.3.1. 
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corporate governance provisions for the empirical investigation of the internal corporate 
governance-performance link (Gillan et al., 2003, p.4; Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.7). 
 
5.2.1.1 The Potential Weaknesses of the Two Competing Methodologies  
To date, no researcher has used both competing corporate governance models within 
the same study and context. However, from a methodological perspective, serious empirical 
questions remain unanswered in relation to the two models. With regard to the equilibrium-
variable model, a theoretical argument is that the existence of alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms and their possible interdependence renders OLS regressions that 
attempt to link the use of any single mechanism to firm performance difficult to interpret 
(Agrawal and Knoeber 1996, p.378; Beiner et al., 2006, p.252). That is, the results from such 
regressions may be spurious because they ignore possible interactions among the corporate 
governance mechanisms 
Also, the potential presence of omitted variable bias suggests that cross-sectional OLS 
regressions of firm performance on single corporate governance structures may result in 
misleading regression coefficients (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.377; Black et al., 2006a, 
p.367). Additionally, it has been contended that while it is theoretically possible for a firm to 
determine its optimal governance structure46, in practice, it is extremely difficult to unravel 
(Karpoff, 1998, p.352). In fact, and as has been reviewed in subsection 4.2 of chapter four, a 
considerable number of studies document significant impact of internal corporate governance 
structures on performance using cross-sectional samples. This demonstrates that, in practice, 
sufficient variations in wealth effects of corporate governance structures may exist across 
firms47. 
In the case of the compliance-index, Gillan et al. (2003, p.3) suggest that it is possible 
for a constructed compliance-index to loose some of its explanatory power through the 
aggregation process. By contrast, Core (2001, p.452) suggests that aggregating the corporate 
governance proxies into a single measure may enhance explanatory power. Also, if this 
model’s contention that firms’ internal governance structures are largely a function of external 
forces, such as the regulatory environment, is allowed to hold, then it will fail to provide 
                                                 
46It should also be noted that while a firm can theoretically determine its optimal internal governance structure, it 
has no control over its external governance mechanisms whose effects may maximise or destroy firm value 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.379). Arguably, this can potentially still push a firm which is presumably in 
equilibrium with respect to its internal governance structure into disequilibrium. This makes the equilibrium 
assumption very unrealistic in practice (Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, p.184). 
47At least, if potential data and methodological weaknesses within prior studies are assumed away. 
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compelling explanations for the cross-sectional differences in the use of corporate governance 
mechanisms among firms’ that are observed in practice (Core, 2001, p.444). Crucially, and as 
has been discussed in subsection 5.1.4, compliance-index construction 48  has been widely 
acknowledged to be costly in terms of time and labour involved (Beattie et al. 2007, p.140; 
Core, 2001, p.452). This places limitations on the sample size used by prior studies and the 
generalisability of their research results. 
 As a consequence, a critical methodological question is that – does the use of the 
equilibrium-variable model or the compliance-index model have the potential to influence the 
interpretation of the resulting empirical analyses? Another methodological issue of concern, 
for example, is that if applying the equilibrium-variable model leads to essentially similar 
results as the compliance-index model, then is it valuable to construct a compliance-index 
given that it has been shown to be expensive and labour-intensive to the extent that it is only 
feasible in relatively small samples? Crucially, and as has been discussed in chapter four, 
much of the existing literature has produced conflicting results regarding the impact of internal 
corporate governance mechanisms on financial performance. To what extent can this be 
explained by the methodological choices of researchers? 
While these are largely empirical issues, however, prior research has not examined 
their comparative empirical validity and explanatory powers. Danielson and Karpoff (1998, 
p.368) discuss most of the theoretical and methodological issues raised above, but fail to offer 
empirical support. Similarly, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996, p.377) provide empirical evidence 
of interdependence among alternative corporate governance mechanisms, but they do not 
construct a compliance or composite index to examine their respective empirical robustness.  
This has left previous researchers to either arbitrarily choose one methodology (e.g., Yermack, 
1996; Gompers et al., 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) or select the other based on some of 
the theoretical and methodological arguments that have been pointed out above alone (Gillan 
et al., 2003; Black et al., 2006a; Beiner et al., 2006).  
However, it is contended that such a crucial methodological choice ought to be based 
on both their respective theoretical and empirical validity if the resulting empirical evidence is 
to be robust. Hence, consistent with prior research, the equilibrium-variable and the 
compliance-index models are independently estimated. In this case, the relationship between a 
                                                 
48This is particularly crucial for non-US studies where researchers usually have to resort to manual collection of 
corporate governance data because firm-level corporate governance data is not readily available from 
independent professional corporate governance research and ratings organisations, such as Insititutional 
Shareholder Services and Standards & Poors.  
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constructed comprehensive corporate governance index for South African listed firms (the 
SACGI) and financial performance is first examined, while the second model investigates the 
same relationship by using single corporate governance provisions in isolation. Distinct from 
previous studies, however, their comparative empirical validity and powers are further 
investigated within the same study and context. As has already been pointed out in subsection 
4.2.1 of chapter four, the central rationale is to ascertain whether different research results will 
be obtained depending on the model used. This may help inform methodological choices of 
future researchers. 
The next subsection will describe the independent, control and dependent variables, 
and how they are measured in each model. Specifically, subsection 5.2.2 will provide a 
comprehensive description of the compliance-index model – how the SACGI was constructed, 
the control, as well as the dependent variables. This will be followed by a similar description 
of the independent, control and dependent variables for the equilibrium-variable model at 
subsection 5.2.3. Also, the rationale, the limitations, the strengths and where applicable, the 
theoretical links relating to the selected proxies for independent, control and dependent 
variables of each model will be discussed. Finally, methodological issues of replicability, 
reliability and validity will also be addressed. 
 
5.2.2 The Compliance-Index Model 
 
5.2.2.1 The Main Independent Variable: The South African Corporate Governance Index  
           (the SACGI) 
 
With regards to the compliance-index model, the constructed South African Corporate 
Governance Index (hereafter, the “SACGI”) is the main independent variable used in 
examining the relationship between internal corporate governance structures and financial 
performance. The SACGI is an aggregation of 50 comprehensive set of corporate governance 
provisions contained in the 2002 King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 
(henceforth, “King II”). As has been discussed in chapter three, the SACGI is constructed 
based on the six broad sections of King II covering: (1) boards and directors; (2) risk 
management; (3) internal audit; (4) integrated sustainability reporting (non-financial 
information); (5) accounting and auditing; and (6) compliance and enforcement. As has been 
explained in chapter three, South African companies listed on the JSE are required to comply 
with these corporate governance provisons or give reasons in the case of non-compliance.  
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This is generally in line with prior studies that have relied on either national (e.g., 
Cadbury Report, 1992; Combined Code 1998; Swiss Code of Best Practice, 2002) or 
international codes of corporate governance (e.g., OECD Principles, 1999; Commonwealth 
Principles, 1999; Global Reporting Initiative, 2000), in constructing their composite corporate 
governance indices (e.g., Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Cheung et al., 2007). 
Appendix 2 contains the six broad sections and the various variables that make-up the SACGI. 
It also provides explicit definitions of the coding instruments and how the variables have been 
measured. 
 The SACGI is distinct from those of prior research in three main aspects. Firstly, unlike 
previous studies that focus on specific aspects of corporate governance in isolation, for 
instance, shareholder rights (Gompers et al., 2003; Cremers and Nair, 2005), board size 
(Yermack, 1996), blockholding (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), role duality (Baliga et al., 1996), 
director ownership (Morck et al., 1988), and frequency of board meetings (Vefeas, 1999a), 
amongst others, it covers all aspects of internal corporate governance. This allows for the 
existence of potential interactions and interdependences among alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms. Secondly, in line with prior studies (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006; Black 
et al., 2006a and b; Cheung et al., 2007), the SACGI covers conventional internal corporate 
governance issues, such as the board and directors, and internal audit (see sections 1 to 4 of 
Appendix 2). By contrast, it is distinct in its coverage of South African context specific 
affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions under the integrated 
sustainability reporting (see section 5 of Appendix 2).  
These affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance issues, include 
employment equity, HIV/Aids, occupational health and safety, ethics, board diversity, black 
economic empowerment, social, and environmental reporting. Section 5 of Appendix 2 shows 
how these unique contextual corporate governance issues are measured and incorporated into 
the methodology. As has been discussed in chapter three, these affirmative action and 
stakeholder issues are extremely crucial within the South African corporate context for two 
reasons.  
Firstly, and as has been discussed in subsection 3.3.3.3 of chapter three, there is an on-
going local policy debate as to whether the current ‘hybrid’ or Anglo-American corporate 
governance model is appropriate for South Africa given its unique political, social, and 
economic challenges (e.g., Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Spisto, 2005; West, 2006, 
2009). Secondly, South African listed firms are required to comply with stakeholder issues, 
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such as black economic empowerment. Prior literature suggests that compliance with 
stakeholder issues has additional financial costs implications for listed firms (e.g., Kakabadse 
and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; LSE, 2007). However, it is still empirically unknown how 
compliance with these South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder issues 
will impact on the economic fortunes of listed firms. Therefore, by incorporating these South 
African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder issues in the SACGI, the economic 
consequences of complying with these stakeholder issues for South African listed firms can be 
empirically quantified.  
As will be discussed further in chapters six and seven, the SACGI containing 50 
corporate governance provisons will be split into two: Social-SACGI and Economic-SACGI. 
The Social-SACGI will contain 9 South African context specific affirmative action and 
stakeholder provisions, such as employment equity and black economic empowerment (see 
section 5 of Appendix 2). The relationship between the Social-SACGI and firm financial 
performance, as proxied by return on assets (an accounting based performance measure) and 
Tobin’s Q (a market based performance measure) will be examined. As has been explained 
above, the rationale is to ascertain the economic impact of complying with these affirmative 
action and stakeholder issues on South African listed firms. The Economic-SACGI will 
contain 41 conventional corporate governance provisions, such as role or CEO duality (see 
section 1 to 4 of Appendix 2). The association between the Economic-SACGI and the two 
financial performance proxies will also be examined. Therefore, the analysis of the 
relationship between the Economic-SACGI and the two performance measures can be 
considered to be more comparable with prior studies. 
A potential line of criticism is that by covering distinctively South African context 
specific affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance issues in the SACGI, the 
ability to make direct comparisons with prior studies may be impeded. However, and as can be 
observed from Appendix 2, distinctively South African contextual issues account for less than 
20% (9 out of 50) of the SACGI. In this case, and in line with prior studies, the SACGI is 
dominated by conventional internal corporate governance issues. Distinct from prior studies, 
however, it attempts to incorporate South African context specific affirmative action and 
stakeholder corporate governance issues. Arguably, this has the potential of uncovering new 
valuable insights that may enrich the internal corporate governance-performance relationship 
literature. 
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The next six subsections will discuss how the SACGI is constructed. Specifically, 
subsection (i) will explain the rationale and source of the corporate governance information. 
Subsection (ii) will discuss the rationale for using a researcher-constructed index. Subsection 
(iii) will describe how the internal corporate governance provisions were scored. Subsection 
(iv) will examine the rationale for the coding scheme used in this study. Subsection (v) will 
address the reliability and validity of the SACGI, whilst subsection (vi) will discuss the general 
sampling and index construction limitations. 
 
i) The Source of the Corporate Governance Information: Company Annual Reports 
 Despite the existence of other means 49  by which companies can disclose timely 
corporate governance information (Hassan and Marston, 2008, p.5), the SACGI is solely based 
on corporate governance information that firms provide in their annual reports for several 
reasons. Firstly, and as has been discussed in subsection 3.3.1 of chapter three, unlike other 
media, the Companies Act and the JSE Listings Rules mandate listed firms to issue annual 
reports. It has been argued that the mandatory nature of annual reports makes them a regular 
and reliable source of corporate governance information (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1993; 
Botosan, 1997). This is because a firm can be sued for providing misleading information. 
Secondly, prior evidence suggests that annual report disclosure levels are positively correlated 
with the amount of disclosure provided via other media (Lang and Lundholm, 1993, p.258; 
Botosan, 1997, p.329)50.  
Thirdly, the weights applied to annual report disclosures by the major independent 
professional corporate governance research and ratings organisations, such as AIMR/AFAF, 
                                                 
49Accounting disclosure media have been classified into three major categories: annual published and other 
required information; quarterly or interim and other published information not required; and other aspects or 
investor relations (Lang and Lundholm, 1993, pp.253-254; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002. pp.29-30). Interim 
reports cover quarterly reports to shareholders, proxy statements, annual meeting reports, management forecasts, 
fact books, press releases, and newsletters. Other aspects cover senior management presentations to analysts and 
investors, press conferences, company-sponsored field trips, interviews, and company websites (Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002, p.30). While the corporate governance information provided in company annual reports can be 
expected to be adequate, these other information media are being explicitly acknowledged as potential sources of 
corporate governance information. 
50Lang and Lundholm (1993, p.258) find that the correlation between annual report disclosures and quarterly or 
other report disclosures is .62, while the correlation between annual report disclosures and other aspects or 
investor relations is .41. Similarly, Botosan and Plumlee (2002, p.33) report that: the correlation between annual 
report disclosures and interim or other report disclosures is .634; the correlation between annual report 
disclosures and other aspects or investor relations’ disclosures is .499; and the correlation between annual report 
disclosures and total disclosures (i.e., including annual reports, interim or other reports, and other aspects or 
investor relations) is .824.  
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CLSA, GMI, HCGR, ISS, SEC and S&P51 range between 40-50% of the overall disclosure 
scores (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002, p.30; Hassan and Marston, 2008, p.6). By contrast, 
quarterly and other published information carries a weight that ranges between 30-40%, while 
other aspects or investor relations carry a weight that ranges between 20-30% (Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002, p.30). Botosan and Plumlee (2002, p.30) argue that the weight attached to 
annual reports suggests that annual reports are viewed as one of the most important sources of 
corporate information 
Fourthly, Botosan (1997, p.331) suggests that the annual report is a major corporate 
reporting document, and every other financial report is in some respect subsidiary or 
supplementary to it. Fifthly, practically only company annual reports were consistently 
available in Perfect Information where the annual reports were mainly collected from. Finally, 
using company annual reports is also in line with prior studies, which can facilitate direct 
comparison with their results (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Cheung et al., 
2007).  
 
ii) Subjective Analysts’ Rankings versus Researcher-Constructed Indices: Their   
Strengths and Weaknesses 
 
 To date, the extant literature has employed two major ways of measuring internal 
corporate governance disclosures (Beattie et al., 2004, pp.207-211). The first approach 
involves the use of subjective analysts’ corporate governance quality disclosure rankings 
based on analysts’ perception (survey) of corporate governance disclosure quality of firms 
usually conducted by independent professional corporate governance research and ratings 
organisations, such as those of AIMR/AFAF, and S&P. The second approach, which is more 
popular, has been the use of researcher-constructed quality indices in which the amount of 
disclosure is directly measured via a disclosure vehicle, such as annual reports, and used as a 
proxy for disclosure quality (Beattie et al., 2004, p.207). Both approaches have some 
advantages and disadvantages.  
Researcher-constructed quality indices have been criticised on several grounds. Firstly, 
unlike subjective analysts’ rankings, which cover all types of disclosure media by firms, 
                                                 
51For brevity, these abbreviations will be referred to in this subsection. They stand for: The Association of 
Investment Management and Research (AIMR) (formerly the Financial Analysts Federation (AFAF)) 
headquartered in the US; Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) headquartered in Hong Kong; 
GovernanceMetric International (GMI) headquartered in the US; Horwath Corporate Governance Report (HCGR) 
headquartered in Australia; Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) headquartered in the US; Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) headquartered in the US; and Standard & Poor’s (S&P) headquartered in the US. 
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including annual reports, interim reports, and investor relations, they are less comprehensive 
with regard to the number of disclosure media and items included in the index (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993, p.247). Secondly, Hassan and Marston (2008, p.10) suggest that corporate 
governance ratings provided by leading financial analysts could be more reliable than those 
constructed by researchers because of their professional experience and superior specialist 
knowledge. Thirdly, researcher-constructed indices are vulnerable to researcher judgemental 
errors and bias (Core, 2001, p.452).  
Fourthly, and as has been discussed in subsection 5.1.4, they are more labour intensive, 
and as such tend to be available for a smaller sample of firms, and of lower frequency than 
subjective analysts’ indices (Hassan and Marston, 2008, pp.10, 16). Finally, Marston and 
Shrives (1991, p.198) suggest that using an existing index is advantageous in that direct 
comparisons with previous studies can easily be drawn. 
Despite these limitations, this study adopts a researcher-constructed quality index for 
the following reasons. Firstly, analysts’ corporate governance ratings are normally country 
specific (the majority of them rate only US firms), and as such the criteria used in rating firms 
may not be easily applicable to all countries due to differences in corporate governance 
systems and practices, as has been discussed in chapter two52. The CLSA (2000) subjective 
analysts’ corporate governance rankings that have been used widely by prior studies, for 
example, are standardised for firms from all countries included. This implies that the rankings 
are unable to reflect institutional, cultural and contextual differences in corporate governance 
practices across different countries.   
Secondly, most of the subjective analysts’ corporate governance rankings have been 
either out of date or discontinued53 (Hassan and Marston, 2008, p.10). In this case, there are no 
comparable corporate governance rankings or proxies for South African listed firms54.  
                                                 
52For example, AIMR/AFAF/ISS/SEC and HCGR provide corporate governance rankings only for US and 
Australian firms, respectively. 
53AIMR/AFAF rankings were discontinued in 1997, while CLSA has not updated its emerging markets survey 
since 2001. According to Durnev and Kim (2005, p.1469), available anecdotal evidence suggests that CLSA 
stopped compiling the corporate governance scores because it lost a considerable number of corporate finance 
business it had with companies that were awarded the worst corporate governance scores. 
54A considerable amount of effort was made to obtain subjective analysts’ corporate governance rankings for 
South African listed firms from independent professional corporate governance research and rankings firms. 
Most of them do not rate South African firms. GMI was the only one that confirmed to ranking some of the 
largest South African firms, but could not release the scores because of ‘confidential and commercial’ reasons.  
S&P and Moody’s were also contacted for credit ratings for South African firms to be used as a proxy for 
corporate governance quality. S&P confirmed that they rate only the largest South African commercial banks, 
while Moody’s does not rate South African firms, although both expressed willingness to rate South African 
listed firms of choice at commercial rates.   
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Thirdly, Botosan (1997, p.326-327) suggests that analysts’ ratings tend to be limited to 
the largest firms that are heavily followed in an industry, and as such are unlikely to show 
sufficient cross-sectional variation in corporate governance disclosure levels. As such, using a 
researcher-constructed index ensured that sufficient cross-sectional variation was achieved in 
the sample, and thus avoided the possibility of sample bias that is normally associated with 
subjective analysts’ corporate governance rankings. Fourthly, unlike subjective analysts’ 
rankings, it has the advantage of ensuring that unique and pressing South African contextual 
corporate governance issues of relevance, such as employment equity and black economic 
empowerment, are incorporated into the methodology. 
Fifthly, despite manually constructing the index, and unlike much of the existing 
corporate governance literature, the SACGI is relatively comprehensive with regard to the 
scope of coverage of internal corporate governance disclosure items (50 provisions), sample 
size (100 firms) and frequency (over five firm years). Sixthly, unlike subjective analysts’ 
rankings that are based on mere analysts’ perceptions of corporate governance disclosure 
quality, the SACGI is a direct measure of actual corporate governance disclosures in the 
sampled firms’ annual reports, making it much more reliable and accurate (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993, p.247).  
Finally, subjective analysts’ rankings has also been criticised for the potential biases 
that analysts bring to the corporate governance ratings (Beattie et al., 2004, p.210; Chen et al., 
2009, p.286). Specifically, it has been suggested that as an opinion-based research, subjective 
analysts’ rankings rely on circumstantial and subjective data (Hermes, 2005, p.1). Arguably, 
any research findings based on subjective rankings can be considered to be of little evidential 
value.  
 
iii) The SACGI: How the Internal Corporate Governance Provisions were Scored  
 
 Following a well-established line of scoring corporate governance disclosures in 
annual reports (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Black et al., 2006a; 
Arcot and Bruno, 2007; Henry, 2008; and Morey et al., 2009; amongst others), a binary 
coding scheme is adopted. This method of scoring involves awarding a value of “1” if a 
particular internal corporate governance provision is disclosed in the annual report or “0” 
otherwise. All the corporate governance provisions included in the SACGI (compliance-index) 
are based on the corporate governance provisions of King II. It covers all six broad areas of 
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best corporate governance practices that listed firms are required to ‘comply’ or ‘explain’ in 
the case of non-compliance.  
To capture the intensity of internal corporate governance practices, the six broad 
sections are further disaggregated into 50 provisions. Specifically, the scoring process 
involved manually reading each firm’s annual report and awarding one point if a particular 
corporate governance provision is disclosed or zero if not. For each of the five firm years, the 
individual corporate governance provision by corporate governance provision scores for each 
of the 100 firms were then aggregated and expressed as a percentage of the total possible score 
of 50 to constitute an overall compliance-index, the SACGI. With this scoring scheme, a 
company’s total score in a particular firm year can vary between zero (0%) to fifty (100%), 
with 0% indicating perfect non-compliance and 100% indicating complete compliance. 
Appendix 2 shows the six broad sections and the various subsections that constitute the 
SACGI. The six subsections include: (1) boards and directors; (2) risk management; (3) 
internal audit; (4) integrated sustainability reporting (non-financial information); (5) 
accounting and auditing; and (6) compliance and enforcement. Appendix 2 further provides 
explicit definitions of the coding instruments and how the variables are measured.  
The components of the SACGI are more comprehensive in relation to much of the prior 
literature, helping to tease out actual inherent differences in internal corporate governance 
quality among the sampled firms. For example, and as has been discussed in subsection 4.2 of 
chapter four, Shabbir and Padget (2005, pp.9-10) construct a binary compliance-index based 
on only 12 provisions from the ‘board and directors’ section of the 1998 UK Combined Code, 
completely ignoring other sections, such as accounting and auditing, internal audit, and risk 
management. Similarly, Henry (2008, pp.918-921, 931) constructs a binary composite-index 
based on only 8 provisions from the 2003 Australian Stock Exchange’s Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations, arguing that the other sections 
may not be value relevant. 
 A limitation that can be observed from Appendix 2, though, is that the SACGI is not 
equally distributed across the six sections, with the ‘board and directors’ section accounting 
for approximately 54% of the total 50 best corporate governance practices. However, it 
suggests that King II recognises corporate ‘board and directors’ as an important part of the 
internal corporate governance structure, a view that is consistent with theory (Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992; John and Senbet, 1998). Practically, the distribution of the variables across the 
six sections reflects the original composition of King II as a document. 
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iv) Coding and Weighting Schemes: Their Strengths and Weaknesses 
There are two important methodological issues that need to be addressed when it 
comes to scoring corporate governance disclosures in corporate annual reports: coding and 
weighting schemes to be used.  
With regard to the coding scheme, there are two main options that are open to 
researchers. The first option is to use a simple binary coding scheme, which measures the 
absence or presence of an item (0 or 1). The second choice is to use a complex ordinal coding 
scheme, which attempts to capture the degree of detail and specificity of the disclosed 
information by using a graduated scale (“not limited to but frequently three levels – 0, 1 and 
2”) (Beattie et al., 2004, p.210). For example, if no information is disclosed on an item, a 
sample firm receives “0” point, if only qualitative information is disclosed, the firm gets “1” 
point, while if the disclosed information is quantified, the firm receives the maximum value of 
“2”.  
 To begin with, both binary and ordinal coding schemes have their strengths and 
shortcomings. A major criticism of binary coding scheme is that it fails to allow the quality of 
specific corporate governance disclosures to be measured (Beattie et al., 2004, p.210). It also 
fails to reflect the relative impacts of different corporate governance provisions (Gompers et 
al., 2003, p.114). Despite these weaknesses, a binary rather than ordinal coding scheme is 
adopted for four main reasons.  
Firstly, ordinal coding is appropriate when measuring voluntary disclosures in which 
reasonable differences in the degree of disclosures can be expected (e.g., Botosan, 1997; 
Hassan and Marston, 2008). As can be seen from Appendix 2, with the exceptions of the 
South African context specific issues of employment equity (PEQ), black economic 
empowerment (BEE), HIV/Aids (HIV), health and occupational safety (PHS), code of ethics 
(DCE), environmental practices (PEP), and corporate social investment (CSI) where some 
level of judgement is involved, the remaining provisions involve a straightforward present or 
absent disclosures.  
For example, the board chairperson (BCP) is either independent (“1”) or not (“0”), a 
firm has split the positions of chairperson and CEO (DUAL1) (“1”) or not (“0”), and so on. 
This leaves no avenues to qualitatively discriminate among disclosure levels, such as 
meaningfully differentiating between firms that provide a quantification of the information 
disclosed or not, and thus using ordinal coding will be inappropriate. Appendix 3a contains a 
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spreadsheet of the first eleven coded corporate governance variables for the first six sampled 
firms 55  in alphabetical order. This is a sample that shows how carefully the corporate 
governance information collected from company annual reports were coded. Similar coding 
was undertaken for all the 500 firm-year observations.  
Secondly, distinct from much of the existing literature, the coding instrument has been 
designed in such a way that it is inherently self-discriminating in order to tease out qualitative 
differences in corporate governance disclosures across firms. In this case, the existence of a 
nomination committee (NCOM1), for example, attracts only a point, and if it is well-composed 
(COM2), receives a point. Further, if the chairman of the nomination comittee is independent 
(NCCP), attracts another point, while if membership of the nomination committee (DM1) and 
individual members meeting attendance (INCMMA) are disclosed, attract a point each. This 
compels firms to comply with both the ‘letter and spirit’ of the code rather than engage in 
mere box-ticking.     
 Thirdly, unlike ordinal coding, it requires no or very limited researcher judgement 
about the degree of specificity of internal corporate governance provisions disclosure levels 
(Gompers et al., 2003, p.144). This makes it relatively objective, simple and easy to replicate. 
It also has the advantage of minimising researcher bias, which enhances transparency and 
reliability of the constructed index (Milne and Adler, 1999, p.242). Finally, it has been 
demonstrated that ‘quantity and quality’ are positively correlated (Botosan, 1997, p.329; 
Beattie et al., 2004, p.210). This suggests that, on average, firms that disclose more tend to 
show higher quality attributes. 
The second critical issue is whether to construct a weighted or an unweighted index 
(Barako et al., 2006b, p.8; Hassan and Marston, 2008, p.23). Similarly, weighted or 
unweighted indices have their own limitations and strengths. The use of an unweighted index 
has been criticised for its fundamental assumption that every internal corporate governance 
provision in the index is of equal importance, a view which is inconsistent with theory and 
practice (Barako et al., 2006a, p.115). However, in this study, an equally weighted index (the 
SACGI) is constructed due to the following reasons. 
Firstly, there is a general lack of a rigorously developed theoretical basis on which 
weights could be accurately assigned to the various corporate governance provisions (Black et 
al., 2006a, p.375). In this case, the use of an unweighted index avoids the necessity of making 
                                                 
55The six firms are Amalgamated Appliance Holdings Ltd (AAH), Anglogold Ashanti Ltd (AAS), AECI Ltd 
(ACI), Advtech Ltd (ADV), Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd (AEC), and Afrgri Ltd (AFI).  
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subjective value judgements as to the relative importance or efficacy of each corporate 
governance provision (Owusu-Ansah, 1998, p.609). Secondly, an associated advantage of an 
unweighted index is that it does not involve arbitrarily or subjectively assigning weights. This 
obviates creating a situation whereby the constructed index is unnecessarily dominated by or 
biased towards a particular set of corporate governance provisions. 
Thirdly, rigorously established empirical evidence from the accounting disclosure 
literature suggests that the use of weighted and unweighted indices tend to give the same 
results, especially where the number of corporate governance provisions is relatively large 
(e.g., Robbins and Austin, 1986; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Beattie et al., 2004; and 
Barako et al., 2006a and b, amongst others). Finally, in line with much of the prior corporate 
governance-performance relationship literature (Gompers et al., 2003; Black et al., 2006a; 
Henry, 2008; and Morey et al., 2009, amongst others), an unweighted index is constructed, 
which will make it easier for direct comparisons to be drawn with their results. 
  
v) Addressing the Reliability and Validity of the Constructed Index, the ‘SACGI’ 
 
There are two additional set of critical methodological issues that need to be addressed 
when it comes to using researcher-constructed quality composite indices (Marston and Shrives, 
1991, pp.197-199). These are the reliability and validity of the constructed compliance-index, 
the SACGI.  
Generally, reliability refers to “the extent to which a measuring procedure yields the 
same results on repeated trials” (Hassan and Marston, 2008, p.27). When it comes to 
compliance-index construction, there are two reliability issues that must be addressed: stability 
and reproducibility. The constructed index is reliable if it can be easily replicated by the same 
researcher over time (stability), as well as by another researcher (reproducibility), when 
coding the same content with higher levels of accuracy (Beattie et al., 2004, p.214; Beattie and 
Thompson, 2007, p.139).  
With regard to stability, each annual report was coded twice over a 14-month period – 
with the first round of coding taking 8 months (from February 2007 to September 2007), and 
the second round lasting a period of 6 months (from October 2007 to March 2008). The 
second round of coding, which was meant to cross-check the accuracy of the first round 
coding, involved weekly meetings with supervisors where the coded materials, the coding 
instrument, and categories were critically discussed. Informed by these critical comments, and 
as suggested by Milne and Adler (1999, p.239) and Beattie and Thompson (2007, p.139), the 
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coding rules and categories were made much more explicit, refined, and in some cases, such as 
board diversity on the basis of ethnicity and gender (BDIVE1, BDIVG1), the coding 
instrument was expanded. Also, mistakes or inconsistencies identified in the first round of 
coding were corrected during the second round of coding56. 
 In connection with reproducibility, Beattie and Thompson (2007, p.140) suggest that 
prior studies are generally “silent or vague” as to the specific parts of the annual report that 
were examined. This issue is addressed in two ways in this study. Firstly, even though the 
study focuses exclusively on internal corporate governance, all parts of the annual report, 
including the integrated sustainability report were analysed. For eight57 companies which had 
separate annual and integrated sustainability reports, all parts of the two documents were 
separately analysed. With the exception of disclosure of company risks (DCR), which was 
normally found in the chairman and/or the CEO statement of the annual reports, most of the 
corporate governance disclosures (approximately 90 to 96%) appeared in the corporate 
governance reports. However, most of the corporate governance disclosures were frequently 
repeated58 throughout the annual reports.  
Also, for each company, the whole of its five-year period annual reports were 
consecutively coded. This was found to be a very useful approach because: (a) on average, the 
structure of presenting data in the annual reports did not differ substantially across firms from 
one year to another; and (b) it ensured that experience and learning gained from reading 
previous year’s annual report were easily transferred to the coding of subsequent year’s annual 
report. Secondly, for each corporate governance provision and annual report, a detailed 
spreadsheet containing the page number(s) of what was coded, where it was coded from, and 
where applicable, why it was coded in that way, was developed to accompany the coding 
scheme. This makes the constructed index easy and simple to replicate. Appendix 3b contains 
the spreadsheet of five coded corporate governance variables with data sources and page 
                                                 
56The mistakes or inconsistencies identified between the first and second rounds of coding were not many.  The 
levels of stability between the two rounds of coding were generally high, both with respect to the individual 
corporate governance variables and the overall SACGI scores. For example, the stability between the first round 
SACGI and the second round SACGI is .8948. For the individual corporate governance provisions, the stability 
between the first and second round of coding ranges between .7614 in the case of board composition (COM1) 
to .9056 with respect to the disclosure of individual directors’ attendance of board meetings (IDMA). Beattie and 
Thompson (2007, p.220) suggest that the cut-off level for acceptability ranges from .70 to .80. Thus, the levels of 
stability achieved were generally highly satisfactory.  
57These companies are African and Overseas Enterprises Ltd (AOE), Anglo Platinum Ltd (APL), Bidvest Group 
Ltd (BGR), Gijima AST Group Ltd (GAG), Gold Fields Ltd (GFI), Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd (HGM), 
Sabmiller Plc (SAB), and Sasol Ltd (SAS). 
58Beattie and Thompson (2007, p.141) suggest that repetition is a communication strategy that management may 
adopt to achieve emphasis and reinforcement. It may also signal the importance that a firm’s management 
attaches to particular messages. 
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numbers for the first six sampled firms in alphabetical order. This is a sample that shows how 
carefully the corporate governance data were collected from the company annual reports. 
Similar detailed spreadsheet was prepared for all the 500 firm-year observations. 
The second critical issue that is addressed is the validity of the constructed index. 
Hassan and Marston (2008, p.30) define validity as “the extent to which any measuring 
instrument measures what it is intended to measure”. This includes investigating how well the 
coding instrument performs against others (criterion validity), seeking subjective judgements 
from experts and non-experts as to how well the instrument measures what it is intended to 
measure (content validity), as well as the generalisability of the results (external and construct 
validity).  
Firstly, constructive criticisms and suggestions by supervisors, leading academics and 
experienced researchers at numerous Doctoral Colloquia59 helped in significantly improving 
criterion and content validity of the coding instrument. Secondly, with the exception of the 
South African context specific issues, and as suggested by Beattie et al. (2004, p.220), 
construct and external validity is achieved through the use of conventional internal corporate 
governance provisions covered in King II that are rigorously grounded in empirical research60. 
These conventional corporate governance issues have become widely accepted and have 
extensively been used in previous corporate governance studies that construct composite 
indices (Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Cheung et al., 2007; Henry, 2008; and 
Morey et al., 2009, amongst others). Finally, the sample construction process was structured in 
such a way that sufficient variations between large and small firms, as well as the various 
industries were achieved in the sample. This may also help in improving the generalisation of 
the results. 
 
vi) General Sampling and Index Construction Limitations 
 All research methods often suffer from some limitations, and with regard to the sample 
and index construction, five potential limitations can be identified. Firstly, even though a 
sample of 100 firms is relatively large, the generalisation of the results would have been much 
improved if all 169 companies with full data could have been used. However, and as has been 
                                                 
59This work was presented at the Institute of Chartered Accountants Scotland (ICAS) conference for young 
researchers in 2007, the Scottish Doctoral Colloquium 2007, 2008 and 2009, as well as the British Accounting 
Association’s Doctoral colloquium 2007 and 2008 at different stages of its development, where useful comments 
were received from leading academics and experienced researchers. 
60In preparing King II, the King Committee referred to 120 legal documents, international corporate governance 
codes, theoretical, and empirical papers in addition to 49 useful websites on corporate governance.  
  
159 
pointed out, due the expensive and labour-intensive nature of manual coding, this could not be 
done.  
Secondly, other sources of corporate information media, such as websites, interim 
reports, and company management (via a survey or meetings) could have been additionally 
consulted to at least cross-check the collected data rather than relying solely on annual reports. 
It is admitted that it is possible for a firm to have a particular corporate governance structure, 
which it might not have disclosed in its annual report that other methods, like face-to-face 
interviews would have revealed. Similarly, time and financial constraints did not permit this to 
be done.  
Thirdly, the reliability and validity of the results could have been improved if their 
robustness to a weighted index has been examined by either subjectively applying weights or 
contacting independent professional expert(s) to apply weights to the various corporate 
governance provisions. Similarly, and as suggested by Milne and Adler (1999) and Beattie et 
al. (2004), the reliability and validity of the constructed index (SACGI) could have been 
improved if the data had been coded by different individuals so that inter-coder consistency, 
accuracy and reliability could have been measured.   
Fourthly, the index may not be able to capture informal or personal interactions 
(interpersonal relationships) among board members, and between the board and management, 
employees, analysts or investors, for example, that may also affect corporate governance 
standards and financial performance. Finally, despite the rigorous reliability and validity 
processes that were meticulously followed, every coding scheme involves some amount of 
inherent subjectivity (Beattie et al., 2004, p.233). This is due to differences in cognitive 
abilities, experience, and conception of reality, which need to be acknowledged and taken into 
account when interpreting the results. 
 The next subsection will describe the control variables used in the study. It will also 
develop their theoretical associations with internal corporate governance structures and firm 
financial performance. 
 
5.2.2.2 The Control/Omitted Variables 
 
 Any study that omits relevant economic variable(s) that predict(s) financial 
performance and corporate governance could result in wrong conclusions (Black et al., 2006a, 
p.367; Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, p.180). Also, in theory and as discussed in subsection 5.2.1, 
the use of a comprehensive set of control variables has the potential of:  (a) preventing firms 
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from theoretically reaching “equilibrium” or “optimal differences endogeneity”61, which is a 
situation whereby different firms optimally choose different corporate governance structures 
(Black et al., 2006a, pp.379, 384); and (b) preventing omitted variable(s) endogeneity (Larker 
and Rusticus, 2008, pp.3, 26). As a result, to reduce potential omitted variable bias and 
endogeneity, a number of control variables, including growth prospects (SGRWOTH), 
innovative potential (CAPEX), capital structure (GEAR), firm size (LNTA), foreign/dual-listing 
(DUALIST), audit firm size (BIG4), industry (INDUST), and year dummies (YD) are included 
in the regression in addition to the SACGI, the main variable of focus in this model.  
Section 6 of Appendix 4 contains all the control variables used in this study and how 
they were operationalised. The rationale for selecting these variables is also explained below. 
Further, it should be noted that while these control variables have been chosen on the basis of 
theory and prior evidence, like every other positive accounting research, they are inevitably 
limited to the extent that they may not be exhaustive (e.g., Chenhall and Moers, 2007a and b; 
van Lent, 2007; Larker and Rusticus, 2008). It is admitted that there may be other variables 
that can potentially affect financial performance and corporate governance, which due to 
reasons, such as data unavailability and lack of appropriate theoretical links cannot be 
included in the model (Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, p.187)62.  
 
i) Growth Prospects (SGROWTH) and Innovative Potential (CAPEX) 
Firstly, firms with higher investment opportunities tend to grow relatively faster 
(Durnev and Kim, 2005, p.1473). Theoretically, faster growing firms may receive higher 
valuation, as they are expected to have better future performance (Klapper and Love, 2004, 
p.712). Also, firms with greater growth opportunities will need to raise external capital, and 
may need to adopt better corporate governance to attract capital and reduce its cost (Beiner et 
al., 2006, p.254). Following prior literature (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Drobetz et al., 2004; 
                                                 
61According to Black et al. (2006a) if sample firms were to be in equilibrium with respect to their corporate 
governance choices or variables as discussed in subsection 5.2.1, then the introduction of control or omitted 
variables that are statistically significant could potentially prevent the structural equation from reaching 
equilibrium. This also implies that the introduction of control variables could potentially result in model 
misspecifications. 
62 For example, and as will be discussed further in subsection 5.3.1, managers may adopt good corporate 
governance rules just to signal their quality to investors (Black et al., 2006a, p.384). However, it is the signal that 
is sent to investors rather than the good corporate governance practices that affect firm value. For instance, firms 
may appoint independent non-executive directors to signal ‘managers’ intent’ of treating shareholders fairly, even 
though in practice independent non-executive directors may not substantially affect the behaviour of managers. In 
this case, corporate governance may be highly correlated with firm value, but with no actual causal association. 
Instead, corporate governance will proxy for an omitted variable ‘managers’ intent’, but ‘managers’ intent’ 
cannot be included in the structural model because it is difficult to measure.    
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Cui et al., 2008; Henry, 2008), a positive relationship between financial performance and 
growth opportunities, as proxied by year-on-year sales growth (SGROWTH) is hypothesised.  
Secondly, firms with higher investment in innovation and technology should in theory 
gain competitive advantage through launching new processes, products, and services (Jermias, 
2007, p.828; Brown et al., 2009, p.151). This allows them to receive premium prices and 
generate higher long-term performance by creating quasi-monopolies and barriers to entry for 
rivals (Jermias, 2007, p.829). By contrast, innovation is capital intensive, with potential future 
returns (Weir et al., 2002, p.589), and as such may impact negatively on current performance. 
Also, firms with greater investment in technology and innovation (intangibles) will need to 
adopt a stronger governance regime (stricter monitoring) as it is easier to steal intangibles 
(“soft”) assets than fixed (“hard”) assets (Durnev and Kim, 2005, p.1474). Following prior 
research (e.g., Durnev and Kim, 2005; Black et al., 2006b; Brown et al., 2009), investment 
opportunities and innovative potential of firms, as proxied by the ratio of capital expenditure 
to total assets (CAPEX) is expected to be negatively correlated with performance. 
  
ii) Capital Structure (GEAR) 
 
By relaxing Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) irrelevance of capital structure 
assumptions, an extensive theoretical and empirical literature has emerged, which strongly 
suggests that in the real world, a firm’s capital structure can have an impact on its value or 
profitability (e.g., Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Myers, 1977, 1984; and Rajan and Zingales, 
1995, amongst others). Specifically, and consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1995), Bevan 
and Danbolt (2002, 2004) report a significant negative relationship between gearing and 
profitability using a sample of UK firms. This can be explained from two major theoretical 
perspectives: tax and agency63.  
                                                 
63It is acknowledged that capital structure can also be explained by the perking order theory developed by Myers 
and Majluf (1984). The theory suggests that companies tend to prioritise their sources of financing, normally 
starting with internal to external sources. In this case, firms will usually consider internal sources of financing, 
such as retained earnings as their first option. One reason for this preference is that it costs (e.g., issue cost) less 
to raise internal funding. This means that all internal sources of financing will be used up before external funding 
will be sought. When it comes to external financing, companies will normally issue the safest security first. In 
this regard, the issue of debt will be preferred to equity. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), this is because: 
(1) it costs less to issue debt than equity; and (2) debt issue sends a positive signal to the stock market, whilst 
equity issue sends a negative signal to the stock market. Equity will then be issued as a last resort or when it does 
no longer make economic sense to issue additional debt. Perking order theory can, therefore, also explain why 
there may still be a negative relationship between profitability and gearing, even if earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) is used as a proxy for accounting profitability to be able to take 
advantage of potential tax savings.   
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From a capital structure perspective, interest payments are tax deductible (Modigliani 
and Miller, 1963, p.438), and as such, all else equal, highly geared firms should be able to 
generate higher financial performance. By contrast, the costs of financial distress, such as 
bankruptcy and credit risks that are usually associated with higher levels of gearing, may 
inhibit a firm’s ability to pursue profitable investment opportunities (Myers, 1977, p.148). In 
fact, recent evidence by Brav (2009) suggests that the use of private debt (private equity) by 
private firms to finance growth in the UK is more costly when compared with public firms that 
rely on public equity. 
From an agency perspective, Jensen (1986, p.323) suggests that higher levels of 
gearing can increase performance by reducing agency conflicts associated with having ‘free 
cash flows’ by opportunistic managers. Also, the use of debt financing can improve 
performance by inducing extra monitoring by lenders (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.377). In 
line with prior corporate governance studies (e.g., Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Weir et al., 
2002; Klapper and Love, 2004; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008), capital structure is controlled for. 
Given the mixed theoretical and empirical evidence, however, it is hypothesised that gearing 
(GEAR), as proxied by the ratio of total debt to equity will be significantly correlated with 
financial performance, without specifying the direction of the coefficient. 
 
iii) Firm Size (LNTA) 
 
As has been discussed in subsection 5.1.4, due to the costs implications of compliance, 
complexity of operations, analysts following and public scrutiny, higher political and 
regulatory costs, as well as greater agency problems, firm size is likely to be positively 
correlated with better corporate governance regime (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Himmelberg et al., 
1999; Beiner et al., 2006).  This means that larger firms may receive higher market valuation 
and/or enjoy lower cost of external capital (Botosan, 1997). By contrast, Klapper and Love 
(2004, p.713) suggest that smaller firms tend to have better growth opportunities, and as such 
they will have greater need for external financing. This means that smaller firms may have to 
maintain a better corporate governance regime to be able to attract capital at a cheaper cost 
and increase financial profitability. Faster growth is also more likely to be positively 
correlated with financial performance, especially Tobin’s Q (Black et al., 2006a, p.401). This 
is because Tobin’s Q reflects future growth opportunities available to a firm (Young et al., 
2008, p.1116). 
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Empirically, the relationship between performance and size is ambiguous (Himmelberg 
et al., 1999, p.364). Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Durnev and Kim (2005) report a 
negative relationship between firm size and Tobin’s Q, while Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) find 
that return on assets (ROA) is positively correlated with firm size. Therefore, it is hypothesised 
that there is a negative relationship between firm size, as proxied by naturally logged total 
assets (LNTA) and Tobin’s Q, but a positive relationship with ROA.  
 
iv) Foreign-Listing/Dual-listing (DUALLIST) 
 
As has been pointed out in subsection 5.1.4, firms that maintain secondary listing on 
foreign stock markets are more likely to have better corporate governance structures, because 
they are more likely to be subjected to additional accounting, governance and disclosure 
requirements of the foreign stock exchanges that they are cross-listed to (Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002, p.329; Black et al., 2006a, p.403). Also, firms that seek foreign-listing are more likely to 
have higher growth opportunities and increased need for external capital. Together, cross-
listed firms can be expected to want to signal their quality through the adoption of better 
governance, disclosure and transparency (Klapper and Love, 2004, p.713).  
Lower agency costs that are usually associated with better corporate governance means 
that dual-listed firms are more likely to be exposed to increased and more diverse sources of 
financing (Doidge et al., 2009, p.425; Melvin and Valero, 2009, p.66). Better access to 
external finance also indicates that cross-listed firms may be better able to exploit growth 
opportunities than their non cross-listed counterparts. The prior empirical evidence is in line 
with theoretical expectations. Opinion-based surveys conducted by CLSA (2000) and 
Deutsche Bank (2002) in emerging markets, including South Africa suggest that dual-listed 
firms tend to have better corporate governance standards than their non-dualisted counterparts. 
Similarly, using a cross-country sample that include 8 South African listed firms, Charitou and 
Louca (2009) report that firms that are cross-listed to the US generate significantly higher 
operating returns than their non-dual-listed counterparts.   
 Overall, this suggests that cross-listed firms may generate higher financial returns than 
their domestic listed counterparts. Thus, it is hypothesised that there is a positive relationship 
between dual-listing (DUALLIST), as proxied by a dummy variable that takes a value of one if 
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a firm is cross-listed to a UK/US 64  stock exchange or zero otherwise, and financial 
performance.      
 
v) Audit Firm Size (BIG4) 
 
As will be explained further in section 6.2 of chapter six, the prior auditing literature 
suggests that the size of the audit firm matters (e.g., Shockley, 1981; Palmrose, 1986; Sori et 
al., 2006). Specifically, it suggests that the levels of auditor independence and audit quality are 
positively associated with audit firm size (e.g., Pearson, 1980; DeAngelo, 1981). A major 
implication of this is that, on average, larger audit firms may be better able to resist 
management pressure in conflict situations. This is mainly due to the reputation, resources (i.e., 
financial, human, information and knowledge), and independence advantages that larger audit 
firms enjoy over their smaller couterparts (Sori et al., 2006, p.2; Young et al., 2008, p.1108).  
As has been explained in chapter three, an important feature of the South African corporate 
governance system is that King II recognises external auditors as one of the key stakeholders 
in ensuring that firms voluntarily comply with the corporate governance provisions of the 
Code. 
However, the literature also suggests that audit fees are positively associated with audit 
firm size (e.g., Palmrose, 1986; Gul, 1991). This means that larger firms are more likely to 
make use of the services of larger audit firms as they can be expected to better afford the 
associated higher costs of auditing (higher auditing fees). This implies that, on average, larger 
firms are more likely to have better corporate governance standards and receive higher market 
valuation (Q-ratio) than their smaller counterparts.  
By contrast, since it costs more to hire a larger audit firm (e.g., Pearson, 1980; Sori et 
al., 2006), it is likely to impact negatively on a firm’s accounting returns (ROA). As a result, it 
is hypothesised that audit firm size (BIG4) will be positively associated with the Q-ratio, but 
negatively related to ROA. Audit firm size will be measured by a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if a firm is audited by any of the big four auditing firms (i.e., Deloitte & Touche, 
Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers), zero otherwise.  
 
 
                                                 
64This is because there is evidence which suggests that the UK and US have stronger corporate governance and 
investor protection regimes (La Porta et al., 1998; Klapper and Love, 2004, p.713; Black et al., 2006, p.403). As 
will be discussed further in subsection 6.1.2 of chapter six, in total 26 of the sampled firms (26%) are cross-listed. 
Seven firms are cross-listed to both the UK and US, whilst 8 and 11 firms are cross-listed to the UK and US 
alone, respectively. 
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vi) Industry Dummies (INDUST) 
 
 As has been discussed in subsection 5.1.4, due to differences in the complexity of 
operations, lines of business, capital structure and ownership levels, corporate governance 
practices may vary between industries (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, p.328; Lim et al., 2007, 
p.568). Also, economic and global developments may impact differently on different 
industries. For example, while increases in the prices of petroleum products may have a 
positive impact on the financial performance of Oil and Gas firms, the profitability of 
manufacturing/industrial firms, which rely heavily on energy for production, may be 
negatively affected.  
As has also been discussed in subsection 5.1.4, opinion-based surveys conducted by 
CLSA (2000) and Deutsche Bank (2002) in emerging markets, including South Africa, 
indicate that corporate governance standards vary across different industries. Thus, to capture 
these potential unobserved industry-level heterogeneity, and in line with prior corporate 
governance studies (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006a; and 
Henry, 2008, amongst others), industry dummies, including basic materials (BMAT), 
consumer goods (CGOODS), consumer services (CSERVICES), industrials (INDUSTRIALS), 
and technology (TECHN) are included as controls for these five65 major industries. To avoid 
the dummy-variable trap, only four industry dummies are included in estimating any single 
equation. 
 
vii) Year Dummies (YD)  
  
 Finally, evidence suggests that corporate governance practices across firms change 
over time (Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.10; Henry, 2008, p.933). For example, using a sample 
of 122 FTSE 350 UK listed firms from 2000 to 2003, Shabbir and Padget (2005) report a 
positive relationship between compliance with corporate governance rules (governance quality) 
and time (year). This positive relationship has recently been supported by the findings of 
Henry (2008) in a sample of 116 Australian listed firms from 1992 to 2002. Secondly, 
different economic states and environment may impact on a firm’s profitability differently. On 
average, firms tend to perform financially better during periods of economic boom, for 
example, than when there is economic recession. The current global economic downturn offers 
a classic anecdotal example (e.g., Turner Review, 2009; Walker Review, 2009). 
                                                 
65As has been explained in subsection 5.1.1, the industrial groups were obtained directly from the Information 
Department of the JSE. 
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Similarly, changes in the macro environment, such as government regulations, tax 
policies and technology may impact differently on financial performance and corporate 
governance structures over time. This means firm financial performance, as proxied by 
Tobin’s Q and ROA are more likely to vary over times. Finally, prior corporate governance 
studies have also controlled for year (e.g., Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Guest, 2008; and Henry, 
2008, amongst others), which can facilitate drawing direct comparisons with their results. 
Thus, to control for possible unobserved firm level heterogeneity over the five-year period, 
five dummies (one each for the five years of 2002 to 2006 inclusive) are also included in the 
model. Similarly, to avoid the dummy-variable trap, only four year dummies are included in 
estimating any single equation. 
The next subsection will describe the proxies for financial performance (dependent 
variables) used in estimating the compliance-index model. It will also develop their theoretical 
associations with internal corporate governance structures, as well as their potential strengths 
and limitations. 
 
5.2.2.3 The Dependent Variable: Firm Financial Performance (FP) 
 
 The dependent variable in this study is firm financial performance (FP). Distinct from 
much of the prior literature (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996; Beiner et al., 
2006; Black et al., 2006a; and Henry, 2008, amongst others), but in line with Gompers et al. 
(2003), Klapper and Love (2004), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), and Guest (2009), two 
measurements, namely return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio) are used as proxies for 
accounting and market based measures of financial performance, respectively. Section 1 of 
Appendix 4 contains further information on the two measures used, as proxies for financial 
performance, as well as detailed information on how they were measured. 
 The decision to use the two measures of financial performance is underpinned by two 
main reasons. Firstly, prior evidence suggests that insiders and outsiders value corporate 
governance differently (Black et al., 2006a, p.370). As such, the accounting based measure of 
performance (ROA) attempts to capture the wealth effects of corporate governance 
mechanisms from the perspective of company management (insiders), while the market based 
measure (Q-ratio) represents financial valuation of corporate governance structures by 
investors (outsiders).  Secondly, and as will be discussed further below, each measure has its 
own strengths and weaknesses with no consensus within the literature on a particular measure 
as being the ‘best’ proxy for financial performance (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006, p.1045). Hence, 
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using the two measures represent an attempt to examine the robustness of the results against 
both accounting and market based measures of financial performance. 
 ROA is defined in this study as the book value of operating profit at the end of a 
financial year divided by the book value of total assets at the end of a financial year (Yermack, 
1996, p.192; Beiner et al., 2006, p.260; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006, p.703). It measures how 
efficiently and effectively a firm manages its operations and uses its assets to generate profits 
(Ross et al., 1998, p.62). On average, higher ROA suggests effective and efficient use of a 
firm’s assets in maximising the value of its shareholders’ investments by management (i.e., 
internal corporate governance structures). ROA is an effective measure of performance 
because it eliminates the problem of size which makes it easier for comparisons to be drawn 
across firms (Lev and Sunder, 1979, p.187). Demsetz and Lehn (1985, p.1160) suggest that as 
accounting profit, ROA may reflect year-to-year fluctuations in underlying business conditions 
better than stock market rates of return. This is because stock market rates of return reflect 
expected future developments that may mask current fluctuations in business conditions. It has 
also been used widely by prior corporate governance studies (e.g., Shrader et al., 1997; 
Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Core et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; 
and Cui et al. 2008, amongst others). 
 However, the use of ROA has been criticised on several grounds. Firstly, ROA is a 
historical measure, but past profits can be a poor reflection of true future profitability (Ross et 
al., 2002, p.36). A closely related weakness is that because ROA is based on historical cost 
accounting, it is unable to directly reflect current changes in valuation by the equity markets 
(Krivogorsky, 2006, p.185). Secondly, through changes in accounting policies, methods and 
techniques, ROA is suggested to be susceptible to all kinds of managerial manipulations 
(Alexander et al., 2007, p.867; Mangena and Tauringana, 2008, p.14). A third criticism is that 
as an accounting-based measure of profitability, ROA ignores risk, but it would be wrong to 
conclude, for example, that two firms with identical current profits are equally profitable if the 
risk level of one is higher than the other (Ross et al., 2002, p.36).  
Finally, ROA has been criticised for its inability to reflect industry and environmental 
differences, non-financial performance factors, such as customer and employee satisfaction, 
short-term fluctuations in business fortunes, and changes in the value of money as a result of 
inflation and fluctuations in exchange rates (Alexander et al., 2007, p.867). However, the 
impact of these weaknesses have been minimised through the inclusion of extensive control 
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variables, which takes into account how time, credit risks, industry, and size, for example, 
affect a firm’s financial performance. 
 Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio) is defined in this study as the market value of equity plus the book 
value of total assets minus the book value of equity divided by the book value of total assets 
(Chung and Pruitt, 1994, p.70; Beiner et al., 2006, p.260). As has been pointed out above, 
Tobin’s Q is the alternative measure of financial performance that is used, as a proxy for the 
markets’ valuation of the quality of a firm’s internal corporate governance structures. Due to 
the difficulties involved in computing Tobin’s (1969) original Q-ratio, such as costly 
computational effort and data requirements, this study follows Chung and Pruitt’s (1994, 
p.70)66 approximation of Q, which has been demonstrated to be 96.6% correlated with the 
original Q-ratio. It is normally referred to as the ratio of the market value of the outstanding 
financial claims on a firm to the current replacement cost of its assets (Lewellen and 
Bradrinath, 1997, p.78). As has been explained above, due to data limitations, book value of 
assets will be used, as a proxy for current replacement cost of company assets. Generally, the 
Q-ratio measures the effectiveness with which a firm’s management is able to use its assets to 
generate value for shareholders. Like ROA, a higher Q-ratio suggests greater effectiveness of a 
firm’s internal corporate governance structures, as well as a better perception of a company’s 
financial performance by the market (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1045). 
 The concept of Tobin’s Q has great intuitive appeal and is of immense theoretical and 
practical relevance (Chung and Pruitt, 1994, p.70). As such, it has extensively been used, as a 
proxy for financial performance not only in the corporate governance literature (e.g., Morck et 
al., 1988; Yermack, 1996; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Gompers et al., 2003; and Henry, 
2008, amongst others), but also within the larger corporate finance literature (e.g., Chung and 
Pruitt, 1994; Perfect and Wiles, 1994; and Lewellen and Badrinath, 1997, amongst others). 
This makes it a very advantageous performance proxy because its empirical validity is 
grounded in a rigorously established empirical literature. However, and like any other 
performance proxy, it has received a barrage of criticisms. Unlike other performance proxies 
like the ROA, however, most of its criticisms concern how it is constructed and potential 
measurement errors (e.g., Klock et al., 1991; Chung and Pruitt, 1994). 
                                                 
66Other approximations for Tobin’s Q have been developed. Lindenberg and Ross (1981), Lang and Litzenberger 
(1989), Perfect and Wiles (1994), and Lewellen and Badrinath (1997), amongst others, have provided some form 
of approximation for Tobin’s original Q. However, Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) approximation is adopted because 
it does not only correlate highly (96.6%) with the original Q, but also is simple and less costly in terms of 
computational effort and the intensity of the data required.  
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 A major line of criticism of Tobin’s Q is that it is too expensive in terms of 
computational effort and data requirements (Chung and Pruitt, 1994, p.70). As a results, and as 
has been explained above, many approximations have been developed, most of which propose 
the use of book values of assets, equity, and debt (e.g., Chung and Pruitt, 1994; Perfect and 
Wiles, 1994; Lewellen and Badrinath, 1997, amongst others). This leads to a related criticism 
that it is a ‘quasi-historical’ measure, in that its computation involves the use of accounting 
variables prepared under historical cost accounting (Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.8). Thus, Q 
also appears to suffer from most of the weaknesses of conventional accounting-based 
measures of performance. These weaknesses include being prone to managerial manipulation 
and creative accounting, as has been discussed above. However, with the gradual move 
towards fair value accounting (Alexander et al., 2007, pp.115-117) or even a mixture of 
historical cost and mark-to-market accounting (Danbolt and Rees, 2008, p.272), it can be 
argued that this criticism will increasingly be less valid.  
 Another criticism of Q is that its application may result in spurious correlations with 
corporate governance mechanisms, in that higher Q may not necessarily suggest that a firm’s 
management has a better ability in using its assets in generating value. This is because the 
differences between market and book values can be due to other factors, such as 
undervaluation of tangible and financial assets recognised on the balance sheet (Beattie and 
Thomson, 2007, p.130). It can also be due to the value of intangibles67 that have not been 
captured on the balance sheet, as well as market prices that do not accurately reflect intrinsic 
values of assets (Beattie and Thomson, 2007, p.130). Like ROA, Q-ratio may not be able to 
also capture how informal human relationships that may exist among board members, for 
example, affect financial performance.   
Similarly, as a market based performance measure, changes in Q may not be an 
accurate reflection of underlying economic fundamentals of a firm, but may be driven by 
investors’ sentiments, speculation and rumour-mongering, which are meant to satisfy their 
short-term parochial economic interests (Henwood, 1997, p.145). An anecdotal example of 
this is the widely reported current financial crisis – the so-called ‘credit crunch’ within the 
global financial markets in which share prices of some firms, especially financial companies, 
are ‘alleged’ to have been driven down by investor speculation (e.g., Daglish, 2009; Gorton, 
                                                 
67For example, despite being an important corporate asset, human resource, is often completely not captured on 
corporate balance sheets.  
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2009; Turner Review, 2009; Walker Review, 2009). This resulted in a temporary ban of 
‘short-selling’ in financial stocks by investors in the UK and the US.  
Therefore, to minimise the potential impact of these limitations on the results, and as 
has been discussed above, extensive lists of control variables are included in the model. It may 
also justify the use of both accounting and market based measures of performance, allowing 
each measure to complement the weaknesses of the other. 
Following prior research, and assuming that all relations are linear, the first ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression equation to be estimated in the system68 is: 
∑
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where: 
FINANCIAL                    -  stands for the two variables, namely return on assets (ROA)  
PERFORMANCE (FP) and Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio) as proxies for accounting and market-
based financial performance measures, respectively. 
0α             - Constant term. 
SACGI            - A constructed South African Corporate Governance Index.  
CONTROLS           - Control variables for sales growth (SGROWTH), capital 
    expenditure (CAPEX), capital structure (GEAR), firm size  
(LNTA), foreign-listing (DUALIST), audit firm size (BIG4), five        
industry dummies of basic materials (BMAT), consumer goods   
(CGOODS), consumer services (CSERVICES), industrials  
(INDUSTRIALS), and technology (TECHN), and five year  
dummies for 2002 to 2006 inclusive. To avoid the  
dummy variable trap, the consumer goods industry, and  
year 2003 are excluded in estimating the equation. 
ε            -  Error term. 
To test the robustness of the results, general OLS misspecifications tests, including 
tests for hetereoscedasticity, non-linearity, and multicollinearity, are conducted on a year-by-
                                                 
68It is called a system because in subsection 5.3.2, to test for robustness of the results, as well as for the existence 
of possible interdependence and interactions among alternative corporate governance mechanisms, a system of 
four additional equations will be developed and estimated simultaneously along with equation (1). Also, as a 
robustness check, a lagged performance-corporate governance relationship (i.e., equations 1 and 2) will be re-
estimated as has been specified in equations (10) and (11) in subsection 5.3.1.4 below. The results that will be 
discussed in chapters eight and nine based on un-lagged and lagged corporate governance-financial performance 
structure, respectively, will be essentially the same. 
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year basis, as well as for the pooled panel to ensure that the constant variable ( 0α ) and the 
slope coefficients (
nβββ +++ ,...,21 ), are both best linear unbiased and consistent estimators. 
As will be discussed further in section 7.2 of chapter seven, these tests include correlation 
analyses, examination of studentised residuals, Durbin-Watson, tolerance, variance inflation 
factor, eigenvalues, and conditions indices, amongst others.  
 In the following subsection, the independent, control, and dependent variables used in 
estimating the equilibrium-variable model will be described. It will also describe how they 
were measured. 
 
5.2.3 The Equilibrium-Variable Model 
 
 As has been discussed above, the equilibrium-variable model is the second equation in 
the system that is estimated. The independent variables in the equilibrium-variable model will 
be described below. 
 
5.2.3.1 The Independent Variables: Individual Corporate Governance Structures 
 
 The explanatory variables in this model consist of individual internal corporate 
governance structures operating as single alternative corporate governance mechanisms in 
isolation. Appendix 4 contains all the independent variables used in this model. It also defines 
each variable and shows how they were measured. These include: board size (BSIZE); role or 
CEO duality (DUAL); the proportion of non-executive directors (NEDs); the frequency of 
board meetings (FBMs); board diversity (BDIV); the presence of three key internal board 
committees, namely audit committee (ACOM), remuneration committee (RCOM), and 
nomination committee (NCOM); director shareownership (DTON); director shareownerhip 
squared (DTON2); and director shareownership cubed (DTON3).    
 These corporate board structure and ownership variables are measured in accordance 
with prior research. Board size (BSIZE) is measured as the total number of directors serving on 
a company’s board at the end of its financial year (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Mangena and 
Tauringana, 2008). The proportion of non-executive directors (NEDs) is measured as the total 
number of non-executive directors divided by the total number of directors (e.g., Weir et al., 
2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Director shareownership (DTON) is measured by the total 
number of ordinary shares held by all directors divided by the total number of ordinary shares 
(e.g., Ho and Williams, 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008).  
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Role or CEO duality (DUAL) is a dummy variable that takes the value of “1” if the 
positions of company chairman and CEO are combined, otherwise “0” (e.g., Rechner and 
Dalton, 1991; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Board diversity (BDIV) is also a binary variable 
which takes the value of “1” if a company’s board is constituted by at least a white person, a 
black person, a man and a woman, otherwise zero (e.g., Carter ., 2003; Rose, 2007). Similarly 
and consistent with prior literature (e.g., Laing and Weir, 1999; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; 
Henry, 2008), audit committee (ACOM), remuneration committee (RCOM), and nomination 
committee (NCOM) are measured as dummy variables that take a value of “1” if any of the 
three committees is established at the end a firm’s financial year, otherwise zero.   
 
5.2.3.2 The Control/Omitted Variables 
 
 The control variables included in this model are the same as the eight described in 
subsection 5.2.2.2, and are included in equation (1) as well. 
 
5.2.3.3 The Dependent Variable: Financial Performance 
 
 Similarly, the proxies for financial performance are the same as those described in 
subsection 5.2.2.3, namely return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), which are 
estimated in equation (1) as well. Similarly, following prior studies and assuming that all 
relations are linear, the second equation to be estimated in the system is: 
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where: 
FINANCIAL            -  stands for the two variables, namely return on assets (ROA)  
PERFORMANCE (FP) and Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio) as proxies for accounting and     
market-based financial performance measures,    
respectively. 
0α             -  Constant term. 
BSIZE            -  Board size. 
NEDs            -  Proportion of non-executive directors. 
DUAL            -  Role or CEO duality. 
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BDIV            -  Board diversity. 
FBMs            -  Frequency of board meetings  
ACOM           -  Presence of audit committee. 
NCOM           -  Presence of nomination committee. 
RCOM            -  Presence of remuneration committee. 
DTON              -  Percentage of shareownership by executive and  
 non-executive directors. 
DTON2           -  Director shareownership squared 
DTON3               -  Director shareownership cubed  
CONTROLS           -  Control variables for sales growth (SGROWTH), capital 
     expenditure (CAPEX), capital structure (GEAR), firm size  
 (LNTA), foreign-listing (DUALIST), audit firm size, (BIG4),  
 five industry dummies of basic materials (BMAT), consumer  
 goods (CGOODS), consumer services (CSERVICES),   
 industrials (INDUSTRIALS), & technology (TECHN) and  
 five year dummies for 2002 to 2006 inclusive. To avoid the  
 dummy variable trap, the consumer goods industry, and  
 year 2003 are excluded in estimating the equation. 
ε              -  Error term. 
Similarly, to test the robustness of the results, general OLS misspecifications tests, 
including tests for hetereoscedasticity, non-linearity, and multicollinearity, will be conducted 
on a year-by-year basis, as well as for the pooled panel to ensure that the constant variable ( 0α ) 
and the slope coefficients ( nβββ +++ ,...,21 ), are both best linear unbiased and consistent 
estimators. Also, and as will be discussed further in section 7.2 of chapter seven, these tests 
include correlation analyses, examination of studentised residuals, Durbin-Watson, tolerance, 
variance inflation factor, eigenvalues, and conditions indices, amongst others. 
The next section will describe the various sensitivity analyses conducted in this study. 
Specifically, it will discuss the problem of endogeneity and examines the robustness of the 
empirical results to the potential existence of such endogeneity problems, as well as the 
presence of alternative internal corporate governance mechanisms and their possible 
interdependence or interaction effects on financial performance.  
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5.3 ROBUSTNESS TESTS/SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 
Apart from general OLS misspecifications checks as have been indicated above, a 
series of sensitivity analyses will be conducted to test the robustness of the results. These will 
include checking the robustness of the results against endogeneity, the existence of alternative 
governance mechanisms, and the estimation of a changes model.    
 
5.3.1 The Problem of Endogeneity 
 
 The econometric problems of endogeneity have recently gained a heightened sense of 
awareness within the positive accounting literature (e.g., Börsch-Supan, and Köke, 2002; 
Chenhall and Moers, 2007a and b; van Lent, 2007; Larcker and Rusticus, 2007, 2008). A 
variable is said to be endogenous if it is determined within the context of the model, whilst a 
variable is said to be exogenous if it is correlated with the dependent variable, but its values 
are determined outside the model (Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, p.177). The endogeneity 
problem, therefore, arises when a variable originally assumed to be exogenous within a model 
is actually endogenous. Assume (3) as follows: 
ttt XY εβα ++= 0                   (3) 
Statistically, the variable tX  is said to be endogenously related to the variable tY  if tX  
is correlated with the structural error term, tε , that is., Cov( tX , tε ) 0≠  (Wooldridge 2002, 
p.50). Briefly, there are four major causes of endogeneity: omitted variables, simultaneity or 
reverse causation, measurement errors, and equilibrium conditions (Wooldridge, 2002, pp.50-
51; Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, pp.180-183; Larcker and Rusticus, 2008, p.2).  
Firstly, and as has been pointed out in subsection 5.2.2.2, omitted variables 
endogeneity arises if a relevant control variable is, for example, omitted from equation (1) due 
to data unavailability (Wooldridge, 2002, p.50). Black et al. (2006, p.384) suggest, for 
example, that firms may appoint non-executive directors just to signal “managers’ intent” to 
treat outside investors fairly, even though non-executive directors in practice may not affect 
the behaviour of managers. In this case, corporate governance will wrongly proxy for an 
omitted variable (managers’ intent).  
Secondly, simultaneity or reverse causation arises when at least one of the independent 
variables is also simultaneously determined by the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2002, 
p.51). For example, rather than firms with good internal corporate governance structures 
receiving higher market valuations, as has been assumed in this study, it could be that firms 
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with higher market values are more likely to choose better internal corporate governance 
structures, because they have better investment opportunities and rely more on external 
financing (Beiner et al., 2006, p.250). 
Thirdly, measurement error endogeneity occurs if a key independent variable is 
imperfectly measured (Larcker and Rusticus, 2005, p.3). For example, measurement error 
endogeneity will arise if the SACGI, which is meant to capture the quality of firms’ internal 
corporate governance structures, is inaccurately measured. Finally, and as has been discussed 
in subsections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2.2, equilibrium conditions endogeneity questions whether 
financial performance can be explained by corporate governance given the assumption that all 
firms attempt to operate under equilibrium conditions (Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, p.183). 
That is, if firms optimally choose corporate governance structures, then it will be inappropriate 
to examine the relationship between performance and corporate governance, as it is evident 
that there will be no association between them. This is because every firm is expected to be in 
equilibrium.    
It has been suggested that endogeneity69 caused by any of the above factors can limit 
the validity of empirical models estimated (Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, p.173). In 
econometric terms, if tX  is correlated with tε , then OLS estimates of the coefficient, tβ  will 
be biased and inconsistent, which can result in wrong interpretations of the findings (Larcker 
and Rusticus, 2008, p.10).  
Apart from potential problems of omitted variables, simultaneity or reverse causation, 
measurement errors, and equilibrium conditions, there are additional reasons that call for a 
consideration to be given to endogeneity in this study. First, there is the need to respond to the 
general call for positive accounting researchers to explicitly address potential problems that 
may be posed by endogeneity (e.g., Börsch-Supan, and Köke, 2002; Chenhall and Moers, 
2007a and b). Second, and as has been discussed in chapter four, the current study relies on 
multiple and sometimes conflicting theoretical perspectives. Arguably, this may increase the 
possibility that endogeneity problems will be introduced into the structural equations.   
Third, and as it was evident in chapter four, much of the prior corporate governance 
literature has produced mixed results. However, substantial number of past studies do not 
address any concerns that the potential presence of endogeneity poses. Only a small number of 
                                                 
69It should be noted that there are sharp disagreements within the positive accounting literature as to whether 
endogeneity is a problem worth considering in accounting research (Chenhall and Moers, 2007a and b; Larcker 
and Rusticus, 2007; van Lent, 2007). Specifically, van Lent (2007, pp.197-198, 203) suggests that in practice 
there is little that can be done about endogeneity even if it exists, and as such researchers should be bold enough 
to set aside any concerns of endogeneity, especially when addressing important research questions.  
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prior corporate governance studies have explicitly addressed concerns raised by the potential 
presence of endogeneity (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Durnev 
and Kim, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006a; Henry, 2008). As has been discussed 
in subsection 4.2 of chapter four, this raises doubts with respect to the reliability of the results 
of a considerable number of prior corporate governance studies.  
In addressing the potential problems that endogeneity poses, this study specifically 
follows the five-step procedure suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2008, pp.25-31, 59) for 
positive accounting researchers. As has been pointed out above, and also in chapter four, 
Larcker and Rusticus (2008, pp.25-26, 59) suggest that the first step to addressing any 
concerns of endogeneity is to use rigorous accounting theory and logic to specify endogenous 
and exogenous variables in the structural equation. Additionally, and as has been discussed 
above, the researcher needs to explicitly point out some of the reasons why endogeneity may 
potentially be a problem. 
The second step involves exploring the various alternative ways of solving the problem, 
including following standard ‘textbook’ econometric and non-econometric solutions (Larcker 
and Rusticus, 2008, p.25). With regard to non-econometric solutions, this study uses a five-
year panel data. With both time series and cross-sectional properties, statistical theory suggests 
that panel data may help in reducing problems posed by endogeneity (Börsch-Supan and Köke, 
2002, p.301; Larcker and Rusticus, 2007, p.208). Secondly, and as has been discussed in 
subsection 5.2.2.2, extensive number of control variables have been included in the models to 
mitigate against possible omitted variable endogeneity problems. 
With regard to following standard ‘textbook’ econometric solutions, an instrumental 
variable (IV) model will be estimated to deal with potential omitted variable and measurement 
error endogeneity problems. As suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2008), two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) and a lagged structure will also be estimated to address endogeneity problems 
that may be posed by omitted variable, simultaneity, and equilibrium conditions. In addition, a 
changes model will be estimated to account for possible firm-level heterogeneity over time.   
The procedures for executing these solutions will be set out below. Specifically, the IV 
estimation method will be dealt with first, followed by the 2SLS, the lagged structure, and 
finally the changes model. These estimations will concentrate purely on the compliance-index 
model (equation 1), which models the SACGI. This is because the SACGI is the main variable 
of focus. It is also more comprehensive as it incorporates almost all the variables included in 
the alternative equilibrium-variable model (equation 2). 
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5.3.1.1 Durbin-Wu-Hausman Exogeneity Test 
The third step as suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2008) involves conducting an 
exogeneity test on the key explanatory variable to ascertain whether it is actually endogenous 
or not. In this case, following prior corporate governance studies (Shabbir and Padget, 2005, 
p.22; Beiner et al., 2006, p.267), the popular Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test is followed.  
The test involves a two step procedure. Firstly, the constructed index (that is, the SACGI) 
assumed to be endogenous in equation 1, will first be run on the control variables, and the 
resulting residuals from the regression will be saved (R-SACGI). Secondly, firm financial 
performance will be regressed on the SACGI, the control variables, as well as the saved 
residuals (R-SACGI) from the first stage regression.  If the coefficient on the saved residuals 
(R-SACGI) is significant, then it can be concluded that the constructed index (the SACGI) is 
endogenously related to firm financial performance. This will also suggest that instrumental 
variable (IV) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) models are appropriate methodology to be 
used for the estimations. 
 
5.3.1.2 Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation and the SACGI 
 
 As has been discussed in subsection 5.3.1, if the SACGI is endogenously related to 
firm financial performance, it could be that an essential control variable(s) has(have) been 
omitted from equation 1 or that the SACGI itself has been imperfectly measured. As suggested 
by Larcker and Rusticus (2008), these two potential endogeneity problems can be addressed 
by estimating an instrumental variable (IV) model. The IV technique involves a two-stage 
procedure. The first stage involves finding a proxy variable (an instrument) for the SACGI, 
which correlates highly with the SACGI, but which is uncorrelated with the structural error 
term ( tε ). In the second stage estimation, the SACGI is replaced by the proxy variable (the 
instrument). In this case, the coefficient on the SACGI will be both consistent and unbiased. 
 However, there are some shortcomings that need to be noted when using the IV 
estimation. First, in practice, it is extremely difficult to find an instrument that satisfies the 
above requirements (Chenhall and Moers, 2007, p.188; van Lent, 2007, p.198). Secondly, 
even if an instrument is found that correlates highly with the SACGI, confirming its validity 
and relevance is also a problem (Durnev and Kim, 2005, p.1483; van Lent, 2007; Larcker and 
Rusticus, 2008). 
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 As a result, this study follows the procedure suggested by Beiner et al. (2006, p.267). 
The procedure involves two stages. In the first stage, the SACGI, will be run on the control 
variables, as well as four other variables, including board size (BSIZE), the presence of a 
corporate governance committee (CGCOM), block shareholding (BLKHDNG) and 
institutional shareholding (INSTHDNG) deemed to be exogenously related to the SACGI. The 
resulting predicted values for the SACGI (P-SACGI) will be saved. In the second stage, the 
SACGI will be replaced with the P-SACGI (as an instrument for the SACGI) in equation 1. 
Equation 1 will then be re-estimated in such a way that financial performance will be run on 
the P-SACGI and the control variables. This should generate consistent and unbiased 
coefficient for the SACGI. 
 In theory, and as has been discussed in subsection 5.2.1, larger firms are better placed 
to comply with corporate governance rules than smaller ones. As such, it is hypothesised that 
board size (BSIZE) and audit firm size (BIG4), as proxied by a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if a firm is audited by any of the big four auditing firms (i.e., Ernst & Young, 
KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Deloitte & Touche), otherwise zero, will be positively 
correlated with the SACGI.  
Also, it is expected that firms that set up corporate governance committees to specially 
monitor the firms’ compliance with corporate governance requirements are more likely to 
have improved internal corporate governance structures than those that do not. As a result, it is 
hypothesised that the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM), as proxied by 
a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm has a corporate governance committee, 
zero otherwise, will be positively correlated with the SACGI. As has been discussed in 
subsection 5.2.2.2, firms with cross-listings or foreign-listings are more likely to have better 
corporate governance structures. This is because cross-listed firms are more likely to be 
subjected to additional listing and governance requirements. Cross-listed firms are also usually 
larger in size. Thus, foreign-listing (DUALLIST) is expected to be positively correlated with 
the SACGI.  
Finally, it is hypothesised that block shareholding (BLKSHDNG), as measured by the 
total number of ordinary shares held by shareholders with at least 5% holdings divided by total 
number of ordinary shares, will be positively correlated with the SACGI. Similarly, it is 
hypothesised that institutional shareholding (INSTHDNG), as measured by the total number of 
ordinary shares held by all financial and non-financial institutions scaled by the total number 
of ordinary shares, will be positively correlated with the SACGI. This is because block and 
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institutional shareholders can exert influence on the internal corporate governance structures, 
such as board structure and composition (Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.22).  
As a fourth step suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2008), it will be demonstrated in 
section 8.3 of chapter nine that the instrument, the P-SACGI, is not only highly correlated 
(relevant) with the original SACGI, but also uncorrelated (valid) with the structural error term 
( tε ). Finally, Larcker and Rusticus (2008) suggest that a comparison regarding the magnitude 
and signs of the coefficients of the OLS and IV estimations be made. This will also be done in 
chapter nine 
 
5.3.1.3 Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS), Alternative Corporate Governance  
Mechanisms and Possible Interdependences/Interactions  
 
 As has been discussed in subsection 5.3.1, omitted variables, simultaneity and 
equilibrium conditions can also introduce endogeneity problems into the structural equation. 
As has been discussed in subsection 5.2.2.1, most of the prior corporate governance studies 
have examined the wealth effects of corporate governance structures in isolation. However, 
the existence of alternative corporate governance mechanisms and the possibility for the 
existence of interdependences, for example, may lead to omitted variable bias and spurious 
correlations (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.378; Beiner et al., 2006, p.252). Therefore, 
following Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Beiner et al. (2006), an extensive set of 
alternative internal corporate governance mechanisms, which are not included in the 
compliance-index, will be simultaneously estimated along with the broad compliance-index, 
the SACGI. The alternative corporate governance mechanisms are: (1) leverage (LEV); (2) 
institutional shareholding (INSTHDNG); (3) block shareholding (BLKSHDNG); and (4) board 
size (BSIZE). 
According to Agrawal and Knoeber (1996, pp.378-379) and Beiner et al. (2006, p.252), 
this allows for possible interdependence or interactions between these internal corporate 
governance structures, by specifying a system of simultaneous equations, where each one of 
the five internal corporate governance structures is the dependent variable in one of the five 
equations. This means that the choice of any one of the internal corporate govermance 
mechanisms may depend upon the choices of all the other mechanisms, in addition to all the 
control variables in the system (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.382; Beiner et al. (2006, p.252).  
To examine the relationship between financial performance and internal corporate 
governance structures, a sixth equation which models financial performance (ROA and Q-ratio) 
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as the dependent variable, will be estimated as part of the system. Following Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996, p.385) and Beiner et al. (2006, p.253), financial performance (ROA and Q-
ratio) will be included in equations 4 to 8 below as an explanatory variable which allows for 
possible interdependences or interactions (that is, it allows each of the internal corporate 
governance structures to affect financial performance, ROA/Q-ratio), but also ensures that 
financial performance affects the choice of each internal corporate governance structure.  
As suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2008), in order to control for omitted 
variable(s), simultaneity, and equilibrium conditions, equations 4 to 9 that have been specified 
below will be estimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS). Specifically, and as will be 
discussed further in chapter nine, in the first stage, each of equations 4 to 8 will be estimated 
along with their respective control variables, and the resulting predicted values (i.e., 
instrumented or predicted part of the corporate governance structures) will be saved. In the 
second stage, each corporate governance mechanism will be replaced with its saved predicted 
instrument from the first stage estimations in equation 9. Equation 9 will subsequently be 
estimated along with the eight control variables.   
 
i) The South African Corporate Governance Index (the SACGI) 
 
 As has been described in subsection 5.2.2.1, the SACGI is a compliance-index that 
incorporates 50 internal corporate governance structures. However, it excludes the other four 
alternative internal corporate governance mechanisms. Following Beiner et al. (2006, p.253), 
it is assumed that the SACGI is determined by the choices of the other four alternative internal  
corporate governance mechanisms and the exogenous variables, including growth potential 
(SGROWTH), innovative potential (CAPEX), capital structure (GEAR), firm size (LNTA), 
audit firm size (BIG4), presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM), dual-listing 
(DUALLST), five industry dummies (INDUST) and five year dummies (YD). The basis for the 
selection of the control variables has already been described and justified in subsections 
5.2.2.2 and 5.3.1.2. Therefore, assuming that all relations are linear and labelling firm 
financial performance, as proxied by ROA and Q-RATIO simply as FP, and all nine exogenous 
variables simply as EXOGENOUS, the first equation in the system to be estimated is: 
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ii) Leverage (LEV) 
 
According to Jensen (1986, p.323; 1993, p.848) debt can serve as an alternative or a 
substitute corporate governance mechanism by reducing the agency costs of ‘free cash flows’ 
through the discouragement of overinvestment of free cash flows in non-positive NPV projects. 
This means that the use of debt has the advantage of motivating managers and their companies 
to increase efficiency and enhance their ability to survive (Jensen, 1986, p.324). The use of 
debt can also increase the value of the firm by offering managers the chance to signal their 
willingness to distribute free cash flows, and to be subjected to additional monitoring by 
lenders (Beiner et al., 2006, p.256). As has been discussed in subsection 5.2.2.2, from a capital 
structure perspective, interest payments are tax deductible (Modigliani and Miller, 1963, 
p.438), and as such, all else equal, highly leveraged firms should be able to generate higher 
financial performance. Therefore, the dependent variable of the second equation in the system 
is leverage (LEV), as measured by the percentage of total debt to total assets (Weir et al., 2002, 
p.591).  
Following Jensen (1986, p.324), larger firms with regular cash flows will use more 
debt than smaller ones. Consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1995), Bevan and Danbolt (2002, 
2004) report that debt is positively correlated with size, but negatively associated with 
profitability using a sample of UK firms. Hence, it is hypothesised that LEV will be positively 
correlated with firm size (LNTA), but negatively related to financial performance (FP). Also, 
debt increases credit risks and bankruptcy costs (Jensen, 1986, p.324), which may inhibit a 
firm’s ability to pursue innovative, growth and profitable investment opportunities (Myers, 
1977, p.148). Thus, it is expected that growth potential (SGROWTH), and innovative potential 
(CAPEX) will have a negative association with leverage (LEV). Debt usage is also expected to 
differ across industries (INDUST) and over time (YD). Labelling all five exogenous variables 
simply as EXOGENOUS, the second equation in the system to be estimated is: 
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iii) Block Shareholding (BLKSHDNG)  
 
 In theory, concentrated ownership can act as a substitute for better internal corporate 
governance structures by minimising information asymmetry, free-riding, and agency costs 
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Urzal, 2009). Similarly, increased monitoring by block 
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shareholders, in addition to serving as a credible takeover threat, may also serve as an 
incentive for managers to pursue value maximising strategies (Beiner et al., 2006, p.255; 
Young et al., 2008, p.1108). Also, unlike small shareholders, block shareholders have big 
stakes in companies such that it pays for them to spend private resources to monitor 
management to increase firm value (FP), and thereby benefiting minority investors (Andres, 
2008, p.432).  
 By contrast, block shareholders can also connive with management to engage in 
‘tunnelling’ or expropriate firm assets, resulting in substantial costs to minority shareholders 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1044; Urzal, 2009, p.245). This is more likely to be a problem 
in South Africa where corporate ownership has historically been dominated by a small set of 
very large companies (mining finance houses) built around highly complicated cross-holdings 
and tall pyramids (Barr et al., 1995, p.18). Hence, the third dependent variable in the system of 
equations is block shareholding, as measured by the total number of ordinary shares held by 
shareholders with at least a 5% holding each divided by the total number of ordinary shares. 
 The empirical evidence between block shareholding and financial performance (FP) is 
mixed. While Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find no relationship 
between ownership by block shareholders and performance, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) 
document a statistically significant positive and negative associations between block 
shareholding and, ROA and Q-ratio, respectively. Similarly, Brockman and Yan, (2009) report 
that block shareholding is positively associated with informed trading and decreases volatility 
in a firm’s stock returns. 
All else equal, it costs more to buy a proportion of shares in larger firms than in 
smaller firms, and so a negative relationship is expected between block shareholding 
(BLKSHDNG) and firm size (LNTA). Beiner et al. (2006, p.255) suggest that it is more 
attractive to hold shares in a firm with greater growth and innovative potential, and so it is 
expected that growth (SGROWTH) and innovative (CAPEX) potential will be positively 
associated with block shareholding. Also, gearing (GEAR), as measured by the ratio of debt to 
equity is expected to correlate negatively with block shareholding as firms with concentrated 
ownership are expected to use less debt. Block shareholding is also expected to differ across 
industries (INDUST) and over time (YD). Now, labelling all six exogenous variables simply as 
EXOGENOUS, the third equation to be estimated in the system is: 
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iv) Institutional Shareholding (INSTHDNG)  
 
 Due to their relative financial clout, reputation, knowledge and information advantages, 
institutional shareholders can impact positively on internal corporate governance structures 
and financial performance (FP) by exerting their influence on board structures, composition, 
and functioning (Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.22; Young et al., 2008, p.1108). Within the 
South African context, institutional shareholding is more likely to be a relevant factor because 
through the use of pyramidical structures, institutional shareholding is intrinsically pervasive 
(Barr et al., 1995, p.18). 
Empirically, McConnell and Servaes (1990) document a positive relationship between 
institutional shareholding and financial performance. Similarly, Yan and Zhang (2009) report 
that institutional ownership is positively correlated with future stock returns. Also, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that large institutional shareholders like the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS) have helped in improving internal corporate governance 
structures through activism in the US and elsewhere (Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.22). Hence, 
the fourth dependent variable in the system of equations is institutional shareholding 
(INSTHDNG), as measured by the total number of ordinary shares held by both financial and 
non-financial institutions scaled by the total number of ordinary shares. 
Since it is more attractive to hold shares in larger firms with greater growth and 
innovative potential (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.383), it is expected that growth 
(SGROWTH) and innovative (CAPEX) potential will be positively associated with institutional 
shareholding. Improved internal corporate governance disclosure is positively associated with 
institutional shareholding (Core, 2001, p.446), and so it is expected that the presence of a 
corporate governance committee (CGCOM) will be positively associated with institutional 
shareholding. Also, institutional shareholding is expected to differ across industries (INDUST) 
and over time (YD). Hence, referring to all five exogenous variables simply as EXOGENOUS, 
the fourth equation to be estimated in the system is: 
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v) Board Size 
 
 As has been discussed in section 4.2 of chapter four, board size (BSIZE) can have a 
positive or negative impact on firm financial performance (FP). From agency and resource 
dependence perspectives, larger boards are associated with increased monitoring and greater 
opportunities to secure critical business resources (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1038). By 
contrast, organisational theory suggests that larger boards are associated with greater free-
riding and slower decision-making (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, p.67). The empirical evidence is 
ambiguous. Yermack (1996) and Guest (2009) separately report a negative association 
between board size and performance, while Beiner et al. (2006) document that board size is 
positively correlated with financial performance. Therefore, the fifth dependent variable in the 
system of equations is board size (BSIZE). 
 As has been discussed in subsections 5.2.2.2 and 5.3.1.2, it is expected that firm size 
(LNTA), foreign-listing or dual-listing (DUALLIST), audit firm size (BIG4), gearing (GEAR) 
and the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM) will be positively associated 
with board size. Smaller firms have greater growth prospects and innovative potential, and so 
it is hypothesised that innovative (CAPEX) and growth (SGROWTH) potential will be 
negatively correlated with board size. Now, referring to all nine exogenous variables simply as 
EXOGENOUS, the fifth equation to be estimated in the system is:  
  
itit
n
i
iitit
itititit
EXOGENOUSFPSACGI
INSTHDNGLEVBLKSHDNGBSIZE
εβββ
βββα
++++
+++=
∑
=1
54
3210
                 (8) 
 
vi) Firm Financial Performance (FP) 
 
 Finally, to examine the relationship between financial performance and the internal 
corporate governance structures, including the four alternative mechanisms, the dependent 
variable in the last equation in the system is financial performance (FP – ROA and Q-ratio). 
All the eight control variables included in equation 1, and described in subsection 5.2.2.2 are 
also included, and labelled simply as CONTROLS. Therefore, the final equation to be 
estimated in the system is: 
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Following Agrawal and Knoeber (1996, p.385) and Beiner et al. (2006, p.263), 
equation (9) will be estimated along with equations (4) to (8) as a system of simultaneous 
equations using two-stage least squares (2SLS). Specifically, in the first stage, each of 
equations 4 to 8 specified above will be estimated along with their respective control variables. 
The resulting predicted values (i.e., instrumented or predicted part of each corporate 
governance structure) will be saved. In the second stage, each corporate governance 
mechanism will be replaced with its saved predicted instrument from the first stage 
estimations in equation 9 above. Equation 9 will subsequently be estimated along with the 
eight control variables. 
This procedure as described above considers financial performance (FP) as 
endogenous along with the five alternative internal corporate governance structures, which 
allows each of the corporate governance mechanisms to affect FP, but also allows FP to affect 
the choice of each internal corporate governance structure. As suggested by Larcker and 
Rusticus (2008), a comparison of the 2SLS estimates with the OLS estimates of equation (9) 
will be made to permit a direct assessment of the differences that arise from the possible 
existence of any endogeneity problems. 
There are two major conditions that need to be satisfied when using 2SLS before the 
system can be identified: the order-condition (a necessary condition) and the rank-condition (a 
sufficient condition) (Brooks, 2002, p.307; Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, p.189). The system of 
equations consists of 9 exogenous variables [firm size (LNTA), sales growth (SGROWH), 
capital expenditure (CAPEX), capital structure (GEAR), audit firm size (BIG4), dual-listing 
(DUALLIST), the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM), industry 
dummies (INDUST), and year dummies (YD)] and six endogenous variables [(financial 
performance (FP), leverage (LEV), the SACGI, block shareholding (BLKHDNG), institutional 
shareholding (INSTHDNG), and board size (BSIZE)]. The order-condition for identifying a 
system states that the number of exogenous variables excluded from an equation must be 
greater or equal to the number of endogenous variables included in the equation minus one 
(Beiner et al., 2006, p.263; Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, p.189). This means that at least five of 
the exogenous variables must be excluded from any single equation to identify the system.  
However, and in line with Beiner et al. (2006), as well as suggestions of Chenhall and 
Moers (2007a and b), equations (4) to (9) are independently developed based on theory, logic 
and data availability without excessive regard to satisfying the order-condition. All the six 
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equations in the system are over-identified (have more than four exogenous variables), which 
is acceptable in econometric terms (Brooks, 2002, p.314; Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.24; 
Beiner et al., 2006, p.263). The rank condition additionally requires that at least one of the 
exogenous variables excluded should have a non-zero coefficient (Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, 
p.189). As will be discussed in chapter eight, none of the exogenous variables has a zero 
coefficient. 
 Like any other research methodology, the 2SLS technique may also suffer from some 
limitations that need to be acknowledged. Firstly, while the separation of variables into 
endogenous and exogenous has been done based on theory and logic as have been suggested 
by Chenhall and Moers (2007a and b) and Larcker and Rusticus (2007, 2008), it may be 
limited to some extent by the arbitrariness of the classification process. It has been suggested 
that it may be possible for the structural equations to be sensitive to system specifications 
(Beiner et al., 2006, p.267). Also, it does not mean that all potential endogeneity problems 
have been completely eliminated, as it is impossible to achieve that in practice (Chenhall and 
Moers, 2007a, p192; van Lent, 2007, p.198). However, and as suggested by Larcker and 
Rusticus (2008), the potential existence of endogeneity has been explicitly acknowledged with 
an explicit attempt to minimise its potential impact on the results. 
 
5.3.1.4 Lagged Structure and Changes Model 
 
 Theory and evidence suggests that there is a time lag in the corporate governance-
performance relationship in which this year’s corporate governance structures may be 
associated with next year’s performance (Vefeas, 1999a; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). This is 
because board decisions may have gestation period within which their full benefits may be 
materialised. It may also be possible for firms with better current financial performance to 
improve their internal corporate governance structures in a subsequent year in order to 
continue to attract external financing, as well as receive higher market valuation. 
Following prior studies (e.g., Weir et al., 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), 
endogeneity problems that may be caused by potential time lags between the institution of 
internal corporate governance structures and financial performance are controlled for by re-
estimating equations 1 and 2, with one year lagged structure as equations (10) and (11), 
respectively: 
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 In a similar vein, if better-governed firms tend to be associated with higher financial 
performance than their poorly-governed counterparts, then it can be argued that such a 
relationship will even be better captured by using changes in internal corporate governance 
structures and financial performance over time to estimate the relationship rather than using 
their actual levels. Also, even if a statistically significant relationship is found between 
corporate governance and financial performance, potential omitted variables bias and 
endogeneity problems can make it difficult to ascertain whether better corporate governance 
indeed causes better financial performance. Arguably, using changes rather than actual levels 
of corporate governance and financial performance may effectively also control for any un-
observable or missing firm-specific variables.  
Further, prior literature suggests that corporate governance standards change over time 
among firms (e.g., Bauer et al., 2004; Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Henry, 2008). If good 
corporate governance is indeed associated with higher financial performance, then it can also 
be argued that an increase (decrease) in the standard of a firm’s corporate governance should 
be associated with a similar increase (decrease) in its financial performance. Therefore, to test 
the robustness of the results to a changes model, the compliance-index model (equation 1)70 is 
re-estimated using changes rather than actual levels of the financial performance, corporate 
governance, and the control variables as: 
∑
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where: FP∆ stands for changes in firm financial performance, SACGI∆  refers to changes in 
the SACGI, while CONTROLS∆ refers to changes in all the control variables, excluding the 
dummy variables of industry, year, audit firm size, and foreign or dual-listing. 
 
 
 
                                                 
70Since the equilibrium-variable model (equation 2) contains a lot of dummy variables, it will be inappropriate to 
estimate a similar model or relationship. 
  
188 
5.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
 To recap, this chapter has focused on the research design. It sought to achieve four 
main closely related objectives. Firstly, it attempted to describe the data and research 
methodology. In this regard, the data, its sources, the sample selection procedure and the main 
research methodology used in this study were comprehensively described. Two main types of 
data are used in this study: internal corporate governance and financial performance variables. 
These were mainly collected from Perfect Information and DataStream, respectively.  Out of 
the 402 listed firms on the JSE Ltd as at 31/12/2006, the full data required was obtained for a 
sample of 169. One hundred (100) firms were then stratify sampled over five consecutive 
years (2002 to 2006 inclusive), resulting in a total of 500 firm-year observations.  
The review also identified the compliance-index and the equilibrium-variable models 
as the two main competing research methodologies within the extant literature. It is contended 
that while the two competing models are ostensibly based on contrasting theoretical 
assumptions with their respective potential limitations, prior literature has mainly used one or 
the other based purely on some theoretical arguments without explicitly testing the empirical 
validity of such theoretical propositions. As a result, the two models are explicitly described 
and estimated for the first time within the same study and context to offer new insights into 
their comparative theoretical and empirical validity to potentially serve as a guide for future 
researchers with regard to making their methodological choices. 
The second objective of the chapter has been to explain the rationale for the numerous 
methodological choices made at every stage of the study. In this case, the rationale for the 
choice of data, its sources, sampling procedure, research methodology, and sensitivity 
analyses were explicitly discussed throughout the study. Thirdly, the chapter attempted to 
point out the strengths and limitations of the various methodological choices made throughout 
the study. In line with this view, the weaknesses and strengths of the data, its sources, the 
estimated models, the various proxies and measurement of the independent, control and 
dependent variable, as well as robustness analyses were thoroughly discussed throughout the 
study.  
The final objective of this chapter has been to offer an indication of the extent to which 
the obtained empirical results are robust to alternative estimations and explanations. In this 
regard, robustness of the results to the existence of potential problems of endogeneity, and 
alternative corporate governance mechanisms were thoroughly explored. More specifically, 
the results were subjected to extensive set of sensitivity analyses, including estimating an 
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instrumental variable model, a two-stage least squares model, a lagged corporate governance-
financial performance structure, and a changes model.  
In the next chapter (chapter six), the main objective is to provide a detailed description 
and explanation for the levels of compliance with the South African Corporate Governance 
Index (the SACGI). More specifically, it will generally attempt to determine the levels of 
compliance among the sampled firms, and ascertain whether the levels of compliance that will 
be observed can be explained by firm size, industry, dual-listing, and audit firm size. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX 
(THE SACGI) 
 
 
6. INTRODUCTION 
 
 This chapter discusses the South African Corporate Governance Index (the SACGI). It 
has three main objectives. First, it provides a detailed description of the SACGI using a 
number of descriptive statistics. In this regard, summary descriptive statistics of the levels of 
compliance with the SACGI based on the full sample are reported. The second objective of the 
chapter is to explain the observed variability in the levels of compliance with the SACGI. In 
this respect, the sample is split into size, industry, dual-listed, and big four audited sub-
samples. The rationale is to ascertain whether the observed variability in the levels of 
compliance with the SACGI can be explained by firm size, industry, dual-listing and audit firm 
size.  
In addition to descriptive analyses, a multivariate regression of the SACGI on all the 
eight control variables will be carried out to further ascertain the key determinants of the 
SACGI. As have been explained in chapters two, three and five, a distinquishing feature of the 
South African corporate governance model is that it formally super-imposes a number of 
affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions on firms to comply with. 
Therefore, the third and final aim of this chapter is to examine the levels of compliance within 
the South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance 
provisions.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 discusses descriptive 
statistics of the levels of compliance with the SACGI based on the full sample. Section 6.2 
describes and explains descriptive statistics based on firm size. Section 6.3 examines 
descriptive statistics based on industry. Section 6.4 explores further the determinants of the 
SACGI in a multivariate regression framework. Section 6.5 reports descriptive statistics of the 
levels of compliance with the nine South African context specific affirmative action and 
stakeholder corporate governance issues. Section 6.6 describes other key trends and measures 
of board diversity, while section 6.7 summarises the chapter. 
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6.1 Descriptive Statistics Based on the Full Sample (All 500 Firm Years) 
 
Table 4 reports the levels of compliance among the sampled firms with all the fifty 
individual internal corporate governance provisions that form the South African Corporate 
Governance Index (the SACGI).   
 
Table 4: The Levels of Compliance with the Individual Internal Corporate Governance    
                Provisions among the Sampled Firms  
Compliance Levels Among Firms (%) Individual Internal Corporate Governance 
Provisions of the SACGI All 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
1. Board and directors: 
Role duality(DUAL1) 
Board composition(COM1) 
Board chairperson(BCP) 
Frequency of board meetings(FBM1s) 
Individual directors meetings attendance(IDMA) 
Disclosure of directors’ biography(DDB) 
Disclosure of director classification(DDC) 
Appraisal of chair performance & effect.(ACPE) 
Appraisal of CEO/MD perf. & effect.(ACEOPE) 
Evaluation of board perf. & effect.(EBPE) 
Evaluat. of board subcom. perf. & effect.(EBSCPE) 
Director/officer dealings & securities(DDS) 
Office of the company secretary(COSEC1) 
Existence of nomination committee(NCOM1) 
Composition of nomination committee(COM2) 
Chairperson of nomination committee(NCCP) 
Disclosure of nom. com. membership(DM1) 
Nom. com. members’ meetings attendance(INCMMA) 
Existence of remuneration committee(RCOM1) 
Composition of remuneration committee(COM3) 
Chairperson of remuneration committee(RCCP) 
Disclosure of rem. com. membership(DM2) 
Rem. com. members’ meetings attendance(IRCMMA) 
Directors’ rem., interests & share options(DDR) 
Philosophy & procedure of director rem.(DPLR) 
Director access to free legal advice(DAFIPA) 
2. Accounting and auditing: 
Existence of audit committee(ACOM1) 
Composition of audit committee(COM4) 
Chairperson of audit committee(ACCP) 
Disclosure of audit committee membership(DM3) 
Audit com. members’ meetings attendance(IACMA) 
Narrative on the ‘going-concern’(NGC) 
3. Risk Management and internal audit: 
Disclosure of company risks(DCR) 
Disclosure of policy on risks management(DPM) 
Disclosure policy on internal control system(DPI) 
Existence of risk management committee(RISCOM1) 
Risk mgt. com. members’ metngs. attend.(IRISCMA) 
4. Ownership structure: 
Internal ownership(INON1) 
 
74.2 
  62.8 
  32.4 
  78.0 
  67.6 
  96.8 
  73.0 
  11.8 
  10.6 
  25.8 
  14.8 
  68.6 
100.0 
  46.8 
  27.8 
  29.2 
  45.6 
  31.8 
  90.6 
  17.2 
  47.4 
  84.2 
  49.0 
  97.8 
  36.6 
  79.0 
  
90.6 
  46.6 
  49.0 
  86.0 
  54.4 
  98.2 
  
96.8 
  82.4 
  90.0 
  61.0 
  40.6 
 
55.4 
 
 61 
  55 
  17 
  65 
  36 
  94 
  49 
  4 
  3 
  10 
  5 
  55 
100 
26 
10 
10 
23 
  9 
85 
10 
29 
76 
18 
93 
28 
71 
 
87 
28 
26 
79 
21 
97 
 
96 
74 
89 
40 
10 
 
60 
  
64 
  61 
  25 
  75 
  65 
  96 
  70 
  8 
  10 
  24 
  12 
  65 
100 
42 
26 
23 
41 
25 
90 
14 
39 
81 
40 
99 
36 
79 
 
88 
41 
48 
84 
49 
98 
 
95 
81 
87 
59 
35 
 
58 
 
77 
  67 
  34 
  82 
  76 
  98 
  78 
  12 
  13 
  31 
  14 
  72 
100 
52 
30 
32 
51 
36 
91 
17 
53 
85 
57 
99 
39 
81 
 
90 
51 
55 
86 
63 
98 
 
97 
84 
89 
66 
47 
 
52 
  
83 
  65 
  42 
  84 
  78 
  98 
  84 
  16 
  12 
  31 
  18 
  74 
100 
54 
35 
38 
54 
43 
92 
21 
55 
86 
63 
99 
40 
82 
 
93 
52 
56 
87 
68 
99 
 
98 
85 
91 
67 
54 
 
51 
 
86 
  66 
  44 
  84 
  83 
  98 
  84 
  19 
  15 
  33 
  25 
  77 
100 
60 
38 
43 
59 
46 
95 
24 
61 
93 
67 
99 
40 
82 
 
95 
61 
60 
94 
71 
99 
 
98 
88 
94 
73 
57 
      
56 
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Continuation: Table 4 
Compliance Levels Among Firms (%) Individual Internal Corporate Governance 
Provisions of the SACGI All 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
5. Integrated sustainability reporting/non-finan.: 
Black economic empowerment(BEE) 
Policy on HIV/AIDS(HIV) 
Policy on health and safety(PHS) 
Policy on employment equity(PEQ) 
Policy on good environmental practices(PEP) 
Corporate social Investment(CSI) 
Disclosure of company code of ethics(DCE) 
Board diversity on the basis of ethnicity(BDIVE1) 
Board diversity on the basis of gender(BDIVG1) 
6. Culture of voluntary compliance & enforcement: 
Contribution to devt. of finan. Journalism(CDFJ) 
Encouraging shareholder activism(PSA) 
Compliance/non-compliance with King II(CNC) 
 
68.6 
  62.0 
  53.8 
  82.6 
  59.4 
  63.0 
  84.6 
  76.4 
  50.0  
   
 .0 
  51.6 
  97.8 
 
51 
45 
36 
80 
47 
54 
76 
69 
39 
  
 0 
37 
96 
 
60 
59 
42 
80 
53 
63 
83 
73 
45 
  
0 
47 
97 
 
71 
66 
59 
84 
62 
62 
85 
76 
51 
  
0 
55 
99 
 
77 
70 
64 
83 
67 
67 
89 
78 
55 
  
0 
57 
99 
 
84 
70 
68 
86 
68 
69 
90 
86 
60 
  
0 
62 
98 
 
 
To facilitate comparison, for each provision, the percentage levels of compliance for 
the pooled sample, as well as for each of the five firm years are reported. Three key findings 
can be observed from Table 4. Firstly, it shows that there are substantial variations in the 
levels of compliance with the individual corporate governance provisions among the sampled 
firms. It ranges from 100% (perfect compliance by all 100 firms over the five-year period) in 
the case of the existence of the office of a company secretary (COSEC1) to 0% (complete non-
compliance by all 100 firms over the five-year period) with respect to the contribution to the 
development of financial journalism (CDFJ).  
The perfect compliance with COSEC1 is consistent with the provisions of the South 
African Companies Act and the 2007 JSE Listings Rules. Both regulations mandate every 
public company to maintain a well-resourced and supportive office of a company secretary to 
oversee effective and efficient functioning of the board. The complete non-compliance with 
CDFJ implies that it may be inappropriate within the South African context. A possible reason 
may be that South Africa seems to already possess a well-developed free and vibrant financial 
press such that there may be no need for firms to spend additional resources to help develop 
financial journalism (King Report, 2002, pp.162-163). Similarly, and as will be discussed 
further below, evidence of no variation in these two provisions suggests that it will be 
methodologically inappropriate to link single corporate governance mechanisms to financial 
performance if all the sampled firms were to comply or not to comply with a provision, as 
suggested by the equilibrium-variable model.   
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It also supports suggestions of weak implementation and enforcement of corporate 
governance standards by regulatory authorities in South Africa (e.g., Armstrong, 2003; 
Deutsche Bank, 2002; IIF, 2007). For example, global opinion-based surveys conducted by 
CLSA (2000) and Deutsche Bank (2002) using analysts to examine corporate governance 
standards in emerging markets, suggest that South Africa suffers from weak enforcement of 
corporate governance rules. As has already been discussed in subsection 3.2.2 of chapter three, 
this may be due to the relative dearth of financial resources and trained personnel available to 
South Africa’s regulatory and enforcement embodies, such as the Financial Services Board 
(FSB), the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and the Registrar of Companies (IIF, 
2007, p.8). 
For eight (16%) provisions, compliance levels are comparatively high. Approximately, 
90% or more of the sampled firms complied with these provisions. They include the 
description of directors’ biography (DDB), disclosure of individual directors’ remuneration, 
interests and share options (DDR), provision of a narrative on the possibility of the firm 
operating as a going-concern (NGC), the disclosure of company risks (DCR), disclosure of 
internal control systems and policies (DPI), a positive statement on the compliance or non-
compliance with the corporate governance provisions of King II (CNC)71, and the existence of 
remuneration (RCOM1), and audit (ACOM1) committees.  
By contrast, for 11 (22%) provisions, compliance levels are relatively low. Only 40% 
or less of the sampled firms complied with these provisions. These provisions consist of 
whether the chairpersons of the board (BCP), and the nomination (NCCP) committee are 
independent, evaluation of the performance and effectiveness of the board chairman (ACPE), 
the CEO/managing director (ACEOPE), the board (EBPE), and the board sub-committees 
(EBSCE), the disclosure of the attendance records of meetings by the members of nomination 
(INCMMA), and risk management (IRISCMA) committees, and whether the nomination 
committee consist of a majority of independent non-executive directors (NEDs) (COM2), and 
whether all the members of the remuneration (COM3) committee are Independent NEDs. 
                                                 
71A general observation from reading the annual reports is that, on average, the sampled firms were more willing 
to explicitly highlight (often repeated throughout the annual reports) improvements in corporate governance 
standards or compliance with the corporate governance provisions of King II, but less willing to formally 
acknowledge areas of non-compliance or decreases in corporate governance standards. Specifically, and as Table 
4 shows, a majority (about 98%) of the sampled firms did make a general positive statement (especially in the 
introduction section or paragraph of the corporate governance report) on whether they comply or do not comply 
with the corporate governance provisions of King II. A relatively smaller (about 70% as observed from reading 
the annual reports) number, however, did explicitly specify areas of non-compliance and the reasons for non-
compliance. By contrast, almost all the sampled firms did formally acknowledge or highlight year-on-year 
improvements in corporate governance standards.  
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For the remaining 29 provisions, compliance levels range from 46% with regard to the 
disclosure of the nomination committee membership (DM1) to 86% in the case of the 
disclosure of the audit committee membership (DM3). Overall, the evidence from Table 4 is 
that the sampled firms are more likely to comply with some of the corporate governance 
provisions than others. For example, while 74% of the sampled firms have split the roles of 
chairman and CEO (DUAL1), only 32% of them have independent board chairpersons (BCP). 
Also, whilst 98% provide narratives by directors’ on the possibility of their firm operating as a 
‘going-concern’ (NGC), less than 12% evaluate the performance and effectiveness their 
chairpersons (ACPE) and CEOs/managing directors (ACEOPE) annually. 
The second major evidence from Table 4, and as has been explained above, is that, on 
comparative basis, the use of the compliance-index model is more likely to achieve better 
variation in the levels of compliance with the SACGI among the sampled firms than using the 
equilibrium-variable model. For example, Table 4 shows that over 90% of the sampled firms 
have established a remuneration committee. This results in less than 10% variability in 
compliance levels among the sampled firms, such that if a cross-sectional regression is run on 
such a single corporate governance variable, it is arguably less likely to be value relevant.  
However, on the question of whether the remuneration committee consist entirely of 
independent NEDs (COM3) or is chaired by an independent NED (RCCP), less than 18% or 
50%, respectively, of the sampled firms complied. As a result, when the differences in these 
individual corporate governance variables are aggregated to form a broad compliance 
corporate governance index, it is arguably more likely to show a relatively sufficient variation 
in the levels of compliance among the sampled firms than examining single corporate 
governance mechanisms in isolation.  
The final major finding from Table 4 is that compliance with the corporate governance 
provisions improves over time. Apart from the perfect compliance/non-compliance cases of 
COSEC1/CDFJ, respectively, as well as internal ownership (INON1)72 in which there is a 
reduction (of a 4 percentage points) from 60% in 2002 to 56% in 2006 in the levels of 
compliance, the remaining 47 provisions experienced consistent substantial improvements in 
the levels of compliance among the sampled firms. Excluding COSEC1 and CDFJ, the 
                                                 
72Internal ownership (INON1) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of shares held by all 
insiders or non-public shareholders, including directors, officers, and employees is less than 50% of the total firm 
equity, 0 otherwise (see section of 4 of Appendix 2). Similar to the other continuous variables, including board 
composition (COM1), the frequency of board meetings (FBMs), and board diversity on the basis of gender 
(BDIVG1) and ethnicity (BDIVE1) contained in the SACGI, internal ownership had to be converted from a 
continuous variable to a dummy variable so that it could easily be included in the SACGI without affecting the 
scale of measurement of the remaining 46 dummy variables. 
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provision with the least increase over the five-year period is directors’ narrative on ‘going-
concern’ (NGC), recording only a 2 percentage point improvement (i.e., from 97% in 2002 to 
99% in 2006). However, this is understandable because compliance levels among the sampled 
firms with NGC were already relatively high in 2002.  
In contrast, the disclosure of the risk management committee members’ meetings’ 
attendance records (IRISCMA) experienced the highest increase over the five-year period with 
a 47 percentage point increase (i.e., from 10% in 2002 to 57% in 2006) in the levels of 
compliance across the sampled firms. For example, only 26% of the sampled firms had 
established a functioning nomination committee (NCOM1) in 2002. It increased to 42%, 52%, 
54% and 60% in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively, experiencing an overall increase of 
34 percentage points over the five-year period.  
They also show improvements over the findings of prior opinion-based surveys that 
include South African listed firms. The Deutsche Bank (2002) survey examining corporate 
governance standards in emerging markets, including South Africa, for example, reports that 
60%, 47%, and 16% of South African listed firms have audit, compensation, and nomination 
committees in 1999, respectively. Table 4, however, shows that 85%, 85%, and 26% of the 
sampled firms have established audit, remuneration, and nomination committees in 2002, 
respectively. This implies the number of firms with audit, remuneration, and nomination 
committees has improved compared with the findings of the Deutsche Bank survey in 1999. 
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                Figure 2: SACGI Compliance Levels by Year/Period 
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Figure 2 compares the year-by-year aggregate levels of compliance with the SACGI 
across the sampled firms using computed means, and yearly increases in percentage points. 
Firstly, it demonstrates further that compliance with the corporate governance provisions 
among the sampled firms improves over time. Secondly, the mean percentage point increase 
from 2002 to 2006 is 20 (i.e., from 48% in 2002 to 68% in 2006). Thirdly, as the second year 
in which King II became operational, 2003 experienced the highest yearly percentage point 
increase of 9 (i.e., from 48% in 2002 to 57% in 2003) with compliance levels increasing at a 
decreasing rate in the subsequent three years.  
The positive relationship between the levels of compliance and time is consistent with 
the results of the accounting disclosure literature, prior corporate governance studies, and 
widely cited opinion-based corporate governance surveys. For example, Conyon (1993), 
Conyon and Mallin (1997), Bauer et al. (2004), Shabbir and Padgett (2005), Cui et al. (2008) 
and Henry (2008) report evidence of substantial improvements in the levels of compliance 
with corporate governance standards over time across a sample of European, UK, and 
Australian, listed firms that were examined by them, respectively. Similarly, opinion-based 
surveys conducted by CLSA (2000) and Deutsche Bank (2002) in emerging markets, 
including South Africa, suggest that the introduction of the King Reports is helping to improve 
corporate governance standards among South African listed firms.   
Panel A of Table 5 reports summary descriptive statistics for the SACGI. For 
comparison purposes, descriptive statistics based on firm size, industry, dual-listing, and audit 
firm size are also presented, and will be referred to in sections 6.2 and 6.3. Consistent with the 
evidence of wide variability in compliance levels with the individual corporate governance 
provisions, it suggests that there is a substantial degree of dispersion in the summary internal 
corporate governance scores among the sampled firms. The scores range from a minimum of 
6% (i.e., 3 out of 50) to a maximum 98% (i.e., 49 out of 50) with the average sampled firm 
complying with 60% of the 50 corporate governance provisions analysed.  
This is similar to the results of prior cross-countries studies that include South Africa 
in their sample. Using the CLSA corporate governance ratings, both Klapper and Love (2004) 
and Durnev and Kim (2005) report average firm-level corporate governance scores in 2000 of 
66% and 61% for a cross-country sample that include South African listed firms, respectively. 
Similarly, opinion-based survey conducted by the Deutsche Bank (2002) in emerging markets, 
including South Africa, suggests that the average corporate governance score among South 
African listed firms was 74%. 
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Appendix 5 is a histogram depicting the distribution of the SACGI.  Since Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression technique will be used to test all the hypotheses that have 
been discussed in chapters four and five, a normal distribution curve has been super-imposed. 
First, the skewness statistic (-.36) in Panel A of Table 5, rejects the null hypothesis (the 
absolute critical value for accepting skewness is zero) that the SACGI is symmetrically 
distributed (i.e., skewed to the right with longer left tail) at the 5% significance level.  
By contrast, the kurtosis statistic (-.89) fails to reject the null hypothesis (the absolute 
critical value for rejecting Kurtosis is three) that the SACGI is mesokurtically distributed. The 
negative sign, however, suggests that the observations cluster less and have shorter tails. The 
lack of symmetry in the SACGI may pose problems for the OLS regressions that will 
subsequently be estimated in chapter eight. However, and as will be discussed further below, 
the non-normal behaviour depicted by the SACGI is generally very similar to the reported 
results of prior studies that have carried out OLS estimations (Cheung and Wei, 2006, p.913; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, pp.1048, 1050-1051; Francoeur et al., 2008, p.88). This suggests it 
may be statistically tolerable. 
Appendix 5 also indicates that the SACGI is fairly less non-normal compared with a 
normal distribution. Specifically, and as Panel D of Table 6 shows, less than 5%, 18%, and 
25% of the sampled firms had summary corporate governance scores between 0% and 20%, 
21% and 40%, and 41% and 60%, respectively. By contrast, more than 32% and 19% of the 
sampled firms had corporate governance scores between 61% and 80%, and 81% and 100%, 
respectively.  
Descriptive statistics of the SACGI for each of the five years are fairly similar to those 
observed for the full 500 firm-year observations. All show similar large variability (large 
standard deviations) in the levels of compliance with the SACGI (i.e., minimum of 6% in 2002 
to a maximum of 98% in 2005). Similarly, they are all mildly (in comparison with a normal 
distribution) skewed to the right with less clustering among the observations. As has been 
explained above, ascertaining the distributional properties of the SACGI is important because 
the presence of extreme levels of non-normal behaviour may pose problems for the OLS 
regressions that will be estimated in chapter eight. This is because OLS estimation assumes 
normality in variables. 
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Table 5: Summary Descriptive Statistics for the South African Corporate 
               Governance Index (the SACGI) 
The South African Corporate 
Governance Index (the SACGI) 
 
Mean 
 
T-Test 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skew-
ness 
   Kurt- 
 osis 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi- 
mum 
Panel A: All Firm Years 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel B: All Small Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel C: All Large Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel D: All B. Material Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel E: All Con. Goods Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel F: All C. Services Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
60.00 
47.58 
56.70 
62.50 
65.08 
68.16 
44.48 
34.48 
40.16 
46.12 
48.24 
53.40 
75.53 
60.68 
73.24 
78.88 
81.92 
82.92 
57.92 
48.10 
54.00 
58.20 
60.50 
68.50 
59.32 
47.80 
56.90 
62.10 
63.40 
66.40 
63.44 
49.00 
59.40 
68.40 
69.90 
70.50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31.05*** 
26.20*** 
33.08*** 
32.76*** 
33.68*** 
29.52*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   .96 
 5.50 
   .90 
   .80 
 3.20 
 2.40 
 2.36 
 5.20 
 3.80 
 3.10 
   .30 
   .00 
 6.48** 
 6.40 
 6.30 
 9.40 
 6.20 
 4.10 
22.03 
19.03 
21.56 
21.83 
21.95 
19.89 
17.69 
12.73 
16.39 
18.23 
17.72 
17.12 
13.28 
14.81 
10.57 
9.11 
9.01 
7.86 
 24.70 
22.91 
26.64 
24.78 
25.45 
20.82  
20.90 
20.47 
20.46 
21.07 
20.98 
18.14  
18.66 
13.40 
17.58 
17.50 
17.92 
   18.43 
 -.36** 
 -.06* 
 -.35** 
 -.56** 
 -.53** 
 -.72** 
  .25** 
.20** 
.56** 
.15** 
.15** 
 -.18** 
-1.18*** 
-1.09** 
 -.62** 
 -.24** 
 -.25** 
 -.10** 
 -.32** 
 -.04* 
 -.25** 
 -.29** 
 -.20** 
-1.13*** 
 -.44** 
 -.24** 
 -.49** 
 -.62** 
 -.58** 
 -.43**  
  .10** 
.44** 
  .01* 
 -.26* 
 -.00 
 -.08* 
-.89 
-.81 
-.97 
-.76 
-.77 
-.28 
-.49 
-.17 
-.04 
-.73 
-.42 
-.28 
2.94* 
   2.59* 
.42 
-.38 
-.37 
-.85 
-1.22 
-1.47 
-1.34 
-1.27 
-1.42 
.54  
-.93 
-.80 
-.82 
-.98 
-1.07 
-1.51 
-1.00 
-.10 
-1.26 
-1.00 
-1.00 
-1.20 
6.00 
6.00 
10.00 
6.00 
12.00 
12.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
12.00 
12.00 
12.00 
6.00 
6.00 
 46.00 
 60.00 
 66.00 
 66.00 
 10.00 
12.00 
10.00 
14.00 
18.00 
18.00   
6.00 
6.00 
18.00 
24.00 
28.00 
36.00 
28.00 
28.00 
32.00 
36.00 
38.00 
   38.00 
98.00 
86.00 
94.00 
96.00 
98.00 
96.00 
90.00 
66.00 
82.00 
84.00 
90.00 
88.00 
98.00 
86.00 
94.00 
96.00 
98.00 
96.00 
96.00 
86.00 
94.00 
94.00 
96.00 
96.00 
92.00 
80.00 
88.00 
88.00 
92.00 
86.00 
98.00 
80.00 
96.00 
96.00 
98.00 
96.00 
Notes: The t-test in column 3 is the independent samples t-test for equality of means. The mean differences in 
Panel B test for equality of means between all large and all small firms, while those in Panels D, E, and F test for 
equality of means between all basic materials firms, all consumer goods firms, and all consumer services firms, 
and all technology firms, respectively. A mean difference with (***), and (**) indicates that the null hypothesis 
that the means are equal is rejected at the 1%, and 5% significance level, respectively. The skewness and kurtosis 
test statistics in columns 5 and 6, respectively, test for normal distribution. A test statistic with (***), (**), and (*) 
means that the null hypothesis that the SACGI is normally distributed is rejected at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance level, respectively. 
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Continuation: Table 5 
The South African Corporate 
Governance Index (the SACGI) 
 
Mean 
 
T-Test 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skew-
ness 
   Kurt- 
 osis 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi- 
mum 
Panel G: All Industrials Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel H: All Technology  Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel I: All Dual-listed Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel J: All Non-Dual-listed  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel K: All Big Four Audited 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel L: All Non-Big Four Aud. 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
62.38 
50.40 
60.10 
64.80 
67.90 
68.70 
56.96 
42.60 
53.10 
59.00 
63.70 
66.40 
74.82 
61.04 
72.48 
76.48 
80.08 
94.00 
55.07 
43.93 
51.03 
57.39 
60.08 
62.89 
66.16 
52.82 
63.38 
69.29 
71.72 
73.58 
44.94 
34.76 
40.93 
45.13 
48.83 
54.90 
5.42* 
7.80 
7.00 
5.80 
4.20 
2.30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19.74*** 
17.95*** 
21.45*** 
19.09*** 
20.00*** 
21.11*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21.22*** 
18.06*** 
22.45*** 
24.16*** 
22.89*** 
18.69*** 
25.20 
21.67 
24.97 
25.79 
25.92 
25.32 
 19.63 
16.03 
17.85 
19.46 
19.25 
17.47 
17.54 
20.09 
16.23 
17.09 
15.91 
7.35 
21.17 
16.49 
20.59 
21.33 
21.48 
19.97 
20.67 
18.76 
20.17 
19.51 
20.01 
18.33 
17.61 
12.68 
15.35 
18.17 
17.84 
17.38 
-.60** 
-.27** 
-.68** 
-.86** 
-.92** 
-1.01** 
-.26** 
-.01* 
-.09* 
-.58** 
-.67** 
-.61** 
-1.88*** 
-1.46***  
-2.23*** 
-2.22*** 
 2.34*** 
   .03* 
  -.07* 
   .16** 
  -.04* 
  -.30** 
  -.26** 
  -.40** 
  -.87** 
  -.48** 
  -.79** 
-1.22*** 
-1.18*** 
-1.36*** 
   .55** 
   .32** 
   .75** 
   .49** 
   .53** 
   .25** 
 -.93 
 -.85 
-1.08 
 -.62 
 -.43 
 -.06 
 -.86 
 -.42 
 -.76 
 -.42 
 -.34 
 -.59 
 4.28** 
 2.15 
 6.83*** 
 5.86*** 
 6.90*** 
 -.59 
 -.97 
  -.71 
-1.01 
-.95 
-.94 
 .59 
   .12 
  -.33 
    .29 
  1.11 
    .91 
  1.78 
  -.31 
  -.49 
   .33 
  -.67 
  -.22 
  -.67 
10.00 
10.00 
12.00 
12.00 
12.00 
12.00 
   12.00 
12.00 
24.00 
24.00 
24.00 
34.00 
6.00 
6.00 
14.00 
18.00 
22.00 
70.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
12.00 
12.00 
12.00 
6.00 
6.00 
10.00 
12.00 
12.00 
12.00 
12.00 
12.00 
18.00 
22.00 
20.00 
20.00 
96.00 
86.00 
92.00 
96.00 
96.00 
96.00 
92.00 
70.00 
82.00 
92.00 
90.00 
92.00 
96.00 
96.00 
86.00 
94.00 
96.00 
96.00 
98.00 
80.00 
84.00 
96.00 
98.00 
96.00 
98.00 
86.00 
94.00 
96.00 
98.00 
96.00 
90.00 
62.00 
82.00 
84.00 
90.00 
88.00 
Notes: The t-test in column 3 is the independent samples t-test for equality of means. The mean differences in 
Panel G test for equality of means between all industrial firms and all technology firms. The mean differences in 
Panel I test for equality of means between all dual-listed and all non-dual-listed firms, while those in Panel K test 
for equality of means between all big four audited firms and all non-big four audited firms. A mean difference 
with (***), and (*) indicates that the null hypothesis that the means are equal is rejected at the 1%, and 10% 
significance level, respectively. The skewness and kurtosis test statistics in columns 5 and 6, respectively, test for 
normal distribution. A test statistic with (***), (**), and (*) means that the null hypothesis that the SACGI is 
normally distributed is rejected at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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     Table 6: Additional Characteristics of the Sampled Firms 
FIRM CLASSIFICATION DUAL-
LISTING 
BIG FOUR 
AUDITOR 
NON-BIG FOUR 
AUDITOR 
Panel A: Firm Size 
Small 
Large 
Total 
 
3 
23 
  26 
 
25 
46 
71 
 
27 
3 
29 
Panel B: The Country of Dual-listing 
UK and US 
UK 
US 
Total 
 
7 
8 
11 
26 
 
7 
8 
11 
26 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Panel C: Firm Industry 
Technology 
Consumer services 
Consumer Goods 
Industrials 
Basic Materials 
Total 
 
2 
5 
3 
5 
11 
        26 
 
12 
13 
16 
14 
16 
71 
 
8 
7 
5 
6 
3 
29 
Panel D: A Tabular Distribution of the SACGI Scores 
SACGI Scores % Number of 
Observations 
% of Sample 
Firms With Scores Between: 
 
 
 
 
Total 
  0 –    20 
21 –   40 
41 –   60 
61 –   80 
  81 – 100 
 
 24 
 89 
124 
165 
    98                
500 
 4.80 
17.80 
24.80 
33.00 
19.60 
      100.00 
 
 
However, and as has been explained above, the level of non-normal behaviour shown 
by the SACGI is generally mild (in relation to a normal distribution), as well as very consistent 
with the findings of previous studies that have also applied OLS technique in estimating their 
structural equations (Cheung and Wei, 2006, p.913; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, pp.1048, 1050-
1051; Francoeur et al., 2008, p.88). As has been explained above, this appears to suggest that 
it may be statistically tolerable.  
In sum, the main evidence that emerges from examining the full sample of firms is that 
despite the expectation that the introduction of King II will speed-up convergence of corporate 
governance standards (e.g., Armstrong, 2003; Malherbe and Segal, 2003), internal corporate 
governance practices among South African listed firms still vary substantially. While this is 
consistent with the variability in compliance levels reported by prior cross-country studies that 
include South Africa (e.g., CLSA, 2000; Pellens et al., 2001; Deutsche Bank, 2002; Klapper 
and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Werder et al., 2005), it demonstrates that a high 
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degree of heterogeneity exists when it comes to the importance South African listed firms 
attach to internal corporate governance structures. Methodologically, and unlike prior studies, 
it also suggests that the internal corporate governance provisions and the sampled firms have 
been adequately selected to achieve sufficient variation. This may reduce the possibilities of 
sample selection bias that have arguably plagued much of the prior cross-country studies 
whose samples incude a number of South African listed firms (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; 
Durnev and Kim, 2005; Morey et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009).  
Evidence of improving corporate governance standards among the sampled firms, 
however, implies that contrary to local and international expectations, the current UK-style 
voluntary compliance regime (‘comply or explain’) is at least working to some extent, and 
thus appears to be appropriate for South Africa. This finding is also in line with the results of 
prior studies (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009, pp.376, 383; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009, 
p.262-263). Specifically, and in reviewing prior studies 73  that have examined corporate 
governance standards in firms of countries that have adopted the ‘comply or explain’ regime, 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009, p.376) concludes that “Despite the criticisms that the 
codes’ voluntary nature limits their ability to improve governance practices, codes of good 
governance appear to have generally improved the governance of countries that have adopted 
them, although there is the need for additional reforms ”. 
Following the suggestions of the accounting disclosure literature (e.g., Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993; Botosan 1997; Healy and Palepu, 2001) and prior corporate governance 
studies (e.g., CLSA, 2000; Deutsche Bank, 2002; Bauer et al., 2004; Drobetz et al., 2004; 
Bebenroth, 2005; Werder et al., 2005), the full sample is split into sub-samples on the basis of 
firm size and industry. This is to ascertain whether the observed wide variability in the levels 
of compliance with the corporate governance provisions among the sampled firms can be 
explained by firm size and industry. Apart from being informed by prior evidence, and as has 
been explained in chapter five, the sample is split on the basis of firm size and industry 
because they were the two main criteria on which the stratify sample of 100 was selected.  
In exploring further the characteristics of the SACGI on the basis of firm size and 
industry, three control variables, namely dual-listing, audit firm size, and year will also be 
incorporated into the descriptive analysis. The main reationale for incorporating these three 
                                                 
73Previous studies that have examined the levels of compliance with corporate governance provisons in firms of 
countries that have adopted the ‘comply’ or explain’ compliance regime reviewed by Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra (2009, pp.383-384) are: Conyon (1994); Conyon and Mallin (1997); Weir and Laing (2000); Pellens et 
al., 2001; Bebenroth (2005); Comme (2005); Werder et al. (2005); and Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros (2006), 
amongst others. 
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control variables into the descripitive analysis is that unlike the remaining three control 
variables (namely capital structure, sales growth, and capital expenditure), the available data 
on them are detailed enough such it makes classification simple. For example, and unlike 
capital structure, sales growth or capital expenditure, a firm can simply be classified either as 
cross-listed or not, and audited by a big four or not, amongst others. To investigate further the 
key determinants of the SACGI, a multivariate regression of the SACGI on all the eight control 
variables will be conducted in section 6.4.  
Therefore, the next section will further examine the distributional properties of the 
SACGI among the sampled firms on the basis of firm size, while section 6.3 will do similarly 
on the basis of industry. Section 6.4 will present an analysis of multivariate regression results 
of the SACGI on all the eight control variables. Ssection 6.5 will also investigate similar 
descriptive patterns with respect to the nine South African context specific affirmative action 
and stakeholder issues (the Social-SACGI). 
 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics of the SACGI Based on Firm Size 
 
Panels B and C of Table 5 report summary descriptive statistics of aggregate levels of 
compliance with the SACGI for large and small firms. Figure 3 also presents a comparison of 
the levels of compliance with the SACGI between large and small firms using computed 
aggregate means. Firstly, both show that compliance levels among large sampled firms are 
consistently higher than for small firms at any period of examination. Specifically, the average 
large firm complied with 76% of the 50 corporate governance provisions analysed. By contrast, 
the average small firm complied only with 44% of the 50 corporate governance provisions 
examined. In fact, the independent samples t-test for equality of means between large and 
small firms in Panel B of Table 5 consistently rejects the null hypothesis that the means are 
equal for any period of examination at the 1% significance level.  
Secondly, and consistent with the evidence of the full sample, compliance levels in 
both large and small firms have improved over time. For example, compliance levels for small 
firms consistently increased from 34% in 2002 to 40%, 46%, 48%, and 53% in 2003, 2004, 
2005, and 2006, respectively. This provides additional evidence that corporate governance 
standards in South African listed firms have improved irrespective of firm size. Finally, Table 
5 suggests that both large and small firms show summary distributional properties similar to 
those observed for the combined sample. It suggests that they are either mildly (in comparison 
to with a normal distribution) skewed to the left or right, have large standard deviations, but 
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are mesokurtically peaked. As has been indicated above, the mild non-normal nature of the 
distributional properties of the SACGI is similar to the reported results of past studies that have 
also conducted OLS estimations (Cheung and Wei, 2006, p.913; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, 
pp.1048, 1050-1051; Francoeur et al., 2008, p.88). As has also been explained above, this is 
important because it suggests that it may be appropriate to estimate structural equations using 
OLS regression technique. 
 
A Comparison of the Levels of Compliance with the SACGI 
between Large and Small Firms Using Computed Means
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         Figure 3: SACGI Compliance Levels by Firm Size 
 
Table 7 below reports a comparison of the levels of compliance with all the 50 
individual internal corporate governance provisions analysed between large and small firms. 
The rationale is to ascertain the governance provisions of the SACGI that account for the 
significant differences observed in Table 5 between large and small firms. The sample is split 
into 50 large and 50 small firms as described in subsection 5.1.2 of chapter five. This results in 
50 firms in each firm year, such that all large and small firms will have a total of 250 firm year 
observations each. The t-test in column 4 of Table 7 is the independent samples t-test for 
equality of means between all large and small firms. 
Several interesting findings emerge from Table 7. Firstly, and consistent with the 
findings at the aggregate levels, there is evidence of significant variability in the levels of 
compliance between all large and small sampled firms. Specifically, it shows that in 46 (92%) 
out of the 50 corporate governance provisions investigated, compliance levels amongst large 
firms, are significantly higher than small firms at least at the 5% significance level. By 
contrast, four (8%) of the provisions do not present evidence of any significant difference in 
compliance levels between large and small firms. These include the office of a company 
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secretary (COSEC1), contribution to the development of financial journalism (CDFJ), 
directors’ narrative on the possibility of the firm operating as a ‘going-concern’ (NGC), and a 
positive statement on compliance or non-compliance with the corporate governance provisions 
of King II (CNC).  
Secondly, it shows that the differences in compliance levels observed between large 
and small firms can be explained more by some corporate governance provisions than others. 
Specifically, 16 (32%) corporate governance provisions exhibited the highest significant 
variability between large and small firms. For these provisions, the variability between the 
average large and small firm is more than 40 percentage points. These are: the disclosure of 
the frequency of board meetings’ (FBM1s), the disclosure of individual directors’ meetings’ 
attendance records (IDMA), explicit classification of directors into executive, non-executive, 
and independent non-executive directors (DDC), the existence of a nomination committee 
(NCOM1), whether the membership of the nomination committee (DM1) is disclosed, the 
disclosure of members of the nomination (INCMMA), and the remuneration (IRCMMA) 
committees’ meetings’ attendance records.  
The rest are: the disclosure of the criteria or procedure for determining directors’ 
remuneration (DPLR), whether the audit committee (COMP4) consist of a majority of 
independent NEDs, whether the chairman (ACCP) of the audit committee is an independent 
NED, the existence of a risk management committee (RISCOM1), the disclosure of the audit 
(IACMMA), and risk management (IRISCMA) committees’ members’ meetings attendance 
records, the disclosure of policies and practices aimed at addressing the HIV epidemic among 
the workforce (HIV), the disclosure of environmental policies and practices (PEP), and the 
disclosure of corporate social investments (CSI). For example, while on average, 74% of large 
firms have established audit committees, only 18% of small firms have audit committees. 
Similarly, while 78% of large firms have nomination committees, only 15% of small firms 
have established nomination committees, a difference of 63 percentage points. 
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Table 7: A Comparison of the Levels of Compliance with the Individual Internal Corporate Governance Provisions by firm Size 
Compliance Levels between Large and Small Firms (%) 
All Firm Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Individual Internal Corporate Governance 
Provisions of the SACGI 
Large Small T-Test Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small 
1. Board and directors: 
Role duality(DUAL1) 
Board composition(COM1) 
Board chairperson(BCP) 
Frequency of board meetings(FBM1s) 
Individual directors meetings attendance(IDMA) 
Disclosure of directors’ biography(DDB) 
Disclosure of director classification(DDC) 
Appraisal of chairperson perf. & effect.(ACPE) 
Appraisal of CEO/MD perf. & effect.(ACEOPE) 
Evaluation of board effect. & perf.(EBPE) 
Evalua. of board subcom. perf. & effect.(EBSCPE) 
Director/officer dealings and securities(DDS) 
Office of the company secretary(COSEC1) 
Existence of nomination committee(NCOM1) 
Composition of nomination committee(COMP2) 
Chairperson of nomination committee(NCCP) 
Disclosure of nom. com. membership(DM1) 
Nom. com. members’ meetings attend.(INCMMA) 
Existence of remuneration committee(RCOM1) 
Composition of remuneration committee(COM3) 
Chairperson of remuneration committee(RCCP) 
Disclosure of rem. com. membership(DM2) 
Rem. com. members’ meetings attendance(IRCMA) 
Directors’ rem., interests & share options(DDR) 
Philosophy & procedure of director rem.(DPLR) 
Director access to free legal advice(DAFIPA) 
 
85.6 
80.4 
46.8 
95.6 
89.2 
99.6 
92.8 
21.6 
19.6  
44.4  
24.8 
85.2  
100.0 
78.8  
47.6  
48.0 
76.4 
57.6 
98.4 
27.2 
64.4 
98.4 
74.4 
99.2 
    59.2 
91.6 
 
62.8 
45.2 
18.0 
60.4 
46.0 
94.0 
53.2 
 2.0 
1.6 
7.2 
4.8 
52.0 
100.0 
14.8 
  8.0 
10.4 
14.8 
  6.0 
82.8 
  7.2 
30.4 
70.0 
23.6 
96.4 
    14.0 
   66.4 
 
.228** 
.352** 
.288** 
.352** 
.432** 
.056* 
.396** 
.196** 
.180** 
.372** 
.200** 
.332** 
.000 
.640** 
.396** 
.376** 
.616** 
.516** 
.156** 
.200** 
.340** 
.284** 
.508** 
.028* 
.452**   
.252**     
 
74 
72 
28 
88 
54 
98 
76 
 6 
 6 
18 
  8 
74 
100 
48 
20  
20 
42 
18 
94 
18 
46 
94 
34 
96 
48 
86 
   
48 
   38 
   6 
 42 
 18 
 90 
 22 
   2 
   0 
   2 
   2 
 36 
 100 
     4 
     0  
     0 
     4 
     0 
   76 
     2 
   12 
   58 
     2 
   90 
     8 
56 
 
84 
78 
44 
96 
92 
100 
92 
14 
18 
42 
20 
84 
100 
74 
46 
38 
72 
48 
98 
24 
56 
98 
70 
100 
60 
92 
 
44 
44 
6 
 54 
 38 
 92 
 48 
   2 
   2 
   6 
   4 
 46 
 100 
   10 
     6 
     8 
   10 
     2 
   82 
     4 
   22 
   64 
   10  
 98 
   12 
66 
 
88 
86 
50 
98 
100 
100 
96 
22 
24 
50 
22 
90 
100 
90 
52 
54 
88 
66 
100 
22 
70 
100 
84 
100 
60 
94 
 
66 
48 
18 
66 
52 
96 
60 
 2 
 2 
  12 
 6 
54 
100 
14 
  8 
10 
14 
  6 
82 
12 
36 
70 
30 
98 
18 
68 
 
92 
84 
56 
100 
100 
100 
100 
30 
22 
56 
30 
90 
100 
88 
60 
62 
88 
78 
100 
34 
74 
100 
94 
100 
64 
94 
 
74 
46 
28 
68 
56 
96 
68 
 2 
2 
6 
 6 
  58 
100 
20 
10 
14 
20 
  8 
84 
  8 
36 
72 
32 
98 
16 
70 
 
90 
82 
56 
96 
100 
100 
100 
36 
28 
56 
44 
88 
100 
94 
60 
66 
92 
78 
100 
38 
76 
100 
90 
100 
64 
92 
 
82 
50 
32 
72 
66 
96 
68 
 2 
 2 
10 
  6 
66 
100 
26 
16 
20 
26 
14 
90 
10 
46 
86 
44 
98 
16 
72 
Notes: The t-test in column 4 is the independent samples t-test for equality of means between all large and all small firms. A mean difference with (**), and (*) indicates that the null hypothesis 
that the means are equal is rejected at the 1%, and 5% significance level, respectively. 
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Continuation: Table 7 
Compliance Levels between Large and Small Firms (%) 
All Firm Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Individual Internal Corporate Governance 
Provisions of the SACGI 
Large Small T-Test Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small 
2. Accounting and auditing: 
Existence of audit committee(ACOM1) 
Composition of audit committee(COM4) 
Chairperson of audit committee(ACCP) 
Disclosure of audit commit. Membership(DM3) 
Audit com. members’ meetings attend.(IACMMA) 
Narrative on the ‘going-concern’(NGC) 
3. Risk management and internal audit: 
Disclosure of company risks(DCR) 
Disclosure of policy on risks management(DPM) 
Policy on internal control systems(DPI) 
Existence of risk management committee(RISCOM) 
Risk mgt. com. members’ metngs. attend.(IRISM) 
4. Ownership structure: 
Internal ownership(INON1) 
5. Integrated sustainability reporting/non-fina.: 
Black economic empowerment(BEE) 
Policy on HIV/AIDS(HIV) 
Policy on health and safety(PHS) 
Policy on employment equity(PEQ) 
Policy on good environmental practices(PEP) 
Corporate social Investment(CSI) 
Disclosure of company code of ethics(DCE) 
Board diversity on the basis of ethnicity(BDIVE1) 
Board diversity on the basis of gender(BDIVG1) 
6. Voluntary compliance and  enforcement: 
Contribution to devt. of finan. Journalism(CDFJ) 
Encouraging shareholder activism(PSA) 
Compliance/non-compliance with King II(CNC) 
 
98.8 
74.8 
74.4 
99.6 
79.2 
98.0 
 
99.2 
98.8 
97.2 
81.2 
63.6 
 
72.0 
 
82.8  
88.0  
72.8 
92.4 
85.2 
92.4 
92.8 
92.4  
68.0 
  
.0 
68.8   
97.2 
 
82.4 
18.4 
23.6 
72.4 
29.6 
98.4 
 
94.4 
66.0 
82.8 
40.8 
17.6 
 
38.8 
 
54.4 
36.0 
34.8 
72.8 
33.6 
33.6 
76.4 
60.4 
32.0 
  
.0 
34.4 
98.4 
 
.164** 
.564** 
.508** 
.272** 
.496** 
.004 
 
.048* 
.328** 
.144** 
.404** 
.460** 
 
.332** 
 
.284** 
.520** 
.380** 
.196** 
.516** 
.588** 
.164** 
.320** 
.360** 
 
.000 
.344** 
.012 
 
98 
50 
44 
98 
38 
98 
 
98 
94 
98 
56 
20 
 
74 
 
64 
72 
52 
88 
70 
84 
84 
96 
54 
  
0 
52 
96 
   
76 
     6 
     8 
   60 
     4 
   96 
   
94 
   54 
   80 
   24 
     0 
   
46 
   
38 
   18 
   20 
   72 
   24 
   34 
   68 
   52 
   24 
    
 0 
   22 
   96 
 
100 
70 
74 
100 
78 
98 
 
98 
100 
98 
82 
60 
 
70 
 
76 
86 
58 
92 
80 
94 
94 
90 
64 
  
 0 
62 
  98 
    
76 
   12 
   22 
   68 
   20 
   98 
   
92 
   62 
   76 
   36 
   10 
   
46 
   
44 
   32 
   26 
   68 
   26 
   32 
   72 
   56 
   26 
     
0 
   32 
 100 
 
98 
82 
82 
100 
90 
98 
 
100 
100 
96 
88 
72 
 
72 
 
86 
90 
80 
94 
88 
92 
94 
94 
72 
  
0 
72 
98 
 
82 
20 
28 
72 
36 
98 
 
94 
68 
82 
44 
22 
 
32 
 
56 
42 
38 
74 
36 
32 
76 
58 
30 
  
0 
38 
100 
 
100 
82 
84 
100 
96 
98 
 
100 
100 
96 
90 
84 
 
72 
 
94 
96 
88 
94 
94 
96 
96 
94 
72 
  
 0 
76 
98 
 
86 
22 
28 
74 
40 
100 
 
96 
70 
86 
44 
24 
 
30 
 
60 
44 
40 
72 
40 
38 
82 
62 
38 
  
 0 
38 
100 
 
98 
90 
88 
100 
94 
98 
 
100 
100 
98 
90 
82 
 
72 
 
94 
96 
86 
94 
94 
96 
96 
98 
78 
  
0 
82 
96 
 
92 
32 
32 
88 
48 
100 
 
96 
76 
90 
56 
32 
 
40 
 
74 
44 
50 
78 
42 
42 
84 
74 
42 
  
0 
42 
100 
Notes: The t-test in column 4 is the independent samples t-test for equality of means between all large and all small firms. A mean difference with (**) and (*) indicates significance at 1% and 5% 
level, respectively.  
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In contrast, 3 (6%) of the corporate governance provisions exhibited the least 
significant variability between large and small firms. For these provisions, the variability 
between large and small firms is less than 10 percentage points. These are: the disclosure of 
individual directors’ biography (DDB), the disclosure of individual directors’ remuneration, 
any interests, and share options (DDR), and the disclosure of current and potential future 
company risks (DCR). For instance, on average, 96% of small firms disclosed their individual 
directors’ remuneration, interests and share options in relation to 99% by large firms, a 
difference of 3 percentage points. 
For the remaining 27 (54%) of the corporate governance provisions, the variability 
between large and small firms ranges from 16 percentage points with reference to the 
existence of a remuneration committee (RCOM1) to 40 percentage points in the case of 
whether the nomination committee (COMP2) consist of a majority of independent NEDs. For 
example, on average, 87% of large firms have split the roles of board chaiman and CEO or 
managing director (DUAL1) in comparison with 63% of small firms, a difference of 24 
percentage points. Similarly, while 22% and 20% of large firms evaluate the performance and 
effectiveness of their board chairpersons (ACPE) and CEOs or managing directors (ACEOPE), 
respectively, only 2% of small firms carry annual appraisal of the performance and 
effectiveness of their board chairpersons and CEOs.  
Finally, and consistent with the evidence obtained from examining the SACGI at 
aggregate levels, Table 7 shows that the levels of compliance with the individual corporate 
governance provisions improves over time across both large and small firms. However, the 
pattern of year-by-year improvements in compliance levels is more consistent in the case of 
large firms than for small firms. For instance, only 28% of the large firms had independent 
non-executive directors as board chairpersons (BCP) in 2002. It increased to 44%, 50%, 56% 
and 56% in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively.  
Similarly, 6% of small firms had independent non-executive directors as board 
chairpersons (BCP) in 2002. It remained at 6% in 2003, but increased to 18%, 28%, and 32% 
in 2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively. The variability between large and small firms in the 
levels of compliance with the corporate governance provisions over time also suggests that 
there are differences in adoption rates between large and small firms of corporate governance 
standards. That is, it suggests that large firms are early adopters of King II, while small firms 
are late adopters.  
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As explained further below, this is because large firms have certain advantages, 
including financial, which may make them more responsive to changes in corporate 
governance rules than small firms. For example, 74% of large firms had split the roles of 
board chairman and CEO or managing director (DUAL1) in 2002 in comparison with 48% of 
small firms, a percentage point difference of 26. By 2006, the gap between large and small 
firms had closed to only 8 percentage points with 90% of large firms having the roles of board 
chairman and CEO or MD split in relation to 82% of small firms. 
  As has been discussed in subsection 5.1.4 of chapter five, evidence of consistent 
positive relationship between corporate governance scores and large firms supports the results 
of prior South African studies (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Bebenroth, 2005; Durnev and 
Kim, 2005; Werder et al., 2005). It is also consistent with theory. Firstly, and as has been 
explained above, compliance with corporate governance provisions has costs implications that 
smaller firms may struggle to afford in comparison with their larger counterparts (e.g., 
Botosan, 1997; Hassan and Marston, 2008). Secondly, greater information asymmetry 
associated with larger firms suggests that they can be expected to have greater agency 
problems. This will require stricter corporate governance mechanisms to reduce the 
possibilities of managerial expropriation (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Beiner et al., 2006). 
Thirdly, larger firms are exposed to greater public scrutiny and financial press following. This 
arguably compels them to disclose more than their smaller counterparts. 
Fourthly, prior literature indicates that political costs, such as nationalisation, 
regulation and taxation, for example, are positively associated with firm size (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978, p.115; Andreasson, 2009, p.22). This means that larger firms can be 
expected to comply better with the corporate governance provisions, especially the affirmative 
action and stakeholder provisions of King II than their smaller counterparts. 
Finally, larger firms are more likely to be dual-listed and be subjected to additional 
listing and corporate governance requirements (e.g., Hassan and Marston, 2008; Melvin and 
Valero, 2009). In fact, opinion-based surveys conducted by CLSA (2000) and Deutsche Bank 
(2002) in emerging markets, including South Africa suggest that cross-listed South African 
firms tend to have better corporate governance standards than their non dual-listed 
counterparts.  
To ascertain whether cross-listed firms comply better with the corporate governance 
provisions than their non cross-listed counterparts, the sample is split into two: those with 
cross-listings to the UK and US, and those with no cross-listings. As has been discussed in 
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subsection 5.2.2 of chapter five, prior evidence suggests that the US and UK stock markets 
often maintain more rigorous corporate governance requirements and better investor 
protection regimes (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998; Klapper and Love, 2004). 
    As Panels A and B of Table 6 indicate, in total, 26 of the sampled firms (26%) are 
dual-listed. Seven firms are cross-listed to both the UK and US, whilst 8 and 11 firms are 
cross-listed to the UK74 and US alone, respectively. Of the 26 dual-listed firms, 23 (88%) are 
large, whilst only 3 (12%) are small. This supports prior evidence that large firms are more 
likely to be cross-listed than small firms.  Panels I and J of Table 5 reports the aggregate mean 
levels of compliance with the SACGI by dual-listed and non dual-listed sampled firms, 
respectively. Figure 4 assesses the impact of both dual-listing and audit firm size on 
compliance levels with the SACGI. Both indicate that dual-listed sampled firms have 
significantly higher corporate governance scores than their non cross-listed firms. Specifically, 
the average dual-listed firm complied with 75% of the 50 corporate governance provisions in 
comparison with 55% by their non dual-listed counterparts. The difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
Assessing the Impact of Dual-listing and Audit Firm Size on the 
Levels of Compliance with the SACGI Using Computed Means
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         Figure 4: SACGI Compliance Levels by Dual-listing and Audit Firm Size 
 
Similarly, and as has been discussed in subsection 5.2.2 of chapter five, the prior 
auditing literature suggests that the size of the audit firm matters (e.g., Shockley, 1981; Sori et 
al., 2006). Specifically, it suggests that the levels of auditor independence and audit quality are 
                                                 
74Three firms, including Aveng Ltd, Oceana Group Ltd, and Portland Cement Ltd that are cross-listed to the UK 
also maintain secondary listing on the stock markets of Australia/New Zealand, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, 
respectively. Apart from these three, there were no cross-listings to different stock markets other than the UK and 
US stock markets in the sample.  
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positively associated with audit firm size (e.g., Pearson, 1980; DeAngelo, 1981). This stems 
from the fact that due to their reputation, resources (i.e., financial, human, information and 
knowledge), and independence advantages, larger audit firms are better able to resist 
management pressure in conflict situations. It also helps them to be more effective in 
determining the ‘going-concern’ status of firms, and also tend to be more risk-averse (Sori et 
al., 2006, p.2). However, the literature also suggests that audit fees are positively associated 
with audit firm size (e.g., Palmrose, 1986; Gul, 1991). This means that larger firms are more 
likely to make use of the services of larger audit firms as they can be expected to better afford 
the associated higher costs of auditing (higher auditing fees). 
As has been discussed in section 3.3 of chapter three, the King Reports recognise 
external auditors as one of the key stakeholders in ensuring that firms voluntarily comply with 
the corporate governance provisions of the Code. Specifically, external auditors are required to 
offer their ‘true and fair’ view on the extent to which the corporate governance provisions of 
King II have been applied. Therefore, following the suggestions of the auditing literature, the 
sample is split into two: firms audited by a big four audit firm (i.e., Deloitte & Touche, Ernst 
& Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers), and those audited by a non-big four audit 
firm. The rationale is to ascertain whether firms audited by a big four audit firm tend to 
comply better with the corporate governance provisions than those audited by a non-big four 
audit firm. 
As Panels A of Table 6 shows, 71 (71%) of the sampled firms are audited by a big-four 
audit firm, while 29 (29%) are audited by a non big-four audit firm. Of the 71 firms audited by 
a big-four audit firm, 46 (65%) are large, whilst 25 (35%) are small. Of the 29 firms audited 
by a non big-four audit firm, 27 (93%) are small, whereas 3 (7%) are large. This evidence 
supports the suggestions of the auditing literature that larger firms are more likely to make use 
of the services of larger audit firms. Of special interests, Panel B of Table 6 indicates that all 
the 26 dual-listed firms, including the 3 small firms have a big four auditor, supporting the 
reputation and independence advantages that larger audit firms have over their smaller 
counterparts. 
Panels K and L of Table 5 reports aggregate mean levels of compliance with the 
SACGI by sampled firms’ audited by a big four audit firm and a non-big four audit firm, 
respectively. Figure 4 assesses the impact of both dual-listing and audit firm size on the levels 
of compliance with the SACGI. Both indicate that firms audited by a big four audit firm have 
significantly higher levels of compliance with the SACGI than those audited by a non big four 
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audit firm. Specifically, the average sampled firm audited by a big four audit firm complied 
with 66% of the 50 corporate governance provisions in comparison with 45% by the average 
firm audited by a non-big four audit firm, which is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
To sum up, this section has attempted to investigate the extent to which the significant 
variability in the levels of compliance with the SACGI observed among the sampled firms can 
be explained by firm size. Overall, the results suggest that the observed variability in the levels 
of compliance with the SACGI can largely be explained by the size of the firm. At the 
aggregate levels, the average large firm complied with 75% of the 50 corporate governance 
provisions in comparison with 55% of the small firms, a significant 20 percentage-point 
difference.  
For the individual corporate governance provisions, compliance levels in larger firms 
are significantly higher in relation to smaller firms in 46 (92%) of the 50 corporate governance 
provisions investigated. Finally, the analyses also show that large firms are more likely to be 
cross-listed and be audited by a big four auditing firm with better corporate governance 
standards their non cross-listed and non-big four audited counterparts. 
 The next section will examine the extent to which the variability in the levels of 
compliance with the SACGI observed among the sampled firms can be explained by the 
various industrial groupings. 
 
6.3 Descriptive Statistics Based on Industry Group  
 
As has been discussed in subsections 5.1.4 and 5.2.2 of chapter five, both the 
accounting disclosure literature (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1993; Botosan, 1997) and prior 
corporate governance studies (e.g., Bauer et al., 2004; Black et al., 2006a; Henry, 2008), 
suggest that corporate governance standards differ across different industrial groups. Similarly, 
and of particular interest to this study, opinion-based surveys conducted by CLSA (2000) and 
Deutsche Bank (2002) in emerging markets that include South Africa indicate that corporate 
governance standards vary across listed firms in South Africa. Specifically, Deutsche Bank 
(2002) survey reports that the energy sector (similar to the consumer services firms in this 
study) tend to have the highest corporate governance standards. By contrast, the technology, 
hardware and equipment sector (corresponds with the technology firms in this study) has the 
weakest corporate governance standards.  
Therefore, to ascertain whether the variability in the levels of compliance with the 
SACGI observed amongst the sampled firms, can be explained by industrial groupings, the 
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sample is split into five industries75 as has been described in subsection 5.1.3 of chapter five. 
Panels D to H of Table 5 contain summary descriptive statistics for the five industries. 
Following the suggestion of Deutsche Bank (2002) that technology firms tend to have the 
poorest corporate governance standards, the t-test in Column 3 tests whether the mean 
aggregate corporate governance scores of technology firms are significantly different from the 
other four industries. Figure 5 also presents a comparison of the aggregate levels of 
compliance with the SACGI across the five industries using computed summary means.  
Firstly, Table 5 suggests that the average basic materials, consumer goods, consumer 
services, industrials, and technology firm complied with 58%, 59%, 63%, 62%, and 57% of 
the 50 corporate governance provisions. Secondly, and consistent with the suggestions of the 
Deutsche Bank (2002) survey, consumer services and industrial firms have higher compliance 
levels with the SACGI than technology firms, which is statistically significant at least at the 
10% significance level. In fact, Figure 5 shows that the levels of compliance with the SACGI 
are consistently higher in the cases of consumer services and industrials firms than the other 
three industries.  
 
A Comparison of the Levels of Compliance with the SACGI 
among the Five Industries Using Computed Means
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          Figure 5: SACGI Compliance Levels by Industry  
 
By contrast, the levels of compliance with the SACGI by basic materials and consumer 
goods firms are not significantly higher than for technology firms. However, and consistent 
with the suggestions of the Deutsche Bank (2002) survey, in absolute terms, compliance levels 
with the SACGI are highest (63%) in consumer services firms and least (57%) in technology 
                                                 
75As has explained in subsections 5.1.1 and 5.2.2.2 of chapter five, the industrial groupings are based on the 
JSE’s original industrial classifications and were obtained directly from the Information Department of the JSE 
Ltd. 
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firms. As Panel C of Table 6 indicates, this may be explained by the fact that technology firms 
have the least cross-listed and big four audited firms in comparison with the other four 
industries. For example, of the 26 cross-listed firms, only 2 (8%) are technology firms. 
Similarly, of the 71 firms audited by a big four audit firm, only 12 (17%) are technology firms. 
In contrast, basic materials and consumer services, for example, have 11(42%) and 5 (19%) 
firms cross-listed, respectively. Overall, and in comparison with the firm size groupings, the 
variability in aggregate compliance levels with the SACGI observed amongst the sampled 
firms, is explained less by the industrial groupings than by the firm size classifications. 
To determine the corporate governance provisions that account for the significant 
variability in compliance levels observed between the various industries, compliance levels are 
computed for the individual corporate governance provisions on an industry by industry basis 
as has been described in subsection 5.1.3 of chapter five. Table 8 reports the levels of 
compliance with all the 50 individual corporate governance mechanisms examined by the five 
major industrial groupings.  
Firstly, and consistent with the evidence obtained by investigating the aggregate levels 
of compliance, while there are substantial industrial differences in the levels of compliance 
with some of the individual corporate governance provisions, others do not show any 
substantial industrial differences. For example, and consistent with the findings based on the 
full sample, there are no differences in the levels of compliance with the SACGI in the case of 
the office of a company secretary (COSEC1) and contribution to the development of 
journalism (CDFJ). In contrast, and in absolute levels, the remaining 46 (92%) corporate 
governance provisions show some amount of variability in industrial levels of compliance 
with the SACGI.   
For example, for 4 (8%) of the corporate governance provisions, including the 
disclosure of risk committee members’ meetings’ attendance record (RISCOM1), encouraging 
shareholder activism (PSA), the disclosure of policies and practices with reference to black 
economic empowerment (BEE), and environment (PEP), industrial differences in compliance 
levels are highest. For these provisions, the difference between the lowest and highest 
compliance level is well above 30 percentage points.  
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Table 8: The Levels of Compliance with the Individual Internal Corporate Governance  
               Provisions among the Sampled Firms by Industry 
Compliance Levels Among Firms (%) Individual Internal Corporate Governance Provisions 
of the SACGI All 
Firm 
Years 
Basic 
Mat- 
erials 
Con- 
sumer 
Goods 
Con. 
Ser- 
vices 
Ind- 
ust- 
rials 
Tec- 
hno- 
logy 
1. Board and directors: 
Role duality(DUAL1) 
Board composition(COM1) 
Board chairperson(BCP) 
Frequency of board meetings(FBM1s) 
Individual directors meetings attendance(IDMA) 
Disclosure of directors’ biography(DDB) 
Disclosure of director classification(DDC) 
Evaluation of chair performance & effect.(ACPE) 
Appraisal of CEO/MD perf. & effect.(ACEOPE) 
Evaluation of board perf. & effect.(EBPE) 
Evaluat. of board subcom. perf. & effect.(EBSCPE) 
Director/officer dealings & securities(DDS) 
Office of the company secretary(COSEC1) 
Existence of nomination committee(NCOM1) 
Composition of nomination committee(COM2) 
Chairperson of nomination committee(NCCP) 
Disclosure of nom. com. membership(DM1) 
Nom. com. members’ meetings attend.(INCMMA) 
Existence of remuneration committee(RCOM1) 
Composition of remuneration committee(COMP3) 
Chairperson of remuneration committee(RCCP) 
Disclosure of rem. com. membership(DM2) 
Rem. com. members’ meetings attendance(IRCMMA) 
Directors’ rem., interests & share options(DDR) 
Philosophy & procedure of director rem.(DPLR) 
Director access to free legal advice(DAFIPA) 
2. Accounting and auditing: 
Existence of audit committee(ACOM1) 
Composition of audit committee(COM4) 
Chairperson of audit committee(ACCP) 
Disclosure of audit com. membership(DM3) 
Audit com. members’ metngs. attendance(IACMMA) 
Narrative on the ‘going-concern’(NGC) 
3. Risk management and internal audit: 
Disclosure of company risks(DCR) 
Disclosure of policy on risks management(DPM) 
Disc. policy on internal control systems(DPI) 
Existence of risk management committee(RISCOM1) 
Risk mgt. com. members’ metngs. attend.(IRISCMA) 
4. Ownership structure: 
Internal ownership(INON1) 
  
74.2 
  62.8 
  32.4 
  78.0 
  67.6 
  96.8 
  73.0 
  11.8 
  10.6 
  25.8 
  14.8 
  68.6 
100.0 
  46.8 
  27.8 
  29.2 
  45.6 
  31.8 
  90.6 
  17.2 
  47.4 
  84.2 
  49.0 
  97.8 
  36.6 
  79.0 
  
90.6 
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  49.0 
  86.0 
  54.4 
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90.0 
61.0  
40.6 
  
55.4 
  
73 
  73 
  32 
80 
73 
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49 
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43 
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77 
100 
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  8 
15 
14 
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39 
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27 
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38 
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29 
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86 
50 
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86 
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37 
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Continuation: Table 8 
Compliance Levels Among Firms (%) Individual Internal Corporate Governance Provisions 
of the SACGI All 
Firm 
Years 
Basic 
Mat- 
erials 
Con- 
sumer 
Goods 
Con. 
Ser- 
vices 
Ind- 
ust- 
rials 
Tec- 
hno- 
logy 
5. Integrated sustainability reporting/non-financial: 
Black economic empowerment(BEE) 
Policy on HIV/AIDS(HIV) 
Policy on health and safety(PHS) 
Policy on employment equity(PEQ) 
Policy on good environmental practices(PEP) 
Corporate social investment(CS1) 
Disclosure of company code of ethics(CSI) 
Board diversity on the basis of ethnicity(BDIVE1) 
Board diversity on the basis of gender(BDIVG1) 
6. Culture of voluntary compliance and enforcement: 
Contribution to devt. of finan. Journalism(CDFJ) 
Encouraging shareholder activism(PSA 
Compliance/non-compliance with King II(CNC) 
 
68.6 
  62.0 
  53.8 
  82.6 
  59.4 
  63.0 
  84.6 
  76.4 
  50.0  
    
0.0 
51.6  
98.8 
 
68 
69 
70 
72 
81 
54 
83 
66 
44 
  
0 
51 
99 
 
52 
64 
49 
84 
73 
59 
77 
63 
36 
  
0 
31 
94 
 
63 
72 
55 
87 
60 
72 
90 
86 
62 
  
0 
55 
97 
 
76 
60 
55 
78 
46 
69 
78 
81 
55 
  
0 
63 
100 
 
84 
45 
40 
92 
37 
61 
95 
86 
53 
  
0 
58 
99 
 
 
By contrast, for 9 (18%) of the corporate governance provisions, variability in 
industrial levels of compliance is lowest. These are: whether the roles of chairman and CEO or 
managing director is split (DUAL1), the appraisal of CEO or managing director’s performance 
and effectiveness (ACEOPE), the disclosure of individual directors’ biography (DDB), and 
classification (DDC), the disclosure of the nomination committee members’ meetings’ 
attendance records (INCMMA), the disclosure of the individual directors’ remuneration, 
interests and share options (DDR), a narrative on whether the firm will be operating as a 
‘going-concern’ (NGC), the disclosure of internal control policies and systems (DPI), and a 
positive statement on compliance or non-compliance with the corporate governance proivions 
of King II (CNC). For these provisions, the variability in the levels of compliance between the 
least and the highest complied industry is below 10 percentage points. 
For the remaining 33 (66%) of the corporate governance provisions, the difference 
between the least and highest complied industry with the SACGI ranges from 10 percentage 
points in the case of the disclosure of policies and practices regarding employment equity 
(PEQ) to 27 percentage points with respect to the disclosure of the frequency of board 
meetings (FBM1s). 
Secondly, and on a comparative basis, consumer services and industrials firms have the 
highest scores in most of the individual corporate governance provisions compared with the 
other three industries. Specifically, in 14 (28%) and 13 (26%) of 50 the individual corporate 
governance provisions analysed, the consumer services and industrials firms complied most, 
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respectively. In the case of consumer services, the provisions include: the frequency of board 
meetings (FBM1s), the individual directors attendance of board meetings (IDMA), director 
classification (DDC), the existence of a remuneration committee (RCOM1), and the disclosure 
of the members of the remuneration committee (DM2), amongst others.    
In contrast, technology firms have the lowest scores in most of the corporate 
governance provisions compared with the other four. Specifically, in 14 (28%) of the 
corporate governance provisions, technology firms complied the least. These provisions are: 
director access to free independent legal advice (DAFIPA), and HIV/Aids (HIV), health and 
safety (PHS), and environment (PEP) policies and practices, to mention but a few. Overall, 
these differences in the levels of industrial compliance with the individual corporate 
governance provisions explain the significant variability in the aggregate levels of compliance 
with the SACGI observed in Table 5 between consumer services or industrials and technology 
firms. 
In conclusion, the evidence of significant variability in the levels of compliance with 
the SACGI between the various industries is consistent with suggestions of both the prior 
accounting disclosure and corporate governance literature. Specifically, and of direct 
relevance, prior cross-country corporate governance studies (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; 
Durnev and Kim, 2005) and opinion-based surveys (e.g., CLSA, 2000; Deutsche Bank 2002) 
that include South Africa suggest that corporate governance standards vary across different 
industries.  
On a comparative basis, however, the variability in the levels of compliance with the 
50 individual corporate governance provisions observed among the sampled firms is explained 
less by the industrial groupings than by the firm size classifications. Overall, the significant 
firm size and industrial variability in corporate governance standards observed among the 
sampled firms, appears to justify the construction of the sample on the basis of firm size and 
industry. Unlike prior cross-country studies that include South Africa (e.g., Klapper and Love, 
2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Chen et al., 2009; Morey et al., 2009), this arguably reduces 
sample selection bias and also helps in achieving sufficient variability in the levels of 
compliance with the corporate governance standards among the sampled firms. It can also be 
argued that this may improve the generalisability of the results for South African listed firms. 
A crucial issue, however, is that the analyses on the characteristics of the SACGI so far 
have been purely descriptive. Also, and as has been explained above, due data limitations, the 
analyses (descriptive) have concentrated on only five (i.e., firm size, industry, dual-listing, 
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audit firm size, and year) out of the eight control variables. It did not include capital structure, 
sales growth, and capital expenditure. Therefore, to ascertain whether the descriptive patterns 
identified so far hold in a multivariate regression framework, the next section (6.4) explores 
further the determinants of the SACGI by running a multivariate regression of the SACGI on 
all the eight control variables.  
 
6.4 OLS Regression Results of the SACGI on all the Eight Control Variables 
 
  Table 9 contains OLS regressions results of the SACGI on all the eight control 
variables. Column 3 of Table 9 first reports the results of multivariate regression of the SACGI 
on the eight control variables for the pooled sample, whilst columns 4 to 8 present similar 
results for each of the five firm years. They indicate that the F-value of each model is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This means that the coefficients on all the eight control 
variables can jointly explain significant variations in the sampled firms’ SACGI scores. The 
adjusted R2 for each of the five years is between 30% to 47% for the period 2002-2006 and 
50% for the combined sample. Statistically, this suggests that between 30% to 47% of the 
variations in the sampled firms’ corporate governance standards (SACGI scores) can be 
explained by the control variables. Over the full five-year sample period, the model possesses 
an average 50% explanatory power over variations in SACGI scores among the sampled firms. 
 With regard to the pooled sample in column 3 of Table 9, and consistent with the 
results of the descriptive analyses presented above (see Tables 5, 6 and 7, as well as Figures 3 
and 4), the coefficients on firm size, dual-listing, and audit firm size are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies that larger firms, cross-listed firms, and 
firms audited by a big four auditing firm, on average, tend to comply better with the SACGI 
than their smaller, non cross-listed and non big four audited counterparts. As has been 
discussed above, this is not theoretically surprising. This is because the prior literature 
suggests that larger firms tend to have higher agency problems (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; 
Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006a). This implies larger firms will require stronger 
governance regimes to minimise the possibilities of managerial expropriation.  Other 
theoretical reasons, such as greater public scrutiny and financial press following, higher 
political costs, and greater financial strength, amongst others, that are often associated with 
larger firms serve as additional incentive for them to comply better with corporate governance 
provisions than their smaller counterparts. 
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 Similarly, and as has also been explained above, the positive relationship between 
dual-listing and the SACGI, and between audit firm size and the SACGI are theoretically 
expected. In theory, dual-listed firms are more likely to be subjected to additional listing and 
corporate governance requirements (e.g., Hassan and Marston, 2008; Melvin and Valero, 
2009). This means that they are more likely to have better corporate governance standards 
than their non cross-listed firms. Also, due to their higher reputations, greater independence, 
and superior resources (financial, human, information and knowledge) advantages (e.g., 
Pearson, 1980; Shockley, 1981; Sori et al., 2006), firms audited by a big four audit firm are 
more likely to comply better with corporate corporate governance rules than their non big four 
audited counterparts.  
In fact, the statistics contained in Table 6 show that larger firms are more likely to be 
cross-listed, as well as to be audited by a big four audit firm. Across the five firm years (i.e., 
columns 4 to 8 of Table 9), the coefficients on firm size, dual-listing, and audit firm size 
remain positive and statistically significant. Overall, it offers further empirical support to the 
results of the descriptive analyses that firm size, dual-listing and audit firm size impact 
positively on the levels of compliance with good corporate governance practices (the SACGI).  
The coefficient on capital structure, sales growth and capital expenditure in column 3 
of Table 9 are positive, but only capital structure is statistically significant. The statistically 
significant coefficient on capital structure is consitent with theoretical and empirical 
expectations. Specifically, Bevan and Danbolt (2002, 2004) report a statistically significant 
positive relationship between gearing and firm size in a sample of UK listed firms. This 
implies that larger firms tend to have greater debt usage than their smaller counterparts. 
However, and as has been discussed above, on average, larger sampled firms comply better 
with the SACGI than their smaller counterparts. This appears to explain the statistically 
significant positive relationship between capital structure and the SACGI in column 3 of Table 
9.  
In contrast, the statistically insignificant coefficients on sales growth and capital 
expenditure indicate that sales growth and capital expenditure do not have any significant 
impact on the SACGI.  The results imply that firms with greater growth opportunities (sales 
growth) and higher innovative potential (capital expenditure) do not necessarily have better 
corporate governance standards (SACGI scores). 
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Table 9: OLS Regression of SACGI on the Control Variables 
 Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Adjusted R2 
Standard Error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of Observations 
       .495 
  15.666 
      .545 
 35.876(.000)*** 
500 
     .429 
 14.378 
   1.564 
   8.441(.000)*** 
     100 
     .468 
 15.728 
   1.729 
   9.693(.000)*** 
100 
       .439 
   16.356 
     1.857 
     8.735(.000)*** 
100 
       .428 
   16.609 
     1.839 
     8.396(.000)*** 
100 
       .300 
   16.643 
     2.027 
     5.239(.000)*** 
100 
Constant 
Firm size 
Capital structure 
Sales growth 
Capital expenditure 
Dual-listing 
Audit firm size 
Basic materials 
Consumer services 
Industrials 
Technology 
2002 
2004 
2005 
2006 
 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
33.250(.000)*** 
1.591(.000)*** 
   .048(.028)** 
  .049(.161) 
  .225(.203) 
 19.032(.000)*** 
 18.913(.000)*** 
-7.254(.002)*** 
 7.955(.000)*** 
  2.650(.238) 
  2.670(.233) 
-9.019(.000)*** 
 6.360(.004)*** 
 8.792(.000)*** 
11.456(.000)*** 
27.185(.000)*** 
1.236(.000)*** 
  .048(.272) 
  .089(.207) 
  .539(.171) 
20.428(.000)*** 
 13.265(.000)*** 
  -6.654(.170) 
 5.305(.250) 
 1.361(.770) 
-1.559(.738) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
31.962(.000)*** 
.925(.010)*** 
 .034(.481) 
-.060(.430) 
     .563(.199) 
19.579(.000)*** 
21.925(.000)*** 
-10.520(.053)* 
    6.911(.171) 
  1.251(.806) 
  1.946(.704) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
34.872(.000)*** 
.927(.008)*** 
    .014(.790) 
    .023(.812) 
      .807(.053)** 
15.265(.001)*** 
23.638(.000)*** 
  -9.738(.081)* 
   11.059(.040)** 
   2.848(.588) 
   3.538(.500) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
41.735(.000)*** 
2.591(.000)*** 
    .081(.130) 
    .038(.665) 
    .429(.304) 
21.568(.000)*** 
20.712(.000)*** 
-8.600(.119) 
  10.900(.045)** 
  5.311(.339) 
  4.843(.379) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
47.318(.000)*** 
2.343(.000)*** 
   .054(.330) 
     .178(.071)* 
  -.117(.767) 
 17.956(.000)*** 
15.872(.000)*** 
-3.903(.478) 
  5.382(.327) 
    .961(.860) 
 2.855(.594) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and 
year 2003 are excluded from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. 
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Across the five firm years (i.e., columns 4 to 8 of Table 9), the coefficients on capital 
structure, sales growth and capital expenditure remain statistically insignificant except for 
sales growth in year 2006 in column 8 of Table 9. Generally, the results suggest that the ability 
of capital structure, sales growth, and capital expenditure to explain variations in the SACGI is 
weaker compared with that of firm size, dual-listing, and audit firm size. 
Finally, and with respect to the coefficients on the industry and year dummies in 
column 3 of Table 9, they are generally consistent with the results of the descriptive analyses 
that have been presented above. Consistent with the descriptive statistics that have been 
reported in Table 5 and by Figure 5, for example, the coefficient on industrials and technology 
dummies are not statistically significant. By contrast, the coefficient on consumer services 
firms is positive and statistically significant, whilst the coefficient on basic materials firms is 
statistically significant, but has a negative sign. This implies that consumer services firms have 
the highest (highest significant positive coefficient) level of compliance with the SACGI, 
whereas basic materials firms have the least (least significant negative coefficient) level of 
compliance with the SACGI. Generally, the results based on the industry dummies contained 
in columns 3 to 8 of Table 9 are largely consistent with the conclusions based on the 
descriptive analyses that the ability of industrial classifications to explain variations in the 
SACGI is relatively weak compared with that of firm size. 
Further, the coefficients on all four year dummies in column 3 of Table 9 are 
statistically significant. In line with the results of descriptive analyses (see Tables 4, 5 and 7, 
as well as Figures 2, 3 and 4), the coefficient on year 2002 is negative, whereas those on years 
2004, 2005 and 2006 are positive. The results imply that compliance levels among the 
sampled firms were highest in 2006 (highest significant positive coefficient), whilst 
compliance levels were least among the sampled firms in 2002 (least significant negative 
coefficient). The results are consistent with theoretical and empirical expectations. 
Theoretically, and within a voluntary corporate governance regime (‘comply or explain’), it 
takes time for listed firms to adjust their internal corporate governance structures to reflect the 
recommendations of corporate governance regulations. Empirically, recent evidence by 
Shabbir and Padget (2005) and Henry (2008), for example, also suggests that compliance with 
corporate governance provisions improves over time, using a sample of UK and Australian 
listed firms, respectively.  
To summarise, this section has attempted to ascertain whether descriptive patterns of 
factors explaining variations in the levels of compliance with the SACGI identified in sections 
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6.2 and 6.3 also hold within a multivariate regression framework. Consistent with the results 
of the descriptive analyses, the findings based on the multivariate regression analysis indicate 
that variations in the SACGI are largely explained by firm size, dual-listing, and audit firm size, 
but moderately by industrial groupings. Similarly, the results suggest that, on average, highly 
geared firms tend to have significantly higher SACGI scores than their lowly geared 
counterparts. The results, however, suggest that the ability of sales growth and capital 
expenditure to explain variations in the SACGI is relatively weak. Finally, and in line with the 
results of the descriptive analyses, the findings based on the multivariate regression analyis 
indicates that compliance with the SACGI among the sampled firms generally improves over 
time. 
As has been described in section 5.2 of chapter five, the uniqueness of the SACGI is 
that it contains South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder corporate 
governance provisions. In the next and last section on the distributional characteristics of the 
SACGI, the levels of compliance with the nine South African context specific affirmative 
action and stakeholder provisions will be further analysed. 
 
6.5 Descriptive Statistics Based on the South African Context Specific Issues 
 
 As has been explained in subsection 5.2.2 of chapter five, a sub-index (known as 
Social-SACGI) containing 10 South African context specific affirmative action and 
stakeholder corporate governance provision, is constructed. The 9 affirmative action and 
stakeholder provisions include: board diversity on the basis of gender (BDIVG1), and 
ethnicity (BDIVE1), policies and practices with regard to black economic empowerment 
(BEE), HIV/Aids (HIV), employment equity (PEQ), health and safety (PHS), environment 
(PEP), ethics (DCE), and corporate social investment (CSI).  
 This section, therefore, examines the distributional characteristics of the Social-SACGI. 
Table 10 reports summary descriptive statistics based on the full sample, firm size, industry, 
dual-listing and audit firm size for the Social-SACGI. The rationale is to ascertain whether the 
firm size and industrial patterns observed in the levels of compliance with the SACGI also 
exist in terms of compliance with the Social-SACGI.  
Similar to Table 5, Panel A of Table 10 reports the aggregate levels of compliance with 
the Social-SACGI for the full sample. Panels B and C report levels of compliance with the 
Social-SACGI by small and large firms, respectively.  
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Table 10: Summary Descriptive Statistics for the Nine South African Context  
   Specific Governance Index at Aggregate Levels (the Social-SACGI) 
The Social-SACGI (South African 
Context Specific Provisions) 
 
Mean 
 
T-Test 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skew-
ness 
   Kurt- 
 osis 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi- 
mum 
Panel A: All Firm Years 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel B: All Small Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel C: All Large Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel D: All B. Material Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel E: All Con. Goods Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel F: All C. Services Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
66.71 
55.22 
62.00 
68.44 
72.22 
75.22 
48.22 
37.78 
42.44 
49.11 
52.89 
58.89 
85.20 
72.67 
81.56 
87.78 
91.56 
92.44 
67.44 
60.56 
62.78 
67.78 
68.89 
77.22 
61.50 
50.56 
57.78 
64.44 
61.11 
70.56 
71.89 
55.56 
65.00 
77.78 
81.11 
80.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36.98*** 
34.89*** 
39.12*** 
38.67*** 
38.67*** 
33.55*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1.56 
10.00 
 2.22 
 2.78 
 5.00 
 2.22 
 4.39 
 0.00 
 7.22 
   .44 
 7.78 
 4.44 
 6.00* 
 5.00 
 0.00 
12.78* 
 7.22 
 5.00 
29.21 
28.75 
28.61 
29.98 
29.93 
26.60 
26.50 
22.11 
22.66 
26.57 
27.91 
26.49 
17.92 
23.67 
16.28 
15.10 
12.20 
12.39 
 33.51 
33.31 
36.46 
33.99 
32.56 
28.49  
29.28 
29.17 
29.29 
29.63 
30.05 
28.45  
24.69 
24.18 
24.26 
21.33 
20.74 
   24.34 
 -.60** 
 -.07* 
 -.45** 
 -.71** 
 -.96** 
 -.99** 
  .00 
.21** 
.12** 
.05* 
.25** 
 -.38** 
-1.25*** 
  -.75** 
 -.58** 
-1.24*** 
-2.52*** 
-2.80*** 
 -.69** 
 -.32** 
 -.50** 
 -.68** 
 -.86** 
-1.46*** 
 -.37** 
  .20** 
 -.49** 
 -.31** 
 -.71** 
 -.69**  
  .60** 
.00 
 -.53** 
 -.84** 
 -.86** 
-1.18*** 
-.86 
-.99 
-.88 
-.71 
-.27 
-1.06 
-1.16 
-1.01 
-1.21 
-1.24 
-1.17 
-.89 
2.23 
  -.29 
   .98 
.55 
.47 
.99 
-1.06 
-1.58 
-1.40 
-1.14 
.79 
1.11  
-1.15 
-1.07 
-1.09 
-.79 
-.89 
-.75 
-.60 
-1.09 
.20 
-.65 
-.63 
.43 
.00  
.00  
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
11.11 
11.11 
 33.33 
 33.33 
 33.33 
 33.33 
 .00 
.00 
.00 
11.11 
11.11 
11.11   
11.11 
11.11 
11.11 
11.11 
11.11 
11.11 
11.11 
22.22 
11.11 
33.33 
33.33 
   22.22 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
77.88 
88.89 
88.89 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
Notes: The t-test in column 3 is the independent samples t-test for equality of means. The mean differences in 
Panel B test for equality of means between all large and all small firms, while those in Panels D, E, and F test for 
equality of means between all basic materials firms, all consumer goods firms, and all consumer services firms, 
and all technology firms, respectively. A mean difference with (***), and (*) indicates that the null hypothesis 
that the means are equal is rejected at the 1%, and 10% significance level, respectively.  The skewness and 
kurtosis test statistics in columns 5 and 6, respectively, test for normal distribution. A test statistic with (***), 
(**), and (*) means that the null hypothesis that the Social-SACGI is normally distributed is rejected at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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Continuation: Table 10 
The Social-SACGI (South African 
Context Specific Provisions) 
 
Mean 
 
T-Test 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skew-
ness 
   Kurt- 
 osis 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi- 
mum 
Panel G: All Industrials Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel H: All Technology  Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel I: All Dual-listed Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel J: All Non-Dual-listed  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel K: All Big Four Audited 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel L: All Non-Big Four Aud. 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
66.44 
58.89 
59.44 
67.22 
71.11 
75.56 
65.89 
50.56 
65.00 
65.00 
73.89 
75.00 
86.04 
78.67 
83.11 
87.56 
88.00 
92.89 
60.27 
47.41 
54.96 
62.07 
66.96 
69.93 
73.21 
62.13 
68.39 
75.74 
78.40 
81.38 
50.80 
38.31 
46.36 
50.57 
57.09 
61.69 
 .56 
8.33 
7.00 
5.56 
2.78 
  .56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25.77*** 
31.26*** 
28.15*** 
25.49*** 
21.04*** 
22.96*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22.41*** 
23.82*** 
22.03*** 
25.17*** 
21.31*** 
19.69*** 
31.51 
30.61 
29.79 
33.52 
33.31 
29.86 
25.67  
22.93 
24.79 
25.31 
26.80 
23.05 
20.20 
26.04 
23.32 
20.11 
19.49 
10.58 
28.91 
25.27 
27.58 
28.78 
29.73 
27.87 
27.88 
28.64 
28.15 
27.04 
26.62 
25.04 
26.21 
21.33 
23.58 
25.99 
29.21 
25.47 
-.72** 
-.53** 
-.49** 
-.74** 
-.99** 
-1.55*** 
-.37** 
 .08* 
-.30** 
-.33** 
-.97** 
-.69** 
-2.36*** 
-1.92***           
-1.99*** 
-2.60*** 
-2.79*** 
-1.45*** 
  -.30** 
   .21** 
  -.20** 
  -.44** 
  -.68** 
  -.74** 
-1.08** 
  -.47** 
  -.95** 
-1.29*** 
-1.49*** 
-1.75*** 
   .26** 
   .61** 
   .53** 
   .19** 
  -.15** 
   .02* 
 -.78 
 -.84 
  -.95 
 -.82 
 -.30 
 -.83 
 -.98 
 -.69 
 -.88 
 -.96 
 -.14 
 -.80 
 6.50*** 
3.78** 
 5.53*** 
 8.27*** 
 9.82*** 
 1.24 
-1.11 
  -.86 
-1.00 
-1.04 
-.80 
-.61 
   .17 
   .79 
  -.06 
   .77 
  1.36 
  2.38 
 -1.04 
   -.30 
   -.60 
 -1.09 
 -1.23 
 -1.26 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
   11.11 
11.11 
22.22 
22.22 
11.11 
33.33 
.00 
.00 
11.11 
11.11 
11.11 
66.67 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
11.11 
11.11 
11.11 
11.11 
11.11 
22.22 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
88.89 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
Notes: The t-test in column 3 is the independent samples t-test for equality of means. The mean differences in 
Panel G test for equality of means between all industrial firms and all technology firms. The mean differences in 
Panel I test for equality of means between all dual-listed and all non-dual-listed firms, while those in Panel K test 
for equality of means between all big four audited firms and all non-big four audit firms. A mean difference with 
(***) indicates that the null hypothesis that the means are equal is rejected at the 1% significance level. The 
skewness and kurtosis test statistics in columns 5 and 6, respectively, test for normal distribution. A test statistic 
with (***), (**), and (*) means that the null hypothesis that the Social-SACGI is normally distributed is rejected 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
Similarly, the t-test in column 3 of Table 10 is the independent samples t-test for 
equality of means between large and small firms, technology firms and each of the remaining 
four industries, dual-listed firms and non dual-listed firms, and big four audited and non-big 
  
224 
four audited firms, respectively. Several findings emerge from Table 10. Firstly, consistent 
with the evidence of wide variability in aggregate levels of compliance with the SACGI, Panel 
A suggests that there is a substantial degree of dispersion in the levels of compliance with the 
Social-SACGI among the sampled firms. The scores range from a minimum of 0% (i.e., 0 out 
of 9) to a maximum 100% (i.e., 9 out of 9) with the average sampled firm complying with 
67% of the 9 South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder corporate 
governance provisions analysed. This is higher when compared with the mean level of 
compliance with the SACGI of 60%.  
As will be discussed further in chapters seven and eight, this also implies that any 
financial performance consequences of complying with the Social-SACGI can be expected to 
be similar in direction to that of the SACGI. However, if firms with better corporate 
governance standands (as measured by compliance with the corporate governance provisions 
of King II) do generate higher financial returns, then it can be argued that the magnitude of 
complying with the Social-SACGI (67%) will be expected to be higher than that of the SACGI 
(60%) for the sampled firms.  
Secondly, and in line with the patterns observed with the SACGI, compliance with the 
Social-SACGI improves over time. While the average firm complied with 55% of the 9 
affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions in 2002, it increased to 
75% in 2006, a percentage point difference of 20. Thirdly, the Social-SACGI depicts similar 
distributional characteristics exhibited by the SACGI.  All show similar large variability in the 
levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI and also depict similar large standard deviations.  
Similarly, most of them are mildly (in comparison with a normal distribution) skewed 
to the right or left, but normally peaked. As has already been explained, the mild nature of the 
deviations from normal distributional data properties depicted by the Social-SACGI is in line 
with the findings reported by prior studies that have applied OLS technique in estimating their 
structural equations. As has been explained above, this is relevant because it implies that it 
may be statistically appropriate to carry out OLS estimations. Fourthly, and similar to the 
SACGI, Panels B and C of Table 10, in addition to Figure 6 suggest that there is substantial 
variability in the aggregate levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI between large and 
small firms. Specifically, the average small firm complied with 48% of the 9 affirmative 
action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions compared to 85% of large firms, a 
statistically significant percentage point difference of 37.  
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As has been explained in subsection 5.2.2 of chapter five, this is not theoretically 
surprising. This is because compliance with these affirmative action and stakeholder corporate 
governance provisions places additional cost implications on firms, which larger firms can be 
expected to better afford than smaller firms. More importantly, political cost theory suggests 
that larger firms are more susceptible to political threats of break-ups, nationalisation, 
regulation, and taxation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, p.115; Andreasson, 2009, p.22). 
Therefore, larger firms can be expected to comply better with the Social-SACGI in order to 
reduce potential political costs, and also gain acess to critical resources, such as tax-holidays, 
subsidies and government contracts. 
 
A Comparison of the Levels of Compliance with the Social-
SACGI between Large and Small Firms Using Computed Means
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Figure 6: Social-SACGI Compliance Levels by Firm Size 
 
 Fifthly, and in line with the SACGI, Panels I to L of Table 10, as well as Figure 7 
indicate that the variability in the levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI can also be 
explained by dual-listing and audit firm size. Specifically, they show that while the average 
cross-listed firm complied with 86% of the 9 affirmative action and stakeholder corporate 
governance provisions, its non cross-listed counterpart complied with 60% of the provisions, a 
statistically significant percentage point difference of 26. Similarly, Panels K and L of Table 
10, in addition to Figure 7 indicate that there are significant differences in the levels of 
compliance with the Social-SACGI between big four and non big four audited firms. 
Specifically, the average big four audited company complied with 73% of the 9 affirmative 
action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions compared with 51% by a non big-four 
audited firm, a statistically significant percentage point difference of 22.  
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As has been discussed in subsection 6.3, the significant differences observed in the 
levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI on the basis of dual-listing and audit firm size is 
theoretically expected. This is because the sample suggests that cross-listed firms are likely to 
be large and be subjected to extra rigorous corporate governance requirements. This seems to 
help cross-lited firms to have better corporate governance standards than their non dual-listed 
counterparts. Similarly, the sample indicates that big four audited firms are more likely to be 
large and cross-listed, which suggests they are also more likely to have better corporate 
governance standards than their non big-four audited counterparts.  
 
 
Assessing the Impact of Dual-listing and Audit Firm Size on the 
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  Figure 7: Social-SACGI Compliance Levels by Dual-listing and Audit Firm Size 
 
 Finally, and in line with the SACGI, Panels D to H of Table 10 suggest that there is 
some amount of variability in levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI across the five 
industries. Specifically, the average basic materials firm complied with 67% of the 9 
affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions in comparison to 62%, 
72%, 66%, and 66% by consumer goods, consumer services, industrials, and technology firms, 
respectively. However, and unlike the firm size, dual-listing, and audit firm size groupings, 
only consumer services firms show significantly higher levels of compliance with the Social-
SACGI than those of technology firms, the industry with the least aggregate levels of 
compliance with the Social-SACGI. 
 To ascertain which of the 9 individual affirmative action and stakeholder corporate 
governance provisions account more for the variability in aggregate levels of compliance with 
the Social-SACGI observed among the sampled firms, the levels of compliance with the 9 
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individual provisions are further examined. Table 11 presents the levels of compliance among 
the sampled firms with the 9 South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder 
corporate governance provisions. To facilitate easy comparison, Panels A and C repeat the 
pooled and industry levels of compliance reported in Tables 4 and 8 for the 9 affirmative 
action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions, respectively.  
 Firstly, and similar to the results of the full sample, Panel A of Table 11 suggests that 
there is considerable amount of variation in the levels of compliance with the South African 
context specific affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance issues. The 
affirmative action and stakeholder provision with the weakest compliance score (50%) is 
board diversity on the basis of gender (BDIVG1), whilst the issue with the highest score (85%) 
is the disclosure of company code of ethics (DCE). For the remaining 7 South African context 
specific affirmative action and stakeholder provisions, including board diversity on the basis 
of ethnicity (BDIVE1), policies and practices with regard to black economic empowerment 
(BEE), HIV/Aids (HIV), health and safety (PHS), employment equity (PEQ), environment 
(PEP), corporate and social investment (CSI), compliance levels are above 53%. This is higher 
when compared with the average levels of compliance with some of the conventional 
corporate governance provisions, such as independent board chairman (BCP) among the 
sampled firms. 
Secondly, and similar to the results of the full sample, Table 7 suggested that the 
variability in the aggregate levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI can be explained by 
firm size. Specifically, Table 7 indicated that larger firms tended to have significantly higher 
scores than smaller firms for all the 9 affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance 
provisions examined. The provision with the highest significant difference between large and 
small firms is corporate social investment (CSI) with a percentage point difference of 59. 
By contrast, the provision with the least significant difference between large and small 
firms is the disclosure of company ethics (DCE) with a percentage point difference of 16. For 
the remaining 7 affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions, the 
variability in the levels of compliance between large and small firms ranges from 20 
percentage points with respect to employment equity (PEQ) to 52 percentage points in the case 
of HIV/Aids (HIV). 
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Table 11: Compliance Levels Among the Sampled Firms with the Nine Individual  
      South African Context Specific Corporate Governance Provisions 
Compliance Levels Among Firms (%) Individual Internal Corporate Governance Provisions 
(South African Context Specific Issues) All 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Panel A: South African Context Specific Issues 
Black economic empowerment(BEE) 
Policy on HIV/AIDS(HIV) 
Policy on health and safety(PHS) 
Policy on employment equity(PEQ) 
Policy on good environmental practices(PEP) 
Corporate social investment(CSI) 
Disclosure of company code of ethics(DCE) 
Board diversity on the basis of ethnicity(BDIVE1) 
Board diversity on the basis of gender(BDIVG1) 
Panel B: Other Board Diversity Measures 
 
Board diversity(eth.& gen.) as a % of board size 
Women(gender) as a % of board size 
Non-whites(ethnicity) as a % of board size 
Non-white women (gend.) as a % of board size 
Non-white men (gender) as a % of board size 
Women (gender) as a % of board diversity 
Non-whites(ethnicity) as a % of board diversity 
Non-white women as a % of women (gender) 
Non-white women (gender) as a % of non-white 
%boards with at least 1 non-white man and woman 
%boards with at least 1 non-white 
%boards with at least 1 woman 
%boards with at least 1 non-white man 
%boards with at least 1 non-white woman  
 
68.6 
  62.0 
  53.8 
  82.6 
  59.4 
  63.0 
  84.6 
  76.4 
  50.0  
 
    
23.3 
  8.0 
19.7 
  4.4 
15.3 
34.3 
84.4 
55.6 
22.6 
41.6 
75.0 
50.0 
70.4 
34.0 
 
51 
45 
36 
80 
47 
54 
76 
69 
39 
 
 
17.1 
   5.8 
 13.8 
   2.4 
 11.3 
33.8 
 80.6 
 40.7 
 17.1 
28.0 
71.0 
38.0 
63.0 
20.0 
 
60 
59 
42 
80 
53 
63 
83 
73 
45 
 
 
19.8 
6.7 
15.8 
2.8 
13.1 
33.7 
79.7 
41.7 
17.4 
35.0 
74.0 
45.0 
65.0 
23.0 
 
71 
66 
59 
84 
62 
62 
85 
76 
51 
 
  
23.8 
7.7 
19.8 
4.1 
15.7 
34.0 
84.6 
53.3 
20.8 
43.0 
76.0 
51.0 
69.0 
33.0 
 
77 
70 
64 
83 
67 
67 
89 
78 
55 
 
  
26.9 
9.3 
23.1 
5.6 
17.6 
34.7 
85.7 
59.8 
24.2 
46.0 
78.0 
56.0 
75.0 
42.0 
 
84 
70 
68 
86 
68 
69 
90 
86 
60 
 
  
28.9 
10.3 
24.5 
7.2 
18.6 
35.5 
88.3 
69.9 
28.1 
54.0 
86.0 
60.0 
80.0 
52.0 
Panel C: Industry All BM CG CS IN TE 
Black economic empowerment(BEE) 
Policy on HIV/AIDS(HIV) 
Policy on health and safety(PHS) 
Policy on employment equity(PEQ) 
Policy on good environmental practices(PEP) 
Corporate social investment(CS1) 
Disclosure of company code of ethics(CSI) 
Board diversity on the basis of ethnicity(BDIVE1) 
Board diversity on the basis of gender(BDIVG1) 
68.6 
  62.0 
  53.8 
  82.6 
  59.4 
  63.0 
  84.6 
  76.4 
  50.0  
68 
69 
70 
72 
81 
54 
83 
66 
44 
52 
64 
49 
84 
73 
59 
77 
63 
36 
63 
72 
55 
87 
60 
72 
90 
86 
62 
76 
60 
55 
78 
46 
69 
78 
81 
55 
84 
45 
40 
92 
37 
61 
95 
86 
53 
Notes: Abbreviations are defined as follows: basic materials firms (BM), consumer goods firms (CG), consumer 
services firms (CS), industrial firms (IN), and technology firms (TE). 
  
 
Thirdly, and in line with the full sample, Panel C of Table 11 suggests that there is 
some amount of variability in the levels of compliance with the 9 provisions across the five 
industries. Consumer services firms have the highest compliance levels in 3 out of the 9 
provisions. These are: HIV/Aids (HIV), corporate social investment (CSI), and board diversity 
on the basis of gender (BDIVG1). For black economic empowerment (BEE), employment 
equity (PEQ), and the disclosure of company ethics (DCE), technology firms complied most, 
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while basic materials firms complied most with the health and safety (PHS), and environment 
(PEP) provisions.  
In contrast, consumer goods firms complied least with five provisions. These are: black 
economic empowerment (BEE), health and safety (PHS), the disclosure of company ethics 
(DCE), board diversity on the basis of ethnicity (BDIVE1), and gender (BDIVG1). Similarly, 
technology firms complied least with three provisions. These are: HIV/Aids (HIV), health and 
safety (PHS), and environment (PEP), while basic materials firms complied least with 
corporate social investment (CSI). The variability in compliance levels within the South 
African context specific corporate governance and stakeholder provisions across the five 
industries means that some industries may be more sensitive to some of the special provisions 
than others. For example, basic materials firms are more exposed to environmental issues, 
whilst black empowerment deals, especially involving government contracts, are more 
common among the technology firms. 
To conclude, this subsection has examined the levels of compliance among the 
sampled firms with the South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder 
corporate governance provisions. Consistent with the SACGI, there is significant variability in 
the levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI among the sampled firms. Similar to the 
SACGI, the variability in the levels of compliance amongst the sampled firms, can be 
explained by size, dual-listing, audit firm size, and industry effects. Specifically, large, dual-
listed, and big four audited firms have significantly higher levels of compliance with the 
Social-SACGI than their small, non dual-listed, and non-big four audited counterparts, 
respectively. Consumer services firms also have significantly higher levels of compliance with 
the Social-SACGI than their technology counterparts, the industry with the least aggregate 
levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI. Similar to the results of the SACGI, the 
variability in the levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI is explained more by firm size 
than by industry differences. 
 
6.6 Other Key Trends and Measures of Board Diversity 
 
Finally, to ascertain the level of diversity within South African corporate boards, Panel 
B of Table 11 reports trends with reference to other key measures of board diversity. It shows 
that the average sampled firm has approximately 23% of its board members as women (gender 
diversity) and non-whites (ethnicity). This means that the average South African listed firm’s 
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board76 is dominated (77%) by white males. Swartz and Firer (2005) suggest that the low 
representation of non-whites in particular on South African corporate boards may be due to 
lack of experience and qualifications caused by the lingering negative social and economic 
effects of Apartheid. As will be discussed further in chapters eight and ten, the small number 
of women and non-white representation on South African corporate boards also implies that 
they may not be able to have significant impact on firm financial performance. 
 Empirically, the finding is in line with the results of prior corporate governance 
studies (e.g., Brammer et al., 2007; Fraucoeur et al., 2008).  For example, and of special 
interest to this study, using a sample of 117 South African listed firms in 2003, Swartz and 
Firer (2005) report that the average non-white and women representation on South African 
corporate boards is 20%.  Similarly, in a sample of 543 UK firms, Brammer et al. (2007) find 
that only 13% of the average UK corporate board members originate from diverse ethnic and 
gender backgrounds. 
Of the 23% diverse board members, only 34% are women. In fact, of the 
approximately 20% non-whites found on an average firm’s board, only 22% are women. 
Overall, only 8% of the board members of an average sampled firm are women of which 
slightly more than 4% (i.e., 56% as a proportion of women) are women of colour. This is far 
less than the number of non-white males (15%) as percent of the average board size. The 
evidence of low representation of women on South African corporate boards is also consistent 
with the findings of prior studies (e.g., Carter et al., 2003; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004). For 
instance, Swartz and Firer (2005) report that the board of an average South African listed firm 
consisted of only 6% of women in 2003. Similarly, Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) find that the 
percentage of women who held FTSE 100 directorships was only 7% in 2002.  
An interesting finding, however, is that the average South African corporate board has 
more non-white women (56%) representation than their white counterparts. Similarly, the 
percentage of non-whites as a percentage of board diversity is 84%, which is relatively high. 
Also, irrespective of the board diversity measure used, diversity among South African 
corporate boards has substantially improved over time. For instance, the average sampled 
firm’s board had only 17% of its members originating from diverse ethnic and gender 
backgrounds in 2002. By 2006, it had increased to 29%, a 12 percentage point increase over 
the five-year period.  
                                                 
76As will be discussed further in chapter seven, the average South African listed firm has a board size of 9.69 or 
approximately 10 members. 
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In terms of the distribution of non-whites and women across the sampled firms, similar 
patterns are observed. Approximately 42% of the sampled firms have at least a non-white and 
a woman representation on their boards. This means that 58% of the sampled firms do not 
have at least a woman and non-white on their boards. As has been noted in subsection 4.2.2.2 
of chapter four, the large numbers of zero observations of board diversity among the sampled 
firms imply that it will be inappropriate to measure board diversity as a continuous variable. 
By contrast, 70% of the sampled firms have at least a non-white man representation, 
suggesting that there is relatively less women representation on South African corporate 
boards. In fact, only 50% of the sampled firms have at least one woman board representation, 
of which 34% (68% by proportion of women) are at least represented only by a non-white 
woman. Overall, 75% of the sampled firms have at least a non-white man or non-white 
woman representation on their boards.  
Also, South African listed firms with board members from diverse gender and ethnic 
backgrounds are generally increasing. For example, only 28% of the sampled firms had at 
least one woman and a non-white representation on their boards in 2002. It consistently 
increased to 35%, 43%, 46%, and 54% in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively. Similarly, 
only 38% of the sampled firms had at least one woman representation on their boards in 2002.  
It also consistently increased to 45%, 51%, 56%, and 60% in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, 
respectively. 
The increasing diversity among South African corporate boards may be explained by 
the increasing willingness of the sampled firms to comply with employment equity and black 
empowerment provisions. It may also explain the increasing representation of non-white 
women on corporate boards. Black women directors in particular command a premium in 
South Africa because they tend to satisfy both ethnic and gender diversity requirements. 
Despite the improving board diversity, however, the findings also suggest that board members 
from diverse backgrounds (ethnic and gender) within South African listed firms are still very 
small in number. 
 
 
6.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has discussed the South African Corporate Governance Index (the 
SACGI). It attempted to achieve three main objectives. Firstly, it sought to provide a detailed 
description of the SACGI using a number of descriptive statistics. In this regard, the chapter 
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provided a detailed description of the SACGI based on the full sample. Generally, it showed 
that there were substantial variations in the levels of compliance with the SACGI amongst the 
sampled firms.  
At the aggregate levels, the scores ranged from a minimum of 6% (3 out of 50) to a 
maximum of 98% (49 out of 50) with the average South African listed firm complying with 
60% (30) of the 50 corporate governance provisions analysed. For the individual corporate 
governance provisions, there were variations in the levels of compliance in 48 (96%) of them. 
Overall, an examination of the distribution of the pooled sample showed that despite the 
expectation that the introduction of the King Reports will speed-up convergence of corporate 
governance standards, there are still substantial variations in the levels of compliance with the 
individual corporate governance provisions among South African listed firms.  
However, and in line with the results of prior studies that have examined the levels of 
compliance with a code of corporate governance in a voluntary compliance regime, the 
findings indicate that corporate governance standards have generally improved among South 
African listed firms. A major policy implication of this finding is that the current UK-style 
voluntary compliance regime (‘comply or explain’) is at least working to some extent, and 
thus seems to be appropriate for South Africa. 
The second objective of the chapter has been to ascertain whether the observed 
variability in the levels of compliance with the SACGI can be explained by firm size, industry, 
dual-listing and audit firm size. Similar to the the prior evidence, the analyses show that the 
observed variability in the levels of compliance with the SACGI can largely be explained by 
firm size, and moderately by industry. Specifically, and at the aggregate levels, the average 
large firm complied with 75% of the 50 corporate governance provisions analysed in 
comparison with 44% by the average small firm.  
Examination of the individual corporate governance provisions, also showed that in 46 
(92%) out of the 50 corporate governance provisions investigated, compliance levels among 
large firms were significantly higher than small firms. The analyses also indicated that large 
firms are more likely to be dual-listed and be audited be a big four audit firm with better 
corporate governance standards than their non cross-listed and non big-four audited 
counterparts, respectively. Similarly, the analyses suggested that some of the observed 
variability in the levels of compliance with the SACGI can be explained by industrial 
groupings, but to a lesser degree when compared with the firm size classifications. 
Specifically, and at the aggregate levels, the consumer services firms complied most with the 
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SACGI. By contrast, technology firms complied least with the SACGI. The results based on 
multivariate regression analysis generally offered empirical support to those of the descriptive 
analyses that variations in the SACGI can largely be explained by firm size, dual-listing, and 
audit firm size, but moderately by industrial groupings. 
The final objective of the chapter has been to assess the levels of compliance with the 
nine South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance 
provisions (the Social-SACGI). Consistent with the results based on the full sample, the 
statistics indicated that there is a considerable amount of variation in the levels of compliance 
with the Social-SACGI. Similarly, the analyses suggested that the observed variability in the 
levels of compliance with the social-SACGI can largely be explained by firm size and 
moderately by industry.   
Finally, analyses of the trends in board diversity showed that irrespective of the 
measure used, diversity among South African corporate boards has substantially improved 
over time. Despite the improving board diversity, however, the findings also suggest that 
board members from diverse backgrounds (ethnic and gender) within South African listed 
firms are still very small in number.  
In the next chapter (chapter seven), the main aim will be to present descriptive 
statistics, as well as test the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression assumptions. 
Specifically, descriptive statistics of the financial performance, control and the remaining 
corporate governance variables will be reported and discussed. The OLS regression 
assumptions that have been mentioned in chapter five will then be tested.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND OLS ASSUMPTIONS 
 
 
7. INTRODUCTION 
 
 This chapter discusses the data and the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
assumptions. It seeks to achieve three main objectives. First, it seeks to explain how outliers in 
the financial performance and control variables were dealt with. Second, it presents detailed 
descriptive statistics of the dependent (financial performance) and the other independent 
(corporate governance) variables. Finally, it tests the OLS regression assumptions of 
multicollinearity, autocorrelation, normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity. The rest of the 
chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.1 reports detailed descriptive statistics for the 
dependent and the remaining independent variables. Section 7.2 tests the OLS regression 
assumptions, while section 7.3 summarises the chapter. 
  
 
7.1 SUMMARY DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
      MEASURES AND OTHER CONTINUOUS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
 This section presents descriptive statistics relating to the proxies for the dependent 
(financial performance), the other independent (corporate governance), and the control 
(exogenous) variables. However, before presenting the descriptive statistics, the next 
subsection first describes how outliers in the financial performance and the control variables 
were treated. 
 
7.1.1 Dealing with Outliers in the Financial Performance and Control Variables 
 
 There were extreme values in the financial performance proxies, namely Tobin’s Q (Q-
ratio) and return on assets (ROA), and in the control variables, especially gearing (GEAR), 
and sales growth (SGROWTH). Outliers were also present in the alternative corporate 
governance mechanism – leverage (LEV). For example, the minimum (maximum) value for 
sales growth was -96% (2,236%), while that of gearing was -221% (6,085%). Similarly, the 
minimum (maximum) value for ROA was -240% (60%), the value for Tobin’s Q was .15 
(7.98), and the value for leverage was 0% (157%), respectively. Apart from being extreme 
values, some of the figures did not make economic or theoretical sense. For example, a 
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gearing ratio above 100% is theoretically meaningless. This is because, in theory, a firm can 
either use a combination of debt and equity or a maximum of 100% debt or equity. 
Therefore, to limit the effects of outliers, and specifically following Klapper and Love 
(2004, p.708), and Chhaochharia and Grinstein, (2009, p.242), the financial performance and 
the control variables were winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels. Specifically, all the 500 firm 
year values of each of the financial performance and control variables were ranked in 
ascending order. The top and bottom 25 values of each of the financial performance and 
control variable were replaced with the 26th and 475th values, respectively. As will be 
explained further below, the statistics that will be reported and discussed for the control and 
financial performance variables will be values after winsorisation. 
First, and as has been discussed below, the financial performance and control variables 
were winsorised because the presence of outliers could seriously violate the OLS assumptions 
upon which the models estimated in this study will be based. Second, winsorising or excluding 
outliers is a common practice within the corporate governance literature (Durnev and Kim, 
2005, p.1473; Beiner et al., 2006, p.259; Black et al., 2006a, p.379; Bruno and Claessens, 
2007, p.17; and Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007, p.1796, amongst others). Finally, and 
following prior studies (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005), the corporate 
governance variables were not winsorised77 . In fact, and as will be discussed below, the 
corporate governance variables generally have less extreme values.  
Table 12 contains the summary descriptive statistics of all the variables for all the 500 
firm years, as well as their respective annual values. Panels A and B of Table 12 present 
summary statistics for the dependent variables (financial performance), Panels C to I of Table 
12 report summary statistic for the other continuous independent/alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms, whilst Panels J to M of Table 12 do the same for the control 
variables. Similar to the SACGI, for each variable, the mean, standard deviation, skewness, 
kurtosis, minimum and maximum values will be reported. 
 
7.1.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Financial Performance Measures 
 
Panels A and B of Table 12 report descriptive statistics for the dependent variables. 
First, Panel A of Table 12 shows that the ROA after winsorisation ranges from a minimum of  
                                                 
77The whole regression results that will be reported and discussed below were first run with the outliers included 
before winsoring at the 5% and 95% levels. The results were essentially the same as those that will be reported 
below. As has been explained above, the main rationale for winsoring is to help minimise potential serious 
violations of the OLS assumptions upon which the regression analyses will be based.   
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-21% to a maximum of 30% with an average of 9% for the overall sample period. The 
standard deviation is 12.39, indicating that there is a significant variation in accounting returns 
among the sampled firms. Panel B of Table 12 suggests that the Q-ratio after winsorisation 
also ranges from a minimum of .63 and maximum of 3.01 with an average of 1.49 for the 
combined sample. The standard deviation of .65 indicates that there is less variation in market 
performance among the sampled firms. Consistent with the suggestions of the normal 
histogram plot (which for purposes of brevity not presented here), the skewness and kurtosis 
statistics indicate that the performance variables are mildly (relative to a normal distribution) 
non-normal. For example, the skewness (absolute critical value for accepting skewness is zero) 
statistic of -.67 for the ROA indicates that the distribution departs from symmetry with a 
longer than a normal left tail.  
By contrast, the kurtosis statistic (the absolute critical value for rejecting kurtosis is 
three) of .43 indicate that the null hypothesis that the ROA is mesokurtically distributed 
cannot be rejected. The positive sign, however, indicates that the ROA values cluster more and 
have longer tails than that of a normal distribution.  
Similarly, in line with the suggestions of the normal histogram plot (for reasons of 
brevity not reported here), the skewness statistic of .85 for the Q-ratio suggests that the 
distribution departs from symmetry with a longer than a normal right tail78. The kurtosis 
statistic of -.01 suggests that the null hypothesis that the Q-ratio is mesokurtically distributed 
cannot be rejected. The negative sign, however, means that the Q-ratio values cluster less and 
have shorter tails than that of a normal distribution. As has been discussed in chapter six, the 
mild (in comparison with a normal distribution) nature of the non-normal distributional 
characteristics depicted by the variables are consistent with the reported findings of previous 
studies that have carried out OLS estimations (Cheung and Wei, 2006, p.913; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006, pp. 1048, 1050-1051; Francoeur et al., 2008, p.88). This means that it may be 
statistically tolerable to conduct OLS estimations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
78To reduce non-normalities in the variables, rank and natural log transformations of all the continuous variables 
used in this study were taken both before and after winsorising (e.g., Gujarati, 1995; 2003; Brooks, 2003; 
Maddala, 2005). With the exception of firm size (total assets), the distributions and estimations based on the rank 
and natural log transformations did not produce better results than those based on the actual levels of all the 
variables. 
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Table 12: Summary Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent and All Continuous  
                Independent Variables Based on All (500) Firm-Year Observations 
Dependent/Independent Variables Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Skew- 
ness 
Kurt- 
osis 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi- 
mum 
Panel A: Return on assets (%) All  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel B: Tobin’s Q All  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel C: Board size All  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel D: Non-exec. Directors (%) All  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel E: Frequency of Board meetings   
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel F: Director ownership (%) All 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel G: Leverage (%) All 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
8.75 
7.71 
8.72 
7.11 
9.20 
11.03 
1.49 
1.26 
1.24 
1.43 
1.68 
1.85 
9.69 
9.47 
9.44 
9.68 
9.84 
10.04 
57.24 
52.34 
55.78 
58.87 
59.62 
59.56 
5.29 
5.10 
5.14 
5.47 
5.33 
5.37 
19.54 
20.13 
19.92 
19.83 
19.57 
18.23 
15.71 
16.84 
15.90 
15.51 
15.07 
15.11 
12.39 
12.41 
11.46 
13.25 
13.05 
11.52 
.65 
.55 
.53 
.55 
.68 
.70 
4.33 
4.34 
4.26 
4.47 
4.48 
4.14 
17.97 
18.77 
20.80 
16.92 
15.95 
16.17 
2.16 
2.14 
2.15 
1.90 
2.74 
1.76 
24.47 
23.83 
24.06 
25.46 
24.97 
24.43 
12.45 
13.16 
12.85 
12.22 
12.04 
12.11 
-.67** 
-.75** 
-.72** 
-.52** 
-.76** 
-.56** 
.85** 
1.37*** 
1.26*** 
.80** 
.51** 
.40** 
1.05** 
1.01** 
.96** 
1.17*** 
1.35*** 
.76** 
-.68** 
-.73** 
-.75** 
-.60** 
-.35** 
-.54** 
3.49*** 
2.56*** 
1.69*** 
1.22*** 
5.96*** 
.82** 
1.23*** 
1.21*** 
1.18*** 
1.27*** 
1.22*** 
1.36*** 
.33** 
.23** 
.24** 
.42** 
.38** 
.39** 
 .43 
 .83 
1.07 
-.25 
.39 
.50 
-.01 
1.78 
1.45 
 .78 
-.67 
-.93 
2.31 
 2.16 
1.78 
3.10* 
    3.95** 
     .63 
    1.10 
 .90 
 .97 
 .26 
1.17 
1.30 
26.39*** 
  7.89*** 
  5.16*** 
    1.46 
  46.00*** 
  .71 
  .42 
 .62 
 .41 
 .47 
 .32 
 .66 
   -1.07 
-1.24 
-1.24 
 -.93 
 -.90 
 -.93 
-21.38 
-21.38 
-21.38 
-21.38 
-21.38 
-21.38 
.63 
.63 
.63 
.63 
.63 
.63 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
4.00 
4.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
2.00 
.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.02 
.02 
.02 
.02 
.02 
.02 
29.85 
29.85 
29.85 
29.85 
29.85 
29.85 
3.01 
3.01 
2.96 
3.01 
3.01 
3.01 
31.00 
28.00 
27.00 
30.00 
31.00 
24.00 
100.00 
84.62 
80.00 
84.62 
100.00 
100.00 
27.00 
15.00 
14.00 
12.00 
27.00 
10.00 
93.81 
91.22 
89.99 
93.81 
89.36 
89.60 
39.36 
39.36 
39.36 
39.36 
39.36 
39.36 
The skewness and kurtosis test statistics in columns 4 and 5, respectively, test for normal distribution. A test 
statistic with (***), (**), and (*) means that the null hypothesis that a variable is normally distributed is rejected 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), and 
leverage (LEV) were winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels. The statistics reported for these variables refer to 
values after winsorisation. This explains why the minimum and maximum pooled and annual values for these 
variables are the same. The corporate governance variables, namely board size, the percentage of non-executive 
directors, the frequency of board meetings, and director ownership were not winsorised. 
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Continuation: Table 12 
Dependent/Independent Variables Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Skew-
ness 
Kurt- 
osis 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi- 
mum 
Panel H: Institutional ownership (%) All  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel I: Block ownership (%) All   
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel J: Firm size All  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel K: Gearing (%) All  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel L: Sales growth (%) All 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel M: Capital expenditure (%) All 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
71.02 
70.47 
69.53 
72.00 
71.03 
71.66 
59.91 
69.15 
61.25 
60.35 
59.97 
57.85 
5.93 
5.89 
5.88 
5.90 
5.94 
6.05 
37.83 
41.43 
37.62 
37.49 
35.28 
37.33 
11.33 
16.21 
4.36 
4.57 
12.09 
14.26 
5.70 
5.22 
5.36 
5.74 
6.03 
6.14 
25.98 
25.26 
26.81 
25.46 
26.37 
26.43 
20.85 
21.80 
21.73 
21.78 
19.91 
19.15 
1.07 
1.04 
1.07 
1.08 
1.08 
1.06 
32.96 
33.87 
33.44 
33.44 
31.84 
32.54 
20.72 
22.13 
22.26 
18.27 
20.64 
18.26 
4.18 
3.90 
4.06 
4.22 
4.28 
4.40 
-.40** 
-.21** 
-.59** 
-.41** 
-.53** 
-.46** 
-.42** 
-.37** 
-.48** 
-.51** 
-.47** 
-.35** 
-.11** 
-.83** 
-.11** 
-.18** 
-.11** 
.56** 
.54** 
-.36** 
.51** 
.67** 
.63** 
.57** 
.10** 
.28** 
.13** 
.68** 
.21** 
.31** 
.83** 
.96** 
1.00** 
.84** 
.71** 
.68** 
     .28 
     .28 
 4.89*** 
10.25*** 
9.39*** 
8.84*** 
   -.61 
   -.84 
   -.65 
   -.56 
   -.33 
   -.46 
   1.25 
   1.25 
   1.31 
 -1.36 
  -1.25 
  -.93 
   -.94 
  -1.15 
   1.00 
.82 
    -.75 
.85 
    -.03 
    -.36 
-.14 
.68 
.03 
.79 
    -.27 
.32 
.41 
-.26 
-.40 
-.70 
.28 
.28 
4.89 
10.32 
9.02 
8.84 
6.72 
11.27 
10.30 
6.72 
11.51 
11.64 
4.12 
4.12 
4.12 
4.12 
4.12 
4.12 
.02 
.02 
.02 
.02 
.02 
.02 
-30.35 
-30.35 
-30.35 
-30.35 
-30.35 
-30.35 
.47 
.47 
.47 
.47 
.47 
.47 
99.61 
99.57 
99.61 
98.30 
98.35 
99.00 
99.69 
99.69 
97.34 
97.84 
95.72 
92.64 
7.55 
7.55 
7.55 
7.55 
7.55 
7.55 
99.31 
99.31 
99.31 
99.31 
99.31 
99.31 
54.19 
54.19 
54.19 
54.19 
54.19 
54.19 
15.08 
15.08 
15.08 
15.08 
15.08 
 15.08 
The skewness and kurtosis test statistics in columns 4 and 5, respectively, test for normal distribution. A test 
statistic with (***), and (**) means that the null hypothesis that a variable is normally distributed is rejected at 
the 1%, and 5%, significance level, respectively. Firm size (LNTA), gearing (GEAR), sales growth (SGROWTH), 
and capital expenditure (CAPEX) were winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels. The statistics reported for these 
variables refer to values after winsorisation. This explains why the minimum and maximum pooled and annual 
values are identical for these variables. The corporate governance variables, namely institutional ownership and 
block ownership were not winsorised. 
 
 
Across the years, Panels A and B show that accounting and market performance of the 
sampled firms were highest in 2006 with an average ROA and Q-ratio of 11% and 1.85, 
respectively. By contrast, ROA was least in 2004 with a mean of 7%, while the Q-ratio was 
least in 2004 with an average of 1.24. This indicates that the South African economy might 
  
239 
have performed poorly in 2003 and 2004, but the market strongly recovered in 2006. This may 
be due to the significant depreciation of the South African Rand as a result of poor gold and 
diamond prices on the international markets over the 2003-2004 period (e.g., Armstrong, 2003; 
Malherbe and Segal, 2003). Overall, the averages of the ROA and Q-ratio are consistent with 
those reported by prior South African studies. Klapper and Love (2004) report an average 
ROA and Q-ratio of 9% and 1.90, respectively, for a cross-country sample of 374 firms, 
including South Africa in 1999. Ho and Williams (2003) also report an average ROA value of 
13% for a sample of 84 South African firms in 1998. 
 
7.1.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Independent/Alternative Governance Mechanisms 
 
 The independent/alternative corporate governance mechanisms are presented in Panels 
C to I of Table 12.  Panel C indicates that board size ranges from a minimum of 3 and a 
maximum of 31 with an average size of 9.69 for a South African listed firm. This is within the 
average board size recommended (i.e., between 8 and 10) by Lipton and Lorsch (1992), for 
greater board efficiency and effectiveness. The respective five annual means were stable, 
ranging between 9.44 and 10.04 in 2003 and 2006, respectively. The overall range is within 
the provisions of the South African Companies Act 1973. It recommends that a public 
company must have a minimum board size of two, but does not specify a maximum size. 
It is also consistent with the results of previous South African studies. Opinion-based 
survey conducted by the Deutsche Bank in 2002 suggests that the number of members on 
South African corporate boards ranges from 5 to 30 with an average board size of 12. 
Similarly, Ho and Williams (2003) find an average board size of 13.02 for a sample of 84 
South African firms in 1998. Finally, using a sample of 117 South African listed firms in 2003, 
Swartz and Firer (2005) report that the average South African board consist of 10.30 members.  
 Panel D of Table 12 reports the composition of South African boards. It shows that 
South African corporate boards are dominated by non-executive directors (NEDs) with a mean 
percentage of NEDs of 57% for the pooled sample. Consistent with observations regarding the 
other corporate governance mechanisms, the mean percentage of NEDs increased from 52% in 
2002 to 60% in 2006. This suggests that the King Reports have helped in making South 
African corporate boards more independent. They are also in line with the evidence of prior 
South African studies. Ho and Williams (2003) find an average percentage of NEDs of 52%, 
whereas Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report a mean of 57% and 41% for a sample of control 
and suspended South African listed firms, respectively.  
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Similarly, Panel E of Table 12 presents the frequency of board meetings in a year. It 
indicates that the average annual number of board meetings increased from 5.10 in 2002 to 
5.37 in 2006. Overall, the frequency of board meetings ranges from a minimum of zero to a 
maximum of 2779 with the average South African listed firm meeting more than 5 times in a 
year. This is higher than the minimum of 4 annual meetings recommended by King II. It is 
also in line with the results of previous studies. As has been discussed in chaper six, 78% of 
the sampled firms complied with the recommendation of having a minimum of 4 annual 
meetings. Using a sample of 307 US listed firms between 1990 to 1994, Vefeas (1999a) find 
that the average US board holds 7.45 annual meetings. Similarly, for a sample of 157 
Zimbabwean listed firms, Mangena and Tauringana (2006) report that the average annual 
number of board meetings is 3.30. Finally, El Mehdi (2007) finds that the average annual 
number of board meetings for 24 Tunisian listed firms is 3.98. 
 Panel F of Table 12 reports director shareownership. It shows that director 
shareownership ranges from 0% to 94% with an average of 20%. This is consistent with the 
findings of previous South African studies, but substantially higher than those reported for 
some developed markets. Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report a mean of 20% and 23% for a 
sample of control and suspended South African listed firms, respectively. By contrast, 
Yermack (1996) and Weir et al. (2000) report an average of 9% and 3% of director 
shareownership in a sample of US and UK listed firms, respectively. Panel H of Table 12 
contains institutional shareholding. It indicates that institutional shareholding ranges from 
0.28% to 99% with an average of 71%. This is remarkably high and is quite similar to 
institutional shareholdings in some developed markets. For example, Henry (2008) reports that 
UK institutional ownership ranges from 60% to 75%. A study by Barr et al. (1995), however, 
suggests that most of the South African institutional shareholdings are in the form of complex 
cross-holdings and pyramidical structures. 
Finally, Panel I of Table 12 reports block shareholding. The Panel suggests that block 
shareholding also ranges from 7% to 99% with a mean of 60%. This indicates that the average 
South African listed firm has a concentrated ownership structure. It is also substantially higher 
when compared with the levels of ownership concentration in some mature markets, but 
consistent with the results of previous South African studies. Mangena and Chamisa (2008) 
                                                 
79Examination of the data shows that there are substantial variations in the distribution of the number of board 
meetings among the sampled firms. Specifically, in 169(31.71%), 78(14.63%), 73(13.70%), and 33(6.19%) of the 
500 firm year observations, the number of board meetings in a year was 4, 6, 5, and 7 times, respectively. 
Similarly, in 11(2.06%) firm year observations, the annual number of meetings held was 3, 8, and 9 times each.  
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report an average block ownership of 61% and 50% for a sample of control and suspended 
South African listed firms, respectively. By contrast, Yermack (1996) and Shabbir and Padget 
(2005) report an average block ownership of 24% and 29% for a sample of US and UK listed 
firms, respectively. The incidence of block ownership, however, decreased from an average of 
60% in 2002 to 58% in 2006. This may be explained by the introduction of more rigorous 
Listings Rules by the JSE aimed at discouraging the listing of concentrated ownerships and 
pyramidical structures (e.g., Malherbe and Segal, 2003; Armstrong et al., 2006). 
 
7.1.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Control/Exogenous Variables 
 
 Panels J to M of Table 12 contain summary descriptive statistics for the 
control/exogenous variables. First, Panel J shows that the mean firm size as proxied by a 
natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets increased from 5.89(R6.14bn) in 2002 to 
6.05(R6.31bn) in 2006. Overall, firm size after winsorising ranges from 4.12(R0.13bn) to 
7.55(R35.77bn) with a mean of 5.93(R6.18bn). Panel K suggests that the average gearing ratio 
after winsorising ranges from 35% in 2005 to 41% in 2002 with an overall mean for the entire 
sample period of 37%. This indicates that the average sampled firm is moderately geared. This 
is also consistent with the reported results of prior research. Mangena and Chamisa (2008) 
report an average gearing ratio of 86% and 47% for a sample of suspended and control South 
African listed firms, respectively.  
Consistent with the ROA and Q-ratio, Panel L indicates that the average sales growth 
after winsorising was least in 2004 at 4%, but highest in 2006 at 14%. Overall, the average 
sampled firm’s sales grew by 11%. Finally, Panel M suggests that the average investments in 
assets for innovation and growth as represented by capital expenditure after winsorising 
consistently increased from about 5% in 2002 to 6% in 2006. The average firm invested 6% in 
assets over the entire sample period. Compared with the financial performance and corporate 
governance variables, the control variables have relatively larger standard deviations, which 
also imply that the sample has been adequately selected to achieve sufficient variation. 
 The next section will test the OLS assumptions, as well as present the results of 
bivariate correlation analyses. 
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7.2 TESTS OF OLS ASSUMPTIONS AND BIVARIATE CORRELATION ANALYSES  
       
As has been explained in chapters five and six, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
multivariate regression technique is used to test all the hypotheses that have been discussed in 
chapters four and five. As a result, OLS assumptions of multicollinearlity, autocorrelation, 
normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity are tested. First, the multicollinearity assumption is 
tested by conducting a correlation matrix among the variables. Table 13 contains a correlation 
matrix for the financial performance and all the continuous corporate governance variables. As 
has been discussed above, the skewness and kurtosis statistics reported in Table 12 suggested 
that the variables generally suffer from mild non-normal behaviour. As a result, Table 13 
reports both Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients. 
The bottom left half of the table presents Pearson parametric correlation coefficients, whilst 
the upper right half of the table contains Spearman’s non-parametric alternative.   
Table 13 shows that the coefficients of both the parametric and non-parametric 
bivariate correlations are very similar. The similar nature of the parametric and non-parametric 
correlation coefficients seems to suggest that any remaining non-normalities in the variables 
may be mild, and are also similar to those reported by prior studies (Cheung and Wei, 2006, 
p.913; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, pp. 1048, 1050-1051; Francoeur et al., 2008, p.88). As has 
been discussed in chapter six, this appears to indicate that it may be statistically tolerable to 
use OLS technique to estimate the specified structural equations. Apart from the SACGI and 
its sub-indices, both matrices suggest that correlations among the variables are relatively low, 
indicating that no serious multicollinearity80 problems remain.  
Additionally, tolerance statistics, variance inflation factor (VIF), eigenvalues, 
condition indices, and variance proportions, which test for multicollinearity are computed (for 
purposes of brevity is not reported here) for both the compliance-index and equilibrium-
variable models based on both the accounting (ROA) and market (Q-ratio) based measures of 
financial performance after winsorisation.  
According to Gujarati (2003, p.351-353), tolerance statistic close to one means that 
there is little multicollinearity, whereas a value close to zero suggests that multicolliearity may 
                                                 
80There were high significant initial correlations between the SACGI and board size (.667), the SACGI and firm 
size (.762), and between board size and firm size (.761). This was resolved by running board size (BSIZE) on the 
SACGI, firm size and the remaining seven seven variables. The regression residuals (R_BSIZE) were saved and 
used as a proxy for board size (BSIZE). RW refers to regression residuals based on the winsorised financial 
performance and control variables. This procedure was repeated to obtain RW_LNTA, a proxy for firm size. This 
also resulted in high correlations between BSIZE and RW_BSIZE (.612), and LNTA and RW_LNTA (.508), but 
low correlations between RW_BSIZE and RW_LNTA (-.442), RW_LNTA and the SACGI (.000), and 
RW_BSIZE and the SACGI (.000). 
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be a threat. Also, a VIF statistic below the value of ten implies non-existence of severe 
multicollinearity problems (Gujarati, 2003, p.351-353). With the exception of the ownership 
variables 81  of the equilibrium-variable model, tolerance statistics (for brevity reasons not 
shown here) for all the variables are close to the critical value of one, whilst none of the VIF 
statistics is above the critical value of ten.  
Brooks (2003, p.404), suggests that eigenvalues above the critical value of zero 
indicates that multicollineratiy may not be a problem, whereas Gujarati (2003, p.351-353) 
indicates that condition indices below the critical value of thirty imply that multicollinearity 
may not be a serious concern. Similarly, apart from the ownership variables of the 
equilibrium-variable model, all the eigenvalues (for the sake of brevity not shown here) are 
above the critical value of zero, while none of the condition indices is above the critical value 
of thirty. Similar to the suggestions of the parametric and non-parametric correlation 
coefficients in Table 13, the correlation of variance proportions (for purposes of brevity not 
reported here) generally indicates low levels of correlation among the variables. Overall, the 
collinearity statistics (including the parametric and non-parametric correlation matrices, 
condition indices, eigenvalues, tolerance statistics, variance proportions and VIF) suggest that 
the levels of multicollinearity in the variables appear to be statistically tolerable. 
By contrast, Table 13 shows that there are high correlations between the SACGI, the 
Social-SACGI, the Economic-SACGI, and the predicted instrument to be used as a proxy for 
the SACGI (P-SACGI) in conducting the endogeneity test (instrumental variable estimation) in 
chapter nine. As expected, and has also been noted already above, there are high, but 
statistically tolerable correlations among the three director ownership variables, namely 
director ownership, director ownership squared, and director ownership cubed. The high 
correlation between the SACGI and the P-SACGI (i.e., .864 and .868 for Pearson and 
Spearman coefficients, respectively) appears to suggest that it may be a relevant instrument for 
the SACGI.  
  
                                                 
81This is less surprising because the ownership variables, especially director ownership2 and director ownership3 
are squared and cubed versions of the director ownership variable, respectively, which affects their normal 
distribution properties. As expected, there are also high correlations (see Table 13) among the three director 
ownership variables. Further, rank and natural log transformations of these variables did not produce better 
distributions and estimations than those based on the actual levels of the variables. They are included because 
excluding them did not result in significant changes in the regression results.  
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Table 13: Correlation Matrix of Financial Performance and All Continuous Corporate Governance Variables for All (500) Firm Years 
 ROA Q-ratio SACGI S-
SACGI 
E-
SACGI 
P-
SACGI 
BSIZE NEDs FBMs DTORN INST- 
HDNG 
BLK- 
HDNG 
DTORN2 DTORN3 
ROA 
 
Q-ratio 
 
SACGI 
 
S-
SACGI 
 
E-
SACGI 
 
P-
SACGI 
 
BSIZE 
 
NEDs 
 
FBMs 
 
DTORN 
 
INST- 
SHDNG 
 
BLK- 
SHDNG 
 
DTORN2 
 
DTORN3 
 
 
 .283*** 
 
 .322*** 
 
 
 .325*** 
 
 
 .302*** 
 
 
 .276*** 
 
-.040* 
 
 .013* 
 
-.034* 
 
-.079* 
 
 
 .116*** 
 
 
-.052* 
 
-.060* 
 
-.051* 
 .391*** 
 
 
 
 .320*** 
 
 
 .323*** 
 
 
 .299*** 
 
 
 .326*** 
 
 .131*** 
 
 .179*** 
 
 .107** 
 
-.203*** 
 
 
 .162*** 
 
 
-.073* 
 
-.166*** 
 
-.147*** 
 .276*** 
 
 .372*** 
 
 
 
 
 .836*** 
 
 
 .987*** 
 
 
 .864*** 
 
 .000 
 
 .398*** 
 
 .167*** 
 
-.533*** 
 
 
 .314*** 
 
 
-.287*** 
 
-.455*** 
 
-.391*** 
 .295*** 
 
 .387*** 
 
 .806*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 .736*** 
 
 
 .757*** 
 
 .051* 
 
 .323*** 
 
 .162*** 
 
-.469*** 
 
 
 .354*** 
 
 
-.184*** 
 
-.403*** 
 
-.345*** 
 .261*** 
 
 .346*** 
 
 .988*** 
 
 
 .711*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 .841*** 
 
-.015* 
 
 .395*** 
 
 .153*** 
 
-.519*** 
 
 
 .283*** 
 
 
-.300*** 
 
-.442*** 
 
-.381*** 
 .235*** 
 
 .384*** 
 
 .868*** 
 
 
 .772*** 
 
 
 .844*** 
 
 
 
 
 .094** 
 
 .363*** 
 
 .145*** 
 
-.497*** 
 
 
 .364*** 
 
 
-.331*** 
 
-.414*** 
 
 .353*** 
-.060* 
 
 .145*** 
 
-.042* 
 
 
 .018* 
 
 
-.057* 
 
 
 .005 
 
 
 
-.150*** 
 
  .060* 
 
  .067* 
 
 
  .154*** 
 
 
  .176*** 
 
  .079* 
 
  .087* 
-.032* 
 
 .196*** 
 
 .378*** 
 
 
 .276*** 
 
 
 .375*** 
 
 
 .336*** 
 
-.142*** 
 
 
 
 .152*** 
 
-.338*** 
 
 
 .154*** 
 
 
-.110** 
 
-.267*** 
 
-.222*** 
-.001 
 
 .140*** 
 
 .276*** 
 
 
 .241*** 
 
 
 .259*** 
 
 
 .251*** 
 
 .117*** 
 
 .183*** 
 
 
 
-.076* 
 
 
 .024* 
 
 
-.063* 
 
 .025* 
 
 .004 
-.133*** 
 
-.276*** 
 
-.527*** 
 
 
-.457*** 
 
 
-.516*** 
 
 
-.504*** 
 
 .111*** 
 
-.430*** 
 
-.218*** 
 
 
 
 
-.294*** 
 
 
 .262*** 
 
 .812*** 
 
 .798*** 
 .158*** 
 
 .225*** 
 
 .347*** 
 
 
 .355*** 
 
 
 .323*** 
 
 
 .410*** 
 
 .104** 
 
 .175*** 
 
 .006 
 
-.311*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 .299*** 
 
-.241*** 
 
-.191*** 
-.027* 
 
-.092** 
 
-.285*** 
 
 
-.185*** 
 
 
-.301*** 
 
 
-.342*** 
 
 .171*** 
 
-.126*** 
 
-.048* 
 
 .132*** 
 
 
 .237*** 
 
 
 
 
  .306*** 
 
  .314*** 
-.133*** 
 
-.272*** 
 
-.524*** 
 
 
-.453*** 
 
 
-.513*** 
 
 
-.503*** 
 
 .113*** 
 
-.430*** 
 
-.218*** 
 
  .832*** 
 
 
 -.314*** 
 
 
  .127*** 
 
 
 
 .839*** 
-.121*** 
 
 -.181*** 
 
-.438*** 
 
 
-.360*** 
 
 
-.425*** 
 
 
-.503*** 
 
 .104** 
 
-.379*** 
 
-.167*** 
 
 .819*** 
 
 
-.314*** 
 
 
  .127*** 
 
 .845*** 
Notes: the bottom left half of the table presents Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whilst the upper right half of the table presents Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients.  
***, ** and  * denote correlation is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), the South African 
Corporate Governance Index (the SACGI), the Social-SACGI (S-SACGI), the Economic-SACGI (E-SACGI), the Predicted-SACGI (P-SACGI), board size (BSIZE), the percentage of non-executive 
directors (NEDs), the frequency of board meetings (FBMs), director shareownership (DTORN), institutional shareownership (INSTSHDNG), block shareownership (BLKSHDNG), director 
shareownership squared (DTORN2) and director shareownership cubed (DTORN3). 
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The high correlation between the SACGI and the Social-SACGI (i.e., .836 and .806 for 
Pearson and Spearman coefficients, respectively) indicates that, on average, firms with higher 
corporate governance scores also tend to comply better with the South African context specific 
affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions.  
In fact, and as has been discussed in section 6.5 of chapter six, the average firm 
complied better with the Social-SACGI (67%) than the SACGI (60%). As has also been 
explained in section 6.5 of chapter six, this implies that any financial performance 
consequences of complying with the Social-SACGI can be expected to be similar in direction 
to that of the SACGI. However, if firms with better corporate governance standards (as 
measured by compliance with the provisions of King II) tend to be associated with higher 
financial returns, then it can be argued that the magnitude of complying with the Social-
SACGI (67%) will be expected to be higher than that of the SACGI (60%) for the sampled 
firms. Also, the SACGI and the Economic-SACGI are highly (i.e., .987 and .988 for Pearson 
and Spearman coefficients, respectively) correlated. This is expected because the SACGI is 
dominated by the Economic-SACGI. Specifically, 82% (41 out of 50) of the corporate 
governance provisions that also form part of the SACGI constitute the Economic-SACGI. 
As expected, director (DTON) and block (BLKSHDNG) ownerships are negatively 
correlated with the SACGI. This indicates that firms with higher director/block ownership tend 
to have poorer internal corporate governance structures. This is in line with both the theory 
and evidence that due to the associated increased monitoring, block ownership can serve as an 
alternative to or a substitute for better internal corporate governance (e.g., Andres, 2008; 
Young et al., 2008). 
In contrast, institutional shareholding (INSTHDNG) is positively associated with the 
SACGI. This suggests that institutional shareholders can complement, as well as impact 
positively on a firm’s internal corporate governance structures, including board size and 
percentage of non-executive directors. This is because they possess superior financial 
resources, specialised knowledge, information collection and analyses advantages over the 
average individual investor (Young et al., 2008, p.1108). 
As hypothesised, the SACGI is positively related to both the accounting (ROA) and 
market (Q-ratio) based measures of financial performance. This means that firms with higher 
quality internal corporate governance structures are valued higher (Q-ratio) and/or performed 
better (ROA). This is consistent with prior South African evidence. Specifically, using cross-
country samples of listed firms that include South Africa, Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev 
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and Kim (2005), and Morey et al. (2009) report a statistically significant and positive 
coefficient of .020, .060, and .470 between the Q-ratio and their composite corporate 
governance index, respectively. Similarly, using a cross-country sample of listed firms that 
include South Africa, Klapper and Love (2004) find a statistically significant and positive 
coefficient of .10 between ROA and their composite corporate governance index. 
Apart from the correlation analyses, examination of scatter plots, Cook’s distances, 
Durbin-Watson, leverage values, studentised residuals, normal histogram, probability-
probability (P-P) and quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plots of residuals (for reasons of brevity are not 
presented here), skewness and kurtosis tests are conducted to test for homoscedasticity, 
autocorrelation, normality and linearity assumptions. 
First, scatter plots, studentised residuals, leverage values, and Cook’s distances are 
computed to test for the existence of outliers that can cause hetereoscedasticity and non-
linearity in the variables after winsorising. The constructed scatter plots for ROA, Q-ratio and 
the SACGI (for brevity purposes not reported here) indicate that outliers are no longer present 
with the distributions looking fairly random and linear.  
Studentised residuals (stud. residuals), leverage values, and Cook’s distances after 
winsorising for both the compliance-index and equilibrium-variable models based on both the 
ROA and Q-ratio are computed (for brevity reasons not reported here). Cook’s distance and 
leverage value greater than the absolute value of one indicates the presence of outliers, 
whereas studentised residual greater than the absolute value of three suggests the presence of 
outliers (Maddala, 2005, pp.470-474). None of the Cook’s distances and Leverage values is 
greater than one. Specifically, the Cook’s distances for the four models range from a minimum 
of .000 to a maximum of .080 with a highest mean of .003. Similarly, the leverage values 
range from a minimum of .017 to a maximum of .540 with a highest mean of .058. Studentised 
residuals for the four models range from a minimum of -3.084 to a maximum of 3.826 with a 
highest mean of .006. The minimum (-3.084) and maximum (3.826) values are above the 
critical value of three, which imply a limited number of outliers still exist. On average (.006), 
however, the residual statistics suggest the non-existence of severe outliers.  
Second, Durbin-Watson test statistic tests for the presence of autocorrelation in the 
residuals from a regression. According to Brooks (2003 p.163) and Gujarati (2003, p.467-469), 
Durbin-Watson value of two and above suggests that successive residual terms are, on average, 
much different in value to one another. Computed Durbin-Watson test statistics are reported in 
Tables 9, 14, 16 to 26, and 29. They generally indicate that the Durbin-Watson statistics are 
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either close to or above one. This indicates the presence of moderate rather than severe 
positive autocorrelation problems. 
 Finally, skewness and kurtosis test statistics (see Table 12), normal histogram (not 
shown here for purposes of brevity), and proability-probability (P-P) (for brevity reasons not 
reported here) plots of regression residuals are conducted to test for normality. Table 12 
reports computed skewness and kurtosis statistics for all the variables except the SACGI and 
the Social-SACGI. Tables 5 and 10 in chapter six reported the skewness and kurtosis statistics 
for the SACGI and the Social-SACGI, respectively. Generally, the skewness statistics reject the 
null hypothesis that the variables are symmetrically distributed at least at the 10% significance 
level. However, as has already been explained, the rejections are generally mild (in 
comparison with a normal distribution), and are also very similar to the reported results of past 
studies that have carried similar OLS estimations (Cheung and Wei, 2006, p.913; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006, pp. 1048, 1050-1051; Francoeur et al., 2008, p.88). This implies that any 
remaining non-normalities may be statistically tolerable. 
By contrast, the kurtosis statistics generally do not reject the null hypothesis that the 
variables are mesokurtically distributed. This indicates the non-existence of severe non-
normalities in the variables. A normal histogram plot (for brevity purposes not presented here) 
of regression residuals after winsorising for both the compliance-index and equilibrium-
variable models based on both the ROA and Q-ratio were conducted. Similarly, a normal P-P 
plot (not reported for reasons of brevity) of regression residuals after winsorising for both the 
compliance-index and equilibrium-variable models based on both the ROA and Q-ratio were 
conducted.  
In line with the suggestions of the standard errors contained in Tables 9, 14, 16 to 26, 
and 29, they show that the regression residuals are less non-normally distributed. Further, a 
normal histogram, P-P, and Q-Q plots (for purposes of brevity not reported here) after 
winsorising for the ROA, the Q-ratio and the SACGI were constructed. Similar to the 
distribution of the bivariate scatter plots, they indicate that the ROA, the Q-ratio and the 
SACGI are less non-normally distributed. Overall, the analyses suggest that any remaining 
multicollinearities, hetereoscedasticities, non-normalities, and non-linearities in the variables 
are not so severe to cause serious violations of the OLS assumptions. This implies that it will 
be statistically appropriate to conduct multivariate OLS regression analyses.  
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7.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has focused on describing the data and testing the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) assumptions. It attempted to achieve three main objectives. Firstly, it sought to clearly 
explain how outliers in the financial performance and control variables were treated. Secondly, 
it sought to provide a detailed description of the data using a battery of descriptive statistics. In 
this regard, a detailed description of the dependent (financial performance) and the other 
independent (corporate governance) variables were presented. The third and final objective of 
the chapter has been to test the OLS assumptions of multicollinearity, autocorrelation, 
normality, homoscedasticity and linearity. In this regard, correlation matrices, scatter and 
normal histogram plots, Cook’s distance, condition indices, residual, and tolerance statistics 
were reported. Together, they indicated generally that there were no serious violations of the 
OLS assumptions, and thus statistically appropriate to carry out OLS regressions. 
The next chapter will, therefore, report the main estimated OLS empirical results. 
Specifically, it will discuss the estimated OLS multivariate regression results based on both 
the compliance-index and equilibrium-variable models.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
8. INTRODUCTION 
  
This chapter discusses the empirical results.  It seeks to achieve four main objectives. 
First, it investigates whether better-governed firms based on the equilibrium-variable model 
will be associated with higher financial performance, as measured by return on assets (ROA) 
and Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio). In this regard, estimated OLS regression results based on the 
equilibrium-variable model will be reported and discussed. Second, it examines whether 
better-governed firms based on the compliance-index model will be associated with higher 
financial performance, as proxied by return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio). In this 
respect, estimated OLS regression results based on the compliance-index model will be 
presented and analysed. Third, it investigates the economic consequences of complying with 
the South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance 
provisions for listed firms. In this vein, estimated OLS regression results based on the Social-
SACGI will be reported and discussed. Finally, the chapter compares the empirical properties 
and explanatory powers of the compliance-index (the economic-SACGI) and the equilibrium-
variable models using summary descriptive statistics and diagnostics.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.1 presents the empirical 
results. Specifically, subsection 8.1.1 discusses the findings from the multivariate regression 
analyses based on the equilibrium-variable model to test hypotheses one to seven. Subsection 
8.1.2 reports the regression results based on the compliance-index model to test hypothesis 
eight. To ascertain the financial effects of complying with the South African context specific 
affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions on the sampled firms, 
subsection 8.1.3 report the estimated regression results based on both the Social-SACGI and 
Economic-SACGI. Section 8.2 compares the regression results of the compliance-index (the 
Economic-SACGI) and equilibrium-variable models, while section 8.3 summarises the chapter.  
 
 
8.1 EMPIRICAL RESULTS: MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSES 
 
 This section presents the main regression results. Specifically, subsection 8.1.1 will 
report the regression results for the equilibrium-variable model to test hypotheses one to seven. 
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Subsection 8.1.2 will discuss the regression results for the compliance-index model to test 
hypothesis eight, whereas subsection 8.1.3 will do similarly for the results of the Social-
SACGI and Economic-SACGI. Further, for each model, the results based on the accounting 
based measure of financial performance (ROA) will be presented first, followed by those 
based on the market based measure of financial performance (Q-ratio). 
  
8.1.1 Empirical Results: The Equilibrium-Variable Model 
 
8.1.1.1 Results Based on the Accounting Measure of Financial Performance (ROA) 
 
 Table 14 contains OLS regression results for the equilibrium-variable model based on 
the accounting based measure of financial performance (ROA). To facilitate comparison and 
easy following, Table 15 presents a summary of all seven hypotheses and results for the 
equilibrium-variable model based on all firm years for both the ROA and the Q-ratio. As a 
result, Table 15 will also be referred to in subsection 8.1.1.2. The variables of focus in this 
model are the first 11 corporate governance variables. Column 3 of Table 14 first presents the 
results of multivariate regression of ROA on the 11 corporate governance variables alone, 
whereas columns 4 to 9 report the results of multivariate regression of ROA on the 11 
corporate governance variables and the control variables for the combined sample, as well as 
for each of the five firm-years, respectively.  
Column 3 of Table 14 suggests that the F-value is statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the 11 corporate 
governance variables are jointly equal to zero can be rejected. It suggests that the coefficients 
on the 11 corporate governance variables can jointly explain significant variations in the 
sampled firms’ accounting returns. The adjusted R2 is approximately 6%. This means that at 
least 6% of the variations in the sampled firms’ accounting returns (ROA) can be explained 
jointly by the 11 corporate governance variables.  
The coefficients on the percentage of non-executive directors (NEDs), board diversity, 
director ownership, director ownership squared, and director ownership cubed are statistically 
significant, whereas the coefficients on board size, CEO duality, the frequency of board 
meetings, the existence of audit, nomination, and remuneration committees are not statistically 
significant. The positive coefficients on director ownership squared (which will be explained 
further below), board diversity, the existence of audit, nomination, and remuneration 
committees, in addition to the negative coefficient on director ownership cubed, are also 
theoretically expected (see column 3 of Table 15). By contrast, the negative coefficients on 
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board size, the percentage of NEDs, and the frequency of board meetings in addition to the 
positive coefficient on CEO duality are inconsistent with hypothesised relationship (see 
column 3 of Table 15). 
Therefore, to test whether the observed theoretically unexpected relationships could be 
spuriously caused by some omitted variables, the control variables are included in the 
regressions in Columns 4 to 9 of Table 14. It suggests that the F-value is statistically 
significant for the pooled sample, and in year 2006, but insignificant in the remaining four 
years. The adjusted R2 for each of the five years is between 1%-10%, and 12% for the 
combined sample. This compares, for example, with the adjusted R2 of 23% of Weir and Laing 
(2000, p.274), and 27% of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006, p.1055) for their pooled regressions of 
ROA on a number of corporate governance and control variables.  
With reference to the 11 corporate governance variables, the signs of all the 
coefficients remain unchanged for the complete sample. However, the coefficients on board 
diversity, director ownership, director ownership squared, and director ownership cubed that 
were statistically significant, are now insignificant. In contrast, the coefficients on CEO 
duality and the existence of a nomination committee, which were statistically insignificant, are 
now significant. These sensitivities may be due to omitted variables bias resulting from the 
exclusion of the control variables. Therefore, the estimated coefficients that include the control 
variables are discussed further. 
To start with, the coefficient on the first corporate governance variable, board size, is 
negative, but not significant over the entire sample period. This rejects hypothesis two (see 
column 6 of Table 15) that there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between 
board size and ROA. In contrast, it supports the results of prior South African studies (Ho and 
Williams, 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008), as well as other international evidence (e.g., 
Eisenberg et al., 1998; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Guest, 2009). For 
instance, Ho and Williams (2003) report a statistically insignificant and negative relationship 
between board size and the value added by a firm’s physical and intellectual resources, using a 
sample of 84 South African firms. 
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Table 14: OLS Regression Results of the Equilibrium-Variable Model Based on Return on Assets (ROA –Accounting Measure) 
 Exp. sign All firm years All firm years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Adjusted R2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
     .063 
    .116 
    .904 
 3.522(.000)*** 
    500 
    .115 
    .114 
    .925 
3.125(.000)*** 
  500 
  -.086 
   .115 
 2.010 
   .747(.763) 
   100 
  .007 
  .115 
1.794 
1.028(.419) 
   100 
  .021 
  .127 
2.114 
1.144(.331) 
   100 
  .042 
  .126 
1.980 
1.180(.298) 
   100 
  .102 
  .110 
1.918 
1.615(.097)* 
   100 
Constant 
Board size 
CEO duality 
Non-executiv. dtors. 
Dtor. ownership 
Dtor. ownership2 
Dtor. ownership3 
Board diversity 
Board meetings 
Audit committee 
Nomination com. 
Remuneration com. 
Firm size  
Capital structure  
Sales growth  
Capital expenditure  
Dual-listing  
Audit firm size 
Basic materials  
Consumer services  
Industrials  
Technology  
Year 2002 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
- 
  .048(.383) 
 -.003(.138) 
  .023(.159) 
 -.001(.016)** 
 -.003(.044)** 
  .000(.060)* 
 -.000(.093)* 
  .036(.004)*** 
 -.002(.418) 
  .038(.680) 
  .021(.122) 
  .051(.539) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .046(.435) 
-.002(.311) 
 .029(.037)** 
-.002(.032)** 
-.003(.131) 
 .000(.104) 
-.000(.106) 
 .021(.112) 
-.003(.324) 
 .050(.581) 
 .021(.091)* 
 .034(.641) 
 .001(.928) 
 .000(.021)** 
 .001(.000)*** 
-.002(.105) 
 .024(.138) 
 .010(.559) 
-.011(.611) 
-.002(.925) 
-.014(.464) 
 .006(.772) 
-.014(.457) 
-.011(.550) 
-.012(.495) 
-.002(.928) 
-.016(.931) 
-.003(.630) 
 .032(.418) 
-.001(.613) 
-.004(.444) 
 .000(.812) 
-.000(.991) 
 .022(.517) 
-.004(.612) 
 .196(.330) 
 .016(.669) 
 .005(.970) 
-.013(.706) 
-.001(.089)* 
 .002(.045)* 
-.004(.377) 
-.014(.738) 
-.057(.289) 
 .080(.159) 
 .034(.514) 
 .034(.509) 
 .016(.791) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .155(.185) 
-.007(.242) 
 .043(.261) 
-.002(.061)* 
 .003(.594) 
-.000(.850) 
-.000(.927) 
 .053(.109) 
 .007(.297) 
-.023(.890) 
 .022(.570) 
 .028(.844) 
-.010(.774) 
 .000(.970) 
 .002(.014)** 
-.005(.200) 
 .021(.579) 
-.034(.428) 
 .007(.887) 
-.110(.385) 
-.040(.025)** 
-.046(.367) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
  .050(.748) 
 -.003(.714) 
  .022(.668) 
 -.001(.282) 
 -.001(.780) 
  .000(.763) 
  .000(.735) 
  .034(.369) 
 -.006(.512) 
  .110(.525) 
  .052(.211) 
 -.055(.779) 
 -.041(.249) 
.000(.840) 
.003(.014)** 
.002(.674) 
.002(.956) 
.018(.677) 
 -.032(.559) 
 -.051(.307) 
 -.042(.396) 
  .021(.691)  
- 
- 
- 
- 
-.108(.542) 
-.002(.805) 
-.004(.944) 
-.000(.993) 
-.005(.297) 
  .000(.226) 
 -.000(.222) 
  .019(.591) 
 -.003(.572) 
  .248(.177) 
  .017(.690) 
 -.036(.811) 
.032(.328) 
 -.001(.108) 
  .002(.029)** 
 -.004(.266) 
.022(.598) 
.037(.402) 
 -.021(.708) 
.046(.333) 
 -.008(.879) 
  .011(.828) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-.088(.600) 
  .000(.971) 
  .083(.048)** 
  .000(.869) 
 -.002(.585) 
  .000(.501) 
 -.000(.533) 
  .013(.687) 
  .012(.111) 
 -.334(.066)* 
  .008(.813) 
-.141(.278) 
 .004(.878) 
-.001(.084)* 
 .001(.106) 
-.003(.335) 
 .038(.275) 
 .015(.691) 
-.020(.662) 
 .024(.557) 
 .002(.971) 
 .025(.544) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 2003 are excluded 
from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. Director ownership2 and director ownership3 refers to director ownership squared 
and director ownership cubed, respectively. 
  
253
Table 15: A Summary Table of All Hypotheses and Results for the Equilibrium-Variable Model Based on All Firm Years 
Dependent 
Varaiabe 
Return on Assets (ROA) Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio) 
Independent 
Variable 
Hypothesis 
Number 
Hypothesised 
Sign 
Actual 
Sign of 
Result 
Statistical 
Significance of 
Result 
Conclusion 
(Hypothesis) 
Hypothesised 
Sign 
Actual 
Sign of 
Result 
Statistical  
Significance of 
Result 
Conclusion 
(Hypothesis) 
Board diversity 
 
Board size 
 
CEO duality 
 
Non-exec. dtors. 
 
Board meetings 
 
Audit committee 
 
Nomination com. 
 
Remuneration co. 
 
Dtor. ownership 
 
Dtor. ownership2 
 
Dtor. ownership3 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
6 
 
6 
 
7 
 
7 
 
7 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
-/+ 
 
-/+ 
+ 
 
- 
 
       + 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
Insignificant 
 
insignificant 
 
Significant(5%) 
 
Significant(5%) 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Significant(10%) 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Accepted 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
-/+ 
 
-/+ 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
Insignificant 
 
Significant(10%) 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Significant(10%) 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
Rejected 
 
Accepted 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 Notes: The Table presents a summary of all the seven hypotheses tested and results for the equilibrium-variable model. Columns 2 to 6 present information relating to hypotheses 1 to seven with 
regard to the ROA, while columns 7 to 10 do similarly with respect to the Q-ratio. The information in columns 7 to 10 wil be referred to in the discussions at subsection 8.1.1.2. Director 
ownership2 refers to director ownership squared, whilst director ownership3 refers to director ownership cubed. 
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However, the results differ from prior studies that document a statistically significant 
and positive link between board size and accounting returns (e.g., Sanda et al., 2005; Haniffa 
and Hudaib, 2006; Mangena and Tauringana, 2008). Theoretically, it implies that larger 
boards are less effective. Within the South African context, this appears to indicate further that 
board appointments may be made in order to meet affirmative action provisions, such as black 
empowerment and employment equity targets rather than for the quality of their contributions 
to board decisions.  
CEO duality, board diversity, and the existence of audit, nomination and remuneration 
committees, are found to be positively associated with accounting returns, but only CEO 
duality and the existence of a nomination committee are significant for the pooled sample. 
CEO duality is further significant in year 2006. The statistically significant and positive 
association between CEO duality and ROA rejects hypothesis three (see column 6 of Table 15) 
that CEO duality significantly impacts negatively on firm financial performance. It also does 
not lend empirical support to the recommendations of corporate governance codes, including 
King II that the roles of company chairman and CEO should be split.  
Empirically, this finding is different from the results of previous studies that report a 
statistically significant and negative relationship between ROA and role duality (e.g., Rechner 
and Dalton, 1991; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Specifically, it does not lend empirical support 
to the results of Ho and Williams (2003) who report a statistically significant and negative 
association between CEO duality and the intellectual capital performance of 84 South African 
listed firms. In contrast, the results lend empirical support to the findings of Donaldson and 
Davis (1991) and Boyd (1995) that there is a statistically significant and positive nexus 
between role duality and ROA. Theoretically, it suggests that role duality allows a visionary 
and charismatic CEO the opportunity to have a sharper focus on firm objectives without 
excessive board interference (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, p.321). It also facilitates quick 
decision-making, which may improve financial performance.  
The statistically significant and positive coefficient on the presence of a nomination 
committee supports hypothesis six (see column 6 of Table 15) that the presence of a 
nomination committee impacts positively on accounting returns. It also offers empirical 
support to the recommendations of many corporate governance codes, including King II that 
call for the establishment of board committees. Empirically, it rejects the results of Bozec 
(2005) who reports a statistically insignificant relationship between ROA and the 
establishment of a nomination committee in a sample of 25 Canadian listed firms from 1976 to 
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2005. Theoretically, the establishment of a nomination committee can improve the process by 
which directors are appointed, as well as the independence of the board and its decisions. 
Arguably, this can potentially impact positively on firm financial performance by enhancing 
the effectiveness with which the board carries out its monitoring and advisory functions. 
On the other hand, the results suggest that the presence of audit and remuneration 
committees are positively related to ROA, but both are statistically insignificant. This does not 
support hypothesis six (see column 6 of Table 15), as well as the recommendations of King II. 
Given the high adoption rate of audit and remuneration committees, their insignificance in 
explaining ROA is not empirically too surprising. This is because, and as has already been 
discussed in chapter six, less than 10% of the sampled firms’ do not have audit and 
remuneration committees, which results in less variation among them. This also raises 
questions as to the methodological appropriateness for estimating the corporate governance-
financial performance link by applying the equilibrium-variable model. This is because it can 
be argued that if all firms were to fully comply or not to completely comply with some of the 
single corporate governance provisions, then there will simply be no cross-sectional variations 
in the variables for them to be value relevant in any regression. 
The statistically insignificant relationship between board diversity and ROA means 
that hypothesis one (see column 6 of Table 15) is rejected. As has been discussed in 
subsection 6.5 of chapter six, this is less empirically surprising. This is because the number of 
non-whites and women representation on South African corporate boards are small such that 
they may not be able to have any significant impact on board decisions. Empirically, it does 
not support the results of Swartz and Firer (2005) that South African listed firms significantly 
enhance their intellectual capital performance by having ethnically diversed board of directors. 
However, the positive coefficients are consistent with the findings of Adler (2001) who report 
that board diversity impact positively on accounting returns. By contrast, it rejects the results 
of Shrader et al. (1997) who find a negative association between board diversity and ROA. 
The positive coefficient is also consistent with theory. It has been suggested that board 
diversity increases creativity and innovation in decision-making due to differences in 
cognitive abilities, which impacts positively on performance (Carter et al., 2003, p.36). 
The percentage of non-executive directors (NEDs) and frequency of board meetings 
are negatively related to accounting returns, but only the percentage of NEDs is statistically 
significant for the full sample. The statistically significant and negative relationship between 
the percentage of NEDs and ROA means that hypothesis four (see column 6 of Table 15) is 
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not supported. This finding is also contrary to the expectations of many corporate governance 
codes, including King II, which promote the inclusion of more NEDs on corporate boards. 
Empirically, it also does not support the results of prior South African studies of Ho and 
Williams (2003) and Mangena and Chamisa (2008) that indicate that more NEDs impact 
positively on firm performance. However, it supports previous corporate governance evidence 
(e.g., Weir and Laing, 2000; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), which 
reports a negative link between the percentage of NEDs and ROA.  
Theoretically, stewardship theory suggests that non-executive directors often command 
less knowledge about the business, and find it difficult to understand the complexities of the 
firm (Weir and Laing, 2000, p.267). This negatively affects performance. The statistically 
insignificant and negative ROA-the frequency of board meetings nexus means that hypothesis 
five (see column 6 of Table 15) can be rejected.  It also implies that the recommendations of 
King II that South African corporate boards must hold a minimum of four meetings in a year 
are not empirically supported. Empirically, this finding is consistent with the result of El 
Mehdi (2007) who reports a statistically insignificant association between the frequency of 
board meetings and ROA for a sample of 24 Tunisian listed firms from 2000 to 2005. By 
contrast, it does not support the results of Mangena and Tauringana (2006) who document a 
statistically significant and positive relationship between the frequency of board meetings and 
ROA in a sample of 157 Zimbabwean listed firms from 2001 to 2003. 
Theoretically, the negative coefficient on the frequency of board meetings under the 
ROA supports the idea that frequent board meetings are not necessarily beneficial. A higher 
frequency of board meetings, for example, can result in higher costs in the form of managerial 
time, travel expenses, refreshment, and directors’ meetings fees.  
Director shareownership is found to be negatively related to accounting returns, but not 
statistically significant. This implies that hypothesis seven (see column 6 of Table 15) is not 
supported. In contrast, it is consistent with the results of previous South African studies (e.g., 
Ho and Williams, 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008). For example, using a sample of 84 
South African listed firms, Ho and Williams (2003) report a negative association between 
director ownership and a firm’s physical and intellectual capital performance. Theoretically, 
the negative coefficient can be explained by the entrenchment hypothesis. The hypothesis 
states that at high levels of shareholding, directors may hold sufficient voting power to protect 
themselves against any disciplinary actions from minority shareholders. This motivates 
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managers to engage in opportunistic behaviour, including the consumption of more perquisites, 
which impacts negatively on firm financial performance.  
To replicate the results of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990), two 
additional ownership variables – director ownership squared and cubed are introduced. 
Specifically, Morck et al. (1988) document a positive director ownership-performance link at 
lower levels (0% to 5% - interests convergence), a negative relationship at moderate levels 
(5% to 25% - entrenchment), and additional positive association at higher levels (above 25% - 
interests convergence). This results in a non-linear relationship between director ownership 
and performance. 
 The results show that director ownership squared and director ownership cubed82 are 
negatively and positively associated with ROA, respectively, but both are statistically 
insignificant. The positive and negative coefficient on director ownership squared and director 
ownership cubed, respectively, suggests the presence of a non-linear relationship. However, 
the statistically insignificant coefficients fail to offer empirical support to past evidence, which 
indicates significant curvilinear director ownership-performance link (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990). Overall, the statistically insignificant and negative coefficient 
on director shareownership does not support the director entrenchment hypothesis. Similarly, 
statistically insignificant coefficients on director shareownership cubed and squared also fail 
to offer evidence to neither support the director interest alignment hypothesis nor director 
entrenchment hypothesis even at higher levels of director shareownership. 
With respect to the control variables, and consistent with predictions, firm size, capital 
structure, sales growth and dual-listing are found to be positively associated with accounting 
returns, whilst capital expenditure is negatively related to ROA for the pooled sample. Audit 
firm size is also positively related to ROA for the full sample. However, only capital structure 
and sales growth are statistically significant for the combined sample, whereas firm size, 
capital structure and dual-listing are significant over the entire sample period. The statistically 
                                                 
82 Following Beiner et al. (2006), the coefficients on director shareownership, directorship shareownership 
squared, and director shareownership cubed are interpreted separately. This is because unlike Morck et al. (1988) 
and McConnell (1990) who investigate the non-linear director shareownership-firm value relationship in isolation, 
in this study and similar to Beiner et al. (2006), the curvilinear relationship is explored alongside eight other 
corporate governance mechanisms. Director shareownership levels are, therefore, not classified from 0% to 5%, 
5% to 25%, and 25% above range, as done by Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Sevaes (1990). However, 
and as has been reported above, in this study, director shareownership ranges from 0% to 94% for the pooled 
sample. This makes it difficult to ex ante determine the potential turning points and the direction of the 
coefficients on director shareownership squared and director shareownership cubed. Therefore, the coefficients 
on the director shareownership variables are interpreted separately based on the post ante predicted coefficients 
and statistical significance.  
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significant and positive coefficient on capital structure implies that higher levels of gearing 
can significantly increase performance by reducing agency conflicts often associated with 
having ‘free cash flows’ by self-serving managers (Jensen, 1993, p.323). The positive 
coefficient on firm size offers empirical support to past evidence, which suggests a positive 
link between firm size and ROA (e.g., Weir and Laing, 2000; Bozec, 2005). The positive, but 
statistically insginficant relationship between audit firm size and ROA for the full sample is 
theoretically not expected. 
By contrast, the statistically significant and positive sales growth-ROA link is 
consistent with theory and previous evidence that, on average, firms that generate higher sales 
are more likely to report higher accounting profits (Klapper and Love, 2004; Shabbir and 
Padget, 2005). Similarly, the positive coefficient on dual-listing supports recent cross-country 
evidence that includes South Africa by Charitou and Louca (2009), which indicates that cross-
listed firms are associated with higher operating accounting returns than their non cross-listed 
counterparts.  
In contrast, the negative relationship between capital expenditure and ROA indicates 
that investments in assets are capital intensive, but often tend to have positive impact on future 
profitability (Weir et al., 2002, p.589). This negatively affects current accounting profits. It 
also seems to suggest the existence of of lagged structure relationship between ROA and 
capital expenditure. As a robustness test, a lagged corporate governance-financial performance 
structure will be estimated in chapter nine. Finally, the results show that none of the industry 
and year dummies is significant for the combined sample. This fails to support prior results of 
Shabbir and Padgett (2005), and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) that suggest that accounting 
returns of firms differ across different industries and financial years.  
 
8.1.1.2 Results Based on Market Measure of Financial Performance (Q-ratio) 
 
Table 16 contains OLS regression results for the equilibrium-variable model based on 
the market based measure of financial performance (Q-ratio). Similarly, the variables 
investigated in this model are the first 11 corporate governance variables. As has been 
explained above, to facilitate comparison and easy following, Table 15 presents a summary of 
all seven hypotheses and results for the equilibrium-variable model based on all firm years for 
both the ROA and the Q-ratio. Column 3 of Table 16 first reports the results of multivariate 
regression of the Q-ratio only on the 11 corporate governance variables, while columns 4 to 9 
present the results of multivariate regression of the Q-ratio on the 11 corporate governance 
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variables and the control variables for the pooled sample, as well as for each of the five firm-
years, respectively.  
Consistent with the ROA, Column 3 of Table 16 indicates that the F-value is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the 11 corporate governance variables are jointly equal to zero can be rejected. 
It implies that the coefficients on the 11 corporate governance mechanisms can jointly explain 
significant differences in the sampled firms’ market value. The adjusted R2 is approximately 
6%, which is also virtually the same as the adjusted R2 obtained for the ROA. This means that 
at least 6% of the variations in the sampled firms’ market value (Q-ratio) can be explained 
jointly by the 11 corporate governance variables.  
With the exceptions of the negative coefficient on the existence of an audit committee, 
and the positive coefficient on CEO duality, the signs of the coefficients of the remaining 9 
corporate governance mechanisms are as theoretically expected (see column 7 of Table 15). 
However, only board diversity is statistically significant. The statistically significant 
coefficient on the constant term in column 3 of Table 16 appears to suggest that there may be 
omitted variables bias. Therefore, to investigate whether the lack of significant relationship 
between the Q-ratio and the corporate governance structures is spuriously caused by some 
omitted variables, the control variables are added to the regressions in Columns 4 to 9 of Table 
16. 
Table 16 indicates that the F-Value is statistically significant for the pooled sample, 
and for each of the five firm-years except 2005. The adjusted R2 for each of the five years is 
between 11% and 24%, and 29% for the combined sample. This is consistent with the results 
of previous studies. For instance, Weir et al. (2002, p.597), and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006, 
p.1053) report adjusted R2 of 22% and 28%, respectively, for their pooled regressions of the 
Q-ratio on a group of corporate governance and control variables.  
Of particular interest, the adjusted R2 of the regressions of ROA and the Q-ratio on the 
11 corporate governance mechanisms alone are virtually the same. However, including the 
control variables leads to substantially higher adjusted R2 for the Q-ratio than for the ROA. 
This implies that the observed difference in the ability of the 11 corporate governance 
variables to explain the variations in the ROA and Q-ratio is accounted for by the contribution 
of the control variables.  
With respect to the 11 corporate governance structures, the results show some level of 
sensitivities when the control variables are added. First, the direction of the coefficients on 
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CEO duality, board diversity, and the existence of audit, nomination and remuneration 
committees have changed. Second, board diversity, which was statistically significant, is now 
insignificant, whereas board size and director ownership that were statistically insignificant, 
are now significant. These sensitivities may be due to omitted variables bias arising out of the 
exclusion of the control variables. Therefore, the discussion below is based on the estimated 
coefficients that include the control variables. 
To begin with, and in contrast to accounting returns, board size is found to be 
positively related to the market based measure of performance and statistically significant for 
the full sample. This lends support to hypothesis two (see column 10 of Table 15) that there is 
a statistically significant and positive relationship between the Q-ratio and board size. It also 
supports past evidence that documents a statistically significant and positive nexus between 
the Q-ratio and board size (e.g., Adams and Mehran, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008; 
Mangena and Tauringana, 2008). It, however, contradicts the results of past studies that report 
a statistically significant and negative link between board size and the Q-ratio (e.g., Yermack, 
1996; Vefeas 1999a and b; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Cheng et al., 2008; Coles et al., 2008; 
Guest, 2009).  
Theoretically, this indicates that the market perceives larger boards as more effective. 
This is because larger boards offer greater access to their firms’ external environment, which 
reduces uncertainties and facilitates securing of critical resources, such as finance, raw 
materials and contracts (e.g., Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Goodstein et al., 1994). Within the 
South African context, securing and renewing profitable government and mining contracts, for 
example, are usually tied-up with meeting black economic empowerment and employment 
equity targets (e.g., Murray, 2000; Malherbe and Segal, 2003). As has already been discussed 
in chapter six, however, larger firms have significantly higher levels of compliance with black 
economic empowerment and employment equity provisions. This means that larger firms may 
be more likely to secure profitable government backed black economic empowerment 
contracts that may help them to receive higher market valuation than their smaller counterparts. 
CEO duality and board diversity are found to be negatively related to market valuation, 
but both are statistically insignificant over the entire sample period. The coefficients are in the 
opposite direction to those of the accounting returns. The statistically insignificant and 
negative coefficient on CEO duality does not support hypothesis three (see column 10 of 
Table 15), as well as the recommendations of King II. It implies that CEO duality has no 
impact on the sampled firms’ market value. Empirically, this finding is in line with prior 
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studies that report a statistically insignificant link between the Q-ratio and CEO duality (e.g., 
Vefeas and Theodorou, 1998; Sanda et al., 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Specifically, the 
finding offers further empirical support to the results of Mangena and Chamisa (2008) that 
role duality has no impact on on the likelihood that a firm will be suspended from listing on 
the JSE in a sample of 81 South African listed firms. The negative coefficient, however, 
suggests that the market perceives CEO duality as a bad practice. This is because it tends to 
give too much power to one person who can choose to engage in opportunistic activities.  
The statistically insignificant and negative coefficient on board diversity implies that 
hypothesis one (see column 10 of Table 15) is similarly rejected. It also contradicts the 
recommendations of King II and the results of Carter et al. (2003) that suggest a statistically 
significant and positive link between board diversity and the Q-ratio. This finding is, however, 
in line with the result of Rose (2007) that indicates that board diversity has statistically 
insignificant relationship with the Q-ratio. Theoretically, this suggests that the market views 
diversed board members as bringing their individual interests to the board. The greater the 
diversity of these interests, the higher the potential for conflicts and factions to emerge, which 
impairs boardroom cohesion and performance (Goodstein et al., 1994, p.243). 
Of special note, the differences in the sensitivities of board size and the other corporate 
governance mechanisms, that will be discussed below, towards the two performance measures, 
may be explained by the differences in their respective effects, strengths, and weaknesses. For 
example, and as has been discussed in subsection 5.2.2.3 of chapter five, as a historical 
measure, ROA is unable to reflect current changes in market valuation. By contrast, as a 
market measure, the Q-ratio reflects expected future developments that may be masked by 
current fluctuations in business conditions. It also offers empirical support to previous 
evidence, which suggests that insiders (managers – ROA) and outsiders (shareholders – Q-
ratio) value corporate governance differently (Black et al., 2006a, p.370; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006). Overall, it appears to justify the use of both accounting and market based measures of 
performance, allowing each measure to complement the weaknesses of the other. 
In contrast to the ROA, the coefficients on the percentage of NEDs and the frequency 
of board meetings are positive, but the coefficient on the percentage of NEDs is not 
statistically significant over the entire sample period, while the coefficient on the frequency of 
board meetings is only significant in 2003. The statistically insignificant and positive 
relationship between the percentage of NEDs and the Q-ratio does not offer empirical support 
to the recommendations of King II and hypothesis four (see column 10 of Table 15).  
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Table 16: OLS Regression Results of the Equilibrium-Variable Model Based on Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio – Market Measure) 
 Exp. Sign All firm years All firm years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Adjusted R2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
     .062 
    .623 
  1.032 
 3.466(.000)*** 
    500 
    .290 
    .542 
    .983 
7.690(.000)*** 
  500 
   .171 
   .501 
 2.008 
 1.660(.076)* 
   100 
  .164 
  .492 
1.740 
1.749(.048)** 
  100 
  .243 
  .455 
2.105 
2.286(.006)*** 
   100 
  .110 
  .641 
1.905 
1.504(.108) 
   100 
  .153 
  .651 
2.007 
1.763(.042)** 
   100 
Constant 
Board size 
CEO duality 
Non-executive dtors. 
Dtor. ownership 
Dtor. ownership2 
Dtor. ownership3 
Board diversity 
Board meetings 
Audit committee 
Nomination com. 
Remuneration com. 
Firm size  
Capital structure  
Sales growth  
Capital expenditure  
Dual-listing  
Audit firm size 
Basic materials  
Consumer services  
Industrials  
Technology  
Year 2002 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
 1.322(.000)*** 
  .020(.101) 
  .002(.985) 
  .003(.278) 
 -.011(.217) 
  .000(.287) 
 -.000(.264) 
  .179(.008)*** 
  .021(.147) 
 -.354(.473) 
  .089(.220) 
  .229(.689) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .642(.024)** 
 .022(.064)* 
-.117(.153) 
 .003(.255) 
-.018(.084)* 
 .000(.153) 
-.000(.192) 
-.025(.701) 
 .011(.424) 
 .068(.876) 
-.105(.141) 
-.119(.765) 
-.183(.003)*** 
-.003(.000)*** 
 .002(.124) 
 .020(.005)*** 
 .086(.267) 
 .271(.001)*** 
 .428(.000)*** 
 .551(.000)*** 
 .217(.002)*** 
 .308(.000)*** 
-.022(.811) 
 .183(.033)** 
 .398(.000)*** 
 .581(.000)*** 
 .572(.466) 
 .003(.910) 
-.082(.635) 
 .003(.572) 
 .000(.995) 
-.000(.910) 
-.000(.809) 
-.129(.384) 
 .014(.669) 
 .380(.664) 
-.128(.420) 
 .580(.313) 
 .057(.706) 
-.006(.012)** 
 .006(.048)** 
 .013(.484) 
 .169(.372) 
 .315(.098)* 
 .478(.057)* 
 .372(.101) 
 .183(.410) 
-.027(.916) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .799(.113) 
 .030(.251) 
-.140(.390) 
-.002(.582) 
 .008(.700) 
-.000(.564) 
-.000(.713) 
-.026(.852) 
 .080(.010)*** 
-.272(.698) 
-.157(.348) 
 .239(.691) 
-.164(.264) 
-.002(.218) 
 .000(.982) 
 .002(.903) 
 .135(.415) 
 .333(.074)* 
 .527(.023)** 
 .421(.046)** 
 .221(.269) 
 .184(.397) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
2.076(.000)*** 
  .028(.257) 
 -.143(.442) 
  .006(.159) 
 -.005(.781) 
  .000(.786) 
 -.000(.571) 
  .073(.583) 
 -.002(.946) 
-1.093(.182) 
  .019(.899) 
 -.134(.811) 
 -.125(.325) 
 -.003(.082)* 
  .007(.094)* 
.001(.954) 
.015(.919) 
.291(.068)* 
  .184(.343) 
  .390(.031)** 
  .212(.230) 
  .382(.050)**  
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .451(.618) 
 .026(.412) 
-.310(.320) 
 .004(.607) 
-.051(.053)* 
 .002(.065)* 
-.000(.070)* 
  .010(.956) 
 -.001(.967) 
  .849(.362) 
  .051(.813) 
  .154(.839) 
 -.292(.179) 
 -.004(.127) 
  .008(.075)* 
  .031(.085)* 
.093(.660) 
.220(.323) 
  .251(.376) 
.585(.018)** 
  .057(.825) 
  .162(.547) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-.576(.559) 
  .038(.226) 
 -.078(.756) 
  .006(.296) 
 -.038(.130) 
  .001(.147) 
 -.000(.116) 
 -.073(.694) 
  .033(.460) 
1.123(.291) 
 -.242(.231) 
  .534(.485) 
 -.313(.157) 
 -.005(.049)** 
  .004(.384) 
  .019(.321) 
 -.072(.726) 
  .411(.066)* 
  .616(.024)** 
  .393(.126) 
  .718(.014)** 
  .409(.065)* 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 2003 are excluded 
from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. Director ownership2 and director ownership3 refers to director ownership squared 
and director ownership cubed, respectively.
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The positive coefficient on the percentage of NEDs, however, lends support to the 
results of previous South African studies (e.g., Ho and Williams, 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 
2008). Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report, for example, that South African corporate boards 
dominated by NEDs are less likely to be suspended from the stock exchange. The statistically 
insignificant and positive nexus between the frequency of board meetings and the Q-ratio 
indicates that hypothesis five (see column 10 of Table 15) is also not empirically supported. It 
also implies that the recommendations of King II that South African corporate boards must 
hold a minimum of four meetings in a year are not empirically supported. It is also not in line 
with the results of prior studies that report a statistically significant and negative association 
between the frequency of board meetings and the Q-ratio (e.g., Vefeas 1999a; Carcello et al., 
2002; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006).  
By contrast, the positive coefficient supports the results of Karamanou and Vefeas 
(2005) and Mangena and Tauringana (2006) that document a positive relationship between the 
frequency of board meetings and the Q-ratio. Unlike the finding of this study, however, the 
results of Karamanou and Vefeas (2005) and Mangena and Tauringana (2006) were 
statistically significant. The positive, but statistically insignificant nexus between the 
frequency of board meetings and the Q-ratio also indicates that even though the frequency of 
board meetings has no valuation implications for the sampled firms, the market perceives it as 
a good corporate governance practice. This is because a higher frequency of board meetings 
can lead to enhanced managerial monitoring. 
Similar to the results of the ROA, the existence of a remuneration committee is 
positively related to the Q-ratio. By contrast, the coefficients on the existence of audit and 
nomination committees are negative. Also, the coefficients on all three board committees are 
statistically insignificant over the entire sample period. This rejects hypothesis six (see column 
10 of Table 15) and does also not lend empirical support to the recommendations of King II. 
The mixed and insignificant results may be explained by the fact that there is generally a high 
level of compliance with board committees, which results in insufficient variation among the 
sampled firms.  
As has been explained above, this also brings into question as to the methodological 
appropriateness for estimating the corporate governance-financial performance link by using 
the equilibrium-variable model. This is because it can be argued that if all firms were to fully 
comply or not to completely comply with some of the single corporate governance provisions, 
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then there will simply be no cross-sectional variations in the variables for them to be value 
relevant in any regression. 
Empirically, the findings are consistent with the results of prior studies that report a 
statistically insignificant relationship between board committees and the Q-ratio (e.g., Vefeas 
and Theodorou, 1998; Weir and Laing, 2000; Weir et al., 2002). Vefeas and Theodorou 
(1998), for example, report a statistically insignificant nexus between the presence of audit, 
nomination, and remuneration committees and the Q-ratio.  By contrast, the finding does not 
offer empirical support to the results of previous studies that report statistically significant and 
positive or negative association between board committees and the Q-ratio (e.g., Vefeas, 
1999a; Karamanous and Vefeas, 2005). The finding is also not consistent with the results of 
Mangena and Chamisa (2008). Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report that the presence of an 
audit committee significantly reduces the possibility of a firm being suspended from listing on 
the JSE in a sample of 81 South African listed firms. 
The results of director ownership and director ownership cubed are negatively 
correlated to market performance, whilst director ownership squared is positively associated 
with the Q-ratio. All of them are only statistically significant in 2005. This indicates that 
hypothesis seven is not supported (see column 10 of Table 15). The statistically significant 
and negative link between director ownership and the Q-ratio supports the entrenchment 
hypothesis (Short and Keasey, 1999; Beiner et al., 2006), as well as the results of previous 
South African studies (e.g., Ho and Williams, 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008).  
The implication of this finding is that at high levels of shareholding, directors tend to 
concentrate on maximising their own utility, such as guaranteed employment with attractive 
salaries to the disadvantage of other shareholders. This is because they hold enough voting 
power to effectively insulate themselves against any disciplinary action. The evidence of 
significant positive and negative coefficients on director ownership squared and director 
ownership cubed, respectively, offers additional empirical support to the results of Morck et al. 
(1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990), who report significant non-monotonic relationship 
between director ownership and the Q-ratio. Overall, the statistically significant and negative 
coefficient on director ownership suggests director entrenchment with no evidence of a 
reversal to interest alignment even at higher levels of director ownership. 
With respect to the control variables, all of them show the hypothesised relationships 
with the Q-ratio. Also, firm size, capital structure, audit firm size and capital expenditure are 
statistically significant for the combined sample, whereas sales growth is statistically 
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significant in 2002, 2004 and 2005. Audit firm size is also statistically significant for all firm 
years except 2005. Dual-listing, however, is not significant over the entire sample period. All 
the industry and year dummies except 2002 are significant for the pooled sample. As has been 
explained above, this also means that the substantial difference in the adjusted R2 between 
ROA and the Q-ratio is explained by the contribution of the control variables. 
The statistically significant and negative coefficient on firm size offers empirical 
support to the results of previous studies that report a negative relationship between firm size 
and the Q-ratio (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Durnev and Kim, 2005), but contradicts the 
findings of those that establish a positive relationship (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Carter et al., 
2003). Similarly, the significant negative coefficient on capital structure indicates that firms 
that use more debt restrict their financial flexibility and capacity to pursue positive NPV 
projects (Myers, 1977, p.148).  
On the contrary, the statistically significant and positive coefficients on sales growth 
and capital expenditure suggest that faster growing firms receive higher valuation from the 
market, because of the expectation that they will generate higher future performance (Klapper 
and Love, 2004, p.712). The positive coefficient on dual-listing is consistent with recent 
evidence (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Black et al., 2006a). Theoretically, this implies that 
South African firms that cross-list to the UK and US markets, and submit themselves to 
increased investor protection associated with those markets, are better able to exploit growth 
opportunities due to the greater access to external capital (Melvin and Valero, 2009, p.66). The 
positive and statistically significant coefficient on audit firm size over the entire sample period 
except 2005 means that firms that are audited by a big four audit firm receive higher market 
valuation than those that are audited by a non big four audit firm.  
Finally, consistent with prior studies (e.g., Durnev and Kim, 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006), the results show that a firm’s industry and year of operation affects its Q-ratio. The 
industry dummies show that consumer services firms (have highest statistically significant 
coefficient) performed significantly better than their counterparts in the other four industries. 
Similarly, the year dummies indicate that the average firm received significantly higher 
market valuation in 2006 (highest statistically significant coefficient) than in any other year. 
To conclude, this subsection has discussed the results of the equilibrium-variable 
model based on both the ROA and the Q-ratio. In line with the prior equilibrium-variable 
literature, the results based on both the ROA and the Q-ratio are generally mixed. First, the 
findings suggest that regardless of the firm financial performance measure used, board 
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diversity has no statistically significant impact on firm financial performance in South Africa. 
This fails to support hypothesis one (see columns 6 and 10 of Table 15). It does not also lend 
support to recommendations of King II and the general efforts in South Africa to diversify 
corporate boards. As has been explained already, this is empirically less surprising given the 
small number of women and non-whites that are currently on South African corporate boards.  
Second, the findings indicate that market returns (Q-ratio) are significantly higher if a 
firm has a larger board size, but this is not reflected in any significant measure in its 
accounting returns (ROA). This statistically significant and positive relationship between the 
Q-ratio and board size supports hypothesis two (see column 10 of Table 15). By contrast, the 
statistically insignificant and negative relationship between ROA and board size do not 
support hypothesis two (see column 6 of Table 15). The positive board size and the Q-ratio 
relationship also contradicts much of the prior UK and US evidence (e.g., Yermack, 1996; 
Vefeas, 1999; Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Guest, 2009). However, it lends empirical support to 
a number of non UK and US studies (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008; Mangena and 
Tauringana, 2008).  
This appears to imply that within the UK and US context, the stock market values the 
ability of smaller corporate boards to effectively monitor and advise managers higher than the 
potential greater access to resources that is usually associated with larger boards. In contrast, 
and within the South African context, the positive association between board size and the Q-
ratio seems to indicate that greater access to a firm’s external environment, which may 
facilitate securing critical resources that is often associated with larger boards, is rather highly 
valued by the stock market. 
Third, the findings indicate that firms that combine the roles of board chairman and 
CEO generate significantly higher accounting returns than their counterparts that split the roles. 
This fails to support hypothesis three (see column 6 of Table 15). However, it has no 
significant impact on market valuation (also fails to support hypothesis three, see column 10 
of Table 15) even though role or CEO duality is generally considered by the market as a 
negative corporate governance practice. This implies that the policy of King II and the JSE’s 
Listing Rules for South African firms to follow Cadbury-style suggestion to split the two roles 
may not be appropriate. A major theoretical implication of the statistically significant and 
positive ROA-CEO duality relationship is that role duality allows a visionary and charismatic 
CEO the opportunity to have a sharper focus on firm objectives without excessive board 
interference. 
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Fourth, the findings indicate that boards with a higher percentage of non-executive 
directors generate significantly lower accounting returns, rejecting hypothesis four (see 
column 6 of Table 15). Further, even though having more non-executive directors on the board 
is perceived positively by the market, it has no significant impact on market valuation. This 
does not support hypothesis four (see column 10 of Table 15). It also implies that the 
Cadbury-style recommendation of King II and the JSE’s Listing Rules that South African 
boards should consist of a majority of non-executive directors may not necessarily be 
applicable in South Africa.  
Theoretically, the statistically significant and negative association between the 
percentage of non-executive directors and ROA supports stewardship theory. It suggests that 
non-executive directors often command less knowledge about the business, and find it difficult 
to understand the complexities of the firm. Also, corporate boards dominated by non-executive 
directors tend to stifle managerial initiative and delay strategic action, which arise from 
excessive managerial monitoring. This can impact negatively on a firm’s ability to generate 
higher accounting returns.  
Fifth, the findings suggest that the frequency of board meetings has no statistically 
significant impact on financial performance, regardless of the measure used. The statistically 
insignificant nexus between the frequency of board meetings and firm financial performance 
indicates that hypothesis five (see columns 6 and 10 of Table 15) is not empirically supported. 
It also implies that the recommendations of King II that South African corporate boards must 
hold a minimum of four meetings in a year are not empirically supported. 
Sixth, the findings are mixed when it comes to board subcommittees. The findings 
indicate that firms that have established a nomination committee tend to generate higher 
accounting returns. This supports hypothesis six (see column 6 of Table 15). By contrast, the 
findings suggest that firms with audit and remuneration committees have no impact on 
accounting returns and market valuation. This fails to support hypothesis six (see columns 6 
and 10 of 15). It generally implies that the Cadbury-style suggestion of King II and the JSE’s 
Listing Rules that South African listed firms should establish audit, nomination, and 
remuneration committees may not be applicable.   
The seventh and final finding indicates that the market values firms with higher 
director shareownership significantly lower, but higher director ownership appears to have no 
significant impact on accounting returns. This does not offer empirical support to hypothesis 
seve (see columns 6 and 10 of Table 15). It also implies that higher director shareownership 
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may result in director entrenchment and expropriation to the disadvantage of minority 
shareholders. Overall, and as expected, the results suggest that some of the single corporate 
governance mechanisms impact positively on firm financial performance, others impact 
negatively on the financial performance, whereas some seem to have no impact on the 
financial performance of the sampled firms.  
The next subsection will discuss the results of the compliance-index model to test 
hypothesis eight. Specifically, the results based on the accounting based measure of financial 
performance (ROA) will first be discussed, followed by those based on the market based 
measure of financial performance (Q-ratio). 
 
8.1.2 Empirical Results: The Compliance-Index Model 
 
8.1.2.1 Results Based on the Accounting Measure of Financial Performance (ROA) 
 
 Table 17 contains OLS regression results for the compliance-index model based on the 
accounting based measure of financial performance (ROA). For this model, the main variable 
of focus is the South African Corporate Governance Index (the SACGI). Column 3 of Table 17 
first presents the results of a simple regression of ROA on the SACGI alone, whereas columns 
4 to 9 report the results of multivariate regression of ROA on the SACGI and the control 
variables for the pooled sample, as well as for each of the five firm-years, respectively.  
Column 3 of Table 17 suggests that the F-value of the simple regression is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This means that the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the 
SACGI is equal to zero can be rejected. It indicates that the coefficient on the SACGI can 
explain significant variations in the sampled firms’ accounting returns. The adjusted R2 is 
approximately 10%. This implies that at least 10% of the variations in the sampled firms’ 
accounting returns (ROA) can be explained by the quality of their internal corporate 
governance structures (the SACGI). This is relatively better compared with those reported by 
prior South African studies. Specifically, in a cross-country sample that include South Africa, 
Klapper and Love (2004, p.719) report an adjusted R2 of 3% for a simple regression of ROA 
on their composite corporate governance index. As hypothesised (i.e., hypothesis eight), and 
in line with the suggestions of the parametric and non-parametric correlation coefficients, the 
coefficient on the SACGI is positive (.002) and statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
also supports the positive (.08) and significant (p<.01) relationship reported by Klapper and 
Love (2004, p.719). 
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Table 17: OLS Regression Results of the Compliance-Index Model Based on Return on Assets (ROA – Accounting Measure) 
 Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years All firm years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Adjusted R2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
       .102 
      .117 
      .869 
 57.706(.000)*** 
500 
     .189 
     .111 
     .881 
   8.751(.000)*** 
500 
     .233 
     .109 
   2.097 
   3.736(.000)*** 
100 
      .071 
      .110 
    1.834 
    1.686(.090)* 
100 
     .187 
     .119 
   1.727 
   3.071(.002)*** 
100 
     .165 
     .119 
   2.155 
   2.777(.004)*** 
100 
     .133 
     .107 
   1.892 
   2.383(.012)** 
100 
Constant 
SACGI 
Firm size  
Capital structure  
Sales growth  
Capital expenditure  
Dual-listing  
Audit firm size 
Basic materials  
Consumer services  
Industrials  
Technology  
Year 2002 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
- 
-.021(.1661) 
 .002(.0001)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .005(.808) 
 .002(.000)*** 
 .013(.165) 
 .000(.004)*** 
 .002(.000)*** 
-.001(.563) 
 .012(.397) 
-.015(.270) 
-.034(.043)** 
-.021(.183) 
-.025(.121) 
 .004(.790) 
 .000(.998) 
-.019(.224) 
-.017(.305) 
-.006(.698) 
 .000(.998) 
 .003(.001)*** 
 .009(.649) 
-.001(.044)** 
 .002(.000)*** 
-.003(.295) 
-.027(.422) 
-.021(.473) 
 .004(.907) 
-.034(.333) 
-.033(.350) 
-.012(.734) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .022(.614) 
 .002(.010)*** 
-.006(.812) 
-.000(.830) 
 .001(.021)** 
-.002(.506) 
 .011(.732) 
-.037(.240) 
-.005(.893) 
-.061(.088)* 
-.028(.428) 
-.010(.774) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-.055(.259) 
 .002(.002)*** 
 .004(.869) 
 .000(.371) 
 .002(.018)** 
 .002(.557) 
 .007(.832) 
-.004(.900) 
-.057(.154) 
-.051(.204) 
-.054(.166) 
-.002(.954) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .002(.966) 
 .002(.036)** 
 .056(.018)** 
-.001(.161) 
 .001(.032)** 
-.001(.688) 
 .027(.446) 
-.006(.854) 
-.066(.100)* 
 .025(.532) 
-.012(.766) 
 .011(.778) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .042(.378) 
 .001(.080)* 
 .002(.905) 
-.001(.008)*** 
 .002(.011)** 
-.001(.624) 
 .038(.217) 
-.017(.566) 
-.043(.227) 
 .018(.603) 
 .020(.571) 
 .044(.210) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 
2003 are excluded from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison.  
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To ascertain whether the statistically significant positive relationship could be 
spuriously caused by omitted control variables, the regressions in columns 4 to 9 of Table 17 
include the control variables. They show that the F-value of each model is statistically 
significant. This means that the coefficients on the SACGI and the control variables can jointly 
explain significant variations in the sampled firms’ accounting returns.  The adjusted R2 for 
each of the five years is between 7% to 23% for the 2002-2006 period and 19% for the pooled 
sample. Statistically, this means that between 7% to 23% of the variations in the sampled 
firms’ accounting returns (ROA) can be explained by the quality of their internal corporate 
governance structures (the SACGI) and the control variables. Over the full five-year sample 
period, the model possesses an average of 19% explanatory power. This compares with the 
adjusted R2 of 29% for the pooled sample, including the control variables, of Klapper and 
Love (2004). 
 Colum 4 of Table 17 indicates that the SACGI remains positive and statistically 
significant, after adding the control variables, over the entire sample period. This supports 
hypothesis eight that there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between the 
SACGI and firm financial performance, based on ROA. It also means that, on average, better-
governed South African listed firms are associated with higher accounting returns than their 
poorly-governed counterparts. Specifically, the finding can be quantified as a one standard 
deviation improvement in the average firm’s mean internal corporate governance (the SACGI) 
score from 60% to 82%, can be expected to be associated with an increase in its average 
accounting returns (ROA) by at least 4% (22.03 x .002) from 9% to 13%, certeris paribus.  
Overall, the results are generally consistent with those of previous corporate 
governance studies (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Cui et al., 2008), 
but specifically with the findings of Klapper and Love (2004, p.719) and Chen et al. (2009). 
Using a cross-country sample that includes South African listed firms, Klapper and Love 
(2004) document a positive (.10) and statistically significant (p<.01) relationship between 
higher firm-level corporate governance quality and accounting returns (ROA). 
Similarly, in a cross-country sample that includes South Africa, Chen et al. (2009) 
report a statistically significant and negative relationship between a firm-level composite 
corporate governance index and cost of equity capital. Theoretically, this suggests that better-
governed firms in their sample are able to raise capital at cheaper cost to better exploit growth 
opportunities that helps in boosting accounting returns. 
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With respect to the control variables, the coefficient on capital structure and sales 
growth are statistically significant for the pooled sample, whereas firm size is only significant 
in year 2005. In contrast, the coefficients on audit firm size, dual-listing and the year dummies 
are not significant in any period, while all except the basic materials industry dummy is 
significant for the full sample, and also in year 2005. 
The positive and statistically significant (p<.05) coefficient on firm size in 2005 is not 
consistent with expectations. It indicates that larger firms tend to be associated with higher 
accounting returns. It also contradicts previous results of Ho and Williams (2003), but is in 
line with those of Gompers et al. (2003), Klapper and Love (2004) and Shabbir and Padget 
(2005). As hypothesised, the coefficient on sales growth is significant and positively 
associated with financial performance as measured by ROA over the entire sample period. 
Theoretically, past sales growth tend to be positively correlated with future growth 
opportunities (Klapper and Love, 2004, p.720). This implies that firms with higher past sales 
growth are likely to be associated with higher accounting returns. 
Similarly, and in line with predictions, the coefficient on capital structure (gearing) is 
positive and statistically significant for the pooled sample. It is, however, significant and 
negative in the year 2002 and 2006. As has already been discussed in subsection 5.2.2 of 
chapter five, gearing can either impact positively or negatively on ROA. The statistically 
significant and negative coefficient in 2002 and 2006, for example, suggests that due to the 
costs of financial distress, such as bankruptcy that are usually associated with higher levels of 
gearing, firms that use more debt restrict their financial flexibility and capacity to pursue 
positive NPV projects (Myers, 1977, p.148).  
By contrast, the statistically significant and positive coefficient for the pooled sample 
indicate that higher levels of gearing can increase accounting returns by reducing agency 
conflicts associated with ‘free cash flows’ by opportunistic managers (Jensen, 1986, p.323). 
The negative relationship between gearing and performance also supports previous findings. 
Specifically, Bevan and Danbolt (2002, 2004) and Ho and Williams (2003) report statistically 
significant and negative relationship between gearing and accounting profits. The negative 
sign on the coefficient of audit firm size is theoretically expected, but it is statistically 
insignificant. This implies that audit firm size appears to have no impact on the sampled firms’ 
accounting returns. 
 The statistically insignificant coefficients on dual-listing and the year dummies reject 
the hypotheses that dual-listing and firm year affect a firm’s accounting returns. The negative 
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and statistically insignificant coefficient on dual-listing further rejects the results of Charitou 
and Louca (2009). Using a cross-country sample that include South Africa, Charitou and 
Louca (2009) find that dual-listing is positively associated with operating accounting returns.  
It also rejects the suggestions of cross-country surveys conducted in emerging markets 
that include South Africa by CLSA (2000) and Deutsche Bank (2002) that cross-listing is 
expected to impact positively on operating financial performance. Finally, the significant 
negative coefficient on the basic materials industry dummy implies that basic materials firms 
tend to be associated with significantly lower accounting returns than their counterparts. This 
offers support to the results of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) that a firm’s industry of operation 
can affect its accounting (ROA) performance. 
 
8.1.2.2 Results Based on the Market Measure of Financial Performance (Q-ratio) 
 
 Table 18 contains OLS regression results for the compliance-index model based on the 
market based measure of financial performance (Q-ratio). Similarly, the main variable of focus 
is the SACGI. Column 3 of Table 18 first presents the results of a simple regression of the Q-
ratio on the SACGI only, whilst columns 4 to 9 report the results of multivariate regression of 
the Q-ratio on the SACGI and the control variables for the full sample in addition to a 
regression for each of the five firm-years, respectively.  
Consistent with the results of the ROA, Column 3 of Table 18 suggests that the F-
value of the simple regression is statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the 
null hypothesis that the coefficient on the SACGI is equal to zero can be rejected. It implies 
that the SACGI can explain statistically significant variations in the sampled firms’ market 
value. The adjusted R2 is 10%, which is very similar to the adjusted R2 obtained for the ROA. 
This also indicates that at least 10% of the variations in the sampled firms’ market value (Q-
ratio) can be explained by the quality of their internal corporate governance structures (the 
SACGI). This is also an improvement in the results reported by Klapper and Love (2004). It is, 
however, very similar to the results of Black et al. (2006a).  
Using a cross-country sample that includes South Africa, Klapper and Love (2004, 
p.719) report an adjusted R2 of 3% for a simple regression of the Q-ratio on their composite 
corporate governance index. In a simple regression of the Q-ratio on their composite corporate 
governance index, Black et al. (2006a, p.381) document adjusted R2 of 12%.  
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Table 18: OLS Regression Results of the Compliance-Index Model Based on Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio – Market Measure) 
 Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years All firm years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Adjusted R2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
      .100 
     .617 
   1.018 
 56.633(.000)*** 
500 
     .292 
     .548 
   1.039 
 14.729(.000)*** 
500 
     .160 
     .506 
   2.089 
   2.716(.005)*** 
100 
     .218 
     .469 
   1.936 
   3.503(.000)*** 
100 
      .071 
      .530 
    1.966 
    1.690(.089)* 
100 
     .142 
     .632 
   1.933 
   2.495(.009)*** 
100 
     .167 
     .641 
   2.185 
   2.804(.004)*** 
100 
Constant 
SACGI 
Firm size  
Capital structure  
Sales growth  
Capital expenditure  
Dual-listing  
Audit firm size 
Basic materials  
Consumer services  
Industrials  
Technology  
Year 2002 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
 
+ 
- 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
 .926(.000)*** 
 .009(.000)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .720(.000)*** 
 .004(.008)*** 
-.172(.000)*** 
-.003(.000)*** 
 .001(.373) 
 .020(.001)*** 
 .192(.006)*** 
 .158(.016)** 
 .237(.004)*** 
 .416(.000)*** 
 .099(.209) 
 .215(.006)*** 
 .053(.501) 
 .178(.024)** 
 .397(.000)*** 
 .565(.000)*** 
 .899(.000)*** 
 .001(.737) 
 .011(.912) 
-.003(.070)* 
 .003(.226) 
 .014(.309) 
 .321(.039)** 
 .134(.327) 
 .192(.266) 
 .257(.118) 
-.032(.844) 
 .184(.263) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .681(.000)*** 
 .003(.015)** 
-.265(.009)*** 
-.001(.344) 
-.003(.223) 
 .014(.303) 
 .135(.334) 
 .183(.172) 
 .238(.149) 
 .355(.021)** 
-.043(.780) 
 .151(.323) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
  .985(.000)*** 
  .001(.667) 
 -.209(.056)* 
 -.001(.561) 
  .002(.537) 
  .003(.831) 
  .146(.328) 
  .160(.295) 
  .204(.248) 
  .439(.014)** 
  .230(.178) 
  .206(.227) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1.172(.000)*** 
  .002(.706) 
 -.178(.154) 
 -.004(.069)* 
  .004(.291) 
  .039(.015)** 
  .269(.152) 
  .098(.571) 
  .080(.707) 
  .451(.033)** 
  .032(.880) 
  .063(.765) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1.094(.000)*** 
  .005(.096)* 
 -.199(.110) 
 -.006(.007)*** 
  .002(.638) 
  .027(.077)* 
  .136(.455) 
  .143(.412) 
  .342(.110) 
  .533(.014)** 
  .234(.268) 
  .358(.085)* 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 
2003 are excluded from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. 
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 As predicted (i.e., hypothesis eight), the SACGI is positive (.009) and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This finding also supports the results of prior studies. Specifically, 
in a simple regression of the Q-ratio on their composite corporate governance indices, Klapper 
and Love (2004) and Black et al. (2006a) separately report statistically significant and positive 
relationships of .011 and .006, respectively. 
The statistically significant coefficient on the constant term in column 3 of Table 18 
seems to suggest that there may be omitted variables bias. Therefore, to control for potential 
omitted variables bias, control variables are added to the regressions in columns 4 to 9 of 
Table 18. In line with the results for the ROA, Column 4 of Table 18 shows that the F-value of 
each model is statistically significant. It indicates that the coefficients on the SACGI and the 
control variables can jointly explain significant variations in the sampled firms’ market value. 
The adjusted R2 for each of the five years is between 7% and 21%, and 29% for the combined 
sample. This is generally similar to the results of prior South African studies. Using cross-
country samples that include South Africa, Klapper and Love (2004, p.719), Durnev and Kim 
(2005, p.1482), and Morey et al. (2009, p.260) report adjusted R2 that include control variables 
of 37%, 34%, and 17%, respectively. 
As expected (i.e., hypothesis eight), Table 18 indicates that the coefficient on the 
SACGI is positive over the entire sample period. However, the coefficient is statistically 
significant for the combined sample, as well as in 2003 and 2006, but insignificant in 2002, 
2004 and 200583. The statistically significant coefficient for the pooled sample, and in 2003 
and 2006 supports hypothesis eight that there is a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between the SACGI and the Q-ratio. 
This indicates that investors reward South African listed firms that show higher 
standards of corporate governance with higher market valuation. Specifically, the result can be 
interpreted as a one standard deviation improvement in the average firm’s internal corporate 
governance (the SACGI) score from 60% to 82%, can be expected to be associated with an 
                                                 
83The statistically insignificant coefficients in 2004 and 2005 in particular are not empirically too surprising 
because, and as has already been discussed in chapter six, compliance with the SACGI generally improves over 
time. As variability in corporate governance standards across the sample reduces over time, the variability in 
market valuation (variation in the Q-ratio over time will be discussed further in chapter nine) among the sampled 
firms appears to also reduce. That is, with convergence of corporate governance standards over time, the ability 
of the SACGI to explain valuation differences among the sampled firms seems to also reduce. This also offers 
firm-level evidence to support the results of cross country studies, including Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev 
and Kim (2005), Chen et al. (2009), and Morey et al. (2009), which suggest that corporate governance matters 
more in countries with poor legal and investor protection regimes. 
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increase in its average market valuation (Q-ratio) by at least 20% (22.03 x .009) from 1.49 to 
1.79, all else equal.  
Of particular interest, and as expected, the adjusted R2 for the pooled sample of 29%, 
and the valuation impact of 20% for the Q-ratio, are substantially higher when compared with 
those of the ROA. As has already been discussed in subsection 5.2.2.3 of chapter five, this 
may be explained by the fact that ROA is a historical measure, which reflects actual 
accounting profits from the operations of firms. By contrast, as a market based measure, Q-
ratio reflects potential future growth opportunities of firms. This implies that the association 
between firm-level improvements in the quality of corporate governance and financial 
performance is more likely to be tighter for the market based measure (Q-ratio) than for the 
accounting based measure of performance (ROA). The adjusted R2 of the full sample in the 
regression analysis when the control variables are added is higher for the Q-ratio than for the 
ROA. The adjusted R2 for the ROA and Q-ratio, however, become essentially the same when 
the control variables are excluded. This further suggests that the control variables account 
more for the observed differences in the adjusted R2 between the two performance measures. 
Overall, the positive relationship between the Q-ratio and the SACGI offers additional 
empirical support to the extant corporate governance literature, as well as the results of prior 
South African studies. For example, Beiner et al. (2006), Black et al., (2006a), and Henry 
(2008) find that corporate governance is positively correlated with the Q-ratio for a sample of 
Swiss, South Korean, and Australian listed firms, respectively. Similarly, using cross-country 
samples that include South Africa, Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2005), and 
Morey et al. (2009) separately report a statistically significant and positive link between the 
Q-ratio and the quality of a firm’s corporate governance.  
The evidence of a statistically significant and positive internal corporate governance-
performance link is also in line with the extant theory.  It has been suggested that compliance 
with a Code of Best Governance Practice, such as King II, is a major way by which firms 
signal to investors that they are better-governed, and by implication working in the best 
interests of shareholders (Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.1). The positive perception is then 
translated by investors into higher valuation for such firms perceived by the market to be 
better-governed. 
With regard to the control variables, the coefficient on sales growth, year 2002 and 
industrials firms’ dummies are not statistically significant, whereas the rest are statistically 
significant for the combined sample. In line with predictions, firm size, and capital structure 
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are negatively associated with the Q-ratio, whilst sales growth, capital expenditure, audit firm 
size and dual-listing are positively correlated with the Q-ratio for the full sample.  
Across the years, the negative coefficient on firm size is further statistically significant 
in 2003 and 2004, whereas the negative coefficient on capital structure is also significant in 
2002, 2005 and 2006. The negative relationship between gearing and performance suggests 
that more profitable firms tend to use less debt than equity. This is because equity offers 
managers more financial flexibility (Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.19). The negative size-
performance link also indicates that investors perceive smaller firms as better performers than 
their larger counterparts (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1052). Empirically, the findings are 
consistent with the results of prior corporate governance studies. Specifically, Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996), Durnev and Kim (2005), and Henry (2008) report statistically significant and 
negative association between the Q-ratio and firm size.  
Across the years, the positive coefficient on capital expenditure is also statistically 
significant in 2005 and 2006. The statistically significant and positive coefficients on capital 
expenditure offers empirical support to the theory that firms with greater investment in assets, 
innovation and technology, are more able to stimulate faster growth, and tend to be associated 
with superior sustainable performance (Jermias, 2007, p.829). The positive relationship 
between capital expenditure and the Q-ratio generally supports the results of prior studies (e.g., 
Black et al., 2006a; Brown et al., 2009). 
Apart from the full sample, the positive coefficient on dual-listing is also statistically 
significant at the 5% level in 2002. The statistically significant and positive coefficient on 
dual-listing in 2002 supports the idea that firms resort to cross-listing as a way of reducing the 
agency costs of controlling shareholders by offering them greater access to cheaper external 
capital. This makes them better able to take advantage of growth opportunities relative to their 
non-dual-listed counterparts (Doidge et al., 2009, p.425; Melvin and Valero, 2009, p.66). 
Evidence of a statistically significant and positive dual-listing-performance link is also 
consistent with the results of recent corporate governance studies. Specifically, using cross-
country samples that include South Africa, Klapper and Love (2004) and Charitou and Louca 
(2009) independently report that cross-listed firms generate higher financial performance than 
their non dual-listed counterparts. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on audit 
firm size for the pooled sample implies that the market values firms that are audited by a big 
four audit firm higher than those that are audited a non big four audit firm. 
  
277 
Of special interest is that the coefficients on all of the industry and year dummies for 
the combined sample are positive. As has been explained above, except for the coefficients on 
industrials firms and year 2002, which are statistically insignificant, all the industry and the 
year dummies for the pooled sample are statistically significant. The positive industry 
coefficients suggest that, on average, industrial firms (positive but insignificant coefficient) 
performed poorly compared with their counterparts in the other four industries. Similarly, and 
in line with the suggestions of the descriptive statistics, performance was lower for the average 
firm in 2002 than in the other years. By contrast, the results indicate that consumer services 
firms received higher (highest significant positive coefficient) market valuation than their 
counterparts. Also, and similar to the results of the descriptive statistics, the year coefficients 
show that the average sampled firm’s market valuation was higher in 2006 (highest significant 
positive coefficient) than in the other years. 
Overall, the results offer empirical support to prior evidence that suggests that a firm’s 
industry and year of operation can affect its financial performance. Specifically, Klapper and 
Love (2004), Beiner et al. (2006), and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) separately report 
statistically significant industrial differences in the levels of financial performance, whereas 
Shabbir and Padget (2005) and Henry (2008) independently find that financial performance of 
firms tend to differ over time. 
To sum up, this subsection has presented the results of the compliance-index model. 
Consistent with the prior literature, it shows that irrespective of the performance measure used, 
on average, better-governed firms are associated with significantly higher financial 
performance than their poorly-governed counterparts. Generally, this offers empirical support 
to hypothesis eight. However, and interpreting the coefficients of the simple regressions, the 
association between the Q-ratio and firm-level corporate governance appears to be stronger 
than the relationship between firm-level corporate governance and ROA. This is theoretically 
expected because, as a historical based measure, accounting profit reflects actual company 
performance, while as a market based measure, the Q-ratio captures NPV of all future growth 
opportunities.  
By contrast, when simple regressions of the performance measures (ROA and Q-ratio) 
against the SACGI without the control variables are run, the results show that the ability of the 
SACGI to explain variations in the ROA and Q-ratio are very similar. However, when the 
control variables are added, the explanatory power of the Q-ratio becomes substantially higher 
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than the ROA. This indicates that the contribution of the control variables accounts more for 
the observed difference in the SACGI’s ability to explain variations in the ROA and Q-ratio. 
As have been discussed in chapters five, six and seven, the SACGI will be split into 
two: the Social-SACGI and the Economic-SACGI. This is to help in quantifying the economic 
consequence of complying with the nine South African context specific affirmative action and 
stakeholder corporate governance provisions (the Social-SACGI) on South African listed firms. 
Therefore, the next subsection will discuss the results obtained based on estimating the Social-
SACGI and the Economic-SACGI. 
 
8.1.3 OLS Regression Results of the Link between Financial Performance and  
         Sub-Indices 
 
Table 19 contains the regression results of the financial performance proxies (ROA and 
Q-ratio) on the two constructed sub-indices: the Social-SACGI and the Economic-SACGI. As 
have been explained in chapters five and six, the Social-SACGI consists of nine South African 
context specific affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions. These are 
board diversity on the basis of ethnicity (BDIVE1) and gender (BDIVG1), policies and 
practices with respect to black economic empowerment (BEE), HIV/Aids (HIV), employment 
equity (PEQ), health and safety (PHS), environment (PEP), corporate social investment (CSI), 
and ethics (DCE). The Economic-SACGI is made up of the remaining 41 ‘conventional’ 
corporate governance provisions. Methodologically, splitting the SACGI is in line with past 
corporate governance studies (e.g., Durnev and Kim, 2005; Black et al., 2006a). For example, 
Durnev and Kim (2005) split their composite corporate governance index into investor 
protection, transparency, and social awareness sub-indices. 
The rationale is to empirically investigate whether compliance with the two sub-
indices results in different impacts on the sampled firms’ financial performance. This is 
because, and from a theoretical perspective, it has been contended that the inclusion of the 
South African context specific affirmative and stakeholder issues as part of the general 
corporate governance provisions for listed firms to comply by King II imposes excessive costs 
burden on them (e.g., Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; LSE, 2007). If this contention 
holds, then a priori, it can be expected that compliance with the Social-SACGI is more likely 
to negatively affect the sampled firms’ financial performance. By contrast, compliance with 
the Economic-SACGI can be expected to have a positive impact on the sampled firms’ 
financial performance. 
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Table 19: OLS Regression Results of Financial Performance on the Social and Economic Sub-indices 
Performance  Variable Exp. 
sign 
ROA Q-ratio ROA Q-ratio ROA Q-ratio ROA Q-ratio 
Adjusted R2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
       .104 
      .117 
      .871 
 58.641(.000)*** 
500 
    .103 
    .617 
  1.027 
58.163(.000)*** 
500 
   .181 
   .112 
   .873 
8.332(.000)*** 
500 
    .298 
    .545 
  1.040 
15.110(.000)*** 
500 
    .089 
    .118 
    .864 
49.892(.000)*** 
500 
    .087 
    .622 
  1.018 
50.103(.000)*** 
500 
  .179 
  .112 
  .978 
8.233(.000)*** 
500 
    .291 
    .520 
  1.059 
14.600(.000)*** 
500 
Constant 
Social-SACGI 
Economic-SACGI 
Firm size 
Capital structure 
Sales growth 
Capital expenditure 
Dual-listing 
Audit firm size 
Basic materials 
Consumer services 
Industrials 
Technology 
2002 
2004 
2005 
2006 
 
- 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-.004(.743) 
 .001(.000)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1.011(.000)*** 
  .001(.000)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .030(.142) 
 .001(.000)*** 
- 
 .008(.384) 
 .000(.002)*** 
 .001(.000)*** 
-.001(.416) 
 .016(.236) 
 .002(.905) 
-.042(.010)*** 
-.019(.244) 
-.022(.177) 
-.000(.995) 
-.009(.573) 
-.016(.321) 
-.012(.462) 
-.001(.993) 
 .716(.000)*** 
 .003(.009)*** 
-
 
-.180(.000)*** 
-.003(.000)*** 
 .001(.476) 
 .019(.002)*** 
 .168(.006)*** 
 .161(.009)*** 
 .230(.004)*** 
 .408(.000)*** 
 .101(.196) 
 .200(.011)** 
 .049(.526) 
 .175(.025)** 
 .391(.000)*** 
 .559(.000)*** 
-.013(.398) 
- 
 .002(.000)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
.970(.000)*** 
- 
.009(.000)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .011(.614) 
- 
 .002(.000)*** 
 .014(.140) 
 .000(.002)*** 
 .002(.000)*** 
-.001(.670) 
 .019(.191) 
-.012(.368) 
-.034(.043)** 
-.019(.240) 
-.025(.124) 
 .007(.675) 
-.001(.961) 
-.018(.264) 
-.014(.374) 
-.004(.823) 
 .746(.000) 
- 
 .006(.010)*** 
-.172(.000)*** 
-.003(.000)*** 
 .001(.345) 
 .021(.001)*** 
 .210(.002)*** 
 .172(.010)*** 
 .232(.004)*** 
 .423(.000)*** 
 .101(.202) 
 .219(.005)*** 
 .047(.552) 
 .183(.020)** 
 .404(.000)*** 
 .574(.000)*** 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, and **  denote p-value is significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 2003 are excluded from the 
regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. 
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 19 present the regression results of ROA and Q-ratio on the 
Social-SACGI alone without the control variables. The F-values of both regressions are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the coefficient on 
the Social-SACGI is equal to zero can be rejected. It means that the coefficient on the Social-
SACGI can explain significant differences in the sampled firms’ financial performance. The 
adjusted R2 is approximately 10% for both the ROA and Q-ratio. This means that on its own, 
the Social-SACGI can explain approximately 10% of the variability in the sampled firms’ 
ROA and Q-ratio. This is very similar to the adjusted R2 reported in Column 3 of Tables 17 
and 18 for the SACGI, but statistically 0.2% and 0.3% higher in the case of ROA and the Q-
ratio, respectively. As have been discussed in chapters six and seven, this is expected because 
the average firm’s compliance level with the Social-SACGI was higher (67%) than the average 
firm’s compliance level (60%) with the SACGI. This explains the marginally higher 
explanatory power of the Social-SACGI compared with the SACGI. 
The coefficient on the Social-SACGI under both the ROA and Q-ratio is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The positive link between the Social-SACGI and the 
two financial performance proxies (ROA and Q-ratio) is contrary to theoretical expectations. 
This implies that, on average, firms that comply better with the South African context specific 
affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions (the Social-SACGI) are 
associated with higher accounting returns and/or receive higher market valuation.  
The statistically significant coefficient on the constant term in column 4 (under the Q-
ratio) of Table 19 seems to suggest that there may be omitted variables bias. As a result, to test 
whether the unexpected positive relationship between the Social-SACGI and the performance 
proxies is spuriously caused by some omitted variables, the control variables are added to the 
regressions in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 19. The F-values of both regressions are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This means that the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the 
Social-SACGI and the control variables are jointly equal to zero can be rejected. This indicates 
that the coefficients on the Social-SACGI and the control variables can jointly explain 
significant differences in the sampled firms’ financial performance. The adjusted R2 is 
approximately 18% and 30% for the ROA and Q-ratio, respectively. This means that the 
Social-SACGI together with the control variables can explain approximately 18% and 29% of 
the variability in the sampled firms’ ROA and Q-ratio, respectively. This is also very similar 
to the adjusted R2 reported in Column 4 of Tables 17 and 18 for the SACGI with the control 
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variables, but statistically 0.8% lower with respect to the ROA, and .6% higher in the case of 
the Q-ratio.  
Similar to the results of the SACGI, when simple regressions are run, the ability of the 
Social-SACGI to explain variations in the ROA and Q-ratio are essentially the same. However, 
once control variables are included, the ability of the Social-SACGI to explain variations in the 
Q-ratio is substantially (12%) higher than the ROA. This implies that the observed difference 
in explanatory power between the ROA and Q-ratio can be attributed to the effects of the 
control variables. 
With respect to the coefficient on the Social-SACGI, it remains positive under both 
performance measures, the ROA and Q-ratio. The main difference, however, is that whereas 
the coefficient under the ROA remains unchanged at .001, that of the Q-ratio has increase 
from .001 to .003. This means that the valuation impact for complying with the Social-SACGI 
when control variables are included is higher at 9% (i.e., 29.21 x .003) for the Q-ratio than for 
the ROA at 3% (i.e., 29.21 x .001). As has already been explained above, this is theoretically 
expected because, as a market based measure, Q-ratio captures discounted future expected 
cash flows without accounting for potential deviations from actual cash flows. By contrast, as 
a historical based measure, ROA reflects actual accounting profits from operations, including 
deviations from projected profits. This explains the observed difference in valuation 
consequences of complying with the Social-SACGI between the ROA and Q-ratio. 
What then explains the positive rather than the theoretically expected negative 
relationship between the Social-SACGI and financial performance proxies? As have been 
discussed in chapters six and seven, both the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients 
indicate that the levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI are statistically significant and 
positively correlated with the levels of compliance with the SACGI.  This shows that, on 
average, the sampled firms’ with higher total corporate governance (the SACGI) scores also 
tend to comply better with the South African context specific affirmative action and 
stakeholder corporate governance provisions (the Social-SACGI).  
Practically, and as will be explained further below, this means that the valuation 
consequences of complying with the South African context specific affirmative action and 
stakeholder corporate governance provisions appears to outweigh the costs implications such 
that there is a net positive impact on financial performance. Empirically, the positive 
coefficient offers support to the results of Durnev and Kim (2005, p.1482) who report a 
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positive, but statistically insignificant, relationship between their social awareness sub-index 
and the Q-ratio.  
Despite being contrary to theoretical expectations, evidence that the sampled firms 
tend to be associated with higher accounting returns (ROA) or investors value (the Q-ratio)  
compliance with the affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions in 
South Africa is, however, less surprising. As has been discussed in chapters two and three, 
even though the South African corporate governance model is predominantly Anglo-American, 
listed firms are officially required to comply with a number of affirmative action and 
stakeholder provisions. This compels listed firms to depict some of the major characteristics of 
both the ‘shareholding’ and ‘stakeholding’ governance models. Most of these affirmative 
action and stakeholder provisions are meant to address some of the apparent negative social 
and economic legacies of Apartheid in South Africa. 
As has also been discussed in chapter three, apart from being part of King II and the 
JSE’s listing rules, some of the stakeholder provisions, such as employment equity (PEP) and 
black economic empowerment (BEE) are backed by enforceable statutory legislation. There 
are also occasional implicit threats from government (political cost) of its intentions to 
introduce more stringent laws if firms do not voluntarily comply (e.g., Rossouw et al., 2002; 
West, 2009). This implies that listed firms, and especially large companies, are more likely to 
voluntarily comply with the South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder 
provisions in order to minimise potential political costs, such as strigent regulation, taxation, 
and nationalisation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, p.115; Andreasson, 2009, p.22). Together, 
they appear to compel firms to comply with the affirmative action and stakeholder provisions, 
and also seems to explain why compliance with the Social-SACGI is higher than the SACGI.  
Crucially, and of a particular relevance to basic materials and technology firms, 
securing and renewing profitable government and mining contracts, for instance, are normally 
linked to satisfying black empowerment and employment equity targets (e.g., Murray, 2000; 
Malherbe and Segal, 2003). This means that compliance with the Social-SACGI may be a 
major way by which firms can gain access to valuable resources, including securing profitable 
government backed empowerment deals and contracts that can facilitate growth and improve 
long-term financial performance. This seems to serve as a major additional motivation for 
firms to voluntarily comply with the Social-SACGI, and hence, appears to explain the positive 
association between the Social-SACGI and both the ROA and Q-ratio. 
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With reference to the control variables, their statistical significance and direction of the 
coefficients remain very similar to those reported in column 4 of Tables 17 and 18, 
respectively. For example, the significance and the coefficients of firm size, capital structure, 
sales growth, capital expenditure, audit firm size and dual-listing under both the ROA and Q-
ratio remain unchanged when compared with those of the combined SACGI, indicating that the 
results are stable. Overall, the results suggest that the Social-SACGI holds significant 
explanatory power over the variability in firm financial performance with or without the 
control variables. 
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 19 report the regression results of ROA and Q-ratio on the 
Economic-SACGI alone without the control variables. The F-values of both regressions are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient on the Economic-SACGI is equal to zero can be rejected. It indicates that the 
coefficient on the Economic-SACGI can explain significant differences in the sampled firms’ 
financial performance. The adjusted R2 is approximately 9% for both the ROA and Q-ratio. 
This means that on its own, the Economic-SACGI can explain approximately 9% of the 
variability in the sampled firms’ ROA and Q-ratio. This is approximately 1% less than the 
adjusted R2 reported in Column 3 of Tables 17 and 18 for the SACGI. This is expected because, 
on average, the Social-SACGI holds more explanatory power than the SACGI. As a result, the 
Economic-SACGI appears to loose some of its explanatory power through the exclusion of the 
Social-SACGI from the SACGI. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the coefficient on the 
Economic-SACGI under both the ROA and Q-ratio is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% significance level. This supports the previous conclusion that, on average, better-
governed firms are associated with higher financial performance than their poorly-governed 
counterparts.  
The statistically significant coefficient on the constant term in column 8 (under the Q-
ratio) of Table 19 appears to suggest that there may be omitted variables bias. Therfore, to 
ascertain whether the positive relationship between the Economic-SACGI and the performance 
proxies is spuriously caused by some omitted variables, the control variables are included in 
the regressions in Columns 9 and 10 of Table 19. The F-value of both regressions are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies that the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients on the Economic-SACGI and the control variables are jointly equal to zero can be 
rejected. This indicates that the coefficients on the Economic-SACGI and the control variables 
can jointly explain significant differences in the sampled firms’ financial performance. The 
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adjusted R2 is approximately 18% and 29% for the ROA and Q-ratio, respectively. This means 
that the Economic-SACGI together with the control variables can explain approximately 18% 
and 29% of the variability in the sampled firms’ ROA and Q-ratio, respectively. This is also 
very similar to the adjusted R2 reported in Column 4 of Tables 17 and 19 for the SACGI with 
the control variables, but statistically 1% and .1% less in the case of ROA and Q-ratio, 
respectively. 
With respect to the coefficient on the Economic-SACGI, it remains positive under both 
the ROA and Q-ratio. The main difference, however, is that while the coefficient under the 
ROA remains the same at .002, that of the Q-ratio has decreased from .009 to .006. This may 
also be explained by the exclusion of the impact of the Social-SACGI from the SACGI. 
With reference to the control variables, their statistical significance and direction of the 
coefficients remain essentially the same as those reported in column 4 of Tables 17 and 18, 
respectively. For example, the significance and the coefficient of firm size, capital structure, 
sales growth, capital expenditure, audit firm size and dual-listing under both the ROA and Q-
ratio remain unchanged when compared with those of the combined SACGI, indicating that the 
results are stable. Overall, the results suggest that the Economic-SACGI holds significant 
explanatory power over the variability in the sampled firms’ financial performance with or 
without the control variables. This reinforces the earlier conclusion that South African listed 
firms with higher quality corporate governance standards, on average, tend to be associated 
with higher financial returns than their counterparts with lower quality corporate governance 
standards. 
In summing up, this subsection has examined the economic consequences of 
complying with the nine South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder 
corporate governance provisions (the Social-SACGI) for South African listed firms. Contrary 
to theoretical expectations, compliance with the Social-SACGI is found to be statistically 
significant and positively related to both the ROA and Q-ratio. The main implication of this 
evidence is that South African listed firms that comply better with the nine affirmative action 
and stakeholder corporate governance provisons tend to be associated with significantly higher 
financial returns, as measured by the ROA and Q-atio than their counterparts that do not.  
Despite being contrary to theoretical predictions, however, the results can be explained 
within the South African context. Compliance with the Social-SACGI appears to be a major 
way by which South African listed firms seem to reduce possible political costs and also gain 
access to valuable resources, such as securing profitable mining and government contracts to 
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expand growth opportunities and improve long-term financial performance. This appears to 
serve as a great motivation for firms to comply with the Social-SACGI, and thus may explain 
the positive relationship between the Social-SACGI and both the ROA and Q-ratio. As 
hypothesised, the Economic-SACGI is found to be statistically significant and positively 
associated with both the ROA and Q-ratio. Overall, the results support the earlier conclusion 
that, on average, better-governed South African listed firms tend to be associated with higher 
financial returns than their poorly-governed counterparts. 
In the final section below, the empirical strengths of the compliance-index (the 
Economic-SACGI) model and the equilibrium-variable model will be assessed and compared 
using their respective results, as well as the summary regression diagnostics. Specifically, 
subsection 8.2.1 will compare their respective regression results, whilst subsection 8.2.2 will 
carry out similar comparison using their respective summary regression diagnostics. 
 
 
8.2 A COMPARISON OF THE RESULTS OF THE COMPLIANCE-INDEX AND     
      THE EQUILIBRIUM-VARIABLE MODELS 
 
 As has been discussed in subsection 5.2.1 of chapter five, the prior literature has 
mainly either used a compliance-index model or an equilibrium-variable model. To date, no 
researcher has used both approaches within the same study and context in order to assess their 
respective potential empirical strengths. This section attempts to fill this gap in the prior 
literature by comparing further the results obtained under the compliance-index and the 
equilibrium-variable models. 
   
8.2.1 A Comparison of the Empirical Results of the Compliance-Index and the  
         Equilibrium-Variable Models 
  
Since the compliance-index model contains conventional (41 out of 50) and non-
conventional (9 out of 50) corporate governance provisions, it may be in appropriate to 
compare its results with those of the equilibrium-variable model, which contains only 
conventional corporate governance mechanisms. As a result, the comparison is done by using 
the Economic-SACGI and the equilibrium-variable model. Comparing the results84  of the 
                                                 
84Despite the fact that the two models have different number of explanatory variables, drawing comparisons of 
the respective strengths of their empirical results is deemed appropriate. This is because both models are 
estimated based on the same dataset and context. More importantly, and as has been discussed in subsection 5.2.1 
of chapter five, the models are based on distinct or contrasting ontological, epistemological, methodological and 
data requirements assumptions. For example, past researchers using the compliance-index model have usually 
composed some measure of a ‘compliance or composite’ corporate governance index in examining the corporate 
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equilibrium-variable model in Tables 14 and 16 to those of the compliance-index (the 
Economic-SACGI) in Table 19 model and ignoring possible endogenity problems and 
potential interdependences85, a number of interesting findings emerge. The results contained in 
Table 19 show that irrespective of the performance measure used, the Economic-SACGI is 
statistically significant with consistent positive coefficient over the entire sample period (for 
brevity purposes, the results for the firm years are not reported here) in the case of the ROA. 
The Economic-SACGI is statistically insignificant in 2002, 2004 and 2005 (for brevity 
purposes, the results for the firm years are not presented here) with respect to the Q-ratio.  
However, the p-values are relatively low (relatively close to becoming statistically 
significant) with consistently positive coefficients. Overall, and consistent with the results of 
recent researchers who also constructed some measure of ‘composite’ corporate governance 
index (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008), it suggests that a firm’s 
internal corporate governance structures significantly and positively impact on its financial 
(both accounting and market based measures) performance.  
 By contrast, and in line with previous evidence (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Vefeas, 1999; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), the results of the equilibrium-variable model presented in Tables 
14 and 16 are highly mixed. Irrespective of the performance proxy used, most of the corporate 
governance variables are statistically insignificant, and even where they are found to be 
significant, the sign of the coefficients are not consistent across the performance measures. 
Overall, and consistent with past evidence (e.g., Weir and Laing, 2000; Weir et al., 2002), the 
results obtained from this model suggest either a statistically weak or insignificant relationship 
between the selected single internal corporate governance structures and financial performance. 
 In summary, it is evident from the reported results that the compliance-index 
(Economic-SACGI) model provides better empirical properties, as well as explanatory power 
than the equilibrium-variable model. In the next and last subsection, summary regression 
diagnostics will be examined further to ascertain whether similar conclusions can be drawn.  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
governance-financial performance link (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006a; Henry, 
2008; Morey et al., 2009). Similarly, the equilibrium-variable model researchers have applied different measures 
and/or number of single corporate governance metrics in assessing the corporate governance-financial 
performance relationship, such as board size (Yermack, 1996; Guest, 2009), director ownership (Morck et al., 
1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990), the frequency of board meetings (Vefeas, 1999a), board diversity (Carter et 
al., 2003), as well as a number of corporate governance provisions together (e.g., Laing and Weir, 1999; Weir et 
al., 2002; Bozec, 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006).  
85In chapter nine, the extent to which the results reported in this chapter are robust or sensitive to the potential 
existence of endogeneities and interdependences among possible alternative corporate governance mechanisms 
will be examined. 
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8.2.2 A Comparison of Summary Regression Diagnostics 
 
First, and as has been discussed in chapter seven, normal distributional properties and 
statistics were conducted for both the compliance-index (the Economic-SACGI) and 
equilibrium-variable models. They indicate that irrespective of the financial performance 
measure and regression diagnostic used, the compliance-index (the Economic-SACGI) model 
provides better distributional properties than the equilibrium-variable model. For example, 
while none of the computed tolerance statistics for the compliance-index (the Economic-
SACGI) model is above the critical value of one, some of the equilibrium-variables, such as 
director ownership, have tolerance statistics well above the critical value of one. Similarly, the 
statistics show that the equilibrium-variable model possesses poor Cook’s distances, condition 
indices, eigenvalues, variance proportions, VIF, and studentised residuals, in comparison with 
those of the compliance-index (the Economic-SACGI) model.  
Second, Table 20 presents summary regression diagnostics from both the compliance-
index (the Economic-SACGI) and the equilibrium-variable models. They have already been 
reported in Tables 14, 16 and 19, but have been repeated to facilitate comparison. Panels A to 
G report summary regression diagnostics for: the pooled sample, but without the control 
variables; the pooled sample with the control variables; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; and 2006 
firm years, respectively.  
For each model, adjusted R2, F-value and its statistical significance, standard error, and 
Durbin-Watson statistics are reported. Briefly, the adjusted R2 provides an indication of the 
extent to which the internal corporate governance variables are able to explain the observed 
variability in the financial performance measure under consideration. The higher the adjusted 
R2, the greater the explanatory power of the model. 
The F-value tests for whether the coefficients on all the independent (corporate 
governance) variables in a particular model are jointly significant. The lower the significance 
level (i.e., closer to zero), the better the model. The standard error is a measure of the standard 
deviation of the distribution of the regression residuals. The lower the standard errors, the 
better the model. Durbin-Watson statistic tests for the level of autocorrelation in a particular 
model. A higher Durbin-Watson statistic indicates the absence of serious autocorrelation 
problems.    
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Table 20: A Comparison of Summary Regression Diagnostics 
Compliance-Index 
Model (E-SACGI) 
Equilibrium-
Variable Model 
Regression Diagnostics 
ROA Q-ratio ROA Q-ratio 
Panel A: All firm Years – without control variables 
Adjusted R2 
F-value 
F-value significance 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
 
.089 
49.892 
.000 
.118 
.864 
 
.087 
50.103 
.000 
.622 
1.018 
 
.063 
3.522 
.000 
.116 
.904 
 
.062 
3.466 
.000 
.623 
1.032 
All firm Years – with control variables 
Adjusted R2 
F-value 
F-value significance 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
 
.179 
8.233 
.000 
.110 
.978 
 
.291 
14.600 
.000 
.520 
1.059 
 
.115 
3.125 
.000 
.114 
.925 
 
.290 
7.690 
.000 
.542 
.983 
Panel C: 2002 firm Year 
Adjusted R2 
F-value 
F-value significance 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
 
.218 
3.867 
.000 
.103 
2.125 
 
.194 
3.479 
.000 
.492 
2.064 
 
-.086 
.747 
.781 
.115 
2.010 
 
.171 
1.660 
.076 
.501 
2.008 
Panel D: 2003 firm Year 
Adjusted R2 
F-value 
F-value significance 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
 
.054 
1.634 
.095 
.109 
1.846 
 
.206 
3.158 
.000 
.436 
2.085 
 
.007 
1.028 
.419 
.115 
1.794 
 
.164 
1.749 
.048 
.492 
1.740 
Panel E: 2004 firm Year 
Adjusted R2 
F-value 
F-value significance 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
 
.204 
3.648 
.000 
.103 
1.864 
 
.086 
1.985 
.046 
.518 
1.959 
 
.021 
1.144 
.331 
.127 
2.114 
 
.243 
2.286 
.006 
.455 
2.105 
Panel F: 2005 firm year 
Adjusted R2 
F-value 
F-value significance 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
 
.185 
3.672 
.000 
.101 
2.423 
 
.154 
3.658 
.000 
.624 
1.938 
 
.042 
1.180 
.298 
.126 
1.980 
 
.110 
1.504 
.108 
.641 
1.905 
Panel G: 2006 firm year 
Adjusted R2 
F-value 
F-value significance 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
 
.168 
3.648 
.000 
.124 
1.804 
 
.184 
3.216 
.001 
.636 
2.328 
 
.102 
1.615 
.097 
.110 
1.918 
 
.153 
1.763 
.042 
.651 
2.007 
 
 
In line with the better distributional properties shown by the compliance-index (the 
Economic-SACGI) model, irrespective of the financial performance measure and the summary 
regression diagnostic used, they indicate that the compliance-index (the Economic-SACGI) 
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model possesses better summary diagnostics than the equilibrium-variable model. For 
example, while the adjusted R2 of the compliance-index (the Economic-SACGI) model in 
Panel A of Table 20 suggests that the Economic-SACGI can explain about 9% of the 
variability in the ROA that of the equilibrium-variable model indicates that the 11 corporate 
governance mechanisms can only explain about 6%. The same trend is observed in Panels B to 
G of Table 20 for the Adjusted R2.  
With regards to the F-value, while the F-values of the entire compliance-index (the 
Economic-SACGI) model are statistically significant, those of the equilibrium-variable model 
are not significant in years 2002 to 2005 in the case of the ROA, and in year 2005 with respect 
to the Q-ratio. The standard errors and Durbin-Watson statistics, however, present mixed 
evidence. While the standard errors and Durbin-Watson statistics of the compliance-index (the 
Economic-SACGI) model are lower and higher, respectively, in the case of the Q-ratio, the 
opposite holds when the ROA is examined. Overall, and consistent with the suggestions of the 
individual variables’ p-values and coefficients, the compliance-index (the Economic-SACGI) 
model appears to possess better empirical properties and explanatory power than the 
equilibrium-variable model. 
 Methodologically, this implies that despite its costly and labour intensive nature, on 
average, it seems to be value relevant to construct some measure of a ‘compliance or 
composite’ corporate governance index when examining the corporate governance-financial 
performance relationship rather than to use single corporate governance mechanisms in 
isolation. A major explanation (as have been discussed in chapters five and six) is that because 
the construction of a compliance-index (the Economic-SACGI) involves the use of several 
corporate governance variables, it appears to be better able to capture actual qualitative 
differences in corporate governance disclosures across firms. Arguably, this makes it more 
likely to achieve better cross-sectional variation in the quality of corporate governance among 
the sampled firms with higher explanatory power than using the equilibrium-variable model.  
 
 
8.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has focused on presenting and discussing the empirical results regarding 
the link between internal corporate governance structures and firm financial performance. 
Specifically, the chapter attempted to achieve four main objectives. First, it attempted to 
examine whether better-governed firms based on the equilibrium-variable model will be 
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associated with higher financial performance, as measured by return on assets (ROA) and 
Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio). Consistent with the prior evidence, the results based on the equilibrium-
variable model indicate either a statistically weak or no relationship between the eleven single 
corporate governance structures and firm financial performance examined. Second, it sought 
to investigate whether better-governed firms based on the compliance-index model will be 
associated with higher financial performance. The results based on the compliance-index 
model suggest that there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between the 
SACGI and firm financial performance. This means that, on average, better-governed South 
African listed firms tend to be associated with higher financial returns, as measured by ROA 
and the Q-ratio than their poorly-governed counterparts.  
Third, the chapter attempted to quantify the economic consequences of complying with 
the Social-SACGI for South African listed firms. Contrary to theoretical expectations, the 
results suggest that firms that comply better with the Social-SACGI tend to be associated with 
higher financial returns than firms that comply less with the Social-SACGI. Evidence of a 
positive relationship between the Social-SACGI and financial performance is, however, 
consistent with the conditions within the South African corporate context. Within the South 
African corporate context, compliance with Social-SACGI appears to be a major way by which 
firms may gain access to critical business resources to enhance growth and improve financial 
performance.  
Finally, the chapter compared the empirical strengths of the two models based on their 
respective summary regression results and diagnostics. Whilst the results of the compliance-
index (the Economic-SACGI) model indicate a statistically significant and positive link with 
consistent coefficients, those of the equilibrium-variable model are ambiguous. A further 
comparison of the summary regression diagnostics indicates that, on average, the compliance-
index (the Economic-SACGI) model show better empirical properties, as well as explanatory 
power than those of the equilibrium-variable model. A major methodologically implication is 
that despite its expensive and labour intensive nature, on average, it appears to be valuable to 
construct some measure of a ‘compliance or composite’ corporate governance index when 
investigating the governance-financial performance relationship than to use single corporate 
governance mechanisms in isolation. 
A crucial issue is that the results presented so far ignores the possible existence of 
endogeneity problems, and/or interdependences among possible alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms. The positive link between the SACGI and firm financial performance 
  
291 
that has been established, for example, could be spurious. Therefore, in the next chapter 
(chapter nine), the main aim is to offer an indication of the extent to which the obtained 
empirical results are robust or sensitive to alternative estimations and explanations. In this 
regard, the robustness or sensitivity of the results to the existence of potential problems of 
endogeneity, and alternative corporate governance mechanisms will be thoroughly explored. 
More specifically, the results will be subjected to an extensive set of sensitivity analyses, 
including estimating: a lagged corporate governance-financial performance structure; an 
instrumental variable model; a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model; and a changes model.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
ROBUSTNESS OR SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 
 
9. INTRODUCTION 
 
 This chapter discusses results based on a series of robustness or sensitivity analyses. 
The central objective is to demonstrate how the results reported in chapter eight are robust or 
sensitive to alternative explanations and estimations. More specifically, the chapter subjects 
the results presented in chapter eight to an extensive set of sensitivity analyses, including 
carrying out a lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure, an instrumental 
variable (IV) model, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model, and a changes model estimations. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 9.1 briefly outlines the 
procedure suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2008) for positive accounting researchers to 
address endogeneity problems in positive accounting research. Section 9.2 reports results 
based on estimating a lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure. Section 
9.3 discusses results based on estimating an instrumental variable (IV) model. Section 9.4 
reports results based on estimating a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model. Section 9.5 
examines the relationship between year-on-year changes in both the financial performance 
proxies and the SACGI, whereas section 9.6 summarises the chapter. 
 
 
9.1 RESULTS AIMED AT ADDRESSING THE EXISTENCE OF POTENTIAL 
      ENDOGENITY PROBLEMS 
 
 As has already been explained in chapters five and eight, the results reported so far 
ignore the existence of possible endogenity problems, as well as interdependences among 
possible alternative corporate governance structures. Therefore, the next four sections examine 
the extent to which the reported results are robust or sensitive to the existence of potential 
endogenities and interdependences among possible alternative corporate governance 
mechanisms. However, before presenting the results based on the robustness or sensitivity 
tests, the procedure for addressing potential endogeneity problems is first outlined below. 
As has been described in section 5.3 of chapter five, and unlike most of the prior 
literature, in this study, problems that the potential presence of endogeneity poses are 
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explicitly addressed. Specifically, the five-step procedure proposed by Larcker and Rusticus 
(2008, pp.25-31, 59) for positive accounting researchers is followed.  
Briefly, Larcker and Rusticus (2008, p.25) suggest that the first step in addressing any 
concerns of endogeneity is to use rigorous accounting theory and logic to specify the 
endogenous (dependent) and exogenous (independent) variables within the structural 
equations. In chapters four and five, the theoretical links between the dependent and 
independent variables were discussed. Additionally, Larcker and Rusticus (2008) indicate that 
the researcher needs to explicitly point out some of the reasons why endogeneity may 
potentially be a problem.  
As has also been discussed in subsection 5.3.1 of chapter five, due to potential omitted 
variables, measurement errors, equilibrium conditions and simultaneity or reverse causation, 
endogeneity could potentially be a problem in this study. Moreover, and as evident in chapter 
four, the corporate governance phenomenon is very complex. As a result, the study has relied 
on multiple, and sometimes conflicting theoretical perspectives, which arguably also increases 
the possibility that endogeneity could be introduced into the specified structural equations. 
According to Larcker and Rusticus (2008), the second step involves exploring the 
various alternative ways of solving the endogeneity problem. As has been described in 
subsection 5.3.1, problems that the potential existence of endogeneity poses are explicitly 
addressed in four main ways. As will be discussed further below, these include estimating: (1) 
a lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure; (2) an instrumental variable 
model; (3) a two-stage least squares model; and (4) a changes model. The third step as 
suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2008) involves conducting exogeneity test on the key 
explanatory variable to ascertain whether it is actually endogenous or not. In this case, 
following prior corporate governance studies (Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.22; Beiner et al., 
2006, p.267), the popular Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test will be followed below. 
The fourth step suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2008) is to demonstrate that any 
instrument used as a proxy for the original variable is a relevant and valid instrument. As will 
be explained further below, the predicted instrument to be used as a proxy for the SACGI (i.e., 
P-SACGI) in carrying out the instrumental variable (IV) estimation is a relevant and valid 
instrument. The final step suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2008) is to compare the 
magnitude, statistical significance and signs of the OLS and endogeneity corrected estimations 
to ascertain the extent to which they are robust or sensitive to the presence of endogeneity 
problems.    
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In the following four sections, results based on the four endogeneity analyses will be 
discussed and compared with those based on the OLS estimates that have already been 
reported in chapter eight. Specifically, section 9.2 will present results obtained by estimating a 
lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure. Section 9.3 discusses results 
based on instrumental variable (IV) estimates. Section 9.4 reports results based on a two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) model, whereas section 9.5 presents results based on estimating a 
changes model.  
  
 
9.2 RESULTS BASED ON ESTIMATING A LAGGED FINANCIAL  
      PERFORMANCE-CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
  
 This section discusses results based on estimating a lagged financial performance-
corporate governance structure to deal with endogeneity problems that may arise as a result of 
a time-lag in the financial performance-corporate governance relationship. Specifically, 
subsection 9.2.1 reports results obtained by estimating a lagged financial performance-
corporate governance structure based on the equilibrium-variable model, while subsection 
9.2.2 presents results obtained by estimating a lagged financial performance-corporate 
governance structure based on the compliance-index model.  
 
9.2.1 Results from Estimating a Lagged Financial Performance-Corporate  
         Governance Structure based on the Equilibrium-Variable Model 
 
Columns 7 to 10 of Table 21 contain the results obtained by estimating a lagged 
financial performance-corporate governance structure for the equilibrium-variable model as 
specified in equation 11 in chapter five and repeated below:  
 
          
∑
=
−
−−
−−
−−−−
−−−−
++
++
++++
++++=
n
i
ititiit
itit
itititit
ititititit
CONTROLSDTON
DTONDTON
RCOMNCOMACOMFBMs
BDIVDUALNEDsBSIZEFP
1
11
3
111
2
11019
18171615
141312110
εββ
ββ
ββββ
ββββα
              (11) 
 
where FP refers to the financial performance proxies, as measured by the ROA and Q-ratio, 
and BSIZE, NEDS, DUAL, BDIV, FBMs, ACOM, NCOM, RCOM, DTON, DTON2 and DTON3 
is defined as board size, the percentage of non-executive directors, CEO duality, board 
diversity, the frequency of board meetings, audit, nomination, and remuneration committees, 
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director shareownership, director shareownership squared, and director shareownership cubed, 
respectively. CONTROLS refers to the eight control variables, namely firm size, dual-listing, 
audit firm size, capital structure, capital expenditure, sales growth, industry, and year dummies. 
Lagging the variables also reduces the total firm-year observations from 500 to 400.  
To facilitate comparison, and as suggested by Larker and Rusticus (2008), Columns 3 
to 6 of Table 21 repeat the results based on estimating an un-lagged corporate governance-
financial performance structure reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Tables 14 and 16 in chapter 
eight, respectively. Similar to the results of based on estimating the un-lagged structure 
contained in Columns 3 to 6 of Table 21, Columns 7 and 8 of Table 21 first present the results 
of a multivariate regression of the ROA and Q-ratio on the 11 corporate governance structures 
alone.  
Columns 9 and 10 then report the results of a multivariate regression of the ROA and 
Q-ratio on the 11 corporate governance mechanisms and the control variables based on 
estimating a lagged structure, respectively. In line with the results based on estimating the un-
lagged structure, Columns 7 and 8 indicate that the F-values for both the ROA and Q-ratio are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient on the SACGI is equal to zero can be rejected. This also implies that the 
coefficients on the 11 corporate governance variables can jointly explain significant variations 
in the sampled firms’ accounting returns and market value, respectively. 
 The adjusted R2 is approximately 9% and 6% for the ROA and Q-ratio, respectively. 
This implies that at least 9% and 6% of the differences in the sampled firms’ accounting 
returns and market value can be explained by the 11 corporate governance structures, 
respectively. This is very similar to the results reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 21 based 
on estimating the un-lagged structure, but statistically 2.5% higher in the case of ROA, 
and .1% less with respect to the Q-ratio, respectively. 
With reference to the coefficients on the 11 corporate governance variables in columns 
7 and 8 of Table 20 based on estimating the lagged structure, three main cases of sensitivities 
can be observed when compared with those in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 21 based on 
estimating an un-lagged structure. First, the sign on the coefficient of CEO duality under the 
Q-ratio in Column 8 has changed from positive to negative, but remains statistically 
insignificant. Second, the direction of the coefficient on the frequency of board meetings 
under the ROA in Column 7 has changed from negative to positive, but also remains 
statistically insignificant. 
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Table 21: Results of the Equilibrium-Variable Model Based on a Lagged Financial Performance-Corporate Governance Structure 
  Results Based on an Un-lagged Performance-Governance Structure  Results Based on a Lagged Performance-Governance Structure 
Perform.  Var. Exp.sign ROA Q-ratio ROA Q-ratio ROA Q-ratio ROA Q-ratio 
Adjusted R2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observa. 
     .063 
    .116 
    .904 
 3.522(.000)*** 
    500 
    .062 
    .623 
  1.032 
 3.466(.000)*** 
    500 
    .115 
    .114 
    .925 
3.125(.000)*** 
  500 
    .290 
    .542 
    .983 
7.690(.000)*** 
  500 
    .088 
    .116 
    .973 
 3.815(.000)*** 
    400 
  .062 
  .624 
1.185 
2.932(.001)*** 
   400 
 .105 
 .115 
1.020 
2.562(.000)*** 
   400 
  .271 
  .550 
1.123 
5.963(.000)*** 
   400 
Constant 
Board size 
CEO duality 
Per. of NEDs 
Dtor ownership 
Dtor ownership2  
Dtor ownership3 
Board diversity 
Board meetings 
Audit comm.. 
Nom. comm.. 
Rem. comm. 
Firm size 
Capital structure 
Sales growth 
Capital expendit. 
Dual-listing 
Audit firm size 
Basic materials 
Consumer service 
Industrials 
Technology 
2002 
2004 
2005 
2006 
 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
 
 
  .048(.383) 
 -.003(.138) 
  .023(.159) 
 -.001(.016)** 
 -.003(.044)** 
  .000(.060)* 
 -.000(.093)* 
  .036(.004)*** 
 -.002(.418) 
  .038(.680) 
  .021(.122) 
  .051(.539) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 1.322(.000)*** 
  .020(.101) 
  .002(.985) 
  .003(.278) 
 -.011(.217) 
  .000(.287) 
 -.000(.264) 
  .179(.008)*** 
  .021(.147) 
 -.354(.473) 
  .089(.220) 
  .229(.689) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .046(.435) 
-.002(.311) 
 .029(.037)** 
-.002(.032)** 
-.003(.131) 
 .000(.104) 
-.000(.108) 
 .021(.112) 
-.003(.328) 
 .050(.581) 
 .021(.095)* 
 .034(.641) 
 .001(.928) 
 .000(.021)** 
 .001(.000)*** 
-.002(.105) 
 .024(.138) 
 .010(.559) 
-.011(.611) 
-.002(.925) 
-.014(.464) 
 .006(.772) 
-.014(.457) 
-.011(.550) 
-.012(.495) 
-.002(.928) 
 .642(.024)** 
 .022(.064)* 
-.117(.153) 
 .003(.255) 
-.018(.084)* 
 .000(.153) 
-.000(.192) 
-.025(.701) 
 .011(.424) 
 .068(.876) 
-.105(.141) 
-.119(.765) 
-.183(.003)*** 
-.003(.000)*** 
 .002(.124) 
 .020(.005)*** 
 .086(.267) 
 .271(.001)*** 
 .428(.000)*** 
 .551(.000)*** 
 .217(.002)*** 
 .308(.000)*** 
-.022(.811) 
 .183(.033)** 
 .398(.000)*** 
 .581(.000)*** 
-.016(.783) 
-.005(.039)** 
 .010(.598) 
-.001(.025)** 
-.003(.088)* 
 .000(.118) 
-.000(.160) 
 .042(.003)*** 
 .002(.421) 
 .117(.209) 
 .015(.336) 
 .029(.727) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1.438(.000)*** 
 .011(.440) 
-.024(.810) 
 .003(.204) 
-.010(.331) 
 .000(.448) 
-.000(.446) 
 .213(.005)*** 
 .022(.177) 
-.552(.270) 
 .084(.305) 
 .326(.470) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-.026(.697) 
-.005(.086)* 
 .018(.365) 
-.001(.041)** 
-.004(.107) 
 .000(.124) 
-.000(.111) 
 .033(.035)** 
 .002(.539) 
 .118(.211) 
 .011(.530) 
 .023(.784) 
-.002(.899) 
 .000(.924) 
 .001(.001)*** 
-.003(.063)* 
 .020(.286) 
 .012(.546) 
-.015(.535) 
-.001(.968) 
-.014(.531) 
-.001(.967) 
- 
 .002(.913) 
 .018(.389) 
 .022(.293) 
 .674(.037)** 
 .011(.414) 
-.142(.130) 
 .004(.157) 
-.020(.060)* 
 .001(.136) 
-.000(.108) 
 .012(.874) 
 .010(.476) 
-.260(.565) 
-.127(.124) 
-.334(.414) 
-.178(.015)** 
-.003(.002)*** 
 .004(.007)*** 
 .015(.044)** 
 .094(.292) 
 .256(.007) *** 
 .346(.004)*** 
 .553(.000)*** 
 .194(.073)* 
 .291(.012)** 
- 
 .252(.008)*** 
 .485(.000)*** 
 .640(.000)*** 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 2003 are excluded 
from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. Director ownership2 and director ownership3 refers to director ownership squared 
and director ownership cubed, respectively. To facilitate comparison, and as suggested Larker and Rusticus (2008), Columns 3 to 6 repeat the results based on an un-lagged performance-corporate 
governance structure reported in Columns of 3 and 4 of Tables 14 and 16 in chapter eight, respectively, whereas Columns 7 to 10 present alternative results based on a lagged performance-
corporate governance structure. Note further that the un-lagged structure is based on 500 firm year observations, whilst the lagged structure is based on 400 firm year observations.
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Finally, the statistical significance of the coefficients on board size, director ownership 
squared, and director ownership cubed under the ROA in Column 7 have changed. 
Specifically, the coefficients on director ownership squared and director ownership cubed, 
which were statistically significant at the 10% level, are no longer statistically significant. By 
contrast, the coefficient on board size, which was statistically insignificant, is now statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The statistical significance and direction of the coefficients of the 
remaining 7 and 10 corporate governance variables under the ROA and Q-ratio, respectively, 
remain unchanged whether a lagged or un-lagged financial performance-corporate governance 
structure is estimated. This suggests that the majority of the results based on the un-lagged 
structure reported in chapter eight are not sensitive to a lagged financial performance-
corporate governance structure. 
The statistically significant coefficient on the constant term in columns 4 and 8 (under 
the Q-ratio) of Table 21 seems to suggest that there may be omitted variables bias. Therefore, 
to examine whether the limited sensitivities identified in the results of the lagged structure are 
spuriously caused by some omitted variables, the control variables are added to the regressions 
in columns 9 and 10 of Table 21. In line with the results reported in chapter eight, Columns 9 
and 10 indicate that the F-values for both the ROA and Q-ratio remain statistically significant 
at the 1% level. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the 11 corporate 
governance mechanisms and the control variables are jointly equal to zero can be rejected. 
This also suggests that the 11 corporate governance structures and the control variables can 
jointly explain significant differences in the sampled firms’ accounting returns and market 
value, respectively. 
The adjusted R2 is approximately 11% and 27% for the ROA and Q-ratio, respectively. 
This means that at least 11% and 27% of the differences in the sampled firms’ accounting 
returns and market value can jointly be explained by the 11 corporate governance mechanisms 
and the control variables, respectively. This is also very similar to the results reported in 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 21 based on estimating an un-lagged structure, but statistically 1.5% 
less in the case of ROA, and 1.9% less with respect to the Q-ratio, respectively. The slight 
reductions in explanatory power may also be explained by the 20% decrease in the number of 
firm-year observations (i.e., from 500 to 400).  
Similar to the results based on estimating the un-lagged structure, the adjusted R2 of 
the regressions of the ROA and Q-ratio on the 11 corporate governance mechanisms alone are 
essentially the same. However, once the control variables are added, the adjusted R2 for the Q-
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ratio becomes substantially higher than that of the ROA. This also implies that the difference 
in explanatory power between the ROA and Q-ratio can be attributed to the contribution of the 
control variables. 
With regard to the coefficient on the 11 corporate governance variables based on an 
un-lagged structure under both the ROA and Q-ratio in Columns 9 and 10 of Table 21, a 
limited number of sensitivities can be identified. First, the sign of the coefficient on the 
frequency of board meetings in Column 9 under the ROA, which was negative is now positive, 
but remain statistically insignificant. Second, the statistical significance of the coefficients on 
board size, CEO duality, board diversity, and the existence of a nomination committee under 
the ROA in Column 9 have changed. Specifically, the coefficients on board size and board 
diversity, which were not statistically significant in Column 5, are now statistically significant 
in column 9. In contrast, the coefficient on CEO duality and the existence of a nomination 
committee which, were statistically significant in Column 5, are no longer statistically 
significant in column 9. 
Third, the sign on the coefficients on board diversity and the presence of an audit 
committee under the Q-ratio in Column 10 have changed, but they remain statistically 
insignificant. Finally, board size, which was statistically significant under the Q-ratio in 
Column 6, is no longer statistically significant under the Q-ratio in Column 10. The direction 
and statistical significance of the coefficients on the remaining 6 and 8 corporate governance 
structures under the ROA and Q-ratio, respectively, remain unaffected whether a lagged or an 
un-lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure is estimated. Generally, the 
results suggest that the evidence regarding the sensitivity or robustness of the 11 corporate 
governance variables to a lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure is 
mixed. Specifically, whereas the coefficient on a majority of the 11 corporate governance 
mechanisms are robust to the estimation of a lagged structure, the coefficients on a limited 
number (i.e., board size, CEO duality, board diversity and frequency of board meetings) are 
sensitive to the estimation of a lagged structure with or without the control variables.  
First, the observed sensitivities in some of the corporate governance mechanisms, such 
as board size and CEO duality may indeed suggest that there is a time-lag between them and 
firm financial performance. Second, the sensitivities may be due to misspecifications within 
the structural equation, such as potential omitted variables bias. Third, and as has already been 
pointed out above, it may also be explained by the differences in the number of firm-year 
observations. Overall and on a comparative basis, it offers additional empirical support to the 
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previous conclusion in chapter eight that the results of the equilibrium-variable model are 
generally conflicting.  
 With reference to the control variables, two main cases of sensitivities in the control 
variables to the estimation of a lagged structure can be identified. First, the positive sign on the 
coefficient on firm size in Column 5 under the ROA has now changed to negative in Column 9 
of Table 21, but remain statistically insignificant. Second, the statistical significance of the 
coefficients on capital structure and capital expenditure under the ROA in Column 9, and sales 
growth under the Q-ratio in Column 10 have changed.  
Specifically, the coefficients on capital expenditure under the ROA in Column 5 and 
sales growth under the Q-ratio in Column 6, which were statistically insignificant, are now 
statistically significant under the ROA and Q-ratio in Columns 9 and 10 of Table 21, 
respectively. By contrast, the coefficient on capital structure under the ROA in Column 5, 
which was statistically significant at the 5% level, is now statistically insignificant in Column 
9 of Table 21. These sensitivities may indicate the existence a lagged structure relationships 
between capital expenditure and the ROA, between capital structure and the ROA, and 
between sales growth and the Q-ratio. The coefficient and statistical significance of the 
remaining control variables, including audit firm size, dual-listing, the year and industry 
dummies remain affected whether a lagged or an un-lagged structure is estimated. 
In conclusion, this subsection has sought to ascertain the extent to which the results of 
the equilibrium-variable model based an un-lagged financial performance-corporate 
governance structure discussed in chapter eight are robust or sensitive to the estimation of a 
lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure. Generally, and consistent with 
results of the equilibrium-variable model reported in chapter eight, the evidence regarding the 
sensitivity or robustness of the results to a lagged or an un-lagged financial performance-
corporate governance structure is mixed. While the direction and the statistical significance of 
the coefficients on a majority of the 11 corporate governance mechanisms examined remain 
unchanged whether a lagged or an un-lagged structure is estimated, a limited number (i.e., 
board size, CEO duality, board diversity and the frequency of board meetings) show some 
level of sensitivity.   
As has been explained above, these sensitivities may suggest that there is indeed a 
financial performance-corporate governance time-lag for the sensitive corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as board size and CEO duality. It may also be explained by the differences 
in the number of observations between the lagged and un-lagged structures. Overall, these 
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findings offer further support to the earlier conclusions in chapter eight that there is either a 
statistically weak or insignificant relationship between most of the eleven individual internal 
corporate governance structures and financial performance.  
The next subsection will also examine the extent to which the results of the 
compliance-index model based on estimating an un-lagged financial performance-corporate 
governance structure are robust or sensitive to an estimation of a lagged structure. 
 
9.2.2 Results from Estimating a Lagged Financial Performance-Corporate  
         Governance Structure based on the Compliance-Index Model 
 
Columns 7 to 10 of Table 22 contain the results obtained by estimating a lagged 
financial performance-corporate governance structure for the compliance-index model. To 
facilitate comparison, and as suggested by Larker and Rusticus (2008), Columns 3 to 6 of 
Table 22 repeat results based on an un-lagged corporate governance-financial performance 
structure reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Tables 17 and 18 in chapter eight, respectively. 
Unlike the un-lagged structure equations, the lagged structure models are estimated as 
specified in equation 10 of chapter five and repeated below: 
                       ∑
=
−
−−
+++=
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ititiitit CONTROLSSACGIFP
1
11110 εββα                         (10) 
  
where FP refers to the financial performance proxies, as measured by ROA and the Q-ratio, 
SACGI is the South African Corporate Governance Index, and CONTROLS refers to the eight 
control variables, namely firm size, dual-listing, audit firm size, capital structure, capital 
expenditure, sales growth, industry, and year dummies. Lagging the variables also reduces the 
total firm-year observations from 500 to 400.  
The decision to estimate a lagged structure is motivated by the theory and evidence 
that there is a time-lag in the corporate governance-financial performance association (e.g., 
Vefeas, 1999a; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). One reason is that board decisions may have 
gestation periods within which they may be fully realised. As such, estimating a lagged 
structure is one way by which potential endogenity problems, such as reverse causality that 
may be associated with the corporate governance-financial performance time lag may be 
avoided. 
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Table 22: Results of the Compliance-Index Model Based on a Lagged Financial Performance-Corporate Governance Structure 
  Results Based on an Un-lagged Performance-Governance Structure  Results Based on a Lagged Performance-Governance Structure 
Performance  
Variable 
Exp. 
sign 
ROA Q-ratio ROA Q-ratio ROA Q-ratio ROA Q-ratio 
Adjusted R2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
     .102 
    .117 
    .869 
57.706(.000)*** 
   500 
    .100 
    .617 
  1.018 
56.633(.000)*** 
   500 
  .189 
  .111 
  .881 
8.751(.000)*** 
   500 
    .292 
    .548 
  1.039 
14.729(.000)*** 
   500 
     .095 
     .118 
     .904 
42.676(.000)*** 
   400 
    .084 
    .633 
  1.056 
37.583(.000)*** 
   400 
  .142 
  .115 
  .999 
5.731(.000)*** 
   400 
   .268 
   .566 
 1.012 
11.442(.000)*** 
   400 
Constant 
SACGI 
Firm size 
Capital structure 
Sales growth 
Capital expenditure 
Dual-listing 
Audit firm size 
Basic materials 
Consumer services 
Industrials 
Technology 
2002 
2004 
2005 
2006 
 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
 
 
-.021(.166) 
 .002(.000)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .926(.000)*** 
 .009(.000)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .005(.808) 
 .002(.000)*** 
 .013(.165) 
 .000(.004)*** 
 .002(.000)*** 
-.001(.563) 
 .012(.397) 
-.015(.270) 
-.034(.043)** 
-.021(.183) 
-.025(.121) 
 .004(.790) 
 .000(.998) 
-.019(.224) 
-.017(.305) 
-.006(.698) 
 .720(.000)*** 
 .004(.008)*** 
-.172(.000)*** 
-.003(.000)*** 
 .001(.373) 
 .020(.001)*** 
 .192(.006)*** 
 .158(.016)** 
 .237(.004)*** 
 .416(.000)*** 
 .099(.209) 
 .215(.006)*** 
 .053(.501) 
 .178(.024)** 
 .397(.000)*** 
 .565(.000)*** 
-.011(.510) 
 .002(.000)*** 
 
 
1.041(.000)*** 
  .009(.000)*** 
 
 
 
 .010(.666) 
 .002(.000)*** 
 .016(.152) 
-.000(.843) 
 .001(.000)*** 
-.002(.267) 
 .012(.474) 
-.015(.346) 
-.039(.042)** 
-.012(.504) 
-.021(.251) 
 .016(.395) 
- 
-.027(.112) 
-.011(.538) 
-.005(.778)  
 .799(.000)*** 
 .003(.045)** 
-.166(.003)*** 
-.003(.002)*** 
 .008(.010)*** 
 .010(.185) 
 .226(.006)*** 
 .157(.041)** 
 .248(.009)*** 
 .464(.000)*** 
 .143(.115) 
 .208(.022)** 
- 
.185(.025)** 
 .439(.000)*** 
 .577(.000)*** 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 2003 are excluded 
from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. To facilitate comparison, and as suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2008), 
Columns 3 to 6 repeat the results based on estimating an un-lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Tables 17 and 18 in chapter eight, 
respectively, whereas Columns 7 to 10 contain alternative results based on estimating a lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure. Note further that the un-lagged structure is 
based on 500 firm year observations, whilst the lagged structure is based on 400 firm year observations. 
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Similar to the results based on estimating the un-lagged structure presented in Columns 
3 to 6 of Table 22, Columns 7 and 8 of Table 22 first report the results of a simple regression 
of the ROA and Q-ratio on the SACGI alone, respectively. Columns 9 and 10 then report the 
results of a multivariate regression of the ROA and Q-ratio on the SACGI and the control 
variables based on estimating the lagged structure, respectively. Consistent with the results 
based on estimating the un-lagged structure, Columns 7 and 8 of Table 22 indicate that the F-
values for both the ROA and Q-ratio are statistically significant at the 1% level. This means 
that the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the SACGI is equal to zero can be rejected. This 
also indicates that the coefficient on the SACGI can explain significant variations in the 
sampled firms’ accounting returns and market value, respectively. 
 The adjusted R2 is approximately 10% and 8% for the ROA and Q-ratio, respectively. 
This implies that at least 10% and 8% of the differences in the sampled firms’ accounting 
returns and market value can be explained by the quality of their internal corporate governance 
structures, respectively. This is virtually similar to the results reported in Columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 22 based on estimating the un-lagged structure, but statistically .7% and 1.6% less for 
the ROA and Q-ratio, respectively. Similarly, the coefficient on the SACGI under both the 
ROA and Q-ratio remain positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The magnitude 
of the coefficient under both the ROA and Q-ratio remain the same at .002 and .009, 
respectively. This means that generally the results reported in chapter seven are not sensitive 
to estimating a lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure. 
The statistically significant coefficient on the constant term in columns 4 and 8 (under 
the Q-ratio) of Table 22 appears to indicate that there may be an omitted variables bias. As a 
result, to investigate whether the lack of sensitivity of the results to estimating a lagged 
structure is falsely caused by some omitted variables, the control variables are added to the 
regressions in columns 9 and 10 of Table 22. In line with the results based on estimating the 
un-lagged structure, Columns 9 and 10 indicate that the F-values for both the ROA and Q-
ratio are statistically significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients on the SACGI and the control variables are jointly equal to zero can be rejected. 
This suggests that the SACGI and the control variables can jointly explain significant 
differences in the sampled firms’ accounting returns and market value, respectively. 
The adjusted R2 is approximately 14% and 27% for the ROA and Q-ratio, respectively. 
This means that at least 14% and 27% of the differences in the sampled firms’ accounting 
returns and market value can be explained by the SACGI and the control variables, 
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respectively. Statistically, this is 4.7% and 2.4% less compared with the adjusted R2 for the 
ROA and Q-ratio in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 22 based on estimating the un-lagged structure, 
respectively.  The reductions in explanatory power may be explained by the 20% decrease in 
the number of firm-year observations (i.e., from 500 to 400). Consistent with the results of the 
un-lagged structure, when a simple regression is run, the ability of the SACGI to explain 
variations in the ROA and Q-ratio are essentially the same. However, once the control 
variables are added, the explanatory power of the SACGI under the Q-ratio becomes 
substantially higher than that of the ROA. This implies that the difference in explanatory 
power between the ROA and Q-ratio can be attributed to the contribution of the control 
variables.  
 Similarly, the coefficient on the SACGI under both the ROA and Q-ratio remain 
positive, but whereas the coefficient on the SACGI under the ROA remains statistically 
significant at the 1% level, that of the Q-ratio is now statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Also, while the magnitude of the coefficient on the SACGI under the ROA remains unchanged 
at .002, that of the Q-ratio has witnessed a slight derease from .004 to .003. Also, the slight 
reductions in the level of statistical significance of the coefficient under the Q-ratio may be 
explained by the 20% decrease in the number of firm-year observations (i.e., from 500 to 400).  
Generally, the results based on estimating the lagged financial performance-corporate 
governance structure are essentially the same as those based on estimating the un-lagged 
structure with or without the control variables. This supports the previous conclusion in 
chapter eight that South African listed firms with higher corporate governance standards tend 
to be associated with higher financial performance than their counterparts with poor corporate 
governance standards. As will be discussed further in section 9.5, one reason for the limited 
change in the results based on estimating the lagged and un-lagged financial performance-
corporate governance structures may be that the year-by-year changes in the SACGI observed 
in chapter six are not substantial enough to cause any statistically significant changes in the 
firm financial performance proxies. 
 With reference to the control variables, the statistical significance, the direction and 
magnitude of the coefficients on firm size, capital expenditure, dual-listing, audit firm size, the 
industry and the year dummies under both the ROA and Q-ratio remain essentially unchanged. 
By contrast, the statistical significance and the direction of the coefficient on capital structure 
under the ROA, and the statistical significance of the coefficient on sales growth under the Q-
ratio have changed. Specifically, the coefficient on capital structure under the ROA which was 
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positive and statistically significant at the 1% level is now negative and statistically 
insignificant. Similarly, the coefficient on sales growth under the Q-ratio, which was 
statistically insignificant, is now statistically significant at the 1% level. These sensitivities 
may suggest that a lagged structure relationship exists between capital structure and ROA, and 
between sales growth and the Q-ratio. 
In short, this subsection has sought to ascertain the extent to which the results of the 
compliance-index model based on estimating an un-lagged financial performance-corporate 
governance structure discussed in chapter eight are robust or sensitive to estimating a lagged 
structure. Generally, apart from a limited number of changes in the magnitude and statistical 
significance levels that are observed and described above, the general evidence is that the 
compliance-index model results reported in chapter eight are essentially robust whether a 
lagged or an un-lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure is estimated.  
Overall, the results support the earlier conclusion in chapter eight that there is a 
statistically significant and positive relationship between the SACGI and firm financial 
performance. The general tenor of such a relationship remains the same whether an accounting 
or a market based financial performance proxy is used. As has already been explained above, 
one reason for the limited change in the results based on estimating the lagged and un-lagged 
financial performance-corporate governance structures may be that the year-on-year changes 
in the SACGI observed in chapter six are not substantial enough to cause any statistically 
significant changes in the firm financial performance measures. On comparative basis, 
however, the results of the compliance-index model are generally more stable, and show better 
empirical properties than those of the equilibrium-variable model. 
The next section will discuss the results of the compliance-index model based on 
estimating an instrumental variable model. 
 
 
9.3 RESULTS OF THE COMPLIANCE-INDEX MODEL BASED ON  
      INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE (IV) ESTIMATION  
 
This section reports the results of the compliance-index model based on instrumental 
variable (IV) estimates rather than OLS estimates. As has already been stated above, to be able 
to conduct IV estimation, exogeneity test will have to be first conducted to determine whether 
or not the SACGI is actually endogenous. In this regard, following prior corporate governance 
studies (Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.22; Beiner et al., 2006, p.267), the popular Durbin-Wu-
Hausman exogeneity test is followed. The procedure involves two stages.  
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As specified in equation 13 below, in the first stage, the SACGI is assumed to be 
endogenous in equation 1, and is regressed on the eight control variables considered to be 
exogenous to the SACGI. These are: firm size (LNTA), capital structure (GEAR), sales growth 
(SGROWTH), capital expenditure (CAPEX), dual-listing (DUALLIST), audit firm size 
(BIG4), the five industry dummies (INDUST), and the five year dummies (YD). The resulting 
regression residuals from equation 13 are saved and referred to as R-SACGI. 
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In the second stage, and as specified in equation 14 below, the financial performance 
proxies (FP - ROA and Q-ratio) are regressed on the SACGI, the saved regression residuals (R-
SACGI), and the control variables (CONTROLS). If the coefficient on the saved regression 
residuals (R-SACGI) is statistically significant, then it can be concluded that the SACGI is 
endogenously related to firm financial performance.  
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In contrast, if the coefficient on the R-SACGI is statistically insignificant, then it will 
indicate that the SACGI is exogenously related to firm financial performance. As has been 
described in subsection 5.3.1 of chapter five, this will imply that OLS estimates of the 
regression coefficients will be biased and inconsistent. This can result in wrong interpretations 
of the research findings (Larcker and Rusticus, 2008, p.10). However, and as has also been 
noted in subsection 5.3.1 of chapter five, there are substantial disagreements within the 
positive accounting literature as to whether endogeneity is a problem that needs to be 
considered in accounting research (Chenhall and Moers, 2007a and b; Larcker and Rusticus, 
2007; van Lent, 2007). Specifically, van Lent (2007, pp.197-198, 203) suggests that in 
practice there is little that can be done about endogeneity even if it exists, and as such 
researchers should be bold enough to ignore any threats that the existence of endogeneity may 
pose. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 23 report the results of Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test. 
The results of the test are mixed: the coefficient on the R-SACGI under the ROA is statistically 
insignificant, whereas the coefficient under the Q-ratio is statistically significant at the 5% 
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level. This suggests that the SACGI is exogenously (i.e., not determined within the equation) 
related to the ROA, but endogenously (i.e., determined within the equation) related to the Q-
ratio. To be more cautious, and also following previous corporate governance studies (e.g., 
Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006), however, the IV estimation is conducted for 
both the ROA and Q-ratio.  
As has been discussed in subsection 5.3.1 of chapter five, the IV estimation technique 
involves two stages. The first stage involves finding a proxy variable (an instrument) for the 
SACGI, which correlates highly with the SACGI (i.e., relevant), but correlates lowly or 
uncorrelated with the regression residuals (i.e., valid). Finding an instrument that satisfies the 
relevance and validity criteria is extremely difficult (Durnev and Kim, 2005, p.1483). As a 
result, and as has been explained in subsection 5.3.1 of chapter five, this study follows a two-
stage procedure proposed by Beiner et al. (2006, p.267).  
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In the first stage, and as specified in equation 15, the SACGI is regressed on board size 
(BSIZE), institutional shareholding (INSTSHDNG), block shareholding (BLKSHDNG), the 
presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM)86, and the eight control variables 
(CONTROLS) considered to be exogenously related to the SACGI.  These are: firm size 
(LNTA), capital structure (GEAR), sales growth (SGROWTH), capital expenditure (CAPEX), 
dual-listing (DUALLIST), audit firm size (BIG4), the five industry dummies (INDUST), and 
the five year dummies (YD). In the second stage, the predicted regression values from 
equation 15 are saved (P-SACGI). The SACGI is then replaced with the P-SACGI (i.e., the 
predicted instrument) to re-estimate the compliance-index model. 
However, before the P-SACGI can be used to re-estimate the compliance-index model, 
it has to be ascertained whether it is a relevant and valid instrument for the SACGI. Table 24 
reports a correlation matrix of the financial performance proxies, the SACGI, the P-SACGI, 
the R-SACGI, and the alternative corporate governance mechanisms87.   
                                                 
86As has been defined in subsection 5.3.1.2 of chapter five, this committee is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if a firm has separate committee specifically tasked to monitor its compliance with corporate 
governance standards or regulations, 0 otherwise.   
87Section 9.4 will discuss the results based on estimating a two-stage least squares model and the availability of 
alternative corporate governance mechanisms. Table 24 will, therefore, be referred to again in section 9.4. 
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Table 23: Results of the Compliance-Index Model Based on Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates 
 Exp. 
Sign 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test Instrumental Variable Estimates OLS Estimates 
Adjusted R2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
   .184 
  .118 
  .880 
7.986(.000)*** 
      500 
    .312 
    .531 
  1.085 
15.346(.000)*** 
    500 
  .168 
  .116 
  .856 
7.964(.000)*** 
     500 
    .318 
    .543 
  1.068 
16.341(.000)*** 
     500 
  .189 
  .111 
  .881 
8.751(.000)*** 
   500 
    .292 
    .548 
  1.039 
14.729(.000)*** 
   500 
Performance Measure  ROA Q-ratio ROA Q-ratio ROA Q-ratio 
Constant 
SACGI 
R-SACGI 
P-SACGI 
Firm size  
Capital structure  
Sales growth  
Capital expenditure  
Dual-listing  
Audit firm size 
Basic materials  
Consumer services  
Industrials  
Technology  
Year 2002 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
   .012(.540) 
   .002(.028)** 
   .003(.486) 
- 
   .046(.298) 
   .000(.009)*** 
   .001(.010)*** 
  -.000(.741) 
   .029(.284) 
  -.020(.246) 
  -.081(.048)** 
  -.019(.423) 
  -.038(.116) 
   .027(.469) 
  -.021(.675) 
  -.065(.128) 
  -.010(.743) 
  -.003(.876) 
  .368(.034)** 
  .010(.006)*** 
 -.006(.045)** 
- 
 -.248(.010)*** 
 -.005(.000)*** 
  .001(.486) 
  .014(.009)*** 
  .049(.754) 
  .245(.006)*** 
  .382(.000)*** 
  .425(.000)*** 
  .094(.428) 
  .145(.034)** 
  .142(.108) 
  .116(.159) 
  .436(.000)*** 
  .584(.000)*** 
  -.012(.764) 
- 
- 
   .002(.000)*** 
  -.010(.362) 
   .000(.010)*** 
   .002(.000)*** 
  -.001(.498) 
   .011(.496) 
  -.019(.325) 
  -.028(.068)* 
  -.027(.148) 
  -.018(.169) 
   .023(.562) 
  -.002(.798) 
  -.034(.156) 
  -.022(.218) 
  -.014(.431)  
   .542(.000)*** 
- 
- 
   .008(.005)*** 
  -.263(.000)*** 
  -.003(.006)*** 
   .002(.258) 
   .017(.008)*** 
   .118(.162) 
   .131(.046)** 
   .265(.002)*** 
   .586(.000)*** 
   .048(.429) 
   .094(.345) 
   .148(.025)** 
   .136(.084)* 
   .524(.000)*** 
   .672(.000)*** 
   .008(.808) 
   .002(.000)*** 
- 
- 
   .013(.165) 
   .000(.004)*** 
   .002(.000)*** 
  -.001(.563) 
   .012(.397) 
  -.015(.270) 
  -.034(.043)** 
  -.021(.183) 
  -.025(.121) 
   .004(.790) 
   .000(.998) 
  -.019(.224) 
  -.017(.305) 
  -.006(.698) 
  .720(.000)*** 
  .004(.008)** 
- 
- 
 -.172(.000)*** 
 -.003(.000)*** 
  .001(.373) 
  .020(.001)*** 
  .192(.006)*** 
  .158(.016)** 
  .237(.004)*** 
  .416(.000)*** 
  .099(.209) 
  .215(.006)** 
  .053(.501) 
  .178(.024)** 
  .397(.000)*** 
  .565(.000)*** 
 Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods   industry and year 
2003 are excluded from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. Columns 3 and 4 contain results of the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test. As has already been explained in subsection 5.3.1.1 of chapter five, the R-SACGI is the saved residuals of a regression of the SACGI on the eight 
control variables. This has also been specified in equation 13. The P-SACGI is the predicted instrument to be used as a proxy for the SACGI. As has also been described in 
subsection 5.3.1.2 of chapter five, the P-SACGI is the saved predicted values of a regression of the SACGI on variables exogenous to the SACGI, including board size, the 
presence of corporate governance committee, block shareholding, institutional shareholding, as well as the eight control variables. This has also been specified in equation 15. 
Columns 5 and 6 report coefficient estimates based on the predicted instrument (the P-SACGI). To facilitate comparison, and as suggested Larcker and Rusticus (2008), 
Columns 7 and 8 repeat OLS estimates contained in Column 4 of Tables 17 and 18 in chapter eight, respectively.  
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Table 24: Correlation Matrix of Performance and Alternative Corporate Governance Mechanisms for All (500) Firm Years 
 ROA Q-ratio SACGI P-
SACGI 
R-
SACGI 
DUA- 
LIST 
LEV 
 
BSIZE BIG4 GEAR 
 
INST- 
SHDNG 
BLK- 
SHDNG 
CGCOM LNTA 
ROA 
 
Q-ratio 
 
SACGI 
 
P-
SACGI 
 
R-
SACGI 
 
DUA-
LIST 
 
LEV 
 
BSIZE 
 
BIG4 
 
GEAR 
 
INST- 
SHDNG 
 
BLK- 
SHDNG 
 
CGCOM 
 
LNTA 
 
 
 .283*** 
 
 .322*** 
 
 
 .276*** 
 
 
 .155*** 
 
 
 .144*** 
 
-.087* 
 
-.040* 
 
 .131*** 
 
-.096** 
 
 
 .116*** 
 
 
-.052* 
 
 .145*** 
 
 .051* 
 .391*** 
 
 
 
 .320*** 
 
 
 .326*** 
 
 
 .138*** 
 
 
 .236*** 
 
-.151*** 
 
 .131*** 
 
 .181*** 
 
 .046* 
 
 
 .162*** 
 
 
-.073* 
 
 .148*** 
 
-.127*** 
 .276*** 
 
 .372*** 
 
 
 
 
 .864*** 
 
 
 .556*** 
 
 
 .471*** 
 
 .066* 
 
 .000 
 
 .477*** 
 
 .000 
 
 
 .314*** 
 
 
-.287*** 
 
 .537*** 
 
 .000 
 .235*** 
 
 .384*** 
 
 .868*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 .108** 
 
 
 .543*** 
 
 .075* 
 
 .094** 
 
 .544*** 
 
 .008 
 
 
 .364*** 
 
 
-.331*** 
 
 .624*** 
 
 .294*** 
 .181*** 
 
 .168*** 
 
 .539*** 
 
 
 .132*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 .001 
 
 .006 
 
 .003 
 
 .209*** 
 
 .026* 
 
 
 .104** 
 
 
-.125*** 
 
 .148*** 
 
-.639*** 
 .133*** 
 
 .258*** 
 
 .483*** 
 
 
 .551*** 
 
 
 .016* 
 
 
 
 
 .109** 
 
-.000 
 
 .331*** 
 
 .000 
 
 
 .270*** 
 
 
-.133*** 
 
 .480*** 
 
 .000 
-.108** 
 
-.121*** 
 
 .116*** 
 
 
 .116*** 
 
 
 .048* 
 
 
 .130*** 
 
 
 
 -.032* 
 
  .079* 
 
  .000 
 
 
  .037* 
 
 
  .066* 
 
  .124*** 
 
 -.005 
-.060* 
 
 .145*** 
 
-.042* 
 
 
 .005 
 
 
 .019* 
 
 
-.110*** 
 
-.042* 
 
 
 
 .039* 
 
 .090** 
 
 
 .154*** 
 
 
 .176*** 
 
-.020* 
 
-.446** 
 .130*** 
 
 .196*** 
 
 .480*** 
 
 
 .544*** 
 
 
 .241*** 
 
 
 .331*** 
 
 .051* 
 
 .024* 
 
 
 
 .043* 
 
 
 .073* 
 
 
-.160*** 
 
 .260*** 
 
 .097** 
-.126*** 
 
 .081* 
 
 .019* 
 
 
 .021* 
 
 
 .006 
 
 
 .037* 
 
-.049* 
 
 .144*** 
 
 .057* 
 
 
 
 
 .009 
 
 
-.061* 
 
-.078* 
 
-.084* 
 .158*** 
 
 .225*** 
 
 .347*** 
 
 
 .410*** 
 
 
 .114** 
 
 
 .322*** 
 
 .011* 
 
 .104** 
 
 .097** 
 
 .003 
 
 
 
 
 
 .299*** 
 
 .241*** 
 
-.013* 
-.027* 
 
-.092** 
 
-.285*** 
 
 
-.342*** 
 
 
-.132*** 
 
 
-.139*** 
 
  .041* 
 
 .171*** 
 
-.165*** 
 
-.016* 
 
 
  .237*** 
 
 
 
 
-.098** 
 
-.138*** 
 .111*** 
 
 .197*** 
 
 .547*** 
 
 
 .630*** 
 
 
 .136*** 
 
 
 .480*** 
 
 .144*** 
 
-.067* 
 
 .260*** 
 
-.104** 
 
 
 .264*** 
 
 
-.112*** 
 
 
 
 .088** 
 .027* 
 
-.123*** 
 
 .032* 
 
 
 .309*** 
 
 
-.578*** 
 
 
 .006 
 
 -.002 
 
-.428*** 
 
 .093** 
 
-.101** 
 
 
-.008 
 
 
-.149*** 
 
 .093** 
Notes: the bottom left half of the table contains Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whilst the upper right half of the table reports Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients.  
***, ** and  * denote correlation is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  Variables are defined as follows: return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), the South African 
Corporate Governance Index (the SACGI), Predicted-SACGI (P-SACGI), Residual-SACGI (R-SACGI), dual-listing (DUALIST), leverage (LEV), board size (BSIZE), audit firm size (BIG4), 
capital structure/gearing (GEAR), institutional shareholding (INSTSHDNG), block shareholding (BLKSHDNG), corporate governance committee (CGCOM), and firm size (LNTA).
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As the skewness and kurtosis statistics contained in Table 12 of chapter seven suggests 
that the variables show some level of non-normal behaviour, Table 24 reports both the Pearson 
parametric and the Spearman non-parametric correlation coefficients. Similar to Table 13 of 
chapter seven, the bottom left half of the table reports Pearson parametric correlation 
coefficients, whereas the upper right half of the table presents Spearman’s non-parametric 
alternative. 
The results show that the P-SACGI (predicted instrument) is highly significant and 
positively correlated with the SACGI (.864 and .868 for the Pearson and Spearman correlation 
coefficients, respectively). By contrast, and unlike the SACGI, which is highly correlated with 
the R-SACGI (regression residuals) (.556 and .539 for the Pearson and Spearman correlation 
coefficients, respectively), the P-SACGI is lowly correlated with the R-SACGI (.108 and .132 
for the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients, respectively). This suggests that P-
SACGI is to a greater extent a relevant and valid instrument for the SACGI. It also means that 
replacing the SACGI with the P-SACGI in the compliance-index model should results in an 
unbiased and consistent coefficient estimate, particularly for the coefficient on the P-SACGI 
under the Q-ratio. 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 23 contain the results of the compliance-index model based 
on the instrumental variable (the P-SACGI). To facilitate comparison, and as suggested by 
Larcker and Rusticus (2008), Columns 7 and 8 repeat the OLS results of the compliance-index 
model contained in Column 4 of Tables 17 and 18 of chapter eight, respectively. Columns 5 
and 6 of Table 23 indicate that the F-values for both the ROA and Q-ratio remain statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the P-SACGI 
and control variables are jointly equal to zero can be rejected. It implies that the P-SACGI and 
the control variables can jointly explain significant variations in the ROA and Q-ratio, 
respectively. 
The adjusted R2 of approximately 17% for the ROA based on the instrumental variable 
estimates in Column 5 is statistically 2 percentage point lower than the 19% based on the OLS 
estimates in Column 7. The adjusted R2 for the Q-ratio based on the instrumental variable 
estimates in Column 6 is also similar to that of the OLS estimates in Column 8, but 
statistically 2.6% higher. This means that the coefficient on the P-SACGI and the control 
variables can explain approximately 17% and 32% of the variations in the sampled firms’ 
accounting returns and market value, respectively.  
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Similarly, the coefficients on the P-SACGI under both the ROA and Q-ratio in 
Columns 5 and 6, respectively, remain positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Consistent with the suggestions of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test that the SACGI is 
actually exogenously related to the ROA, the coefficient on the P-SACGI under the ROA in 
Column 5 remains unchanged at .002 when compared with the OLS estimate in Column 7. By 
contrast, the coefficient on the P-SACGI under the Q-ratio in Column 6 has increased by 
approximately 50% from .004 in Column 8 to .008 in Column 6. This is consistent with the 
suggestions of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test that the SACGI is actually endogenously related 
to the Q-ratio.  
The increase in the coefficient on the P-SACGI under the Q-ratio is expected. This is 
because, and as will be clarified further in section 9.4, past studies suggest that instrumental 
variables tend to over-predict (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008). For example, the 
coefficient on the Henry (2008)’s internal corporate governance score for a sample of 116 
Australian listed firms increased from an OLS estimate of .056 to .074 under the instrumental 
variable estimate. Generally, the results based on the instrumental variable estimates indicate 
that the statistically significant and positive financial performance-corporate governance 
relationship reported in chapter eight is robust whether the instrumented part (the P-SACGI) or 
the un-instrumented part of the SACGI (the SACGI) is used. Overall, the results support the 
earlier conclusion in chapter eight that South African listed firms with better corporate 
governance standards tend to be associated with higher financial performance than their 
counterparts with poor corporate governance standards. 
With respect to the control variables, three cases of sensitivities can be identified. First, 
the coefficient on firm size, which was positive under the ROA in Column 7 of Table 23 is 
now negative, but remains statistically insignificant in Column 5 of Table 23. Second, the 
coefficient on dual-listing under the Q-ratio in Column 8, which was statistically significant at 
the 1% level, is no longer statistically significant in Column 6. Third, the coefficient on the 
year 2002 dummy under the Q-ratio in Column 8 of Table 23, which was statistically 
insignificant, is now statistically significant at the 5% level in Column 6. Apart from these 
sensitivities, the coefficients and statistical significance of the estimates based on the 
instrumental variables in Column 5 and 6 of Table 23 are generally essentially similar to the 
OLS estimates in Column 7 and 8 of Table 23.  
In summary, this section has examined the extent to which the results of the 
compliance-index model reported in chapter eight are sensitive or robust to the existence of an 
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endogenous relationship between the financial performance proxies and the SACGI. The 
results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test aimed at determining whether the SACGI is 
endogenously related to the proxies are mixed. Specifically, it suggests that the SACGI is 
exogenously related to the ROA, but endogenously related to the Q-ratio. To be more cautious, 
and also following prior corporate governance studies, however, instrumental variable (IV) 
estimates are conducted for both the ROA and Q-ratio.  
The results based on the instrumental variable estimates suggest that there is a 
statistically significant and positive relationship between firm financial performance and 
corporate governance. The tenor of such a positive relationship remains unchanged whether an 
accounting or a market based measure of performance is used. Generally, the findings are 
consistent with the results of the compliance-index model based on the OLS estimates 
presented in chapter eight. Overall, the results support the earlier conclusion in chapter eight 
that, on average, better-governed South African firms tend to be associated with higher 
financial performance than their poorly-governed counterparts. 
The next section will discuss the results of the compliance-index model based on 
estimating a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model and the existence of alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms.    
 
 
9.4 RESULTS BASED ON ESTIMATING TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES,  
      ALTERNATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS AND  
      POSSIBLE INTERDEPENDENCES 
 
 As has been discussed in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five, most of the prior corporate 
governance studies have examined the wealth effects of corporate governance structures in 
isolation (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; Yermack, 1996; Vefeas, 1999a; Guest, 2009). However, in 
practice, it can be argued that shareholders will rarely rely on a single corporate governance 
mechanism to monitor managerial behaviour. The existence of alternative corporate 
governance structures, for example, suggests that OLS regression of financial performance on 
single corporate governance mechanisms may lead to omitted variable bias and spurious 
correlations (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.378; Beiner et al., 2006, p.252). It is also possible 
for interactions or independences to exist among alternative corporate governance structures in 
order to maximise their efficiency and effectiveness. 
  
312 
 Therefore, following Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Beiner et al. (2006), a set of 
four88 alternative corporate governance mechanisms are simultaneously estimated along with 
the SACGI. These are: (1) leverage; (2) block shareholding; (3) institutional shareholding; and 
(4) board size. These four corporate governance structures are not included in the broad 
composite corporate governance index, the SACGI.  
To ascertain the level of correlation among the variables, Table 24 contains a 
correlation matrix for the financial performance proxies, the four alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms, and the exogenous variables. The correlation coefficients for the 
exogenous variables cover those that were not reported in Table 13 of chapter seven due to 
limited space. These are dual-listing (DUALLIST), audit firm size (BIG4), firm size (LNTA), 
and the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM). Similar to Table 13, the 
bottom left half of Table 24 contains the Pearson parametric correlation coefficients, while the 
upper right half presents the Spearman non-parametric correlation coefficients. 
Generally, both the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients contained in Table 
24 suggest that there are low89 correlations among the SACGI, the four alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms and the exogenous variables. First, dual-listing (DUALLIST) and 
audit firm size (BIG4) are statistically significant and positively correlated. Both are also 
significant and positively correlated with the SACGI. This is consistent with the results 
reported in chapter six, which suggest that, on average, cross-listed and big four audited firms 
comply better with the SACGI. Second, and as hypothesised, the existence of a corporate 
governance committee (CGCOM) is statistically significant and positively associated with the 
SACGI. This indicates that firms that set up a corporate governance committee to monitor 
compliance with corporate governance rules tend to have better governance standards. 
Third, audit firm size, dual-listing and the presence of a corporate governance 
committee are significant and positively associated with both the ROA and Q-ratio. This is 
expected because these firms also tend to have better corporate governance standards. As has 
already been described in chapter seven, block (BLKSHDNG) and institutional shareholdings 
                                                 
88Even though there are other alternative corporate governance structures, such as the market for corporate 
control, data is only available for the four alternative corporate governance mechanisms used in this study at the 
time of data collection.  
89Before winsorising at the 5% and 95% levels, there was a statistically significant low (.308) correlation between 
the alternative corporate governance mechanism, leverage (LEV) and the control variable capital structure 
(GEAR). After winsorising, the correlation between them was very high (.938). This was resolved by regressing 
the GEAR on LEV and the remaining seven control variables. The regression residuals (R-GEAR), which 
correlated lowly (.000) with LEV, but quite highly (.348) with GEAR was used as a proxy for capital structure 
(GEAR).  
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(INSTSHDNG) are significant and negatively and positively associated with the SACGI, 
respectively. As will be discussed further below, this suggests that block shareholding and the 
SACGI are substitutes, whereas institutional shareholding and the SACGI are complements. 
Fourth, and as expected, audit firm size, dual-listing, and the presence of a corporate 
governance committee are all significant and positively associated with institutional 
shareholding, but significant and negatively correlated with block shareholding.  
Similarly, institutional shareholding is significant and positively related to the ROA 
and Q-ratio, while block shareholding is negatively associated with the ROA and Q-ratio. 
Fifth, and consistent with predictions, leverage (LEV) is significant and positively associated 
with the SACGI, but significant and negatively associated with the ROA and Q-ratio. Finally, 
board size is significant and positively associated with the Q-ratio, indicating that the market 
perceives larger boards as more effective. 
The next subsection will discuss the results of the compliance-index model based on 
estimating a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model and the existence of alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms. Specifically, subsection 9.4.1 will report results based the ROA, 
whereas subsection 9.4.2 will discuss results based on the Q-ratio. 
 
9.4.1 Regression Results from Estimating Two-Stage Least Squares Based on ROA 
 
As has been explained above, past studies suggest that firms tend to use multiple 
corporate governance mechanisms to limit opportunistic activities of managers (e.g., Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006). A major implication is that a regression of the ROA 
on a single corporate governance mechanism can result in omitted variable endogenity as have 
been discussed above and also in chapter five. To avoid this, and following Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) and Beiner et al. (2006), four alternative corporate governance mechanisms in 
addition to the SACGI are introduced. These are leverage, block shareholding, institutional 
shareholding, and board size. They are the only alternative corporate governance structures for 
which data was available at the time of data collection. They do not also form part of the broad 
compliance corporate governance index, the SACGI. 
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Table 25: Regression Results from a Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation of Equations (4) – (9) Based on ROA 
Dependent Variable 
(Equation) 
Exp. 
sign 
SACGI   
(4) 
Leverage 
(5) 
Block shareholding 
(6) 
Inst. shareholding 
(7) 
Board size 
(8) 
ROA 
(9) 
Adjusted R2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
     .657 
    .128 
.804 
48.550(.000)*** 
      500 
  .034 
  .122 
  .643 
2.087(.008)*** 
      500 
    .302 
    .175 
  1.104 
13.628(.000)*** 
      500 
    .297 
    .218 
    .924 
13.302(.000)*** 
      500 
    .216 
    .029 
    .842 
7.828(.000)*** 
   500 
     .758 
     .076 
     .791 
 84.352(.000)*** 
       500 
Constant 
SACGI 
Leverage  
Block ownership 
Institutional owners. 
Board size 
ROA 
Corporate gov. com. 
Audit firm size 
Firm size  
Capital structure  
Sales growth  
Capital expenditure  
Dual-listing  
Basic materials  
Consumer services  
Industrials  
Technology  
Year 2002 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
 
   .355(.000)*** 
- 
   .001(.000)*** 
  -.003(.000)*** 
   .002(.000)*** 
  -.005(.055)* 
   .301(.000)*** 
   .118(.000)*** 
   .149(.000)*** 
  -.050(.000)*** 
  -.000(.842) 
   .020(.502) 
   .270(.066)* 
   .061(.001)*** 
  -.043(.026)** 
   .023(.216) 
   .036(.054)* 
   .003(.859) 
  -.081(.000)*** 
   .061(.001)*** 
   .074(.000)*** 
   .093(.000)*** 
   .070(.024)** 
   .001(.008)*** 
- 
   .001(.020)** 
  -.000(.496) 
  -.003(.297) 
  -.123(.014)** 
- 
- 
  -.002(.872) 
- 
   .000(.899) 
   .003(.039)** 
- 
  -.014(.436) 
   .004(.803) 
   .028(.120) 
  -.017(.318) 
   .017(.329) 
  -.011(.524) 
  -.017(.330) 
  -.014(.419) 
   .573(.000)*** 
  -.005(.000)*** 
   .002(.020)** 
- 
   .004(.000)*** 
   .006(.107) 
   .062(.386) 
- 
- 
  -.043(.011)** 
  -.002(.036)** 
   .001(.013)** 
   .002(.319) 
- 
   .020(.437) 
  -.045(.076)* 
   .026(.311) 
   .025(.319) 
  -.062(.014)** 
   .018(.473) 
   .021(.414) 
   .009(.718) 
    .051(.371) 
    .005(.000)*** 
   -.001(.447) 
    .005(.000)*** 
- 
    .012(.004)*** 
    .005(.955) 
    .018(.469) 
- 
    .048(.024)** 
- 
   -.001(.273) 
    .000(.961) 
- 
    .035(.264) 
    .087(.006)*** 
   -.021(.496) 
   -.019(.549) 
    .066(.036)** 
   -.012(.711) 
   -.030(.335) 
   -.030(.348) 
-1.162(.058)* 
-.016(.055)* 
-.006(.462) 
   .008(.213) 
   .016(.001)*** 
- 
-.260(.782) 
 .516(.065)* 
 .724(.010)*** 
-2.239(.000)*** 
   .011(.224) 
   .000(.986) 
   .002(.928) 
-.314(.316) 
-.161(.637) 
-.060(.859) 
 .104(.755) 
-.023(.944) 
-.091(.785) 
 .088(.791) 
 .137(.680) 
   .181(.590) 
    .418(.000)*** 
    .002(.000)*** 
   -.074(.000)*** 
   -.001(.036)** 
    .004(.010)*** 
   -.012(.008)*** 
- 
- 
   -.018(.341) 
   -.265(.000)*** 
   -.000(.842) 
    .002(.000)*** 
    .082(.000)*** 
   -.064(.000)*** 
   -.128(.000)*** 
   -.037(.031)** 
    .094(.005)*** 
   -.096(.000)*** 
    .058(.000)*** 
   -.032(.000)*** 
   -.080(.000)*** 
   -.043(.000)*** 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 2003 are excluded 
from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. As has been explained in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five, to limit endogenity 
problems, four alternative corporate governance mechanisms in addition to the SACGI are introduced. These are: leverage, block shareholding, institutional shareholding, and board size. They are 
the alternative corporate governance structures for which data was available at the time of data collection. They do not also form part of the broad composite index, the SACGI. Equations 4 to 9 are 
estimated as a system of simultaneous equations by using two-stage least squares. Specifically, in the first stage, each of equations 4 to 8 specified in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five and reported 
in Columns 3 to 7 are first estimated along with their respective control variables. The resulting predicted values (i.e., instrumented or predicted part of each corporate governance structure) are 
saved. In the second stage, the SACGI, leverage, block shareholding, institutional shareholding, and board size are replaced with their instrumented or predicted values from equations 4 to 8 in 
equation 9, respectively. Equation 9, specified in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five and reported in Column 8 is subsequently estimated along with the control variables.   
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As has been discussed in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five, the four alternative 
corporate governance mechanisms in addition to the SACGI are estimated simultaneously 
using two-stage least squares (2SLS). Specifically, in the first stage, each of equations 4 to 8 
specified in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five is estimated along with their respective control 
variables. The resulting predicted values (i.e., instrumented or predicted part of each corporate 
governance structure) are saved. In the second stage, each corporate governance mechanism is 
replaced with its saved predicted instrument from the first stage estimations in equation 9 as 
specified in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five. Equation 9 is subsequently estimated along 
with the eight control variables. 
As has also been explained in chapter five, financial performance (ROA) is also 
included in equations 4 to 8 as an independent variable, but as the dependent variable in 
equation 9. The main rationale is to test for the possible existence of endogeneities or 
simultaneities between the five corporate governance structures and the ROA. That is, it 
permits each of the five corporate governance structures to affect financial performance, but 
also allows the ROA to affect the choice of each of the five corporate governance mechanisms.  
Table 25 contains the results from a two-stage least squares estimation of equations 4 
to 9 based on the ROA as discussed in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five. As can be observed, 
each of the five corporate governance mechanism acts as either the dependent or the 
independent variable in one of equations 4 to 8 along with their respective exogenous (control) 
variables. Similar to the inclusion of the ROA, the rationale is to allow for possible 
interrelations or interdependences (i.e., complementarities or substitutions) to exist among the 
five corporate governance structures. 
The F-values of equations 4 to 8 in Columns 3 to 7 of Table 25 are all statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This means that the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the 
exogenous variables reported in Columns 3 to 7 of Table 23 are jointly equal to zero can be 
rejected. It implies that the coefficients on the explanatory variables in Columns 3 to 7 can 
jointly explain significant differences in the SACGI, leverage, block shareholding, institutional 
shareholding, and board size, respectively. The adjusted R2 ranges between 3% for equation 5 
in Column 4 to 66% for equation 4 in Column 3 of Table 25.  
This is consistent with the adjusted R2 reported by prior corporate governance studies. 
For example, using five alternative corporate governance mechanisms in addition to a broad 
composite corporate governance index, Beiner et al. (2006, p.265) report adjusted R2 ranging 
between 41% for their leverage to 44% for their broad composite corporate governance index. 
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Similarly, using six alternative corporate governance mechanisms, Black et al. (2006a, p.390) 
report adjusted R2 of 19% for their disclosure sub-index to 77% for their shareholder rights 
sub-index. 
Generally, the results from equations 4 to 8 contained in Columns 3 to 7 of Table 25 
present an interesting pattern of statistically significant interdependences among most of the 
five corporate governance mechanisms. As the results for the SACGI from equation 4 reported 
in Column 3 of Table 25 show, all four alternative corporate governance structures are 
statistically significantly related to the SACGI. Also, leverage and institutional shareholding 
are positively related to the SACGI, whereas board size and block shareholding have a 
negative relationship with the SACGI. 
Empirically, the evidence of a statistically significant and negative SACGI-block 
shareholding relationship in Column 3 of Table 25, suggests substitutability between the 
SACGI and block shareholding. This also supports the idea that firms optimally choose 
corporate governance structures, whereby a greater usage of one corporate governance 
mechanism results in a lesser usage of another. Theoretically, this is consistent with the 
hypothesis that firms with poor corporate governance structures can compensate that with a 
dominant vigilant block shareholder (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006). 
By contrast, the statistically significant and positive relationship between the SACGI and 
institutional shareholding in Column 3 of Table 25 indicates that they complement each other. 
It supports the theory that due to their relative superior knowledge and financial clout, greater 
institutional shareholding impacts positively on internal corporate governance structures (e.g., 
Core, 2001; Shabbir and Padget, 2005).  
The statistically significant and positive coefficient between the SACGI and ROA in 
Column 3 of Table 25 indicates that there is a reverse relationship between the SACGI and 
accounting performance. That is, firms with higher SACGI scores do not only help to generate 
higher accounting returns, but that there is also reverse association – firms with higher ROA 
also seems to adopt better corporate governance mechanisms.  
With regard to the findings for leverage from equation 5 presented in Column 4 of 
Table 25, the results show that the SACGI and block shareholding are statistically significant 
and positively associated with leverage. By contrast, institutional shareholding and board size 
in Column 4 of Table 25 are statistically insignificant and negatively related to leverage. This 
means that South African listed firms with higher levels of leverage may not be necessarily 
associated with higher SACGI scores and greater block shareholding. The statistically 
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significant and positive association between leverage and the SACGI, and between leverage 
and block shareholding in Column 4 of Table 25, indicate that there a complementarity 
relationship between leverage and the SACGI, and between leverage and block shareholding. 
It means that firms with good corporate governance standards are better placed to raise debt at 
a cheaper cost. 
Empirically, the statistically significant and positive leverage-block shareholding 
relationship in Column 4 of Table 25 offers empirical support to the reported findings of 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). In contrast, it does not support the results of Beiner et al. (2006) 
who report statistically insignificant and negative association between block shareholding and 
leverage. The statistically significant and negative leverage-ROA relationship in Column 4 of 
Table 25 suggests that there is a simultaneous or reverse association between the ROA and 
leverage. That is, due to the high cost of financial distress and less flexibility often associated 
with leverage (Myers, 1977, p.148), managers of profitable firms are less likely to rely on debt 
financing, but also highly levered firms generate poor accounting returns. 
 With reference to the results for block shareholding from equation 6 reported in 
Column 5 of Table 25, they show that a lower SACGI score, a greater institutional 
shareholding and leverage are statistically significantly associated with block shareholding. 
This evidence is consistent with the results of Beiner et al. (2006) who document similar 
interrelations among the same three corporate governance mechanisms. By contrast, it fails to 
support the results of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) who report a statistically significant 
negative relationship between block and institutional shareholdings.  
Since it costs more to acquire larger ownership stakes, especially in larger firms, the 
statistically significant and positive block shareholding-institutional shareholding association 
in Column 5 of Table 25 is more consistent with prior theory. That is, block shareholders are 
more likely to be institutional shareholders than the other way round. The statistically 
significant and negative relationship between block shareholding and the SACGI, but the 
positive association between block shareholding and leverage in Column 5 of Table 25, 
indicates that there is a significant reverse association between block shareholding and 
leverage. The statistically significant and positive reverse association between block 
shareholding and leverage is, however, theoretically less expected.  
This is because as block shareholding is associated with poor internal corporate 
governance standards (i.e., SACGI scores), it is expected that it will be more difficult for such 
firms to raise external debt from the market. A plausible explanation may be that even though 
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firms dominated by block shareholders tend to have poor corporate governance structures, 
they are still able to raise debt from the market, but possibly at a significantly higher cost. 
Finally, the coefficient on the ROA in Column 5 of Table 25 is positive, but statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that more profitable firms may not necessarily be dominated by block 
shareholders. 
 With respect to the findings for institutional shareholding from equation 7 contained in 
Column 6 of Table 25, they indicate that a higher SACGI score, a greater block shareholding, 
and a larger board size are statistically significantly associated with institutional shareholding. 
The negative, but statistically insignificant relationship between institutional shareholding and 
leverage offers empirical support to the results of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). 
Evidence of a statistically significant and positive institutional shareholding-block 
shareholding, and institutional shareholding-SACGI associations in Column 6 of Table 25 
imply that there are statistically significant reverse interdependences among these three 
alternative corporate governance mechanisms. This means that better-governed firms are more 
attracted to institutional shareholders, but also the presence of institutional shareholders can 
impact positively on internal corporate governance mechanisms. Finally, the coefficient on the 
ROA in Column 6 of Table 23 is negative, but statistically insignificant, indicating that more 
successful firms may not necessarily attract institutional shareholders. 
 With reference to the results for board size from equation 8 reported in Column 7 of 
Table 25, they suggest that board size is statistically significantly associated with a lower 
SACGI score and a greater institutional shareholding. It also implies that there is a reverse 
statistically significant and positive association between board size and institutional 
shareholding, but a reverse statistically significant and negative relationship between board 
size and the SACGI. This also means that board size and the SACGI appear to be substitutes, 
whereas board size and institutional shareholding seem to be complements.  
Finally, the coefficient on the ROA in Column 7 of Table 25 is negative, but 
statistically insignificant. This indicates that more financially successful firms may not 
necessarily end up with having larger board size. Overall, the results suggest interesting 
patterns of interdependences or simultaneities among the five corporate governance 
mechanisms, as well as between the ROA and the five corporate governance structures. This 
indicates that the use of 2SLS to estimate the corporate governance-financial performance 
relationship appears to be appropriate. 
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 Considering the exogenous (control) variables in Columns 3 to 7 of Table 25, most of 
the coefficients have the expected signs with some being statistically significant and others not. 
For example, big four audited firms, cross-listed firms, and firms which have established 
corporate governance committees in Column 3 of Table 25 tend to have significantly higher 
SACGI scores. As hypothesised, the coefficient on capital expenditure is statistically 
significant and positively related to the SACGI. The significant negative relationship between 
the SACGI and firm size in Column 3 of Table 25 is, however, surprising without any 
immediate convincing explanation. A possible explanation is that it may be due to sensitivities 
arising out of the specification of the system of equations, such as omitted variable(s) bias. 
The industry and year dummies in Column 3 of Table 25 also show that corporate governance 
standards significantly differ across different industries and years.  
With regard to leverage in Column 4 of Table 25, all the control variables, including 
the year and industry dummies, are statistically insignificant, except capital expenditure. This 
explains the relatively low reported adjusted R2 of equation 5. The statistically significant and 
positive leverage-capital expenditure association in Column 4 of Table 25 indicates that firms 
with heavy investment in fixed assets tend to have higher levels of debt. 
Block shareholding in Column 5 of Table 25 is statistically significant and negatively 
correlated with firm size and capital structure. However, it also shows that block sharehoding 
is statistically significant and positively associated with sales growth, as hypothesised. 
Consistent with prediction, institutional shareholding in Column 6 of Table 25 is statistically 
significant and positively associated with firm size. This is because larger firms are more 
attractive to institutional investors (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.383). Similarly, and 
consistent with predictions, audit firm size and the presence of a corporate governance 
committee in Column 7 of Table 25 are statistically significant and positively associated with 
board size. The statistically significant and negative relationship between firm size and board 
size Column 7 of Table 25 is theoretically unexpected. It may be due to sensitivities arising 
out of potential misspecification of the system of equations, such as potential omitted 
variable(s). 
Equation 9 in Column 8 of Table 25 allows for the existence of potential 
interdependences or simultaneities among the alternative corporate governance structures. It 
also utilises the ROA as an explanatory variable in predicting the instrumented part of all five 
corporate governance mechanisms. This allows the ROA to affect each corporate governance 
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mechanism, but also permits the corporate governance structures to affect the ROA in order to 
capture potential complementary, simultaneous or substitution effects.  
The F-value of equations 9 in Column 8 of Table 25 is significant at the l% level. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the exogenous variables are jointly 
equal to zero can be rejected. In addition to capturing the control variables, the adjusted R2 is 
76% in Column 8 of Table 25. This is very high, but consistent with theoretical and empirical 
expectations (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Gujarati, 1995, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002)90.  
For example, Black et al. (2006a) report that the adjusted R2 increased from 33% with regard 
to the un-instrumented composite corporate governance index to 64% in the case of the 
instrumented composite corporate governance index. This suggests their instrumented 
composite corporate governance index’s predictions are greater than the un-instrumented one.  
With regard to the coefficients of the corporate governance mechanisms in Column 8 
of Table 25, they suggest significant evidence of interdependences or simultaneities among the 
alternative corporate governance structures. Most importantly, the SACGI remains positive 
and statistically significant in Column 8 of Table 25. The magnitude of the coefficient on the 
SACGI also remains unchanged at .002 as reported in Column 4 of Table 17 of chapter eight. 
This means that the earlier conclusion in chapter eight that, on average, better-governed firms 
tend to be associated with higher accounting returns than their poorly-governed counterparts is 
robust whether alternative corporate governance mechanisms are present or not. Leverage, 
block shareholding, institutional shareholding and board size in Column 8 of Table 25 are all 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Following past studies (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et 
al., 2006a) and assuming instrument validity, the statistically significant and negative 
relationship between the ROA and block shareholding in Column 8 of Table 25 supports the 
entrenchment hypothesis. It implies that block shareholders seem to be more interested in the 
private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders than engaging in effective 
                                                 
90 Theoretically, the instrumented part of each corporate governance mechanism contains portions of the 
remaining four alternative corporate governance structures, as well as parts of the ROA. Empirically, this makes 
the instrumented parts of the corporate governance mechanisms to predict financial performance more strongly 
than their un-instrumented counterparts (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006a). This means that, while 
inferences from the regression diagnostics, statistical significance and direction of coefficients may be accurate, 
their true magnitudes are more likely to be over or underestimated (Beiner et al., 2006, p.271). This is because 
they measure the strength of the instrumented parts of the corporate governance mechanisms to predict financial 
performance rather than the corporate governance mechanisms themselves. This also means that the high 
adjusted R2 may be spurious. Indeed, the main aim of the analysis is to ascertain whether there are significant 
interdependences (substitution or complementary effects) exist among the alternative corporate governance 
mechanisms rather than the explanatory power of the model. 
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monitoring of managers. The statistically significant and negative impact of leverage on the 
ROA fails to lend support to the tax advantage theory of capital structure and the effective 
utilisation of free cash flow theory of agency (e.g., Myers, 1977; Jensen, 1986).  
Also, the statistically significant and negative coefficient between the ROA and board 
size in Column 8 of Table 25 suggests that larger boards are ineffective. With respect to the 
South African context, it indicates board appointments may be made in order to meet black 
economic empowerment and employment equity targets rather than for the quality of their 
contributions to board decisions. By contrast, the statistically significant and positive 
relationship between ROA and institutional shareholding in Column 8 of Table 25 supports 
the suggestions of Barr et al. (1995, p.19). Barr et al. (1995) suggest that despite the 
pervasiveness of complex institutional cross-holdings and pyramidical structures in South 
Africa, it represents an efficient way by which South African companies are able to finance 
new growth opportunities without giving up substantial control.  
Unlike the SACGI, the control variables in Column 8 of Table 25 show some level of 
sensitivities when compared with the results presented in Column 4 of Table 17 in chapter 
eight. First, the directions of the coefficient on firm size, capital structure, capital expenditure 
and dual-listing in Column 8 of Table 25 have changed. Second, firm size, capital expenditure, 
dual-listing, the industry and the year dummies that were not statistically significant, are now 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This partly explains the relatively high reported 
adjusted R2. It suggests that in the presence of alternative corporate governance structures, the 
reported results for the control variables in chapter eight are not robust. These sensitivities 
may be due to misspecifications within the system of equations, such as potential omitted 
variable(s) bias. Generally, the results in Column 8 of Table 25 indicate that the control 
variables interrelate differently with the instrumented part of the alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
Together, the results in Column 8 of Table 25 imply that a higher SACGI score, a 
greater institutional shareholding along with a lesser block shareholding, a smaller board size 
and a lesser debt usage is associated with higher accounting returns. The results also show 
significant reverse associations between the ROA, the SACGI, and leverage. This suggests that 
higher accounting returns is significantly associated with a higher SACGI score, but a lesser 
debt usage. Overall, allowing for the existence of potential interdependences or endogeneities 
among the alternative corporate governance mechanisms, the results support the previous 
conclusion in chapter eight that, on average, better-governed South African listed sampled 
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firms tend to be associated with higher accounting returns than their poorly-governed 
counterparts.  
  
9.4.2 Regression Results from Estimating Two-Stage Least Squares Based on Q-ratio 
 
This subsection discusses results from the two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis 
based on the Q-ratio. Similar to the preceding subsection, the four alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms in addition to the SACGI are estimated simultaneously using two-
stage least squares. Specifically, in the first stage, each of equations 4 to 8 specified in 
subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five is estimated along with their respective control variables. 
The resulting predicted values (i.e., instrumented or predicted part of each corporate 
governance structure) are saved. In the second stage, each corporate governance mechanism is 
replaced with its saved predicted instrument from the first stage estimations in equation 9 as 
specified in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five. Equation 9 is subsequently estimated along 
with the seven control variables. 
Financial performance (Q-ratio) is also added to equations 4 to 8 as an independent 
variable, but as the dependent variable in equation 9. The aim is to test for the potential 
existence of endogeneities or simultaneities by allowing each of the five corporate governance 
mechanisms to affect financial performance, but also permitting the Q-ratio to affect the 
choice of each corporate governance mechanisms. 
Table 26 presents the results from a two-stage least squares estimation of equations 4 
to 9 based on the Q-ratio. Each of the five corporate governance mechanisms appear on the 
left-hand side of one of equations 4 to 8 and the right-hand side of each, of the other equations, 
along with their respective exogenous (control) variables. Similar to the inclusion of the Q-
ratio, the rationale is to capture potential simultaneity, substitution or complementary effects 
among the five corporate governance structures. 
The F-values of equations 4 to 8 in Colums 3 to 7 of Table 26 are all statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the 
exogenous variables reported in Columns 3 to 7 of Table 26 are jointly equal to zero can be 
rejected. It means that the coefficients on the independent variables in Columns 3 to 7 jointly 
explain significant differences in the SACGI, leverage, block shareholding, institutional 
shareholding, and board size, respectively. The adjusted R2 ranges between 6% for leverage in 
equation 5 in Column 4 to 63% for the SACGI in equation 4 in Column 3.  
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This is similar to the adjusted R2 reported by prior corporate governance studies (e.g., 
Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Durnev and Kim, 2005). For example, using four alternative 
corporate governance mechanisms in addition to a broad composite corporate governance 
index, Durnev and Kim (2005, p.1480) report adjusted R2 ranging between 12% for their 
social awareness index to 50% for their composite corporate governance index. 
Generally, the results from equations 4 to 8 in Columns 3 to 7 of Table 26 offer 
evidence of statistically significant interrelations among most of the five corporate governance 
mechanisms. With regard to the results from equation 4 presented in Column 3 of Table 26, 
the SACGI is statistically significant and negatively related to block shareholding and board 
size, but statistically significant and positively associated with leverage and institutional 
shareholding. 
 Empirically, the evidence of a statistically significant and negative coefficient on 
block shareholding in Column 3 of Table 26 suggests the existence of a substitution effect 
between the SACGI and block shareholding. Theoretically, it offers support to the suggestion 
that block shareholding can minimise the agency problems between managers and 
shareholders by reducing information asymmetry (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et 
al., 2006). In contrast, the statistically significant and positive SACGI-institutional 
shareholding relationship in Column 3 of Table 26 suggests the existence of a complementary 
effect between the SACGI and institutional shareholding. Theoretically, this is consistent with 
the notion that because of their information and financial advantages, greater institutional 
shareholding impacts positively on internal corporate governance structures (Core, 2001; 
Shabbir and Padget, 2005). 
Unlike the ROA, the coefficient on the Q-ratio in Column 3 of Table 26 is positive, but 
not statistically significant. This suggests that there is no simultaneous or reverse association 
relationship between the SACGI and the Q-ratio. That is, firms with higher SACGI scores do 
receive significantly higher market valuation, but firms with higher Q-ratio may not 
necessarily adopt better corporate governance mechanisms. 
With respect to the findings for leverage from equation 5 contained in Column 4 of 
Table 26, the results indicate that the SACGI and block shareholding are significant and 
positively associated with leverage. This suggests that South African listed firms with high 
gearing are associated with higher SACGI scores and greater block shareholding. Empirically, 
this offers support to the results of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) who report statistically 
significant and positive association between leverage and block shareholding. In contrast, it 
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does not lend support to the findings of Beiner et al. (2006) who document a statistically 
significant and negative relationship between their constructed good corporate governance 
index and leverage. The coefficient on the Q-ratio in Cloumn 4 of Table 26 is negative and 
statistically significant. This means that not only are highly valued firms less likely to rely on 
debt financing, but also firms that are highly geared do receive lower market valuation. 
With reference to the results for block shareholding from equation 6 presented in 
Column 5 of Table 26, the analysis suggests that a lower SACGI score, but a larger board size, 
a greater institutional shareholding, and a greater debt usage are statistically significantly 
associated with block shareholding. The relationships between the SACGI, leverage and block 
ownership in Column 5 of Table 26 are evidence of the existence of significant reverse 
associations between three alternative corporate governance mechanisms. This means that 
firms with better internal corporate governance structures can afford to have dispersed 
shareholdings, and the presence of a block shareholder is likely to increase debt usage and 
vice-versa.  
This evidence supports the results of Beiner et al. (2006). They report that their 
composite good corporate governance index is statistically significant and negatively 
correlated with block shareholding. Leverage and board size in Column 5 of Table 26, 
however, are statistically significant and positively associated with block shareholding. Also, 
institutional shareholding in Column 5 of Table 26 is statistically significant and positively 
associated with block shareholding. The evidence of a positive block shareholding-
institutional shareholding relationship does not support the results of Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996). The results of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) suggest a statistically significant and 
negative link between block and institutional shareholdings. Finally, the coefficient on the Q-
ratio in Column 5 of Table 26 is negative, but statistically insignificant. This indicates that 
firms dominated by block shareholders may not necessarily receive statistically significant 
lower market valuation. 
 With reference to the findings for institutional shareholding from equation 7 reported 
in Column 6 of Table 26, they suggest that a higher SACGI score, a greater block shareholding, 
and a larger board size are statistically significantly associated with institutional shareholding. 
The statistically significant and positive relationship between the SACGI, block shareholding 
and institutional shareholding in Column 6 of Table 26, suggests the existence of significant 
reverse interrelations among the corporate governance structures.  
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Table 26: Regression Results from a Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation of Equations (4) – (9) Based on Q-ratio 
Dependent Variable 
(Equation) 
Exp. 
Sign 
SACGI   
(4) 
Leverage 
(5) 
Block shareholding 
(6) 
Inst. shareholding 
(7) 
Board size 
(8) 
Q-ratio 
(9) 
Adjusted R2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
     .633 
    .133 
.765 
43.777(.000)*** 
      500 
  .055 
  .121 
  .651 
2.797(.000)*** 
      500 
    .302 
    .175 
  1.106 
13.624(.000)*** 
      500 
    .299 
    .217 
    .922 
13.446(.000)*** 
       500 
    .221 
    .028 
    .845 
8.027(.000)*** 
    500 
     .963 
     .125 
     .854 
684.952(.000)*** 
      500 
Constant 
SACGI 
Leverage  
Block ownership 
Institutional owners. 
Board size 
Q-ratio 
Corporate gov. com. 
Audit firm size 
Firm size  
Capital structure  
Sales growth  
Capital expenditure  
Dual-listing  
Basic materials  
Consumer services  
Industrials  
Technology  
Year 2002 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
 
   .358(.000)*** 
- 
   .001(.053)* 
  -.003(.000)*** 
   .003(.000)*** 
  -.006(.030)** 
   .017(.130) 
   .121(.000)*** 
   .152(.000)*** 
  -.047(.000)*** 
  -.000(.413) 
   .001(.026)** 
   .002(.146) 
   .067(.000)*** 
  -.060(.002)*** 
   .012(.540) 
   .028(.149) 
   .002(.149) 
  -.087(.000)*** 
   .055(.004)*** 
   .067(.001)*** 
   .087(.000)*** 
   .101(.001)*** 
   .001(.009)*** 
- 
   .001(.044)** 
  -.000(.659) 
  -.000(.543) 
  -.041(.000)*** 
- 
- 
  -.008(.499) 
- 
  -.000(.714) 
   .004(.005)*** 
- 
  -.023(.899) 
   .021(.236) 
   .034(.052)* 
  -.010(.546) 
   .020(.262) 
  -.002(.899) 
  -.002(.993) 
   .007(.687) 
   .580(.000)*** 
  -.004(.000)*** 
   .001(.040)** 
- 
   .004(.000)*** 
   .006(.098)* 
  -.012(.399) 
- 
- 
  -.044(.010)*** 
  -.002(.031)** 
   .001(.005)*** 
   .002(.267) 
- 
   .021(.403) 
  -.042(.105) 
   .025(.322) 
   .027(.279) 
  -.061(.015)** 
   .019(.460) 
   .024(.351) 
   .015(.574) 
    .035(.553) 
    .005(.000)*** 
   -.000(.600) 
    .005(.000)*** 
- 
    .018(.007)*** 
    .020(.199) 
    .019(.451) 
- 
    .051(.018)** 
- 
   -.001(.246) 
   -.000(.854) 
- 
    .028(.379) 
    .078(.015)** 
   -.024(.452) 
   -.023(.469) 
    .064(.041)** 
   -.015(.628) 
   -.038(.228) 
   -.041(.199) 
-1.390(.027)** 
-.017(.030)** 
-.003(.692) 
   .008(.200) 
   .015(.002)*** 
- 
 .336(.081)* 
 .550(.049)** 
 .674(.017)** 
-2.187(.000)*** 
   .011(.230) 
  -.001(.902) 
  -.005(.857) 
-.391(.213) 
-.232(.497) 
-.193(.576) 
 .077(.816) 
-.097(.773) 
-.105(.752) 
 .034(.917) 
 .009(.979) 
   .000(.999) 
  3.085(.000)*** 
    .000(.783) 
   -.385(.000)*** 
   -.083(.000)*** 
    .036(.004)*** 
   -.064(.047)** 
- 
- 
     .112(.058)* 
   -.342(.000)*** 
   -.001(.010)*** 
    .001(.038)** 
    .184(.000)*** 
    .031(.096)* 
    .036(.068)* 
    .472(.000)*** 
    .653(.009)*** 
   -.541(.000)*** 
    .243(.000)*** 
    .028(.469) 
    .324(.000)*** 
    .458(.000)*** 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 2003 are excluded 
from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. As has been explained in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five, to limit endogenity 
problems, four alternative corporate governance mechanisms in addition to the SACGI are introduced. These are: leverage, block shareholding, institutional shareholding, and board size. They are 
the alternative corporate governance structures for which data was available at the time of data collection. They do not also form part of the broad composite index, the SACGI. Equations 4 to 9 are 
estimated as a system of simultaneous equations by using two-stage least squares. Specifically, in the first stage, each of equations 4 to 8 specified in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five and reported 
in Columns 3 to 7 are first estimated along with their respective control variables. The resulting predicted values (i.e., instrumented or predicted part of each corporate governance structure) are 
saved. In the second stage, the SACGI, leverage, block shareholding, institutional shareholding, and board size are replaced with their instrumented or predicted values from equations 4 to 8 in 
equation 9, respectively. Equation 9, specified in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five and reported in Column 8 is subsequently estimated along with the control variables.  
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This implies that institutional shareholders are more likely to invest in firms with better 
internal corporate governance structures, but also the presence of institutional shareholders can 
significantly influence managers to improve internal corporate governance mechanisms. 
Finally, and unlike the ROA, the coefficient on the Q-ratio in Column 6 of Table 26 is positive, 
but statistically insignificant. This indicates that higher market valuation is not necessarily 
significantly associated with institutional shareholding. 
 With respect to the results for board size from equation 8 contained in Column 7 of 
Table 26, they suggest that a lower SACGI score, but a greater institutional shareholding, is 
statistically significantly associated with board size. It also indicates the existence of 
significant reverse associations between board size, institutional shareholding and the SACGI. 
The statistically significant and negative relationship between board size and the SACGI in 
Column 7 of Table 26 indicates that they are substitutes or larger boards appear to have lower 
SACGI. The statistically significant and positive association between board size and 
institutional shareholding suggests that they are complements.  
Finally, the coefficient on the Q-ratio under board size in Column 7 of Table 26 is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests the presence of a significant 
reverse association between the Q-ratio and board size. This implies that firms with larger 
boards receive higher market valuation, but also it is presumably more attractive for 
prospective board members to join firms that are financially successful. To summarise, the 
results in Columns 3 to 7 of Table 26 support the existence of significant interrelations or 
simultaneities among the five corporate governance structures, as well as between the Q-ratio 
and the five corporate governance mechanisms. Crucially, it seems to justify the reliance on 
the 2SLS technique to simultaneously estimate the relationship between the corporate 
governance mechanisms and the Q-ratio. 
 With regard to the exogenous (control) in Columns 3 to 7 of Table 26, most of the 
coefficients show the hypothesised signs with some being significant and others not. For 
instance, and as expected, audit firm size, sales growth, dual-listing and the presence a 
corporate governance committee in Column 3 of Table 26 are significantly positively 
associated higher SACGI scores. By contrast, the negative coefficient on firm size in Column 3 
of Table 26 is theoretically unexpected. It, however, does not come with immediate cogent 
theoretical explanation. It may, for example, be due to potential misspecifications in the 
system of equations, such as omitted variable(s) bias. They coefficients on the year dummies 
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in Column 3 of Table 26 also indicate that corporate governance standards significantly differ 
across different financial years, as hypothesised. 
With respect to leverage in Column 4 of Table 26, and consistent with the prediction, it 
is statistically significant and positively associated with capital expenditure. With regard to 
block ownership in Column 5 of Table 26, and as predicted, it is statistically significant and 
negatively associated with firm size and capital structure. Also, leverage is statistically 
significant and positively related to sales growth as expected in Column 5 of Table 26. 
Similarly, and consistent with expectations, firm size is statistically significant and positively 
associated with institutional shareholding in Column 6 of Table 26. Finally, and consistent 
with predictions, board size is statistically significant and positively associated with the 
presence of a corporate governance committee and audit firm size in Column 7 of Table 26.  
Finally, equation 9 in Column 8 of Table 26 allows for the existence of possible 
interrelations or endogeneities among the five corporate governance mechanisms. It also 
utilises the Q-ratio as an exogenous variable in predicting the instrumented portion of all five 
corporate governance mechanisms. This permits the Q-ratio to affect each corporate 
governance structure, but also allows the corporate governance mechanisms to affect the Q-
ratio in order to capture probable complementary, simultaneous or substitution effects among 
the variables.  
The F-value of equation 9 in Column 8 of Table 26 is statistically significant at the l% 
level. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the exogenous variables are 
jointly equal to zero can be rejected. The adjusted R2 is 96%, which is excessively high. 
However, it is theoretically and empirically not too surprising. This is because, and as has 
been explained above, prior econometric theory (e.g., Gujarati, 1995, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002; 
Brooks, 2003), and past corporate governance studies (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; 
Black et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006a), suggest that the instrumented parts of corporate 
governance mechanisms tend to predict financial performance more strongly than their un-
instrumented counterparts.  
This also means that the very high adjusted R2 may be spurious. In fact, and has been 
explained above, the main aim of the analysis is to ascertain whether there are significant 
interdependences (substitution or complementary effects) exist among the alternative 
corporate governance mechanisms rather than the explanatory power of the model. 
Examining the coefficients on the corporate governance structures in Column 8 of 
Table 26, they offer evidence of significant interrelations among the alternative corporate 
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governance mechanisms. Unlike the ROA, however, it indicates that the magnitude and the 
statistical significance of the coefficient on the SACGI are not robust to the presence of 
alternative corporate governance mechanisms. First, the coefficient on the SACGI in Column 8 
of Table 26, which was statistically significant at the 1% level in Column 4 of Table 18 of 
chapter seven, is no longer statistically significant. Second, the magnitude of the coefficient 
has reduced significantly from .004 to .000. These sensitivities may be arising from equation 
misspecifications due to the presence of the alternative corporate governance mechanisms, 
such as potential omitted variable(s) bias. It may also be due to the use of the instrumented 
part of the variables. The results do not support the previous conclusion in chapter eight that 
there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between the Q-ratio and the SACGI. 
By contrast, the remaining four alternative corporate governance structures in Column 
8 of Table 26 are all statistically significant. Following previous corporate governance studies 
(e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006a) and assuming 
instrument validity, the negative coefficient on block shareholding offers empirical support to 
the entrenchment hypothesis (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990). The 
negative relationship between the Q-ratio and leverage does not support the tax advantages of 
using debt and efficient use of free cash flows as suggested by capital structure and agency 
theories, respectively (e.g., Myers, 1977; Jensen, 1986).  
Similarly, the negative coefficient on board size suggests that the market perceives 
larger boards as ineffective. Within the South African context, this seems to suggest that the 
willingness to meet black economic empowerment and employment equity targets tend to take 
precedence over the potential to make quality contributions to board decisions when 
appointments to corporate boards are made. 
In contrast, the positive association between the Q-ratio and institutional shareholding 
offers empirical support to the suggestion of Barr et al. (1995, p.19) that despite the 
pervasiveness of complex institutional cross-holdings and pyramidical structures in South 
Africa, it represents an efficient way by which firms are able to raise external capital to 
finance growth without surrendering significant control.  
With respect to the control variables in Column 8 of Table 26, they generally exhibit 
the expected signs, and are all statistically significant when compared with those reported in 
Column 4 of Table 18 in chapter eight. For example, and as expected, capital expenditure, 
sales growth, audit firm size and dual-listing in Column 8 of Table 26 are statistically 
significant and positively associated with the Q-ratio. Similarly, and as predicted, firm size 
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and capital structure are statistically significantly negatively correlated with the Q-ratio. It also 
shows that the Q-ratio significantly differs across different industries and years as 
hypothesised.  
To summarise, and like the ROA, the results in Column 8 of Table 26 indicate that 
greater institutional shareholding along with lesser block shareholding, smaller board size and 
lesser debt usage are statistically significantly associated with higher market valuation. Unlike 
the ROA, however, the results suggest that allowing for the existence of alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms, the SACGI looses its ability to explain significant differences in the 
Q-ratio. Overall, the results in Column 8 of Table 26 imply that firms with insignificant block 
shareholding, smaller boards and lesser debt usage, but significantly greater institutional 
shareholding can afford to have relatively poor internal corporate governance structures 
without necessarily being punished by the market with lower market valuation. 
The final section below will investigate the relationship between changes in the 
financial performance and changes in the SACGI rather than using actual levels for the 
analysis. 
 
 
9.5 OLS REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE LINK BETWEEN CHANGES IN   
       FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND CHANGES IN THE SACGI 
 
 In line with the prior literature, the results presented in chapter eight and the sensitivity 
or robustness analyses carried out so far generally suggest that firms with better corporate 
governance standards tend to be associated with higher financial returns than their 
counterparts with poor corporate governance standards. However, it is still unclear within the 
prior literature whether better corporate governance causes better financial performance or 
vice-versa. This may partly be attributed to data limitations in prior corporate governance 
studies.   
This section attempts to fill this gap within the prior literature by running a regression 
of changes in the financial performance on changes in the SACGI. This will arguably help to 
directly measure the effect of an improvement or a decline in the quality of firm’s corporate 
governance on its financial performance. The central rationale is that if better-governed firms 
tend to be associated with superior financial performance than their poorly-governed 
counterparts, then it can be argued that a stronger test will be to estimate such relationship by 
using year-on-year changes in the financial performance and the SACGI rather than relying on 
their actual levels. 
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The changes data is computed for the financial performance, the SACGI and the non-
dummy control variables, respectively, as follows: 
 ,1−−=∆ tt FPFPFP   
,1−−=∆ tt SACGISACGISACGI and 
.1−−=∆ tt CONTROLSCONTROLSCONTROLS  
 
where: FP∆ stands for changes in the financial performance proxies, ROA and Q-ratio, 
SACGI∆  refers to changes in the SACGI, while CONTROLS∆ refers to changes in all the 
non-dummy control variables, namely firm size, capital structure, capital expenditure and sales 
growth. Changes data could not be computed for the dummy variables of industry, year, dual-
listing and audit firm size. This also reduces the sample size from 500 to 400 firm-year 
observations.  
The computed changes data as specified above is then used to re-estimate the corporate 
governance-firm financial performance relationship for the compliance-index model (equation 
1)91 as specified in equation 12 in subsection 5.3.1.2 of chapter five and repeated below: 
∑
=
+∆+∆+=∆
n
i
ititiitit CONTROLSSACGIFP
1
10 εββα                            (12) 
 
where: FP∆ , SACGI∆ , and CONTROLS∆ are the same as defined above. 
To ascertain the pattern of changes in the SACGI and financial performance, Table 27 
reports summary descriptive of changes in financial performance and the SACGI. Specifically, 
Panels A, B, C, D, and E of Table 27 contain summary descriptive statistics of changes in  the 
ROA, the Q-ratio, the SACGI, the Economic-SACGI, and the Social-SACGI, respectively. 
The general evidence from Panels A to E is that the summary year-on-year average 
changes in the financial performance proxies and the SACGI are relatively small. By contrast, 
absolute changes in the financial performance proxies and the SACGI generally show very 
large spreads. For example, and as Panel A of Table 27 suggests, the average change in the 
ROA for all the 400 firm-year observations is .83 percentage points, which is relatively small.  
However, the highest decrease in the ROA in a year is 34 percentage points, whereas 
the highest increase in the ROA in a year is 40 percentage points, indicating a very large 
spread. The average change in the ROA for 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 are 1.01, -1.60, 2.09, 
and 1.83 percentage points, respectively. Panel B of Table 27 indicates that the overall average 
                                                 
91Since the equilibrium-variable model (equation 2) contains a lot of dummy variables, it will be inappropriate to 
estimate a similar model or relationship. 
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change in the Q-ratio is .15, with a highest decrease in a year of 2.32, and a highest increase in 
a year of 2.33. This also shows limited average changes, but a very large spread. The average 
change in the Q-ratio for 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 are -.02, .19, .24, and .18, respectively.  
Similarly, Panel C of Table 27 shows that the average overall change in the SACGI is 
5.15 percentage points, which is relatively small. By contrast, the highest decrease in the 
SACGI in a year is 20 percentage points, and a highest increase in the SACGI in a year is 64 
percentage points, also indicating a very large spread. An example of a sampled firm with 
such a large spread is Aflease Gold Ltd (AFO). It scored 12% (6 out of 50), 14% (7 out of 50), 
18% (9 out of 50) and 22% (11 out of 50) in 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively.  
 
Table 27: Summary Descriptive Statistics for Changes in Performance and the SACGI 
Dependent/Independent Variables Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Skew-
ness 
Kurt- 
osis 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi- 
mum 
Panel A: Changes in the  ROA All 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel B: Changes in the Q-ratio All 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel C: Changes in the SACGI All 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel D: Changes in Econ.-SACGI All  
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel E: Changes in  Social-SACGI All  
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
.83 
1.01 
-1.60 
2.09 
1.83 
.15 
-.02 
.19 
.24 
.18 
5.15 
9.12 
5.80 
2.58 
3.08 
5.15 
9.63 
5.66 
2.32 
3.00 
5.11 
6.78 
6.44 
3.78 
3.44 
9.24 
9.95 
9.01 
9.30 
8.30 
.46 
.39 
.45 
.49 
.47 
8.42 
10.25 
7.49 
4.78 
8.67 
8.99 
10.80 
7.9 
5.27 
9.23 
13.98 
16.92 
14.75 
11.63 
11.79 
-.28** 
.17** 
-.43** 
.12** 
.99** 
.33** 
 .62** 
 .80**.
.99** 
.99** 
   .90** 
1.63*** 
 1.28*** 
 .43** 
.97** 
1.96*** 
1.39*** 
  .98** 
.51** 
.99** 
 1.26*** 
 1.12*** 
 1.11*** 
  .68** 
.10* 
3.83** 
3.21** 
3.15** 
3.71*** 
6.19*** 
6.32*** 
 9.98*** 
 5.89*** 
 9.27*** 
 4.75*** 
 9.70*** 
 7.64*** 
 3.09* 
.33 
   .99 
 7.32*** 
 5.38*** 
 2.69 
 1.13 
 9.98*** 
4.12*** 
3.65** 
1.83 
1.75 
8.94*** 
-34.00 
-31.00 
-30.00 
-34.00 
-17.00 
-2.32 
-1.33 
-1.09 
-2.32 
-.97 
-20.00 
-20.00 
-12.00 
-10.00 
-10.00 
-19.51 
-19.51 
-14.63 
-14.63 
-12.20 
-44.44 
-44.44 
-33.33 
-22.22 
-33.33 
40.00 
35.00 
30.00 
31.00 
40.00 
2.33 
2.32 
2.28 
1.64 
2.33 
64.00 
64.00 
38.00 
16.00 
54.00 
63.41 
63.41 
39.02 
17.07 
51.22 
66.67 
66.67 
55.56 
44.44 
66.67 
The skewness and kurtosis test statistics in columns 4 and 5, respectively, test for normal distribution. A test 
statistic with (***), (**), and (*) means that the null hypothesis that a variable is normally distributed is rejected 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 
However, as a result of a takeover by a US-based mining consortium and a subsequent 
cross-listing to the US, it scored 76% (38 out of 50) in 2006, an increase of 32 items or 64 
percentage points. The average change in the SACGI for 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 are 
9.15%, 5.80%, 2.58%, and 3.08%, respectively. Panels D and E of Table 27 also suggest 
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similar limited average changes in the Economic-SACGI and the Social-SACGI, but very large 
spreads. As suggested in subsection 9.2.1, the limited year-on-year average changes in the 
financial performance proxies and the SACGI explains the relatively stable results of the 
compliance-index model reported in chapter seven. 
Table 28 contains the results of a simple OLS regression of changes in the financial 
performance on changes in the SACGI. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 28 show the results of 
changes in the ROA and Q-ratio on changes in the SACGI, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 
contain the results of changes in the ROA and Q-ratio on changes in the Social-SACGI, 
respectively, while Columns 7 and 8 present the results of changes in the ROA and Q-ratio on 
changes in the Economic-SACGI.  
 The F-values of changes in the SACGI, changes in the Social-SACGI and changes in 
the Economic-SACGI are statistically insignificant. Therefore, the null hypothesis the 
coefficients on changes in the SACGI, changes in the Social-SACGI, and changes in the 
Economic-SACGI are equal to zero cannot be rejected. This implies that the regression 
coefficients on changes in the SACGI, the Social-SACGI and the Economic-SACGI cannot 
explain significant differences of the changes in the ROA and Q-ratio.  
Consistent with the suggestions of the F-values, the adjusted R2 of all six simple 
regressions are very low. It ranges from 0% in the case of the simple regression of changes in 
the ROA on changes in the Social-SACGI to .3% with regard to the simple regression of 
changes in the Q-ratio on changes in the Economic-SACGI. This suggests that the regression 
coefficients have no significant explanatory power over variations in the observed changes in 
the ROA and Q-ratio. This is not empirically too surprising because summary descriptive 
statistics contained in Table 27 suggest that the ROA, the Q-ratio and the SACGI experienced 
limited year-on-year changes. This implies that while the analysis in chapter eight using the 
actual levels of the ROA, the Q-ratio and the SACGI suggests significant relationship between 
good corporate governance and financial performance, there is no evidence of a similar 
statistically significant associations using changes in the ROA, the Q-ratio, and the SACGI.   
Similarly, the coefficients on changes in the SACGI, the Social-SACGI and the 
Economic-SACGI under both the ROA and Q-ratio are statistically insignificant. This also 
fails to offer support to the conclusion in chapter eight that firms with better internal corporate 
governance structures tend to be associated with higher financial returns than their poorly-
governed counterparts. By contrast, the positive signs of the coefficients on the remaining six 
simple regressions offer empirical support to the positive relationship reported in chapter eight, 
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although they are all statistically insignificant. The negative and statistically insignificant 
direction of the coefficients on changes in the SACGI under the Q-ratio in Column 4 of Table 
28 and changes in the Economic-SACGI under the Q-ratio in Column 8 are not theoretically 
expected. 
First, the unexpected negative and statistically insignificant coefficients on changes in 
the SACGI and changes in the Economic-SACGI under the Q-ratio suggest that changes in firm 
financial performance may also be influenced by general market conditions. As has been 
explained in subsection 5.2.2.2 (vii) of chapter five, on average, firms tend to perform 
financially better during periods of economic boom, for instance, than when there is economic 
recession. In fact, Panels A and B of Table 12 of chapter seven indicate that average ROA and 
Q-ratio was least in 2004 and 2003, respectively.  
In contrast, the highest average ROA and Q-ratio were recorded in 2006. This finding 
has also been supported by the coefficients on the year dummies under both the compliance-
index model and the equilibrium-variable model reported in chapter seven. The least ROA in 
2004 and Q-ratio in 2003, also explains the negative average change in the ROA in 2004 and 
in the Q-ratio in 2003 in Panels A and B of Table 27, respectively.  
Second, and as has been explained above, the statistically insignificant coefficient on 
changes in the SACGI, the Social-SACGI, and the Economic-SACGI under both changes in the 
ROA and Q-ratio may be explained by the limited changes in the corporate governance 
proxies. That is, the year-on-year changes in the SACGI were not substantial enough to be 
associated with significant changes in the ROA and Q-ratio. Finally, the lack of statistical 
significance, as well as the unexpected negative and statistically insignificant coefficients on 
changes in the SACGI and the Economic-SACGI under the Q-ratio may also be due to omitted 
variable(s) bias. 
Therefore, to test whether the unexpected negative coefficients and the lack of 
statistical significance are spuriously caused by some omitted variable(s), the control variables 
are added to the same set of changes regressions in Table 29. The table shows that after 
including the control variables, the F-values of all 6 changes models are now statistically 
significant at the 1%. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the coefficients on changes in the 
SACGI and the control variables are jointly equal to zero can be rejected. This implies that the 
coefficient on changes in the SACGI and the control variables can jointly explain significant 
differences of the changes in the ROA and Q-ratio. 
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Table 28: OLS Regression Results of Changes in Financial Performance on Changes in the SACGI Alone 
Dependent Variable Exp. 
Sign 
∆ROA ∆Q-ratio ∆ROA ∆Q-ratio ∆ROA ∆Q-ratio 
Adjusted R2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
  -.002 
  .092 
2.377 
   .242(.623) 
     400 
     .001 
     .460 
   2.236 
   1.585(.209) 
       400 
   .000 
   .092 
 2.376 
 1.199(.274) 
    400 
  -.003 
    .461 
  2.239 
.001(.980) 
  400 
  -.002 
    .093 
  2.378 
.036(.850) 
  400 
      .003 
      .460 
    2.237 
2.098(.148) 
  400 
Constant 
∆SACGI 
∆Social-SACGI 
∆Economic-SACGI 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
   .007(.202) 
   .000(.623) 
- 
- 
     .166(.000)*** 
    -.003(.209) 
- 
- 
   .006(.190) 
- 
   .000(.274) 
- 
    .148(.000)*** 
- 
    .000(.980) 
- 
    .008(.144) 
- 
- 
     .000(.850) 
   .168(.000)*** 
- 
- 
   -.004(.148) 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. *** denotes p-value is significant at the 1% level. ∆SACGI, ∆Social-SACGI and ∆Economic-SACGI refer to year-on-year 
changes in the SACGI, the Social-SACGI and the Economic-SACGI, respectively. ∆ROA and ∆Q-ratio refer to year-on-year changes in return on assets (ROA) and 
Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), respectively. 
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Table 29: OLS Regression Results of Changes in Financial Performance on Changes in the SACGI and Control Variables 
Dependent Variable Exp. 
Sign 
∆ROA ∆Q-ratio ∆ROA ∆Q-ratio ∆ROA ∆Q-ratio 
Adjusted R2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
      .142 
     .086 
   2.383 
   5.730(.000)*** 
       400 
     .109 
     .435 
   2.070 
   4.503(.000)*** 
      400 
     .144  
     .085 
   2.386 
   5.792(.000)*** 
     400 
     .110 
     .435 
   2.071 
   4.535(.000)*** 
      400 
     .142  
     .086 
   2.382 
   5.713(.000)*** 
     400 
     .108 
     .435 
   2.071 
   4.458(.000)*** 
      400 
Constant 
∆SACGI 
∆Social-SACGI 
∆Economic-SACGI 
∆Firm size  
∆Capital structure  
∆Sales growth  
∆Capital expenditure  
Dual-listing  
Audit firm size 
Basic materials  
Consumer services  
Industrials  
Technology  
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
     .001(.965) 
     .000(.636) 
- 
- 
   -.002(.951) 
   -.001(.000)*** 
    .001(.000)** 
    .001(.466) 
    .004(.717) 
   -.005(.633) 
   -.005(.728) 
    .017(.219) 
    .018(.176) 
   -.022(.089)* 
   -.022(.074)* 
    .022(.885) 
    .010(.451) 
   -.081(.287) 
     .003(.295) 
- 
- 
   -.825(.000)*** 
    .001(.353) 
   -.001(.155) 
    .014(.026)** 
   -.024(.661) 
   -.019(.714) 
    .041(.561) 
    .097(.159) 
    .043(.535) 
    .035(.610) 
    .236(.000)*** 
    .333(.000)*** 
    .315(.000)*** 
   -.000(.981) 
- 
    .000(.332) 
- 
   -.003(.916) 
   -.001(.000)*** 
    .001(.000)*** 
    .001(.468) 
    .005(.671) 
  -.005(.649) 
  -.004(.749) 
   .017(.210) 
   .019(.166) 
   .022(.098)* 
  -.023(.061)* 
   .001(.449) 
   .010(.332) 
   -.073(.323) 
- 
    .002(.224) 
- 
   -.814(.000)*** 
    .001(.372) 
   -.001(.141) 
    .014(.021)** 
   -.020(.721) 
   -.017(.748) 
    .044(.531) 
   .100(.148) 
   .046(.504) 
   .040(.567) 
   .227(.000)*** 
   .320(.000)*** 
   .303(.000)*** 
    .002(.895) 
- 
- 
    .000(.854) 
    .001(.986) 
   -.001(.000)*** 
    .001(.000)*** 
    .001(.438) 
    .004(.719) 
   -.005(.640) 
   -.005(.731) 
    .017(.218) 
    .018(.175) 
    .022(.084)* 
   -.023(.068)* 
    .001(.954) 
    .009(.508) 
   -.073(.333) 
- 
- 
    .002(.455) 
   -.810(.000) *** 
    .001(.369) 
   -.001(.154) 
    .014(.022)** 
   -.025(.650) 
   -.019(.719) 
    .041(.563) 
    .097(.160) 
    .043(.537) 
    .037(.597) 
    .234(.000)*** 
    .328(.000)*** 
    .308(.000)*** 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and  * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 2003 
are excluded from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison.  ∆SACGI, ∆Social-SACGI and ∆Economic-SACGI refer to 
year-on-year changes in the SACGI, the Social-SACGI and the Economic-SACGI, respectively. ∆ROA and ∆Q-ratio, ∆firm size, ∆capital structure, ∆sales growth, and 
∆capital expenditure refer to year-on-year changes in return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), firm size, capital structure, sales growth, and capital 
expenditure, respectively. 
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 Consistent with the improvements in the F-values, the adjusted R2 of all 6 models in 
Table 29 have also improved substantially. The adjusted R2 range from 11% in the case of the 
regression of changes in the Q-ratio on the changes in the Economic-SACGI in Column 8 of 
Table 29 to 14% with regard to the regression of changes in the ROA on the changes in the 
Social-SACGI in Column 5. This suggests that the control variables have contributed 
substantially to the explanatory power of the models. This also means that the coefficients on 
the changes in the SACGI and the control variables can jointly explain between 11 to 14% of 
the variations of the changes in the ROA and Q-ratio.  
The coefficients on all three compliance corporate governance indices under both the 
ROA and Q-ratio remain statistically insignificant. The signs of the coefficients on all three 
compliance corporate governance indices under both the ROA and Q-ratio are now positive. 
This implies that the unexpected negative and statistically insignificant coefficients on the 
changes in the SACGI and the Economic-SACGI under the Q-ratio in Table 29 were spuriously 
caused by omitted variables. As has already been explained above, the lack of statistical 
significance of the coefficients on the three composite corporate governance indices indicates 
that the average changes in them were not substantial enough to be associated with significant 
changes in the ROA and Q-ratio.  
Overall, the positive coefficients on all three compliance corporate governance indices 
indicate that improvements (decreases) in the quality of firm’s corporate governance are 
associated with similar improvements (decreases) in its financial performance. This offers 
empirical support to the conclusion in chapter eight. The statistically insignificant coefficients, 
however, suggest that the improvements (decreases) in financial performance resulting from 
improvements in (decreases) the quality of corporate governance are not statistically 
significant. This fails to offer empirical support to the conclusion in chapter eight. 
With reference to the control variables in Columns 3 to 8 of Table 29, they generally 
show the expected signs. For example, the statistically significant negative and positive 
coefficient on changes in capital structure and sales growth, respectively, under the changes in 
ROA in Column 3 of Table 29 is consistent with theoretical predictions. Similarly, the 
statistically significant negative and positive coefficient on changes in firm size and capital 
expenditure, respectively, under the changes in the Q-ratio in Column 4 are consistent 
theoretical with expectations. The statistically significant coefficients on the year and industry 
dummies also indicate that changes in the ROA and the Q-ratio differ across different 
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industries and financial years. This also supports the findings from the summary descriptive 
statistics reported in Panels A and B of Table 27. 
In brief, this section has examined whether year-on-year improvements (declines) in 
the quality of the sampled firms’ corporate governance will be associated with similar 
improvements (declines) in their year-on-year reported financial performance. Generally, the 
results indicate that improvements (declines) in the sampled firms’ corporate governance 
standards are associated with positive (negative), but statistically insignificant improvements 
(declines) in their reported financial performance. The lack of statistical significance is not 
empirically surprising. This is because summary descriptive statistics suggest that the year-on-
year changes in the SACGI were not substantial enough to to be associated with significant 
changes in the ROA and Q-ratio. The positive coefficient support the positive coefficient 
reported in chapter eight. The statistically insignificant coefficient, however fails to support 
the statistically significant coefficient on the SACGI reported in chapter eight. 
 
 
9.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has examined the robustness or sensitivity of the empirical results of the 
study. Specifically, the main aim of the chapter has been to ascertain the extent to which the 
results reported in chapter eight are robust or sensitive to alternative empirical and theoretical 
explanations, as well as estimations. In this regard, the results presented in chapter eight have 
been subjected to a number of robustness or sensitivity analyses.  
Firstly, the compliance-index and equilibrium-variable models are re-estimated based 
on a lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure. The aim is to address 
potential endogeneity problems that may arise due to a time-lag in the financial performance 
and corporate governance relationship. The results based on the compliance-index model 
remain generally unchanged, that better-governed South African listed firms tend to be 
associated with higher financial returns than their poorly-governed counterparts.  
Similarly, and consistent with the mixed results reported in chapter eight, the results of 
the equilibrium-variable model based on a lagged financial performance-corporate governance 
structure are conflicting. Generally, the findings from the equilibrium-variable model offer 
support to the earlier conclusion that there is either a statistically weak or no relationship 
between most of the eleven individual internal corporate governance structures and financial 
performance, when they are examined as single corporate governance mechanisms in isolation.  
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On a comparative basis, and consistent with the previous conclusion in chapter eight, 
the compliance-index model appears to produce consistent statistically significant and positive 
coefficients, as well as possesses better empirical properties than the equilibrium-variable 
model, irrespective of the financial performance proxy used. 
Secondly, the presence of potential endogeneity problems among the corporate 
governance variables is further addressed by re-estimating the compliance-index model using 
instrumental variables (IV) and two-stage least squares (2SLS).  The results based on the 
instrumental variable estimates suggest that there is a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between financial performance and corporate governance. The tenor of such a 
positive relationship remains unchanged whether an accounting (ROA) or a market based 
measure (Q-ratio) of performance is used. Generally, the findings from the instrumental 
estimates are consistent with the results of the compliance-index model based on OLS estimate 
presented in chapter eight.  
The results based on the two-stage least squares (2SLS) indicate that there are 
significant interdependences among the five corporate governance mechanisms, as well as 
between the financial performance proxies and the corporate governance structures. 
Specifically, the results based on the ROA suggest that if alternative corporate governance 
mechanisms are allowed to co-exist, a higher SACGI score, a greater institutional shareholding 
along with a lesser block shareholding, a smaller board size and a lesser debt usage tend to be 
associated with higher accounting returns. Generally, allowing for the existence of potential 
interdependences or endogeneities among the alternative corporate governance mechanisms, 
the results support the previous conclusion in chapter eight that, on average, better-governed 
South African listed firms tend to be associated with higher accounting returns than their 
poorly-governed counterparts.  
By contrast, results based on the Q-ratio indicate that allowing for the existence of 
alternative corporate governance mechanisms, the SACGI looses its ability to explain 
significant differences in the Q-ratio. Overall, the results imply that firms with insignificant 
block shareholding, smaller boards and lesser debt usage, but significantly greater institutional 
shareholding can afford to have relatively poor internal corporate governance structures 
without necessarily being punished by the market with lower market valuation. 
Finally, the chapter examined whether year-on-year changes in the quality of the 
sampled firms’ corporate governance are associated with similar changes in their year-on-year 
reported financial performance. Generally, the results indicate that improvements (declines) in 
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the sampled firms’ corporate governance standards are associated with positive, but 
statistically insignificant improvements (declines) in their reported financial performance. The 
positive coefficient on changes in the SACGI supports the positive coefficient reported in 
chapter eight. The statistically insignificant coefficient, however fails to support the 
statistically significant coefficient on the SACGI reported in chapter eight. 
The final chapter will provide the conclusions of the thesis. Specifically, it will provide 
a summary of results, policy implications, limitations, recommendations and potential avenues 
for further studies.  
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSIONS: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS, 
LIMITATIONS, AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
10. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter discusses the conclusions of the thesis. It seeks to achieve five main 
objectives. First, it summarises the research findings. In this regard, the research findings 
based on the: levels of compliance with the South African Corporate Governance Index (the 
SACGI); compliance-index and equilibrium-variable models; and robustness or sensitivity 
analyses are summarised. Second, it discusses the policy implications of the research findings, 
and where applicable, makes appropriate recommendations. Third, the chapter summarises the 
contributions of the study. Fourth, it highlights the limitations of the study. Finally, the chapter 
identifies potential avenues for future research and improvements.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 10.1 presents a summary of the 
research findings. Section 10.2 discusses the policy implications of the research findings, and 
makes recommendations. Section 10.3 briefly summarises the research contributions of the 
study. Section 10.4 highlights the limitations of the study. Section 10.5 identifies potential 
avenues for future research and improvements, while section 10.6 summarises the chapter. 
 
 
10.1 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
 As has been discussed in chapters one, two and three, historically, South Africa’s 
corporate governance model has predominantly been ‘shareholding’ or ‘Anglo-American’. 
Within the ‘shareholding’ corporate governance model, firms are primarily expected to 
advance the interests of shareholders.  However, recent corporate governance reforms (i.e., the 
1994 or King I Report, and the 2002 or King II Report) formally require firms to comply with 
a number of affirmative action and stakeholder issues, such as black economic empowerment, 
and employment equity, amongst others. This compels South African firms to depict some of 
the key features of both the ‘shareholding’ and ‘stakeholding’ models of corporate governance.  
Arguably, this makes the South African corporate governance framework and 
environment unique. Critics of King II, however, suggest that it is inappropriate to formally 
super-impose affirmative action, social and environmental demands on a corporate governance 
model that predominantly has a ‘shareholding’ orientation. Also, as an emerging market, 
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South African firms have a relatively concentrated corporate ownership, often via complex 
cross-shareholdings and pyramidical structures (Barr et al., 1995, p.18). This can potentially 
limit the efficiency and effectiveness of the market for corporate control and managerial 
labour (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1035). Moreover, South Africa has a weak record of 
achieving compliance and enforcement of corporate regulations (Armstrong, 2003, p.2; IIF, 
2007, p.7).  
These issues together raises two critical local and international policy questions. The 
first important policy question is whether the current ‘hybrid’ corporate governance 
framework is appropriate for South Africa. Specifically, there is the critical local question of 
whether the current South African corporate governance model is sufficiently robust to 
effectively pursue the contrasting agenda of maximising shareholder returns and providing a 
meaningful protection of the interests of a larger stakeholder group (Kakabadse and Korac-
Kakabadse, 2002, p.313; Spisto, 2005 p.84; Andreasson, 2009, p.1). The second crucial 
international policy question is whether a UK-style voluntary corporate governance regime 
(i.e., ‘comply or explain’) rather than a US-style mandatory or statutory regime (i.e., ‘comply 
or else’) is appropriate for South Africa, given the relative concentration of ownership among 
listed firms, as well as the poor record of achieving compliance and enforcement of corporate 
regulations. 
It has been contended, however, that ignoring the South African context, and given that 
King II is predominantly Anglo-American with emphasis on shareholder primacy, the a priori 
theoretical expectation will be that ‘better-governed’ firms should be associated with higher 
financial returns than their ‘poorly-governed’ counterparts. This has been the central thesis 
underlying this study. 
 With no prior evidence on South Africa, it sought to empirically ascertain whether 
South African listed firms that complied well with King II performed financially better than 
those that did not. Specifically, using a sample of 100 South African listed firms from 2002 to 
2006 (a total of 500 firm-year observations) and corporate governance data collected directly 
from annual reports, this thesis has mainly examined the relationship between internal 
corporate governance structures and firm financial performance. Distinct from prior studies, 
the corporate governance-financial performance nexus is examined by estimating two 
competing positive methodologies: the compliance-index model and the equilibrium-variable 
model. The rationale has been to ascertain whether the choice of research methodology can 
significantly influence research findings, and any subsequent interpretations. 
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In this section, the research findings of the study discussed in chapters six, seven, and 
eight are summarised. Specifically, subsection 10.1.1 will summarise the research findings 
based on the levels of compliance with the South African corporate governance index (the 
SACGI) that have been discussed in chapter six. Subsections 10.1.2 and 10.1.3 will offer a 
summary of the research findings based on the compliance-index and equilibrium-variable 
models reported in chapter eight, respectively. Subsection 10.1.4 will summarise the research 
findings based on a comparison of the research findings of the compliance-index and 
equilibrium-variable models presented in chapter eight, whereas subsection 10.1.5 will 
provide a summary of the research findings based on the robustness or sensitivity analyses that 
have been discussed in chapter eight. As has been outlined above, the policy implications of 
all the research findings presented in the next five subsections will be separately discussed in 
section 10.2.  
 
10.1.1 Findings Based on the Levels of Compliance with the SACGI 
 
  As has been discussed in chapters four and five, the prior literature has investigated 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm financial performance mainly by 
following either the compliance-index model or the equilibrium-variable model. Briefly, the 
use of the compliance-index model often involves the construction of a broad corporate 
governance index that encapsulates an extensive set of corporate governance structures. The 
association between the compliance corporate governance index and firm financial 
performance is then investigated.  
By contrast, the equilibrium-variable model usually involves examining the nexus 
between single corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial performance. As has also 
been explained in chapters four and five, and reported in chapters eight and nine, in this study 
both the compliance-index and equilibrium-variable models have been estimated. Before 
summarising the research findings based on the compliance-index and equilibrium-variable 
models, this subsection first summarises the levels of compliance with the South African 
corporate governance index (the SACGI) containing 50 corporate governance provisions from 
King II. Specifically, using a sample 100 South African listed companies from 2002 to 2006 (a 
total of 500 firm-year observations), this study has assessed the levels of compliance with both 
conventional corporate governance provisions and South African context specific affirmative 
action and stakeholder issues (the SACGI) among the sampled firms.  
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Generally, and consistent with prior studies, the findings that have been discussed in 
chapter six show that there are substantial variations in the levels of compliance with the 
SACGI among the sampled firms. At the aggregate level, the scores range from a minimum of 
3 (6%) to a maximum of 49 (98%) with the average South African listed firm complying with 
30 (60%) of the 50 corporate governance provisions analysed. For the individual corporate 
governance provisions, there are variations in the levels of compliance in 48 (96%) of the 50 
corporate governance provisions investigated. Overall, an examination of the distribution of 
the pooled sample shows that despite the expectation that the introduction of the King Reports 
will speed-up convergence of corporate governance standards, there are still substantial 
variations in the levels of compliance with the individual corporate governance provisions 
among South African listed firms.  
Despite the substantial variations in the levels of compliance with the SACGI, the 
findings also suggest that corporate governance standards among the sampled firms have 
improved over the period of examination. Specifically, the average compliance level with the 
SACGI in 2002 was 48% among the sampled firms. It increased to 58%, 63%, 65% and 68% 
in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively, an increase of 20 percentage points over the five-
year sample period. As has been discussed in chapter six, these findings are in line with the 
results of prior studies that have analysed firms from countries that have adopted the UK-style 
voluntary (‘comply or explain’) compliance regime (e.g., Conyon 1994; Conyon and Mallin, 
1997; Pellens et al., 2001; and Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazura, 2009, amongst others). The 
results of these studies generally indicate that despite their voluntary nature, corporate 
governance standards in firms of countries that have adopted codes of corporate governance 
based on the ‘comply or explain’ compliance regime have improved substantially. 
The SACGI is further disaggregated on the basis of firm size and industry to ascertain 
whether the observed variability in the levels of compliance with the aggregate SACGI can be 
explained by firm size and industry. Consistent with the findings of prior studies (e.g., CLSA, 
2000; Deutsche Bank, 2002; Bauer, 2004; Bebenroth, 2005; Werder et al., 2005), the analyses 
indicate that the observed variability in the levels of compliance with the SACGI can largely 
be explained by firm size, and moderately by industry. Specifically, and at the aggregate level, 
the findings suggest that the average large firm complied with 75% of the 50 corporate 
governance provisions in comparison with 44% by the average small firm.  
A close examination of the individual provisions also shows that in 46 (92%) out of the 
50 corporate governance provisions investigated, compliance levels among large firms are 
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significantly higher than for small firms. The results can be explained by prior theory as have 
been discussed in chapters five and six. First, and in line with prior studies (e.g., Shockley, 
1981; Marston and Shrives, 1991; Deutsche Bank, 2002; Sori et al., 2006; Melvin and Valero, 
2009), further analyses indicate that larger firms are more likely to be dual-listed and be 
audited by a big four audit firm. Also, and as theoretically expected, the findings show that the 
sampled firms with cross-listings to the UK and US stock markets tended to have better 
corporate governance standards than their non dual-listed counterparts. This is because dual-
listed firms are often subjected to additional listings and corporate governance requirements 
compared with their non cross-listed counterparts.   
In a similar vein, the results indicate that the sampled firms audited by a big four audit 
firm also tended to have better corporate standards than their non big-four audited counterparts. 
Second, compliance with corporate governance rules has cost implications that larger firms 
can be expected to better afford than their smaller counterparts (Lang and Lundholm, 19993; 
Botosan, 1997). Finally, and as has been explained in chapters five to eight, and will be 
explained further below, prior literature suggests that political costs, such as stringent 
regulation and nationalisation, are positively associated with firm size (Wattes and 
Zimmerman, 1978, p.115; Andreasson, 2009, p.22). This means that, on average, larger firms 
can be expected to disclose more than their smaller counterparts, in order to reduce potential 
political costs.  
Similarly, and in line with prior studies discussed in chapter six (e.g., CLSA, 2000; 
Deutsche Bank, 2002; Black et al., 2006a; Henry, 2008), the results suggest that some of the 
observed variability in the levels of compliance with the SACGI can be explained by industrial 
groupings, but to a lesser degree when compared with the firm size classifications. 
Specifically, and at the aggregate level, consumer services firms complied most with the 
SACGI. By contrast, technology firms complied least with the SACGI. 
The levels of compliance with the nine South African context specific affirmative 
action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions (the Social-SACGI) among the 
sampled firms were also examined. These are: board diversity on the basis of ethnicity and 
gender, and policies and practices with respect to black economic empowerment, employment 
equity, environment, ethics, HIV/Aids, and health and safety. Consistent with the findings 
based on the full sample, the summary descriptive statistics indicate that there is a 
considerable amount of variation in the levels of compliance with the social-SACGI among the 
sampled firms.  
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Similar to the SACGI, the analyses suggest that the observed variability in the levels of 
compliance with the social-SACGI could largely be explained by firm size, and moderately by 
industry. Finally, analyses of the trends in board diversity on the basis of ethinicity and gender 
show that, irrespective of the measure used, diversity among South African corporate boards 
has substantially improved over time. Despite the improving board diversity, however, the 
findings also suggest that board members from diverse backgrounds (ethnic and gender) 
within South African listed firms are still very small in number.    
 
10.1.2 Findings Based on the Compliance-Index Model 
 
 The main hypothesis (i.e., hypothesis eight) tested for the compliance-index model is 
that there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between the South African 
corporate governance Index (the SACGI) and firm financial performance. Consistent with the 
results of prior studies, the findings based on the compliance-index model reported in chapter 
eight generally suggest that there is a statistically significant and positive association between 
the SACGI and firm financial performance. The positive relationship is robust to whether an 
accounting (i.e., return on assets – ROA) or a market based measure (i.e., Tobin’s Q – Q-ratio) 
of financial performance is used. Therefore, hypothesis eight cannot be rejected.  
The statistically significant and positive (.002) nexus between the SACGI and the ROA 
implies that, on average, better-governed South African listed firms tend to be associated with 
higher accounting returns than their poorly-governed counterparts. Specifically, the findings 
mean that a one standard deviation improvement in the average firm’s internal corporate 
governance (the SACGI) score from 60% to 82%, may be associated with an increase in its 
average accounting returns (ROA) by at least 4% (22.03 x .002) from 9% to 13%, ceteris 
paribus.  
As has been discussed in subsection 8.1.2.1, this evidience is generally in line with the 
results of prior studies (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Cui et al., 2008), 
but specifically with findings of Klapper and Love (2004). Using a cross-country sample that 
includes South African listed firms, Klapper and Love (2004) report a statistically significant 
and positive relationship between good corporate governance and the ROA. A major 
theoretical implication of this finding is that better-governed firms are able to improve 
accounting returns by reducing managerial expropriation. Also, it indicates that better-
governed firms are able to raise capital at lower cost to better exploit growth opportunities that 
can boost long-term accounting returns. 
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Similarly, the significant positive (.009) association between the SACGI and the Q-
ratio suggests that South African listed firms with better corporate governance trade at a 
significant valuation premium to those with poor corporate governance standards. Specifically, 
a one standard deviation improvement in the average firm’s internal corporate governance (the 
SACGI) score from 60% to 82%, can be expeted to be associated with an increase in its 
average market valuation (Q-ratio) by at least 20% (22.03 x .009) from 1.49 to 1.79, all else 
equal.  
As has also been discussed in subsection 8.1.2.2, this evidence is generally consistent 
with the results of prior studies (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 
2006a; Henry, 2008), but specifically with the findings of Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev 
and Kim (2005), and Morey et al. (2009). Using cross-country samples that include South 
African listed firms, Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2005), and Morey et al. 
(2009) report a statistically significant and positive relationship between good corporate 
governance and the Q-ratio. 
Theoretically, the statistically significant and positive relationship between the SACGI 
and the Q-ratio, is expected. This is because, by complying with the recommendations of good 
corporate practice, a firm will essentially be signalling to prospective investors that it is better-
governed. With better corporate governance credentials, investors can be expected to bid-up 
the share price for similar ownership portions of the firm. This is because with better corporate 
governance they are likely to receive a greater portion of the firm’s profits as opposed to being 
expropriated by managers.  
In addition, the associations between the nine South African context specific 
affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions (the Social-SACGI), and 
41 conventional corporate governance provisions (the Economic-SACGI), and firm financial 
performance are investigated. In line with the results of the SACGI, but contrary to theoretical 
expectations, the findings also suggest a statistically significant and positive relationship 
between the Social-SACGI and firm financial performance (i.e., both ROA and Q-ratio). It is 
theoretically expected that the inclusion of the South African context specific affirmative 
action and stakeholder provisions as part of the general corporate governance provisions for 
firms to comply by King II will impose extra costs burden on the firms (e.g., Kakabadse and 
Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; LSE, 2007). This implies that unlike the SACGI, compliance with the 
Social-SACGI would, therefore, be expected to impact negatively on the sampled firms’ 
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financial performance. By contrast, compliance with the Economic-SACGI could be expected 
to impact positively on the sampled firms’ financial performance. 
Contrary to theoretical predictions, the findings suggest that compliance with the 
Social-SACGI impacts positively on the sampled firms’ financial performance. Despite being 
contrary to the theoretical expectations, evidence that firms that comply better with the Social-
SACGI are valued (Q-ratio) higher by investors or tend to be associated with higher 
accounting returns (ROA) is, however, less surprising. Within the South African context, 
securing and renewing profitable government and mining contracts, for instance, are normally 
linked to satisfying black economic empowerment and employment equity targets (e.g., 
Murray, 2000; Malherbe and Segal, 2003). This means that compliance with the Social-SACGI 
may be a major way by which firms can gain access to valuable resources, including securing 
profitable government backed black economic empowerment deals and contracts. This may 
facilitate growth and improve long-term financial performance.  
Consistent with theoretical predictions, the results indicate that compliance with the 
Economic-SACGI impacts positively on the sampled firms’ financial performance. Evidence 
of a positive nexus between the Economic-SACGI and financial performance (i.e., both ROA 
and Q-ratio) offers further empirical support to the results based on the SACGI. That is, on 
average, better-governed firms tend to be associated with higher financial performance than 
their poorly-governed counterparts.  
  
10.1.3 Findings Based on the Equilibrium-Variable Model 
 
 As has been discussed in subsection 4.2.2 of chapter four and reported in subsection 
8.1.1 of chapter eight, seven main hypotheses are tested for the equilibrium-variable model. 
These hypotheses relate to board diversity, board size, role or CEO duality, the percentage of 
non-executive directors, the frequency of board meetings, the presence of key board 
committees (namely, audit, nomination and remuneration), and director shareownership 
(including director shareownership squared and director shareownership cubed).  
 The first hypothesis tested is that there is a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between board diversity and firm financial performance (i.e., both ROA and Q-
ratio). The coefficient on board diversity under the ROA is positive, but statistically 
insignificant. This is not consistent with the recommendations of King II that encourage 
diversity among South African corporate boards. This evidence also does not offer empirical 
support to prior studies that report a statistically significant and positive relationship between 
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the ROA and board diversity (e.g., Adler, 2001; Swartz and Firer, 2005). It is, however, in line 
with the findings of prior studies that suggest that board diversity has no significant impact on 
ROA (e.g., Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Shader et al., 1997; Rose, 2007).  
By contrast, the coefficient on board diversity under the Q-ratio is negative, but 
similarly statistically insignificant. This is also not in line with the recommendations of King 
II that encourage diversity among South African corporate boards.This means that hypothesis 
one is not empirically supported. This finding does not support the result of Carter et al. (2003) 
that suggest a statistically significant and positive association between board diversity and the 
Q-ratio. It is, however, consistent with the finding of Rose (2007), which indicates that board 
diversity has no statistically significant association with the Q-ratio. Evidence of a statistically 
insignificant board diversity-financial performance nexus is less surprising. As have been 
discussed in chapters six and eight, the number of board members from diverse backgrounds 
on the boards of South African listed firms is still substantially small. This means that they 
may not be able to impact significantly on firm financial performance. 
 Also, and as have been discussed in chapters five and eight, there are differences in the 
associations between board diversity, as well as some of the remaining corporate governance 
mechanisms that will be summarised below towards the ROA and Q-ratio. These differences 
may be explained by variations in their respective effects, weaknesses, and strengths. For 
example, as a historical accounting base measure, ROA may not be able to reflect current 
changes in market valuation. By contrast, as a market based measure, Q-ratio reflects expected 
future developments that may be masked by current fluctuations in business conditions. It also 
offers empirical support to previous evidence, which indicates that insiders (managers – ROA) 
and outsiders (investors – Q-ratio) value corporate governance differently (e.g., Black et al., 
2006a; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Overall, it may justify the use of both accounting and 
market based measures of financial performance, allowing each measure to complement the 
weaknesses of the other. 
The second hypothesis examined is that there is a statistically significant and positive 
association between board size and firm financial performance (i.e., both ROA and Q-ratio). 
The coefficient on board size under the ROA is negative and statistically insignificant, 
whereas the coefficient on board size under the Q-ratio is positive and statistically significant. 
The statistically insignificant negative coefficient on board size under the ROA means that 
hypothesis two is not supported, whilst the statistically significant positive coefficient on 
board size under the Q-ratio offers empirical support to hypothesis two.  
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Empirically, the statistically significant and positive relationship between board size 
and the Q-ratio offers empirical support to the results of Adams and Mehran (2005), Beiner et 
al. (2006), Henry (2008), and Mangena and Tauringana (2008). In contrast, it is not in line 
with the results of prior studies that suggest a statistically significant and negative association 
between board size and the Q-ratio (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Coles et 
al., 2008; Cheng, 2008; Guest, 2009). 
Theoretically, the statistically significant and positive association between the Q-ratio 
and board size indicates that the market appears to perceive larger boards as more effective. 
This may stem from the fact that larger boards tend to offer greater access to their firms’ 
external environment. This can reduce uncertainties and facilitates the securing of critical 
resources, such as finance. It also implies that the market seems to value the ability of South 
African corporate boards to secure more resources, which is often associated with larger 
boards higher than their ability to effectively advice and monitor managers that is usually 
associated with smaller boards. For example, and within the South African context, prior 
evidences suggests that larger boards are more likely to secure profitable government backed 
black economic empowerment contracts that may help larger firms to receive higher market 
valuation than their smaller counterparts.  
The third hypothesis investigated is that there is a statistically significant negative 
relationship between role or CEO duality and firm financial performance (i.e., both ROA and 
Q-ratio). The findings suggest that there is a statistically significant and positive association 
between the ROA and CEO duality, but a statistically insignificant and negative relationship 
between the Q-ratio and CEO duality. This means that hypothesis three can be rejected. It does 
not also lend empirical support to the recommendations of King II that the roles of board 
chairman and CEO should be split. Empirically, this finding is different from the results of 
previous studies that report a statistically significant and negative relationship between ROA 
and role duality (e.g., Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Specifically, it 
does not lend empirical support to the results of Ho and Williams (2003) that document a 
statistically significant and negative association between CEO duality and the intellectual 
capital performance of 84 South African listed firms.  
In contrast, the result offers empirical support to the findings of Donaldson and Davis 
(1991) and Boyd (1995) that there is a statistically significant and positive nexus between role 
duality and ROA. A major theoretical implication of the statistically significant and positive 
ROA-CEO duality relationship is that role duality allows a visionary and charismatic CEO the 
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opportunity to have a sharper focus on firm objectives without excessive board interference.  
By contrast, the statistically insignificant and negative association between the Q-ratio and 
CEO duality shows that role duality has no significant impact on the sampled firms’ market 
value. This also does support the recommendations of King II that discourage role duality. 
Empirically, this finding is in line with prior studies that report a statistically 
insignificant link between the Q-ratio and CEO duality (e.g., Vefeas and Theodorou, 1998; 
Sanda et al., 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Specifically, the finding offers further 
empirical support to the results of Ho and Williams (2003), and Mangena and Chamisa (2008) 
that role duality has no impact on the likelihood that a firm will be suspended from listing on 
the JSE in a sample of 81 South African listed firms. The negative coefficient, however, 
suggests that the market perceives CEO duality as a bad corporate governance practice. This is 
because role duality tends to give too much power to one person who can choose to engage in 
opportunistic activities.  
The fourth hypothesis tested is that there is a statistically significant and positive 
association between the percentage of non-executive directors and firm financial performance 
(i.e., both ROA and Q-ratio). The findings indicate that the percentage of non-executive 
directors is statistically significant and negatively related to ROA, but statistically insignificant 
and positively associated with the Q-ratio. This implies that hypothesis four is not empirically 
supported. The result also contradicts the recommendations of King II that encourage a higher 
percentage of NEDs on South African corporate boards.  
The findings are also not consistent with the results of prior South African studies of 
Ho and Williams (2003), and Mangena and Chamisa (2008). For example, Ho and Williams 
(2003) report a statistically significant and positive association between the percentage of 
NEDs and intellectual capital performance of 84 South African listed firms. By contrast, the 
result in this study offers empirical support to the findings of prior studies that document a 
statistically significant and negative relationship between ROA and the percentage of NEDs 
(e.g., Weir and Laing, 2000; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). 
Theoretically, the statistically significant and negative association between the 
percentage of non-executive directors and ROA supports the stewardship theory. It suggests 
that non-executive directors often command less knowledge about the business, and find it 
difficult to understand the complexities of the firm. Also, corporate boards dominated by non-
executive directors tend to stifle managerial initiative and delay strategic action, which arise 
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from excessive managerial monitoring. This can impact negatively on a firm’s ability to 
generate higher accounting returns.  
The statistically insignificant and positive relationship between the percentage of non-
executive directors and the Q-ratio means that the non-executive directors have no impact on 
the sampled firms’ market value. This also implies that hypothesis four is not empirically 
supported. The result is also not consistent with the recommendations of King II that 
encourage a higher percentage of NEDs on South African corporate boards. Empirically, the 
statistically insignificant nexus between the percentage of NEDs and the Q-ratio is consistent 
with the results of Vefeas and Theodorou (1998), Weir and Laing (2000), and Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006). The positive coefficient, however, shows that the market views the 
appointment of non-executive directors to corporate boards as a positive corporate governance 
practice. This is because the presence of non-executive directors can potentially improve the 
independence of a corporate board and its decisions. 
The fifth hypothesis analysed is that there is a statistically significant and positive 
association between the frequency of board meetings and firm financial performance (i.e., 
both ROA and Q-ratio). The findings suggest that there is a statistically insignificant and 
negative relationship between the frequency of board meetings and the ROA, but a statistically 
insignificant and positive nexus between the frequency of board meetings and the Q-ratio.  
This means that the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant and positive 
relationship between the frequency of board meetings and firm financial performance cannot 
be rejected.  It also implies that the recommendation of King II that South African corporate 
boards must hold a minimum of four meetings in a year is not empirically supported. 
Empirically, this finding is consistent with the result of El Mehdi (2007) who reports a 
statistically insignificant association between the frequency of board meetings and the ROA 
for a sample of 24 Tunisian listed firms from 2000 to 2005.  
By contrast, it does not support the results of Mangena and Tauringana (2006) who 
document a statistically significant and positive relationship between the frequency of board 
meetings and the ROA in sample of 157 Zimbabwean listed firms from 2001 to 2003. 
Theoretically, the negative nexus between the frequency of board meetings and the ROA 
supports the idea that frequent board meetings are not necessarily beneficial. A higher 
frequency of board meetings, for example, can result in higher costs in the form of managerial 
time, travel expenses, refreshment, and directors’ meetings fees.  
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The statistically insignificant and positive nexus between the frequency of board 
meetings and the Q-ratio indicates that hypothesis five is not empirically supported. It also 
implies that the recommendation of King II that South African corporate boards must hold a 
minimum of four meetings in a year is not empirically supported. It is also not in line with the 
results of prior studies that report a statistically significant and negative association between 
the frequency of board meetings and the Q-ratio (e.g., Vefeas 1999a; Carcello et al., 2002; 
Fich and Shivdasani, 2006).  
By contrast, the positive coefficient supports the results of Karamanou and Vefeas 
(2005) and Mangena and Tauringana (2006) that document a positive relationship between the 
frequency of board meetings and the Q-ratio. Unlike the finding of this study, however, the 
results of Karamanou and Vefeas (2005) and Mangena and Tauringana (2006) were 
statistically significant. The positive, but a statistically insignificant nexus between the 
frequency of board meetings and the Q-ratio also indicates that even though the frequency of 
board meetings has no valuation implications for the sampled firms, the market perceives it as 
a good corporate governance practice. This is because a higher frequency of board meetings 
can lead to enhanced managerial monitoring. 
The sixth hypothesis tested is that there is a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between the presence of audit, nomination and remuneration committees and firm 
financial performance (i.e., both ROA and Q-ratio). The findings regarding the nexus between 
the existence of board committees and firm financial performance are generally mixed. On the 
one hand, the results show that the establishment of a nomination committee is statistically 
significant and positively related to the ROA. This implies that hypothesis six is empirically 
supported. It supports the recommendation of King II for South African firms to set up 
nomination committees. Further, it implies that the establishment of a nomination committee 
helps in improving the sampled firms’ accounting returns.  
Empirically, it rejects the results of Bozec (2005) that suggest a statistically 
insignificant relationship between the ROA and the establishment of a nomination committee 
in a sample of 25 Canadian listed firms from 1976 to 2005. Theoretically, the establishment of 
a nomination committee can improve the process by which directors are appointed, as well as 
the independence of the board and its decisions. Arguably, this can potentially impact 
positively on firm financial performance by enhancing the effectiveness with which the board 
carries out its monitoring and advisory functions. 
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On the other hand, while the results suggest that the presence of audit and 
remuneration committees are also positively related to the ROA, neither are statistically 
significant. This does not support hypothesis six, as well as the recommendations of King II. 
Given the high adoption rate of audit and remuneration committees, their insignificance in 
explaining the ROA is not empirically too surprising. This is because, and as has been 
discussed in chapter six, less than 10% of the sampled firms do not have audit and 
remuneration committees, which results in less variation among the sampled firms. 
Similarly, the existence of an audit committee is statistically insignificant and 
positively associated with the Q-ratio, whilst the establishment of nomination and 
remuneration committees are statistically insignificant and negatively related to the Q-ratio. 
This does not lend empirical support to hypothesis six and the recommendations of King II. 
Empirically, the findings are consistent with the results of prior studies that report a 
statistically insignificant relationship between board committees and the Q-ratio (e.g., Vefeas 
and Theodorou, 1998; Weir and Laing, 2000; Weir et al., 2002). Vefeas and Theodorou 
(1998), for example, report a statistically insignificant nexus between the presence of audit, 
nomination, and remuneration committees and the Q-ratio.  By contrast, the finding is not in 
line with the results of previous studies that report statistically significant and positive or 
negative association between board committees and the Q-ratio (e.g., Vefeas, 1999a; 
Karamanous and Vefeas, 2005). The finding is also not consistent with the results of Mangena 
and Chamisa (2008), who report the presence of an audit committee significantly reduces the 
possibility of a firm being suspended from listing on the JSE in sample of 81 South African 
listed firms.  
Generally, the evidence of no statistically significant relationship between the three 
board committees and the Q-ratio is empirically less surprising. As has been explained above, 
the adoption rate of board committees is very high (more than 90% of the sampled firms, for 
example, have established audit and remuneration committees), which leads to limited 
variation among the sampled firms. This seems to limit the ability of the three board 
committees to explain significant differences in the Q-ratio. 
The seventh and final hypothesis examined is that there is a statistically significant and 
positive relationship between director shareownership and firm financial performance. To 
replicate the results of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) that document a 
statistically significant non-linear relationship between director shareownership and the Q-
ratio, two new ownership variables – director ownership squared and director shareownership 
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cubed –  are introduced. The findings show that director shareownership is statistically 
insignificant and negatively related to ROA, whereas director shareownership is statistically 
significant and negatively associated with the Q-ratio. This indicates that hypothesis seven can 
be rejected.  
Theoretically, the statistically significant and negative relationship between the Q-ratio 
and director shareownership supports the entrenchment hypothesis. The hypothesis states that 
at high levels of shareholding, directors may hold sufficient voting power to protect 
themselves against any disciplinary actions from minority shareholders. This motivates 
managers to engage in opportunistic behaviour, including the consumption of more perquisites, 
which impacts negatively on firm financial performance. 
Further, director shareownership squared and director shareownership cubed are 
positively and negatively related to ROA, respectively. However, both are statistically 
insignificant. Similarly, director shareownership squared and director shareownership cubed 
are positively and negatively associated with the Q-ratio, respectively, but both are statistically 
insignificant except in year 2005. The findings generally do not support the statistically 
significant non-monotonic relationship between director ownership and firm value reported by 
Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990). Overall, the statistically significant 
and negative coefficient on director ownership suggests director entrenchment with no 
evidence of a reversal to interest alignment even at higher levels of director ownership. 
  
10.1.4 Findings Based on a Comparison of the Results of the Compliance-Index and  
         Equilibrium-Variable Models 
 
 As have been discussed in subsections 4.2.1 and 5.2.1 of chapters four and five, 
respectively, a supplementary objective of this study has been to offer a methodological 
comparison. Specifically, the study has attempted to ascertain whether the use of the 
equilibrium-variable model or the compliance-index model has the potential to influence the 
empirical findings. This has been done by simply comparing the regression results and 
summary diagnostics based on the equilibrium-variable model to the regression results and 
summary diagnostics based on the compliance-index model.  
A number of interesting findings emerge when the results based on the compliance-
index model are compared with the results based on the equilibrium-variable model. First, the 
findings show that, regardless of the performance measure used, the coefficient on the SACGI 
is consistently positive over the entire sample period. Second, the SACGI is statistically 
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significant over the entire sample period with regard to the ROA. It is also statistically 
significant for the pooled sample, and in 2003 and 2006, but statistically insignificant in 2002, 
2004 and 2005 with respect to the Q-ratio.  
However, and even in 2002, 2003 and 2005 where the SACGI is statistically 
insignificant under the Q-ratio, the p-values are relatively close to becoming statistically 
significant. Overall, and consistent with the results of recent researchers (e.g., Gompers et al., 
2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006a; 
and Morey et al., 2009, amongst others) who also constructed some measure of ‘compliance’ 
or ‘composite’ corporate governance index, the findings suggest that a firm’s internal 
corporate governance structures significantly positively impact on its financial performance.  
 By contrast, and in line with previous evidence (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; Aggrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Weir et al., 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; and Guest, 2009, amongst 
others), the results based on the equilibrium-variable model as summarised above are highly 
mixed. Irrespective of the financial performance proxy used, most of the corporate governance 
variables are statistically insignificant, and even where they are found to be significant, the 
sign of the coefficients are not consistent across the two performance measures used. Overall, 
and consistent with past evidence, the results based on the equilibrium-variable model indicate 
either a statistically weak or insignificant relationship between the selected single internal 
corporate governance structures and firm financial performance. 
Similar conclusions are drawn when the summary regression diagnostics based on the 
compliance-index model are compared with the summary regression diagnostics based on the 
equilibrium-variable model. First, computed Cook’s distances, tolerance statistics, condition 
indices, eigenvalues, variance proportions, VIF, studentised residuals and normal distribution 
plots, indicate that the findings based on the compliance-index model generally possess better 
normal distributional properties than the equilibrium-variable model.  
Second, and in line with the better normal distributional properties shown by the 
compliance-index model, regardless of the performance measure used, they indicate that the 
compliance-index model possesses better summary regression diagnostics than the 
equilibrium-variable model. For example, results based on the compliance-index model 
generally show better adjusted R2, F-values, standard errors and Durbin-Watson statistics 
compared with the results based on the equilibrium-variable model. Overall, and irrespective 
of the summary regression diagnostics used, on average, the findings based on the 
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compliance-index model possess better empirical properties than the findings based on the 
equilibrium-variable model. 
 This evidence has important methodological implications for future research. First, it 
implies that methodological choice can potentially influence the research findings. The second 
implication is that despite its costly and labour intensive nature, on average, it may be value 
relevant to construct some measure of a ‘compliance or composite’ corporate governance 
index when examining the corporate governance-performance nexus rather than to use single 
corporate governance mechanisms in isolation. A major explanation is that because the 
construction of composite or compliance-indices involves the use of several corporate 
governance variables, it is better able to capture actual qualitative differences in corporate 
governance disclosures across firms. This appears to make compliance or composite corporate 
governance indices more likely to achieve better variation in the quality of corporate 
governance across the sampled firms with higher explanatory power than using single 
corporate governance variables in isolation. 
 
10.1.5 Findings Based on the Robustness/Sensitivity Analyses 
 
As has been discussed in chapter five and reported in chapter nine, four main 
robustness or sensitivity analyses were carried out to address potential endogeneity problems. 
The main objective of the sensitivity or robustness analyses has been to ascertain the extent to 
which the results reported in chapter eight are robust or sensitive to alternative empirical and 
theoretical explanations, as well as estimations. These analyses include estimating: a lagged 
financial performance-corporate governance structure; an instrumental variable model; a two-
stage least squares model; and a changes model.  
Firstly, the compliance-index and equilibrium-variable models are re-estimated based 
on a lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure. The aim is to address 
potential endogeneity problems that may arise due to a time-lag in the financial performance 
and corporate governance nexus. On average, the results based on the compliance-index model 
remain essentially the same as those reported in chapter eight that better-governed South 
African listed firms tend to be associated with higher financial performance than their poorly-
governed counterparts.  
Similarly, and in line with the mixed results reported in chapter eight, the results of the 
equilibrium-variable model based on a lagged financial performance-corporate governance 
structure are conflicting. The findings from the equilibrium-variable model generally offer 
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support to the earlier conclusion that there is either a statistically weak or no relationship 
between most of the eleven92 individual internal corporate governance structures and financial 
performance, when they are examined as single corporate governance mechanisms in isolation.   
Secondly, the presence of potential endogeneity problems among the corporate 
governance variables is further addressed by re-estimating the compliance-index model using 
instrumental variables (IV) and two-stage least squares (2SLS). The results based on the 
instrumental variable estimates suggest that there is a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between financial performance and corporate governance. The tenor of such a 
statistically significant and positive relationship remains mainly unchanged whether an 
accounting (ROA) or a market based measure (Q-ratio) of financial performance is used. The 
main implication of this finding is that the results of the compliance-index model based on the 
OLS estimates presented in chapter eight are robust to the presence of endogenity.  
The results based on the two-stage least squares (2SLS) indicate that there are 
statistically significant interdependences among the five93 alternative corporate governance 
mechanisms, as well as between the financial performance proxies and the corporate 
governance structures. Specifically, the results based on the ROA suggest that if alternative 
corporate governance mechanisms are allowed to co-exist, then a higher SACGI score, a 
greater institutional shareholding along with a lesser block shareholding, a smaller board size, 
and a lesser debt usage are associated with higher accounting returns. Generally, allowing for 
the existence of potential interdependences or endogeneities among the alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms, the results support the conclusion in chapter eight that, on average, 
better-governed South African listed sample firms tend to be associated with higher 
accounting returns than their poorly-governed counterparts.  
By contrast, results based on the Q-ratio indicate that allowing for the existence of 
alternative corporate governance mechanisms, the SACGI looses its ability to explain 
significant differences in the Q-ratio. Overall, the findings imply that firms with insignificant 
block shareholding, smaller boards, and lesser debt usage, but significantly greater 
institutional shareholding can afford to have relatively poor internal corporate governance 
structures without necessarily being punished by the market with lower market valuation. This 
                                                 
92The eleven internal corporate governance mechanisms are: board diversity, board size, role or CEO duality, the 
percentage of non-executive directors, the frequency of board meetings, the presence of audit, nomination, and 
remuneration committees, director shareownership, director shareownership squared, and director ownership 
cubed. 
93The five alternative corporate governance mechanisms are: the South African Corporate Governance Index (the 
SACGI), leverage, block shareownership, institutional shareownership, and board size. 
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appears to suggest that alternative corporate governance mechanisms can interact or can be 
combined to produce similar financial performance outcomes.  
For example, firms with significant institutional or block shareholding can afford to 
have relatively poor internal corporate governance practices, such as having less non-
executive directors. The presence of significant block or institutional shareholders, for 
instance, could arguably carry out the function of monitoring and advising of managers that 
non-executive directors would have been expected to perform. This may result in similar 
financial performance outcomes as the monitoring that would have been carried out by non-
executive directors. 
Finally, the robustness or sensitivity analyses examined whether year-on-year changes 
in the quality of the sampled firms’ corporate governance scores result in similar changes in 
their year-on-year reported financial performance. Generally, the results indicate that increases 
(decrease) in the sampled firms’ corporate governance standards are associated with positive, 
but statistically insignificant increase (decrease) in their reported financial performance. The 
positive coefficient on changes in the SACGI supports the positive coefficient reported in 
chapter eight. The statistically insignificant coefficient, however, fails to support the 
statistically significant coefficient on the SACGI reported in chapter eight. 
The next section will discuss the policy implications of the research findings 
summarised above. Specifically, subsection 10.2.1 will discuss the policy implications of the 
levels of compliance with the SACGI. Subsection 10.2.2 will examine the policy implications 
of the research findings based on the compliance-index model, whereas subsection 10.2.3 will 
present the policy implications of the research findings based on the equilibrium-variable 
model. Also, and where applicable, recommendations expected to bring about improvements 
will be made.  
 
 
10.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS AND  
        RECOMMENDATIONS 
  
10.2.1 Compliance with the SACGI, Policy Implications and Recommendations 
 
Several implications can be drawn from the level of compliance with the SACGI.  First, 
analyses of the levels of compliance with the SACGI indicate that corporate governance 
standards have generally improved over the period of examination. This implies that efforts by 
the various stakeholders, notably the Institute of Directors (IoD) of South Africa, the JSE Ltd, 
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and the Financial Services Board (FSB), amongst others, at improving corporate governance 
standards among South African listed firms are at least beginning to yield good outcomes.   
Specifically,  and as summarised above, the findings indicate that the introduction of 
the King Reports (King I, 1994 and King II, 2002) alongside the Companies Act, 1973, the 
JSE’s Listings Rules, and the Insider Trading Act, 1998, have helped in substantially 
improving corporate governance practices among South African listed firms. The evidence of 
improving corporate governance standards among listed firms also implies that, contrary to 
expectations, the UK-style voluntary compliance regime (i.e., ‘comply or explain’) appears to 
be working to some extent, and thus may be appropriate for South African listed firms94.  
As have been discussed in chapter six and summarised above, this conclusion is very 
consistent with the conclusions of prior studies that have examined corporate governance 
standards in firms of countries that have adopted the UK-style voluntary compliance regime 
(e.g., Conyon, 1993; Conyon and Mallin, 1997; Werder et al., 2005; Aguilera and  Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). Specifically, and in reviewing prior studies that 
have examined corporate governance standards in firms of countries that have adopted the 
‘comply or explain’ regime, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009, p.376) concludes that 
“Despite the criticisms that the codes’ voluntary nature limits their ability to improve 
governance practices, codes of good governance appear to have generally improved the 
governance of countries that have adopted them, although there is the need for additional 
reforms ”. 
A major feature of the UK-style voluntary compliance regime is that it encourages 
codes of good corporate governance to be appended to general listings rules for listed firms to 
comply with. Arguably, and in effect, this feature makes the UK-style codes of corporate 
governance largely mandatory for listed firms. They are, however, considered to be voluntary 
because: (1) their provisions are not normally enforceable in the law courts; (2) the provisions 
can only possibly become mandatory for listed firms; and (3) listed or non-listed firms may 
not necessarily be punished for not complying with a particular provision if they are able to 
offer a reasonable explanation. This may serve as a major explanation for the general evidence 
of encouraging levels of compliance among listed firms that have been found for South Africa 
                                                 
94It is acknowledged that this conclusion is only applicable to South African listed firms. Since the study 
examined only listed firms, it could not ascertain whether non-listed or private companies in South Africa have 
also voluntarily complied with the provisions of King II or that corporate governance standards in non-listed 
firms have similarly improved or are improving since the introduction of King II. 
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and also for the findings of prior studies on other countries with similar voluntary compliance 
regimes.  
For example, appending the King Code to the JSE’s Listings Rules seems to have 
enhanced compliance, especially among listed firms. This is because non-compliance by listed 
firms could result in severe punishments. These include the possibility of suspension and de-
listing from the stock exchange, thereby making the market the primary compliance and 
enforcement ‘officer’ in a ‘comply or explain’ corporate governance regime (e.g., Malherbe 
and Segal, 2003; Armstrong et al., 2006; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008). 
Second, and despite the improving corporate governance standards, however, the 
findings also indicate that there are still substantial differences in corporate practices among 
the sampled firms. A further examination of the levels of compliance suggests that the 
observed variability in corporate governance standards among the sampled firms can mainly 
be explained by firm size, and moderately by industry. This is theoretically expected because 
compliance with corporate governance provisions is costly both in terms of time and money, 
which larger firms can be expected to better afford compared with their smaller counterparts.  
Also, it can be argued that governance needs are likely to differ between smaller and 
larger firms. As has been discussed in chapters five and six, prior literature suggests, for 
instance, that agency problems tend to be greater in larger firms compared to smaller firms. 
This implies that there should be some level of judgement and flexibility in the applicability of 
the provisions of King II to avoid excessive monitoring and redundant costs to smaller firms.   
In the case of the UK’s 2006 Combined Code, for example, some of the corporate 
governance provisions are explicitly stated to be inapplicable to smaller and newly listed firms 
(i.e., firms below the FTSE 350) (Combined Code, 2006, para. 6). For instance, the 
requirement that half of the board should be independent non-executive directors is relaxed for 
smaller firms (Combined Code, 2006, para. A.3.2). Smaller firms are allowed to have only two 
independent non-executive directors. Similarly, smaller firms are exempted from the 
requirement to establish audit and remuneration committees with memberships of at least three 
independent non-executive directors (Combined Code, 2006, para. B.2.1, C.3.1). Smaller 
firms can establish audit and remuneration committees with memberships of only two 
independent non-executive directors. 
Similar judgement and flexibilities can be incorporated into the on-going review of 
King II (‘King III’) for smaller firms (for instance, firms below the top 100 listed firms on the 
JSE Ltd). For example, and given that South Africa is generally classified as an emerging 
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market with relatively high ownership concentration (for example, and as has been discussed 
in chapter seven, block ownership ranges from 7% to 99% with an average of 60%), it may 
not be relevant for smaller firms to have the same internal corporate governance structures as 
larger firms. The findings (see Table 24 in chapter nine) show that block shareholding, for 
instance, is statistically significant and negatively associated with firm size and the SACGI.  
One implication of this finding is that governance needs among the sampled firms 
appear to differ on the basis of ownership and firm size. This seems to suggest that there may 
be the need for some level of judgement and flexibility in the applicability of the governance 
provisions of the forthcoming ‘King III’, especially for smaller firms. Arguably, this may help 
smaller firms to meet their governance needs and also avoid incurring excessive costs. Based 
on the evidence that the observed variability in compliance with the provisions of King II or 
governance standards can largely be explained by size, it may arguably not be relevant for a 
smaller firm 95  with a board size of three directors, for example, to establish a separate 
nomination committee or to have a majority of independent non-executive directors, to 
mention but a few.  
 Third, the findings indicate that firms that are cross-listed to the UK and US stock 
markets tend to have better corporate governance standards than do firms only listed on the 
JSE. This is consistent with theory because reputable UK and US stock markets, such as the 
London and New York Stock Exchanges, often maintain more rigorous corporate governance 
requirements. This means that South African firms that list their shares on those stock markets 
are likely to be compelled to meet higher corporate governance standards.  
This implies that the JSE may need to further upgrade or enhance its listings rules to 
bring them up-to-date with international listings standards, especially to match those of the 
UK and US stock markets as an important part of the general efforts at improving corporate 
governance standards in South African listed firms. This may arguably help meet the listings 
needs of its larger firms in particular, which may reduce loss of trade or business to the JSE 
and also deepen the market. 
 Fourth, the low or zero compliance with some of the corporate governance provisions 
suggests that they may be either inappropriate within the South African context or is an 
indication of weak compliance and enforcement.  For example, the zero compliance with the 
                                                 
95As has been summarised above, the robustness analysis conducted in chapter nine indicate that firms can afford 
to have relatively poor internal corporate governance practices, such as having less independent non-executive 
directors, if they have stronger alternative governance mechanisms, like a significant block or institutional 
shareholding, and still able to be associated with similar higher financial performance outcomes like their 
relatively better-governed counterparts.  
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requirement for firms to contribute to development of financial journalism indicates that it 
may be inappropriate within the South African corporate environment. South Africa, for 
example, appears to already possess a well-developed free and vibrant financial press such that 
there may be no need for firms to spend additional resources to help develop financial 
journalism (King Report, 2002, pp.162-163).  
In contrast, the low levels of compliance with some of the corporate governance 
provisions regardless of firm size, such as the requirement to: have independent board 
chairpersons; appraise the chairperson and CEO performance; and establish a nomination 
committee; amongst others, implies that enforcement of these provisions might have been 
weak. Given that some of these provisions are also critical in achieving board independence, 
transparency, responsibility and accountability, the JSE Ltd may further strengthen its 
monitoring of the levels of compliance among listed firms. The JSE may, for example, set-up 
a special ‘compliance and enforcement’ committee to regularly monitor the levels of 
compliance with the governance provisions of the King Code among listed firms.  
As has been discussed in chapters seven and nine (see Tables 12 and 24 to 26), the 
findings show that institutional shareholding significantly improves compliance with the 
provisions of King II or improves corporate governance standards. A major implication of this 
evidence appears to be that greater shareholder activism, especially by institutional investors 
(both local and foreign), as well as granting external auditors greater monitoring powers may 
also help in improving compliance with the provisions. The JSE may also encourage greater 
media and public scrutiny by making available to the general public official corporate filings 
and documentations. For example, as a standard practice by other stock exchanges, the JSE 
may publish interim and annual reports filed by listed firms on its official website to facilitate 
greater public access and scrutiny.  
Similarly, and based on the evidence of poor compliance with some of the provisions 
of King II as discussed above, effective co-operation and co-ordination among all the 
corporate and financial regulatory bodies, such as the Department of Trade and Industry, the 
Financial Services Board, the South African Reserve-Bank, and the JSE Ltd may enhance 
monitoring and improve compliance. Further, and in line with international developments, all 
listed firms may be encouraged to set-up official websites to increase online-reporting to 
improve transparency. Currently, only a small number of listed firms have official website for 
online-reporting. 
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 Finally, the findings suggest that the levels of compliance with the South African 
context specific affirmative action and stakeholders corporate governance provisions (the 
Social-SACGI) are relatively high among the sampled firms. Specifically, and for example, the 
average sampled firm complied with 60% of the 50 corporate governance provisions 
investigated (the SACGI), while the average sampled firm complied with 67% of the 9 South 
African context affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions (the 
Social-SACGI).  
Compliance with the individual affirmative action and stakeholder provisions, 
including board diversity has generally improved substantially over the period of examination. 
This is contrary to theoretical expectations and the suggestions of critics of King II that 
because compliance with these social provisions imposes extra costs, firms will not voluntarily 
comply with them unless they are backed by legislation or the corporate governance structure 
is fundamentally changed from a ‘shareholding’ to ‘stakeholding’ one. 
Apart from being appended to the JSE’s Listings Rules, the relatively high levels of 
compliance with the affirmative action and stakeholder provisions observed among the 
sampled firms in particular may be explained by political costs and resource dependence 
theories. Political costs theory suggests that the political system has the power (i.e., through 
taxation, regulation, nationalisation, expropriations, and break-ups) to redistribute wealth 
between various societal groups (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, p.115; Andreasson, 2009, 
p.22). Corporations, and especially large companies, are particularly susceptible to wealth 
transfers.  
Therefore, firms will voluntarily comply with provisions if it will lead to an 
improvement in the relationships with governments and the public sector. This will not only 
help to decrease political costs, but also offer greater access to resources (resource 
dependence), such as subsidies, tax-rebates, and government contracts, amongst others. Within 
the South African context, compliance with the Social-SACGI may reduce the potential 
political cost of stringent legislation being introduced. More importantly, and as has been 
explained above, compliance with the Social-SACGI may be a major way by which access to 
valuable resources, such as profitable black economic empowerment deals, mining, and 
government contracts may be gained. This may also explain the encouraging levels of 
compliance with the Social-SACGI. 
Despite the improving levels of compliance with the affirmative action and stakeholder 
provisions, there are still room for improvements. As will be recommended further below, the 
  
364 
monitoring of the levels of compliance with the social or affirmative action and stakeholder 
provisions may need to be strengthened to encourage meaningful compliance. In this case, the 
proposed ‘compliance and enforcement’ committee to be set-up by the JSE to specifically 
monitor compliance levels among listed firms and make appropriate recommendations to the 
JSE board for improvement may be useful. 
 
10.2.2 The Compliance-Index Model, Policy Implications and Recommendations 
 
The findings generally suggest that, irrespective of the financial performance measure 
used (i.e., whether an accounting measure – ROA or a market measure – Q-ratio), there is a 
statistically significant and positive relationship between the SACGI and firm financial 
performance. This implies that, on average, better-governed South African listed firms tend to 
be associated with higher financial returns than their poorly-governed counterparts. Similarly, 
and contrary to theoretical expectations, the findings also indicate that compliance with the 
Social-SACGI impact positively on the financial performance of South African listed firms. 
These findings have major implications for the on-going policy debate in South Africa. 
First, and as has been explained above, there is a serious policy debate as to whether the 
current ‘hybrid’ corporate governance model in which substantial ‘stakeholder’ demands are 
super-imposed on a predominantly ‘shareholding’ structure is appropriate for South Africa. 
The second important policy debate is that with a relatively concentrated ownership and a 
weak record of enforcement, there is a question of whether a UK-style voluntary corporate 
governance regime (i.e., ‘comply or explain’) rather than a US-style mandatory or statutory 
regime (i.e., ‘comply or else’) is appropriate for South Africa. 
The positive relationship between the SACGI and firm financial performance suggests 
that South African listed firms are still able to deliver significant financial value to 
shareholders after accounting for the costs of complying with affirmative action and 
stakeholder provisions. Consistent with prior studies, this implies that corporate governance is 
an important determinant of firm financial performance in South Africa. The significant 
positive associations between the Q-ratio and the SACGI, and between the ROA and the 
SACGI, indicate that good corporate governance is not only rewarded by investors with a 
higher valuation multiple, but can also impact positively on the sampled firms’ accounting 
returns. This is presumably because good corporate governance can enhance monitoring and 
reduce managerial expropriation.  
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As an emerging market, good corporate governance practices are particularly 
important as this may not only help reduce corporate failures, but may also help companies to 
attract significant capital inflows or foreign direct investments (FDI). This may facilitate faster 
economic growth and development in South Africa. In this respect, efforts by the Institute of 
Directors (IoD) of South Africa, the King Committee, the JSE, and the Financial Services 
Board (FSB), amongst other stakeholders, at improving governance standards in South 
African companies, may be seen as a step in the right direction. 
The significant positive relationship between the Social-SACGI and firm financial 
performance implies that South African listed firms may need to pay serious attention to 
complying with the affirmative action and stakeholder provisions and in preparing the 
integrated sustainability report. This is because within the South African context, compliance 
with the affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions appears to be a 
major way by which access to valuable resources may be gained to facilitate growth and 
improve long-term accounting returns. This may also be translated into higher share price by 
the market, and thereby resulting in higher market valuation.  
From shareholders’ perspective, the findings also imply that the current ‘hybrid’ 
corporate governance model seems to be appropriate for South Africa, and that there may be 
no serious need for a radical change. Similarly, and as has been discussed above, the findings 
suggest that compliance levels with good corporate governance practices have generally 
improved substantially since the King Reports were introduced. This also implies that the UK-
style voluntary corporate governance framework appears to be working to some extent in 
South Africa, and that there may be no urgent need to effect fundamental changes. 
Despite evidence that South African listed companies are positively embracing 
corporate governance reforms, the significant variation observed in the levels of compliance 
among the sampled firms indicates that there are still substantial room for improvements. In 
particular, based on the evidence that compliance with the South African context specific 
affirmative action and stakeholder provisions help to significantly improve financial 
performance, there may be the need for South Africa to further strengthen its current ‘hybrid’ 
corporate governance model. Specifically, there are several ways by which the current 
‘hybrid’ corporate governance framework may be strengthened for shareholders, and made 
more relevant to the South African corporate context that may be incorporated into the 
forthcoming ‘King III’. 
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First, the integrated sustainability reporting (stakeholder issues reporting) may be 
renewed and strengthened to clear lingering scepticisms among civil society (i.e., various 
stakeholders and general public) as to the true intentions and practices of listed firms. To 
achieve effective and meaningful contribution to the sustainability of local communities and 
other identified legitimate stakeholders, the current integrated sustainability report may be 
made to form part of the annual financial statement and report.   
This may mean that a typical financial report may be made up of: (1) a financial 
statement (profit and loss accounts); (2) a balance sheet; and (3) an integrated sustainability 
report. Like the financial statement and balance sheet, the integrated sustainability report may 
be both backward- and forward-looking in terms of the information it provides. That is, the 
companies may in the least be required to record in both quantitative and qualitative terms the 
contribution that they have made towards sustaining their identified stakeholders in the 
previous year, current year, and what they plan to do in the next financial year.  
In terms of the content of the integrated report, it may be rich enough to state how a 
firm has both positively and negatively affected the social, economic and environmental life of 
its identified stakeholders, especially the local community within which it operated in the 
financial year under review. In addition, the forward-looking part of the integrated report may 
record how the company intends to improve on the positive impacts and minimise the negative 
aspects that affected the social, economic and environmental life of its identified stakeholders, 
including the local community within which it operates.  
This form of integrated sustainability reporting may arguably offer several advantages 
over the current method of integrated sustainability reporting recommended by King II. First, 
it may imply that instead of being a mere ‘add-on’ (as has been observed from reading the 
annual reports) as economic, social and environmental information in the annual report 
currently, the integrated sustainability report may be seen as truly embedded in the activities 
of listed firms. Secondly, by formally becoming part of the financial report, the integrated 
sustainability may fall directly under the remit of the external auditor. The external auditor 
may officially be required to directly audit all aspects of the report and to pass his/her ‘true 
and fair’ view as to the veracity or otherwise of statements or figures provided in the 
integrated sustainability report. This may help improve confidence in the integrated 
sustainability report and reduce public scepticism. 
Thirdly, requiring firms to provide sustainability information on previous year’s, 
current year’s and next year’s basis may arguably result in a better and meaningful compliance 
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with stakeholder provisions. This is because it may prevent companies from being vague or 
repeating the same sustainability contribution in different financial years. Finally, making the 
integrated sustainability report part of the financial report may also not have substantial 
additional costs implications (some amount of increase in auditing fees, however, may be 
expected) as it may be similar to the current sustainability report. It is expected to only elevate 
its importance so that greater care and priority may be placed on its preparation. This may 
make the integrated sustainability report more valuable or useful to potential investors and 
other stakeholders. 
The second major way by which the ‘hybrid’ corporate governance framework may be 
improved is to discourage the incidence of concentrated ownerships and reduce the low levels 
of compliance with some of the provisions of King II as has been discussed above. This is 
because diffused or dispersed ownership enhances the effectiveness of the managerial labour 
and corporate control markets (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1035). However, and as have 
been explained in chapters one, two and three, prior literature suggests that effective and 
efficient market for corporate control can improve voluntary compliance as poorly-governed 
or performing firms can easily be acquired by their better-governed or performing counterparts. 
In this regard, recent efforts by the JSE at reducing concentrated ownerships and cross-
shareholdings via complex pyramidical structures, such as the introduction of more rigorous 
listing rules (in 1995, 2000, 2003, 2005 and 2007) and the de-listing of pyramids may be seen 
as a step in the right direction. It may help improve voluntary compliance and enforcement 
with good corporate governance practices among South African listed firms.  
Finally, and as has been discussed above, another major way by which the ‘hybrid’ 
corporate governance model may be improved is to strengthen the current hybrid regulatory 
structures. Statutory corporate laws, such as the Companies Act 1973 and Insider Trading Act 
1998 may support the voluntary corporate rules, including the King Code and the JSE Listing 
Rules. This may also enhance compliance and enforcement. As has been recommended above, 
these suggestions may be incorporated into the provisions of the forthcoming ‘King III’. 
 
10.2.3 The Equilibrium-Variable Model, Policy Implications and Recommendations 
 
There are several implications of the findings based on the equilibrium-variable model. 
First, the findings suggest that regardless of the firm financial performance measure used, 
board diversity has no statistically significant impact on firm financial performance in South 
Africa. This does not lend support to the recommendations of King II and the general efforts 
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in South Africa to diversify corporate boards. As has been explained above, this is empirically 
less surprising given the small number of women and non-whites that are currently on South 
African corporate boards. For example, the average firm in the sample with approximately a 
mean board size of 10 has only one non-white or female member.  
The small number of women and non-whites on corporate boards implies that women 
and non-white board appointments may be made for symbolic reasons or as a form of token 
rather than for their contribution to the decision-making process in the boardroom. It may also 
be possible that due to the negative lingering legacies of Apartheid, board members from 
diverse backgrounds, especially non-whites, tend to lack the necessary qualifications, skills 
and experience to contribute effectively to boardroom decision-making. 
This appears to suggest that board diversity may need to be meaningfully improved 
before it can be expected to impact positively on the sampled firms’ financial performance. 
This may be done by significantly increasing the number of board members from diverse 
backgrounds. Additionally, companies may conduct special training, education and 
development programmes for new board members from diverse backgrounds with limited or 
no board experience. This may facilitate effective contribution of diverse board members by 
making them better aware of their rights and responsibilities. In this regard, the Institute of 
Directors (IoD) of South Africa may be of immense help by regularly conducting training 
workshops and conferences for existing and new members. 
Second, the findings indicate that market returns (Q-ratio) are significantly higher if a 
firm has a larger board, but this is not reflected in any significant measure in its accounting 
returns (ROA). As summarised above, the significant positive association between board size 
and the Q-ratio is contrary to much of the UK and US evidence, which report a significant 
negative relationship between board size and the Q-ratio. This appears to imply that unlike the 
UK and US context, the board’s ability to secure greater access to critical resources that is 
often associated with larger boards is valued higher by the South African stock market than 
the capacity of the board to effectively monitor and advise managers that is usually associated 
with smaller boards. 
Another implication seems to be that the valuation consequences of board size differ 
across firms and performance measures. In this regard, the decision by King II not to prescribe 
an ‘ideal’ (i.e., ‘one size fits all’) board size may be seen as a step in the right direction. King 
II recommends that every board should consider whether or not its size, diversity and other 
demographics make it effective.      
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It may also imply that the choice of a performance measure has important implications 
for understanding the effect of corporate governance structures on financial performance. As 
have been explained above, this seems to suggest that insiders (managers) and outsiders 
(investors) differ in their valuation of corporate governance. It may also reflect differences in 
weaknesses and strengths of market and accounting based measures of performance. The 
overall implication appears to be that for robust research results, future researchers may need 
to use both accounting and market based performance proxies rather than a single financial 
performance measure. 
Third, the findings indicate that firms that combine the roles of board chairman and 
CEO tend to be associated with higher accounting returns than their counterparts that split the 
roles. However, it has no significant impact on market valuation even though role or CEO 
duality is generally considered by the market as a negative corporate governance practice. This 
appears to imply that the policy of King II and the JSE’s Listing Rules for South African firms 
to follow Cadbury-style suggestion to split the two roles may not be appropriate. Within the 
South African context, and especially for small firms, CEO duality appears to allow a 
visionary and charismatic CEO the opportunity to have a sharper focus on firm objectives 
without excessive board interference.  
Fourth, the findings indicate that boards with a higher percentage of non-executive 
directors tend to be associated with lower accounting returns. Further, even though having 
more non-executive directors on the board is perceived positively by the market, it has no 
significant impact on market valuation. This seems to indicate that the Cadbury-style 
recommendation of King II and the JSE’s Listing Rules that South African boards should 
comprise of a majority of non-executive directors may not necessarily be applicable in South 
Africa.  
One reason may be that as a developing country, non-executive directors, especially 
those from diverse backgrounds, may lack the necessary qualifications, knowledge and 
experience to subject managerial decisions to proper scrutiny. Organising regular training and 
development workshops for existing and new non-executive directors to educate them about 
their rights and responsibilities may be a step in the right direction. 
Fifth, the findings suggest that the frequency of board meetings has no statistically 
significant impact on firm financial performance, regardless of the measure used. This appears 
to imply that the suggestion of King II that every board must at least meet four times in a year 
may not have any significant positive financial effect. Since firms may differ in the challenges 
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and problems that they face, it may be appropriate to allow for judgement and flexibility in the 
frequency of board meetings. For example, while it may be valuable for a board to meet 
regularly in a period of crisis, such as when a firm is facing a hostile take-over bid, there may 
be no need for a board to meet frequently if such problems are non-existent. Judgement and 
Flexibility may allow corporate boards to meet in response to specific needs and challenges. 
Sixth, the findings are mixed when it comes to board subcommittees. The findings 
indicate that firms that have established a nomination committee tend to be associated with 
higher accounting returns. By contrast, the findings suggest that firms with audit and 
remuneration committees have no impact on accounting returns. Further, the market seems not 
to put any significant value on whether firms that have established any of three board 
committees: audit, nomination, and remuneration. This generally implies that the Cadbury-
style suggestion of King II and the JSE’s Listing Rules that South African listed firms should 
establish audit, nomination, and remuneration committees may not be applicable.   
As has been argued above, firms may differ in terms of size, agency problems, and 
thus governance needs. While an independent nomination committee may be relevant for a 
larger firm, it may be argued that a smaller firm of three directors may not necessarily need to 
have an independent nomination committee. As has been suggested above, the on-going 
review of King II may incorporate such judgement and flexibilities into its recommendations, 
especially for smaller firms. 
The seventh and final finding indicates that the market values firms with higher 
director shareownership significantly lower, but higher director ownership appears to have no 
significant impact on accounting returns. This seems to imply that higher director 
shareownership tend to be associated with director entrenchment and expropriation to the 
disadvantage of minority shareholders. In this regard, and as has been discussed above, the on-
going attempts by the JSE to encourage diffused ownerships of listed firms may be seen as a 
positive development. 
The next section will summarise the contributions of the study to the extant corporate 
governance literature. 
 
 
10.3 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION  
 
 As has already been discussed in chapters one and four, prior cross-country studies 
whose samples include some South African listed firms make use of corporate governance 
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ratings based purely on analysts’ perceptions rather than a direct examination of company 
annual reports. A major problem with subjective analysts’ corporate governance rankings is 
that they tend to be biased towards large firms (Beattie et al., 2004, p.210). The Credit 
Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) 2000 corporate governance rankings that has mainly been 
used by prior studies, for example, includes only nine of the biggest South African listed firms. 
Arguably, this makes the sample used by prior studies less representative, and thus limits the 
generalisation of their findings for South Africa. Similarly, the extant literature suggests that 
corporate governance structures and systems vary across different countries (West, 2006, 
p.435, 2009, p.11; Andreasson, 2009, p.22). However, and as has been discussed in chapters 
two, four and five, subjective analysts’ corporate governance rankings are standardised such 
that they are unable to reflect institutional, cultural and contextual differences in corporate 
governance structures across different countries.  
This study makes several new contributions, as well as extensions to the extant 
corporate governance literature. First, using corporate governance data collected directly from 
company annual reports, the study offers for the first time direct evidence on the relationship 
between internal corporate governance structures and firm financial performance in South 
Africa. As has already been explained, the sample is constructed in such a way that there is a 
balance between large and small firms, which arguably enhances the generalisation of the 
findings. Unlike prior studies, the compliance-index (the SACGI) used incorporates 
conventional, as well as affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions 
that are unique to the South African context. Consistent with the results of prior studies (e.g., 
Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; 
Black et al., 2006a; and Morey et al., 2009, amongst others), the findings indicate that there is 
a statistically significant relationship between the quality of a firm’s corporate governance and 
financial performance. 
Second, it offers for the first time evidence on the economic consequences of 
complying with affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions for South 
African listed firms. Contrary to theoretical expectations, the findings suggest that compliance 
with the Social-SACGI impact positively on financial returns of South African listed firms. 
Third, the Institute of International Finance (IIF) 2007 report on Corporate Governance in 
South Africa suggests that even though the King Code is voluntary, no study has been done to 
ascertain the levels of compliance among listed firms. Specifically, it states “…However, to 
date, no study has been conducted to assess the level of compliance with corporate 
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governance-related requirements among listed companies or to verify the reasons for non-
compliance”, (IIF, 2007, p.1). Malherbe and Segal (2003, p.193) have also expressed similar 
concerns.  
This study fills this gap in the existing literature by offering for the first time direct 
evidence on the levels of compliance with the corporate governance provisions recommended 
by King II among South African listed firms. Specifically, it shows that while compliance with 
the recommendations of King II has generally improved, substantial variations in governance 
standards still exist among South African listed firms. These differences, however, can largely 
be explained by size, and moderately by industry. 
Fourth, the study makes for the first time a comparison of findings based on estimating 
the compliance-index model and the equilibrium-variable model. Generally, it shows that 
methodological choice can potentially influence research findings with important implications 
for future research. Finally, and unlike most prior studies, problems that the potential presence 
of endogeneity may cause have been comprehensively addressed. These include estimating: a 
lagged corporate governance-financial performance structure; an instrumental variable; a two-
stage least squares; and a changes model. This has arguably improved the reliability of the 
findings. 
The next section will summarise the limitations of the study to serve as a guide for any 
interpretations of the research findings. 
 
 
10.4 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
 
 While the research findings are important, like any other empirical research, it may 
suffer from several limitations which need to be acknowledged. Most of these potential 
limitations have already been discussed in detail in chapter five. First, there may be problems 
with the sample selection procedure and size. The sample size of 100 listed firms is relatively 
small. As has been explained in subsection of 5.1.3 of chapter five, however, the 100 sampled 
firms were larger compared with the samples of prior South African studies (e.g., Firer and 
Meth, 1986; Ho and Williams, 2003; April et al., 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008). For 
example, April et al. (2003) received only 20 annual reports for examining intellectual capital 
disclosures among South African mining firms. Also, in investigating corporate governance 
and incidences of listing suspension by the JSE, Mangena and Chamisa (2008) obtained data 
on 81 out of a possible 538 suspended firms identified over the period 1999-2005.  
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The five year period also seems to be short. This is, however, longer than most of the 
prior evidence, which is based on one year cross-sectional samples (e.g., Klapper and Love, 
2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006a). Also, the final 100 
stratified sampled firms, which generate a total of 500 firm-year observations, form a 
significant percentage of the total possible sample, as well as the JSE population. It constitutes 
approximately 60% and 34% of the useable final sample of 169 and the possible JSE sample 
of 291 firms, respectively, which statistical sampling (central limit theorem) theory suggests is 
a sufficiently large sample (Whatsham, and Parramore, 1997, pp.136-140; Anderson et al., 
2007, pp.239-241).  
Further, and for practical considerations, the sample was restricted to 100 companies. 
In particular, the corporate governance variables were manually extracted, which is a highly 
labour-intensive activity (Hussainey et al., 2003, p.276; Beattie et al., 2004, pp.232-233). As a 
result, practical limitations of time, effort and finance meant that the sample had to be reduced 
to a number that is statistically large enough to make a significant contribution, while at the 
same time ensuring that the study is completed within the scheduled time-frame of a PhD.  
Arguably, limiting the analysis to a balanced panel introduces survivorship bias. 
However, and as has been explained above, the criteria generated comparatively larger sample 
size in relation to those of prior South African studies to the extent that the generalisation of 
the research results may not be substantially impaired. For regulatory and capital structure 
reasons, the sample also excludes financial and utility firms. As has been explained in 
subsection 5.1.1 of chapter five, this is generally in line with prior studies (e.g., Ho and 
Williams, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008), which facilitated 
drawing comparisons with the results of these studies. Together, these weaknesses may 
potentially limit the generalisation of the research findings. 
Second, and as has been explained in subsection 5.2.2.1 of chapter five, there may be 
validity and reliability problems with the constructed compliance-index, the SACGI. The 
SACGI was constructed based on a binary rather than an ordinal coding scheme. It has been 
argued that binary coding is less informative (Barako et al., 2006a and b; Hassan and Marston, 
2008). Similarly, the SACGI is an un-weighted index. However, un-weighted indices have 
been heavily criticised for treating all corporate governance provisions to be of equal 
importance, a view which is inconsistent with both theory and practice (Barako et al., 2006a, 
p.115).  
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As has been explained in subsection 5.2.2.1 of chapter five, there is a general lack of a 
rigorously developed theoretical basis on which weights could be accurately assigned to the 
various corporate governance provisions (Black et al., 2006a, p.375). In this case, the use of 
unweighted index avoids the necessity of making subjective value judgements as to the 
relative importance or efficacy of each corporate governance provision (Owusu-Ansah, 1998, 
p.609). Also, an associated advantage of an unweighted index is that it does not involve 
arbitrarily or subjectively assigning weights. This obviates creating a situation whereby the 
constructed index is unnecessarily dominated by or biased towards a particular set of corporate 
governance provisions. 
Further, rigorously established empirical evidence from the accounting disclosure 
literature suggests that the use of weighted and unweighted indices tend to give the same 
results, especially where the number of corporate governance provisions is relatively large 
(e.g., Robbins and Austin, 1986; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Beattie et al., 2004; and 
Barako et al., 2006a and b, amongst others).  Moreover, in line with much of the prior 
corporate governance-performance relationship literature (Gompers et al., 2003; Black et al., 
2006a; Henry, 2008; and Morey et al., 2009, amongst others), an unweighted index is 
constructed, which made it easier for direct comparisons to be drawn with their results. 
Also, the SACGI was not coded by a different person in order to ascertain inter-coder 
consistency. As has been explained in subsection 5.2.2.1 of chapter five, the coding was done 
twice over a fourteen month period with high levels of stability between the first and second 
rounds of coding. For example, the stability between the first round SACGI and the second 
round SACGI is .8948. For the individual corporate governance provisions, the stability 
between the first and second round of coding ranges between .7614 in the case of board 
composition (COM1) to .9056 with respect to the disclosure of individual directors’ 
attendance of board meetings (IDMA).  
Beattie and Thompson (2007, p.220) suggest that the cut-off level for acceptability 
ranges from .70 to .80. Thus, the levels of stability achieved were generally highly satisfactory. 
Similarly, and unlike much of the prior literature, for each corporate governance provision and 
annual report, a detailed spreadsheet (see Appendices 3a and b) containing the page number(s) 
of what was coded, where it was coded from, and where applicable, why it was coded in that 
way, was developed to accompany the coding scheme. Arguably, this makes the constructed 
index easy and simple to replicate. 
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The corporate governance data was collected only from annual reports. It could have 
been cross-checked with other sources, such as questionnaire survey and face-to-face 
interviews. However, and as have been discussed in subsection 5.2.2.1 of chapter five, unlike 
other media, the Companies Act and the JSE Listings Rules mandate listed firms to issue 
annual reports. It has been argued that the mandatory nature of annual reports makes them a 
regular and reliable source of corporate governance information (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 
1993; Botosan, 1997). This is because a firm can be sued for providing misleading information.  
Also, prior evidence suggests that annual report disclosure levels are positively 
correlated with the amount of disclosure provided via other media (Lang and Lundholm, 1993, 
p.258; Botosan, 1997, p.329). Further, and for practical reasons, only company annual reports 
were consistently available in Perfect Information where the annual reports were mainly 
collected from. Moreover, using company annual reports is also in line with prior studies, 
which facilitated drawing direct comparisons with their results (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Shabbir 
and Padget, 2005; Cheung et al., 2007).  
 Third, there may be definitional problems with some of the corporate governance 
variables. For example, board diversity was coded as a binary variable rather than using actual 
percentage of board members from diverse backgrounds. Board size was defined to exclude 
‘shadow’ or ‘grey’ directors. Non-executive directors were not distinguished into 
‘independent’ and ‘non-independent’. Similarly, due to data 96  limitations, director 
shareownership could not be separated into ownerships held by executive and non-executive 
directors, directly and indirectly, and beneficially and non-beneficially.  
In the case of block shareownership, no distinctions are made in terms of internal and 
external, and institutional and non-institutional block shareownerships. Institutional 
shareownership could not be categorised into local and foreign institutional ownerships. 
Further, the director shareownership-financial performance non-linear nexus is tested by 
merely squaring and cubing director shareownership. Director shareownership levels could 
have, for example, been properly classified into low (0%-5%), medium (5%-25%), and high 
(25% and above). These definitional limitations may potentially influence the research 
findings. 
                                                 
96The ownership data was collected from the company annual reports. However, they were not clearly classified. 
For example, there were no proper or explicit classifications of shareownerships as to those with cash flow rights 
and those with voting rights. Director ownership was not explicitly classified into those owned by exectutive 
directors and those owned by non-exective directors. Block ownership was not classified into those owned by 
outsiders or institutions and those owned by individuals or insiders. Also, institutional ownership was also not 
classified into those owned by foreign institutions and those owned by local institutions. 
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 Finally, the study may suffer from potential omitted variables bias. In the case of the 
financial performance proxies, they may fail to capture informal personal interactions among 
directors, management, and employees that may potentially impact on a firm’s financial 
performance. With regard to the corporate governance variables, they may not be able to 
capture the true intentions for which they may be instituted by managers. For example, even 
though managers may know that non-executive directors may be practically ineffective in 
monitoring their actions, they may still appoint them just to merely signal their intentions of 
treating outsiders or shareholders fairly.  
Similarly, it can be argued that the provisions contained in King II have nothing to do 
with good corporate governance. Rather, they are meant to achieve accountability, discipline, 
fairness, independence, responsibility, social responsibility, and transparency.  Firm financial 
performance may mainly be determined by macro-economic variables and the general state of 
the economy. For instance, in a state of economic boom, all firms perform financially well. By 
contrast, in a state of economic recession, all firms perform poorly. An anecdotal example of 
this is the current global financial crisis and the associated economic downturn (e.g., Turner 
Review, 2009; Walker Review, 2009). Therefore, corporate governance may not be the main 
determinant of firm financial performance.  
The research findings must, therefore, be interpreted in light of the above limitations. 
Also, these limitations potentially represent avenues for future research. Therefore, the next 
section points out potential avenues for future research and improvements. 
 
 
 10.5 AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENTS 
 
There are several potential avenues for future research and improvements. First, since 
there is a general dearth of corporate governance studies that make use of African listed firms, 
this study can be extended by using data from a cross-section of African stock markets. This 
may improve current understanding of the internal corporate governance-financial 
performance association across different African markets.  
Second, the study has mainly examined the association between internal corporate 
governance structures and firm financial performance. Future studies can investigate how 
external corporate governance mechanisms, such as the market for corporate control, the 
managerial labour market, and the law, amongst others, affect firm financial performance. 
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Future research can also analyse interactions or interdependences between internal and 
external corporate governance mechanisms and their impact on firm financial performance.  
Third, given the current global financial crisis and its association with director pay and 
bonuses, it will be interesting for future research to focus on the relationship between director 
(i.e., CEO, executive, and non-executive) pay and company performance among South 
African listed firms. Also, the association between multiple (i.e., ‘busy directors’) 
directorships and financial performance can be explored by future research. Fourth, future 
studies can examine the relationship between internal corporate governance structures and cost 
of equity capital or risk. This is because if better-governed firms tend to be associated with 
higher financial returns, then such firms will theoretically be expected to be associated with 
lower cost of equity capital or risk. 
Fifth, future studies can examine the determinants of corporate governance or 
compliance with the King Code, the ownership-corporate disclosure nexus, the relationship 
between corporate disclosure and cost of equity capital or risk, as well as the valuation 
consequences of voluntary disclosure of corporate governance among South African listed 
firms. Sixth, and in terms of improvement to the current study, future research can re-examine 
the corporate governance-financial relationship by expanding the sample size and over a 
longer period of time (say from 1990 or 1993 to 2001; from 2001 to 2009; or from 1990 or 
1993 to 2009). Such a study can estimate both balanced and un-balanced panels to avoid 
survivorship bias. It can also examine only financial firms or both financial and non-financial 
firms to ascertain whether the current findings are sensitive or robust to different sample 
specifications.  
Seventh, future research can improve the construction of the compliance corporate 
governance index to enhance validity and reliability. This can be done by examining the 
sensitivity or robustness of the results to: weighted and un-weighted indices; and binary and 
ordinal coding schemes. The reliability of the index can be improved if future research uses 
more than one coder so that inter-coder consistency can be measured. Future studies can also 
collect the corporate governance data via a questionnaire survey (i.e., postal and electronic) to 
either supplement those provided in company annual reports or to be used to supplant those 
provided in company annual reports.  
 Eighth, definitions of variables could be improved and made more precise. Board 
diversity could be measured in percentages, while board size can be defined to include 
‘shadow’ or ‘grey’ directors. Non-executive directors can be distinguished into ‘independent’ 
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and ‘non-independent’. Similarly, director shareownership can be separated into ownerships 
held by executive and non-executive directors, directly and indirectly, and beneficially and 
non-beneficially.  
In the case of block shareownership, distinctions can be made in terms of internal and 
external, and institutional and non-institutional block shareownerships. Institutional 
shareownership can be categorised into local and foreign institutional ownerships. Further, the 
director shareownership-financial performance non-monotonic relationship can be re-
examined by properly classifying director ownership levels into low, medium, and high.  
Finally, and with regard to the research design, event study methodology can be used 
by future researchers to investigate share price reaction to the adoption of the corporate 
governance provisions of King II. Future research can also examine share price reaction to 
board changes, including appointments, resignations, dismissals, deaths, and retirements of 
directors (i.e., chairpersons, CEOs, executive, non-executive, and independent non-executive 
directors).  
Also, there are some pressing corporate governance issues that may be better addressed 
by future researchers via a qualitative methodology. For instance, the importance of corporate 
governance in corporate decision-making and performance can be explored by future research 
by observing boardroom interactions or by conducting interviews (i.e., structured, semi-
structured, and un-structured) with key company stakeholders, such as executive and non-
executive directors, company secretaries, senior management, and institutional investors. The 
interviews with company management can also explore the reasons why firms comply or do 
not comply with the provisions of King II. 
Further, future studies can focus on the motivations and central drivers of corporate 
governance reforms in South Africa. This can be done by conducting face-to-face interviews 
with some of the key stakeholders of corporate governance reforms in South Africa. These 
may include the King Committee chairman and commissioners, key members of the Institute 
of Directors of South Africa, the JSE Ltd, and the South African Department of Trade and 
Industry, amongst others. This may help enhance current understanding of how corporate 
governance structures and systems evolve in a developing country setting. 
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10.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
 This chapter has focused on providing conclusions to the thesis. Specifically, it sought 
to achieve five main objectives. First, it attempted to summarise the research findings of the 
study. In this regard, the research findings based on the: levels of compliance with the South 
African Corporate Governance Index (the SACGI); compliance-index and equilibrium-
variable models; and robustness or sensitivity analyses. The findings suggest the levels of 
compliance with the SACGI have significantly improved over the period of examination. 
However, substantial differences in the standards of corporate governance among South 
African listed firms still exist. Research findings based on the compliance-index model 
indicate that regardless of the measure used, better-governed firms, on average, tend to be 
associated with higher financial returns than their poorly-governed counterparts.  
By contrast, findings based on the equilibrium-variable model are generally mixed.  
Irrespective of the measure used, board diversity and the frequency of board meetings appear 
to have no impact on firm financial performance. With the exception of the presence of a 
nomination committee, board subcommittees do not seem to have any significant effect on 
firm financial performance, regardless of the measure used. Board size is significantly 
positively associated with the Q-ratio, but insignificantly negatively related to the ROA. The 
coefficient on role or CEO duality under the ROA is significant and positive, but the 
coefficient on CEO duality under the Q-ratio is negative and insignificant. The final finding 
based on the equilibrium-variable model is that director shareownership is statistically 
insignificant and negatively related to ROA, but statistically significant and negatively 
associated with the Q-ratio. 
Second, the chapter has discussed the policy implications of the research findings. 
With the respect to the levels of compliance with the SACGI, evidence of increasing levels of 
compliance implies that efforts at improving corporate governance standards by the various 
stakeholders within South African listed firms are beginning to pay-off. It also implies that the 
Cadbury-style voluntary compliance regime appears to be working to some extent in South 
Africa. Evidence of substantial variations in the levels of compliance among the sampled firms, 
however, implies that compliance and enforcement may need to be further strengthened. To 
encourage meaningful compliance, the on-going review of King II may consider introducing 
some level of judgement and flexibility in the applicability of the corporate governance 
provisions, especially for small listed firms. 
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The statistically significant and positive relationship between firm-level corporate 
governance and financial performance implies that corporate governance is an important 
determinant of firm financial performance in South Africa. In this respect, efforts by the 
Institute of Directors (IoD) of South Africa, the King Committee, the JSE, and the Financial 
Services Board (FSB), amongst other stakeholders, at improving corporate governance 
standards in South African companies may be seen as a step in the right direction. The 
significant positive relationship between the Social-SACGI and firm financial performance 
implies that South African listed firms may need to pay serious attention to complying with 
the affirmative action and stakeholder provisions and in preparing the integrated sustainability 
report. From shareholders’ perspective, the findings also imply that the current ‘hybrid’ 
corporate governance model seems to be appropriate for South Africa, and that there may be 
no serious need for a radical change. 
Despite the evidence that South African listed companies are positively embracing 
corporate governance reforms, the significant variability observed in the levels of compliance 
among the sampled firms indicates that there are still substantial room for improvements. The 
‘hybrid’ corporate governance may be improved by renewing and strengthening integrated 
sustainability reporting (stakeholder issues reporting). To achieve effective and meaningful 
contribution to the sustainability of local communities and other identified legitimate 
stakeholders, the current integrated sustainability report may be made to form part of the 
annual financial statement and report. Disperse corporate shareholdings may be encouraged in 
addition to proper co-ordination among regulatory bodies to promote effective monitoring, 
compliance and enforcement of corporate governance provisions. The current hybrid 
regulatory structure may also be strengthened. 
Third, the chapter sought to summarise the contributions of the study. The study makes 
several new contributions, as well as extensions to the extant corporate governance literature. 
First, it offers for the first time direct evidence on the relationship between internal corporate 
governance structures and firm financial performance in South Africa. Second, it documents 
for the first time evidence on the economic consequences of complying with affirmative action 
and stakeholder provisions for South African listed firms. Third, the study presents direct 
evidence on the levels of compliance with the corporate governance provisions recommended 
by King II among South African listed firms. Fourth, it makes for the first time a comparison 
of findings based on estimating a compliance-index model and an equilibrium-variable model. 
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Finally, and unlike most prior studies, the study comprehensively addresses problems that the 
potential presence of endogeneity may cause.  
The fourth objective of the chapter has been to highlight the limitations of the study. 
First, there may be problems with the sample selection procedure and size. The sample size of 
100 listed firms is relatively small. The five year period examined is also comparatively short. 
Limiting the analysis to a balanced panel possibly introduces survivorship bias. The sample 
also excludes financial and utility firms. These weaknesses may potentially limit the 
generalisability of the research findings.  
Second, there may validity and reliability problems with the constructed compliance-
index, the SACGI. The SACGI was constructed based only on a binary coding scheme. The 
corporate governance variables were equally weighted. Also, the SACGI was not coded by a 
different person in order to ascertain inter-coder consistency. The corporate governance data 
was collected purely from annual reports. These weaknesses may limit the validity and 
reliability of the results.  
Third, there may be definitional problems with some of the corporate governance 
variables. For example, board diversity was coded as a binary variable rather than using actual 
percentage of board members from diverse backgrounds. Board size was defined to exclude 
‘shadow’ or ‘grey’ directors. Non-executive directors were not distinguished into 
‘independent’ and ‘non-independent’. Further, the study may suffer from potential omitted 
variables bias. In the case of the financial performance proxies, they may fail to capture 
informal personal interactions among directors, management, and employees that may 
potentially impact on a firm’s financial performance. With regard to the corporate governance 
variables, they may not be able to capture the true intentions for which they may be instituted 
by managers.  
The final objective the chapter has been to point out potential avenues for future 
research and improvements. First, since there is a general dearth of corporate governance 
studies that make use of African listed firms, this study can be extended by using data from a 
cross-section of African stock markets. Second, the study has mainly examined the association 
between internal corporate governance structures and firm financial performance. Future 
studies can investigate how external corporate governance mechanisms, such as the market for 
corporate control, the managerial labour market, and the law, amongst others, affect firm 
financial performance.  
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Third, given the current international financial crisis and its association with director 
pay and bonuses, it will be interesting for future research to focus on the relationship between 
director (i.e., CEO, executive, and non-executive) pay and company performance among 
South African listed firms. Also, the association between multiple (i.e., ‘busy directors’) 
directorships and financial performance can be explored by future research. Fourth, future 
studies can examine the relationship between internal corporate governance structures and cost 
of equity capital or risk. This is because if better governed firms generate significantly higher 
financial returns, then such firms will theoretically be expected to have significantly lower 
cost of equity capital or risk. 
Fifth, and in terms of improvement to the current study, future research can re-examine 
the corporate governance-financial relationship by expanding the sample size and over a 
longer period of time. Such a study can estimate both balanced and un-balanced panels to 
avoid survivorship bias. It can also examine only financial firms or both financial and non-
financial firms to ascertain whether the current findings are sensitive or robust to different 
sample specifications. Finally, future studies can adopt different research methodology, such 
as qualitative and event study research designs to examine the corporate governance-financial 
performance nexus. 
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APPENDICES: 
 
Appendix 1: A List of the Names and Industries of the 100 Sampled Firms  
Full Company Name JSE 
Code 
Chosen 
Code 
Industry ISIN Code 
1.     Amalgamated Appliance Holdings Ltd  
2.     Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 
3.     AECI Ltd  
4.     Advtech Ltd 
5.     Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd  
6.     Afgri Ltd, aka, OTK Holdings Ltd  
7.     Aflease Gold Ltd, aka, Sub Nigel Gold Co. 
8.     Adcorp Holdings Ltd  
9.     AG Industries Ltd 
10.   All Joy Foods Ltd 
11.   African Media Entertainment Ltd  
12.   African and Overseas Enterprises Ltd  
13.   African Oxygen Ltd   
14.   Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd  
15.   Anglo Platinum Ltd  
16.   Astral Foods Ltd  
17.   Allied Technologies Ltd (South Africa) 
18.   Aveng Ltd 
19.   Avi Ltd, aka, Anglovaal Industries Ltd 
20.   Barloworld Ltd  
21.   Business Connexion Group, aka, Comparex 
22.   Bidvest Group Ltd  
23.   Beige Holdings Ltd  
24.   Brandcorp Holdings Ltd  
25.   Bytes Technology Group Ltd  
26.   Buildmax Ltd  
27.   Crookes Brothers Ltd  
28.   Compu-Clearing Outsourcing Ltd  
29.   Command Holdings Ltd  
30.   Comair Ltd  
31.   Cullinan Holdings Ltd  
32.   Datatec Ltd  
33.   Distell Group Ltd  
34.   Datacentrix Holdings Ltd  
35.   Don Group Ltd  
36.   Dorbyl Ltd  
37.   Dynamic Cables Rsa Ltd 
38.   ERP.Com Holdings Ltd  
39.   Edgars Consolidated Stores Ltd  
40.   Faritec Holdings Ltd  
41.   Foneworx holdings Ltd, aka, Interconnective   
42.   Foschini Ltd  
43.   Gijima AST Group Ltd  
44.   Gold Fields Ltd  
45.   House of Busby  
46.   Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd  
47.   Imperial Holdings Ltd  
48.   Infowave Holdings Ltd  
49.   Intertrading Ltd  
50.   Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd  
AMA 
ANG 
AFE 
ADH 
ATN 
AFR 
AFO 
ADR 
AGI 
ALJ 
AME 
AOO 
AFX 
APN 
AMS 
ARL 
ALT 
AEG 
AVI 
BAW 
BCX 
BVT 
BEG 
BRC 
BTG 
BDM 
CSK 
CCL 
CMA 
COM 
CUL 
DTC 
DST 
DCT 
DON 
DLV 
DYM 
ERP 
ECO 
FRT 
FWX 
FOS 
GIJ 
GFI 
BSB 
HAR 
IPL 
IFW 
ITR 
IMP 
AAH 
AAS 
ACI 
ADV 
AEC 
AFI 
AFO 
AHO 
AIN 
AJF 
AME 
AOE 
AOX 
APH 
APL 
ASF 
ATE 
AVE 
AVI 
BAR 
BCG 
BGR 
BHO 
BRH 
BTG 
BUI 
CBR 
CCO 
CHO 
COM 
CUH 
DAT 
DGR 
DHO 
DOG 
DOR 
DYM 
ECH 
ECO 
FHO 
FOH 
FOS 
GAG 
GFI 
HBU 
HGM 
IHO 
INH 
INT 
IPH 
Consumer Goods 
Basic Materials 
Basic Materials 
Consumer Services 
Industrials 
Consumer Goods 
Basic Materials 
Industrials 
Industrials 
Consumer Goods 
Consumer Services 
Consumer Services 
Basic Materials 
Health Care/C. Serv. 
Basic Materials 
Consumer Goods 
Tellecomm./Techn. 
Industrials 
Consumer Goods 
Industrials 
Technology 
Industrials 
Consumer Goods 
Consumer Services 
Technology 
Industrials 
Consumer Goods 
Technology 
Industrials 
Consumer Services 
Consumer Services 
Technology 
Consumer Goods 
Technology 
Consumer Services 
Consumer Goods 
Technology 
Technology 
Consumer Services 
Technology 
Technology 
Consumer Services 
Technology 
Basic Materials 
Consumer Goods 
Basic Materials 
Industrials 
Technology 
Consumer Goods 
Basic Materials 
ZAE000012647 
ZAE000043485 
ZAE000000220 
ZAE000031035 
ZAE000029658 
ZAE000040549 
ZAE000075867 
ZAE000000139 
ZAE000039467 
ZAE000017240 
ZAE000055802 
ZAE000000485 
ZAE000067120 
ZAE000066692 
ZAE000013181 
ZAE000029757 
ZAE000015251 
ZAE000018081 
ZAE000049433 
ZAE000026639 
ZAE000054631 
ZAE000050449 
ZAE000034161 
ZAE000013611 
ZAE000029526 
ZAE000011250 
ZAE000001434 
ZAE000016564 
ZAE000023131 
ZAE000029823 
ZAE000013710 
ZAE000017745 
ZAE000028668 
ZAE000016051 
ZAE000008462 
ZAE000002184 
ZAE000028270 
ZAE000043493 
ZAE000068649 
ZAE000016838 
ZAE000086237 
ZAE000031019 
ZAE000064606 
ZAE000018123 
ZAE000013637 
ZAE000015228 
ZAE000067211 
ZAE000016440 
ZAE000015566 
ZAE000083648 
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Continuation: Appendix 1 
Full Company Name JSE 
Code 
Chosen 
Code 
Industry ISIN Code 
51.   ISA Holdings Ltd, aka, Y3K Group Ltd 
52.   Illovo Sugar Ltd  
53.   JD Group Ltd  
54.   Kairos Industrial Holdings Ltd  
55.   Labat Africa Ltd  
56.   MTN Group Ltd, aka, M-Cell Ltd 
57.   Massmart Holdings Ltd  
58.   Metmar Ltd, aka, Heritage Collection Ltd 
59.   Moneyweb Holdings Ltd  
60.   Murray and Roberts Holdings Ltd  
61.   Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd, aka, Iscor  
62.   Mustek Ltd  
63.   Nampak Ltd  
64.   Naspers Ltd  
65.   Network Healthcare Holdings Ltd  
66.   Nu-World Holdings Ltd  
67.   Oceana Group Ltd  
68.   Onelogix Group Ltd  
69.   Petmin Ltd  
70.   Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Ltd  
71.   Primeserv Group Ltd  
72.   Paracon Holdings Ltd  
73.   Pinnacle Technology Holdings Ltd  
74.   Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd 
75.   Pick n Pay Stores (Holdings) Ltd,   
76.   Remgro Ltd  
77.   Reunert Ltd  
77.   Sabmiller Plc 
78.   Sallies Ltd  
79.   Sappi Ltd  
80.   Sasol Ltd  
81.   Seardel Investment Corporation Ltd 
82.   Sovereign Food Investments Ltd  
84.   Shoprite Holdings Ltd  
85.   Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd  
86.   Simmer and Jack Mines Ltd  
87.   Stella Vista Technologies Ltd  
88.   Scharrig Mining Ltd  
89.   Square One Solutions Group Ltd 
90.   Spanjaard Ltd  
91.   Spescom Ltd  
92.   Spectrum Shipping Ltd, aka, Santova Log. 
93.   Tiger Brands Ltd  
94.   Thabex Exploration Ltd  
95.   Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd  
96.   Telkom SA Ltd  
97.   Village Main Reef Gold Mining Co. (1934) 
98.   Woolworths Holdings Ltd  
99.   York Timber Organisation Ltd  
100. Zaptronix Ltd 
ISA 
ILV 
JDG 
KIR 
LAB 
MTN 
MSM 
MML 
MNY 
MUR 
MLA 
MST 
NPK 
NPN 
NTC 
NWL 
OCE 
OLG 
PET 
PHM 
PMV 
PCN 
PNC 
PPC 
PIK 
REM 
RLO 
SAB 
SAL 
SAP 
SOL 
SER 
SOV 
SHP 
SHF 
SIM 
SLL 
SCN 
SQE 
SPA 
SPS 
SUM 
TBS 
TBX 
TNT 
TKG 
VIL 
WHL 
YRK 
ZPT 
ISH 
ISU 
JGR 
KIH 
LAF 
MGR 
MHO 
MML 
MOH 
MRH 
MSA 
MUS 
NAM 
NAS 
NHH 
NWH 
OGR 
ONG 
PET 
PGL 
PGO 
PHO 
PNC 
PPC 
PPH 
REM 
REU 
SAB 
SAL 
SAP 
SAS 
SER 
SFI 
SHH 
SIH 
SJM 
SLL 
SMI 
SOS 
SPA 
SPE 
SUM 
TBR 
TEX 
THG 
TSA 
VGM 
WHL 
YTO 
ZPT 
Technology 
Consumer Goods 
Consumer Services 
Industrials 
Industrials 
Tellecomm. 
Consumer Services 
Basic Materials 
Consumer Services 
Industrials 
Basic Materials 
Technology 
Industrials 
Consumer Services 
Health Care/C. Ser. 
Consumer Goods 
Consumer Goods 
Industrials 
Basic Materials 
Consumer Services 
Industrials 
Technology 
Technology 
Industrials 
Consumer Services 
Industrials 
Industrials 
Consumer Goods 
Basic Materials 
Basic Materials 
Oil and Gas/B. Mat. 
Consumer Goods 
Consumer Goods 
Consumer Services 
Consumer Goods 
Basic Materials 
Industrials 
Basic Materials 
Technology 
Basic Materials 
Technology 
Consumer Services 
Consumer Goods 
Basic Materials 
Consumer Goods 
Tellecomm./Techn. 
Basic Materials 
Consumer Services 
Basic Materials 
Industrials 
ZAE000067344 
ZAE000083846 
ZAE000030771 
ZAE000011284 
ZAE000018354 
ZAE000042164 
ZAE000029534 
ZAE000078747 
ZAE000025409 
ZAE000073441 
ZAE000064044 
ZAE000012373 
ZAE000071676 
ZAE000015889 
ZAE000011953 
ZAE000005070 
ZAE000025284 
ZAE000026399 
ZAE000076014 
ZAE000039269 
ZAE000039277 
ZAE000029674 
ZAE000022570 
ZAE000005559 
ZAE000005443 
ZAE000026480 
ZAE000057428 
GB0004835483 
ZAE000022588 
ZAE000006284 
ZAE000006896 
ZAE000029815 
ZAE000009221 
ZAE000012084 
ZAE000016176 
ZAE000006722 
ZAE000018198 
ZAE000006474 
ZAE000023768 
ZAE000006938 
ZAE000017919 
ZAE000037446 
ZAE000071080 
ZAE000013686 
ZAE000007449 
ZAE000044897 
ZAE000007720 
ZAE000063863 
ZAE000008108 
ZAE000070934 
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Appendix 2: The Composite-Index Model – Definition of the South African 
         Corporate Governance Index (the SACGI) Variables and Measurement 
 
Internal Corporate 
Governance 
Variable 
Acronym/ 
Code 
King II 
Sub/Section(s)/ 
(Page 
Number(s)) 
Measurement 
1. Board and    
    Directors 
Board Structure 
 
Role duality 
 
 
 
 
Board composition 
 
 
 
 
Board chairperson 
 
 
 
 
Frequency of board 
meetings 
 
 
Individual directors 
meetings attendance 
 
 
 
Disclosure of 
directors’ biography 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclosure of 
director 
classification 
 
 
 
 
 
DUAL1 
 
 
 
 
COM1 
 
 
 
 
BCP 
 
 
 
 
FBM1s 
 
 
 
IDMA 
 
 
 
 
DDB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DDC 
 
 
 
2 (pp.21-30) 
 
2.1-2.10.6 
(pp.21-30) 
2.3.3 (p.23) 
 
 
 
 
2.2.1 (p.23) 
 
 
 
 
2.3.2 (p.23) 
 
 
 
 
2.6.1 (pp.27-28) 
 
 
 
2.6.1 (p.27-28) 
 
 
 
 
2.1.1.6 (p.22) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4.3 (p.24) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
     A binary number of 1 if the 
roles of chairperson and 
CEO/MD of a firm are split at the 
end of its financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a 
majority of a firm’s board of dir- 
ectors are non-executive directors 
at the end of its financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if the 
chairperson of a firm is an inde- 
pendent non-executive director at 
the end of its financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a 
firm’s board of directors meets at 
least 4 times in a financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
   A binary number of 1 if indiv- 
dual directors’ meetings atten-  
dance of a firm is disclosed in the 
firm’s annual report at the end of 
its financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a 
narrative on current directors’ as 
well as directors’ standing for re-
elections’ brief curriculum vitae 
or biography  such as name, offi- 
cial address, age, qualifications, 
experience, responsibilities and 
status is disclosed in the annual 
report at the end of its financial 
year, 0 otherwise.  
   A binary number of 1 if a clear 
narrative that classifies directors 
into executive, non-executive and 
independent non-executive direc-   
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Board and Director 
Evaluation 
Evaluation of 
chairperson 
performance and 
effectiveness 
 
 
Appraisal of 
CEO/MD 
performance and 
effectiveness 
 
 
Evaluation of board 
performance and 
effectiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of board 
subcommittees 
performance and 
effectiveness 
 
 
 
Dealings and 
Securities 
Director/officer 
dealings and 
securities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECPE 
 
 
 
 
 
ACEOPE 
 
 
 
 
 
EBPE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EBSCPE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DDS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.8 (p.29) 
 
2.3.5 (p.23) 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.6 (p.24) 
 
 
 
 
 
2.8.1 (p.29) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.7.10 (p.29) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.9 (p.29) 
 
2.9.1 (p.29) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tors is disclosed in the firm’s 
annual report at the end of its 
financial year, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
     A binary number of 1 if a 
narrative on the evaluation of a 
firm’s chairperson’s performance 
and effectiveness is disclosed in 
its annual report at the end of its 
financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a 
narrative on the appraisal of a 
firm’s CEO/MD’s performance 
and effectiveness is disclosed in 
the annual report at the end of its 
financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a 
narrative on the evaluation of the 
performance and effectiveness of 
a firm’s board as whole and 
individual directors is disclosed 
in the firm’s annual report at the 
end of its financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a 
narrative on the evaluation of the 
performance and effectiveness of 
a firm’s board subcommittees’ is 
disclosed in the firm’s annual 
report at the end of its financial 
year, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
     A binary number of 1 if a 
narrative on the policy or the 
practice of prohibiting dealings in 
a firm’s shares or securities by 
directors, officers and other 
senior internal employees for a 
designated period preceding the 
announcement of financial results 
or in any other period considered 
price sensitive, and have regard to 
the listings requirements of the 
JSE Ltd South Africa in respect 
of share dealings of directors is 
disclosed in the annual report, 0 
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Company Secretary 
Office of the 
company secretary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal Board 
Sub-Committees 
Nomination 
 
Existence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Composition 
 
 
 
 
Chairperson 
 
 
 
 
Disclosure of 
membership 
 
 
 
Disclosure of 
individual meetings 
 
 
COSEC1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NCOM1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMP2 
 
 
 
 
NCCP 
 
 
 
 
DM1 
 
 
 
 
INCMMA 
 
 
2.10 (p.29) 
2.10.1 (p.29) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.7 (pp.28-29) 
 
2.2/2.4  
(pp.23, 25) 
2.2.2/2.4.8 
(pp.23, 25) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2/2.7.9 
(pp.23,29) 
 
 
 
2.2.2/2.7.7 
(pp.23, 29) 
 
 
 
2.7.9 (p.29) 
 
 
 
 
2.6.1/2.7.9 
(pp.27, 29) 
otherwise. 
 
     A binary number of 1 if a 
narrative on the existence of a 
strong and supportive office of a 
company secretary, which 
ensures effective functioning of 
the board, such as conducting 
induction sessions for new or 
inexperienced directors, 
facilitating the taking of free 
independent professional advice 
by board members when 
necessary, assisting the Chair-  
person or CEO/MD in convening 
meetings and performing other 
statutory duties is disclosed in the 
annual report of a firm at the end 
of its financial year, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
      
     
      A binary variable of 1 if a 
firm has a nomination committee 
at the end of its financial year, 0 
otherwise. If the remit of this 
committee includes ensuring co- 
mpliance with corporate rules and 
regulations or governance rules, 
then such a committee will be 
deemed to have been duly set-up. 
     A binary number of 1 if this 
committee is composed of by a 
majority of independent non-
executive directors at the end of a 
firm’s financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if the 
chairperson of this committee is 
an independent non-executive di- 
rector at the end a firm’s financial 
year, 0 otherwise.  
     A binary number of 1 if the 
membership of the committee is 
disclosed in a firm’s annual report 
for the financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a 
record of individual members att- 
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attendance 
 
 
Remuneration 
Existence 
 
 
 
Composition 
 
 
 
 
Chairperson 
 
 
 
 
Disclosure of 
membership 
 
 
 
Disclosure of 
individual members 
meetings attendance 
 
 
Disclosure of 
directors’ 
remuneration, 
interests, and share 
options 
 
Disclosure of 
director 
remuneration 
philosophy 
(procedure) and 
performance-linked 
executive director 
remuneration 
 
 
 
 
 
Director Access to 
Free Independent 
 
 
 
 
RCOM1 
 
 
 
COM3 
 
 
 
 
RCCP 
 
 
 
 
DM2 
 
 
 
 
IRCMMA 
 
 
 
 
DDR 
 
 
 
 
 
DPLR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5 (pp.26-27) 
2.5.2/2.7.5  
(pp.26, 28) 
 
 
2.5.2/2.7.9 
(pp.26, 29) 
 
 
 
2.5.2/2.7.7 
(pp.26, 29) 
 
 
 
2.5.3/2.7.9 
(pp.26, 29) 
 
 
 
2.6.1/2.7.9 
(pp.27, 29) 
 
 
 
2.5.4/2.5.8 
(pp.26-27) 
 
 
 
 
2.5.5/2.5.10 
(pp.26-27) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 (pp.22, 23) 
 
endance of meetings is disclosed 
in a firm’s annual report for the 
financial year, 0 otherwise. 
      
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
has a remuneration committee at 
the end of its financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if the 
remuneration committee of a firm 
is formed only by independent 
non-executive directors at the end 
of its financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if the 
chairperson of this committee of a 
firm is an independent non-
executive director at the end of its 
financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if the 
membership of this committee of 
a firm is disclosed in the firm’s 
annual report at the end of its 
financial year, 0 otherwise.  
     A binary number of 1 if a 
record of individual members 
attendance of meetings is disclos- 
ed in a firm’s annual report for 
the financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a  
firm’s directors’ remuneration, 
interests, and share options are 
disclosed in its annual report for a 
financial year, 0 otherwise. 
      
     A binary number of 1 if the 
performance-related elements of 
executive directors’ remuneration 
such as share options and bonuses 
do constitute substantial portion 
of the total package in order to 
align their interests with sharehol- 
ders, and this is supported by a 
narrative on the specific procedu- 
re and the underpinning philosop- 
hy in a firm’s annual report at the 
end of its financial year, 0 other- 
wise.  
 
 
  
389 
Professional Legal 
Advice 
Director/subcommi- 
ttee access to free 
professional 
independent advice 
 
 
DAFIPA 
 
 
2.1.9/2.7.8 
(pp.22, 29) 
 
 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
has a narrative on the existence of 
a formal procedure, which allows 
directors/subcommittees to seek 
independent professional legal 
advice on any matters (i.e., 
legislative, regulatory or procedu- 
ral) affecting the firm, when they 
deem it to be necessary, at the 
firm’s own expense is disclosed 
in its annual report at the end of 
its financial year, 0 otherwise. 
2. Accounting and  
    Auditing 
Auditing committee 
Existence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Composition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chairperson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclosure of 
membership 
 
 
Disclosure of 
 
 
 
ACOM1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COM4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACCP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DM3 
 
 
 
IACMMA 
 
6.1 (pp.38-40) 
6.3 (pp.39-40) 
2.7.5/6.3.1 
(pp.28, 39) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.1 (p.39) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.7.7/6.3.2 
(pp.29, 39) 
 
 
 
 
 
2.7.9/6.3.5 
(pp.29, 39) 
 
 
2.6.1/2.7.9 
 
 
 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
has an internal audit committee at 
the end of its financial year, 0 
otherwise. If the remit of this 
committee includes those perfor- 
med by a Risk or Corporate Gov- 
ernance committee, then such  
committees will be deemed to 
have been duly constituted.  
     A binary number of 1 if a 
firm’s audit committee is 
composed of by at least two 
independent non-executive 
directors of whom majority are 
financially literate at the end of 
its financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if the 
chairperson of this committee  is 
an independent non-executive dir- 
ector, who is also not the same as 
the chairperson of the main board 
at the end of a firm’s financial 
year, 0 otherwise.  
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
discloses the membership of this   
committee in its annual report for 
a financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a 
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individual members 
meetings attendance 
 
 
Board Statement on 
the Going-Concern 
Status of the Firm 
 
Narrative on the 
‘Going-Concern’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NGC 
(pp.27, 29) 
 
 
 
5.1/6.2/8.4 
 (pp.36, 38-39, 
41) 
 
5.1.3/6.2.3/8.4.6 
(pp.36, 39, 41) 
record of individual members att- 
endance of meetings is disclosed 
in a firm’s annual report for a 
financial year, 0 otherwise.  
 
 
 
 
     A binary number of 1 if a clear 
narrative by the directors of a 
firm on the possibility of the firm 
operating as a ‘going-concern’ is 
disclosed in its annual report for 
the financial year, 0 otherwise. 
3. Risk   
   Management and  
   Internal Audit 
Disclosure of 
company risks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclosure of policy 
on risks 
management 
 
 
Disclosure policy 
on internal control 
systems 
 
 
Risk management 
committee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DCR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DPM 
 
 
 
 
DPI 
 
 
 
 
RISCOM1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3-4 (pp.30-35) 
 
 
3.1.3/3.1.5/3.2.2 
/3.2.6 
(pp.30-33) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.1/3.1.2/3.1.7 
3.2.3/3.2.5 
(pp.30-33) 
 
 
3.1.4/3.1.7-
3.2.1/4.1.1-
4.2.5 
(pp.30-35) 
 
3.1.6 (p.31) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on both actu- 
al and potential future non-syste- 
matic (firm-specific) risks like 
union/labour disruptions, adverse 
incidents (fire outbreaks), cases 
of litigation as well as systematic 
(economy wide) such as inflation, 
exchange rates, politics, currency 
re(de)valuation, interest rates, ec- 
onomic recession, intense busine- 
ss or market competition, among 
others, that it is facing in its ann- 
ual report for a financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
      A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on how curr- 
ent and future assessed risks will 
be managed in its annual report 
for a financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on existing 
internal control systems(including 
internal audit) in its annual report 
for a financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
has a risk management committee 
dedicated to assisting the board in 
reviewing the risk management p- 
rocess and the significant risks 
that it is facing in its annual 
report for a financial year, 0 
  
391 
 
Disclosure of 
individual members 
attendance of risk 
management 
committee meetings 
 
IRISCMA 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6.1/2.7.9 
(pp.27, 29) 
otherwise.  
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a record of individual m- 
embers attendance of risk commi- 
ttee meetings in its annual report 
for a financial year, 0 otherwise.    
4. Ownership   
    Structure 
Internal Ownership 
 
 
INON1 
2.5 (pp.26-27) 
 
2.5.6-2.5.7  
(pp.26-27) 
 
 
     A binary number of 1 if the 
total value of issued ordinary 
equity that is directly or indirectly 
held (including through a firm or 
a holding firm with either a bene- 
ficial or a non-beneficial 
interests) by all directors, officers 
and internal employees of a firm 
is less than 50% of the firm’s 
total book value of issued 
ordinary equity, 0 otherwise. 
5. Integrated   
Sustainability  
Reporting/Non- 
Financial  
Information 
Black economic 
empowerment and 
empowerment of 
women 
 
 
 
 
Policy on HIV/Aids 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy on health and 
safety 
 
 
 
 
Policy on 
employment equity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BEE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HIV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PHS 
 
 
 
 
 
PHQ 
 
 
 
 
5 (pp.35-37) 
 
 
 
5.1.1-5.1.4 
(pp.35-37) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1.4 (p.36) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1.1-5.1.4 
(pp.35-37) 
 
 
 
 
5.1.1-5.1.4 
(pp.35-37) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on how it is 
complying with, and implementi- 
ng the broad-based black 
economic empowerment and 
empowerment of women laws in 
its annual report for a financial 
year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on how it is 
addressing the threat posed by 
HIV/AIDS pandemic in South 
Africa in its annual report at the 
end of a financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on measures 
taken to address the occupational 
health and safety of its employees 
in its annual report at the end of 
its financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on how it is 
complying with employment equ- 
ity laws in terms of gender, age, 
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Policy on good 
environmental 
practices 
 
 
 
 
Offering 
Community 
Support/Corporate 
Social Investment 
 
 
 
 
Disclosure of a code 
of ethics 
 
 
 
Board diversity on 
the basis of 
ethnicity 
 
 
Board diversity on 
the basis of gender 
 
 
 
PEP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CSI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DCE 
 
 
 
 
BDIVE1 
 
 
 
 
BDIVG1 
 
 
 
5.1.1-.51.4 
(pp.35-37) 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1.1-5.1.4 
(pp.35-37) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.1-5.2.4 
(pp.37-38) 
 
 
 
2.1.2/2.1.10/ 
2.2.1 (pp.21-23) 
 
 
 
2.1.2/2.1.10/ 
2.2.1 (pp.21-23) 
 
 
ethnicity and disabilities in its 
annual report for a financial year, 
0 otherwise. 
      A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on how it is 
complying with, and implementi- 
ng the rules and regulations on 
the environment in its annual 
report for a financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on communi- 
ty support and other corporate 
social responsibilities (e.g., cons- 
tructing/supporting schools, local 
hospitals/clinics, supplying porta- 
ble water, etc) in its annual report 
for a financial year, 0 otherwise.     
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on the existe- 
nce of a code of ethics and its 
adherence to in its annual report 
for a financial year, 0 otherwise.  
     A binary number of 1 if a 
firm’s board is formed by at least 
1 white and 1 non-white person at 
the end of a financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a 
firm’s board is formed by at least 
1 male and 1 female person at the 
end of a financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
6. Encouraging a  
Culture of  
Voluntary  
Compliance and  
Enforcement 
Contribution to the 
development of 
financial journalism 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy on 
encouraging 
shareholder 
 
 
 
 
 
CDFJ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PSA 
 
 
7-8/6  
(pp.40-41, 162-
165) 
 
 
6 (p.162) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7-8/6 (pp.40-41, 
163-165) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on how it is 
contributing towards the develop- 
ment of financial journalism, re- 
cognising the financial media as 
an appropriate monitor of corpor- 
ate conduct in its annual report 
for a financial year, 0 otherwise. 
      A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on what it is 
doing to encourage shareholder 
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activism 
 
 
 
 
 
Narrative on 
compliance/non-
compliance with the 
2002 King Report 
on Corporate 
Governance for 
South Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CNC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.4.7 (p.41) 
activism such as having investor 
relations department, the instituti- 
on of proxy voting, encouraging 
shareholder attendance of AGMs 
in its annual report for a financial 
year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a positive statement on 
the compliance or non-
compliance with the provisions of 
the 2002 King Report on 
Corporate Governance for South 
Africa in its annual report at the 
end of its financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
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Appendix 3a – 
A Spreadsheet of Coded Corporate Governance Variables for the First Six Sampled Firms in Alphabetical Order 
YEAR 
COMPANY 
CODE DUAL1 COM1 BCP FBMs1 IDMA BDIVE BDIVG EBPE EBSCPE ACPE ECEOPE 
2002 AAH 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 AAH 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 AAH 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 AAH 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 AAH 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 AAS 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
2003 AAS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
2004 AAS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2005 AAS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2006 AAS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2002 ACI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
2003 ACI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
2004 ACI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
2005 ACI 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 ACI 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
2002 ADV 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 ADV 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2004 ADV 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
2005 ADV 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 ADV 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 AEC 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
2003 AEC 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
2004 AEC 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
2005 AEC 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
2006 AEC 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
2002 AFI 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 AFI 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 AFI 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 AFI 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
2006 AFI 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix 3b – 
A Sample Spreadsheet of Coded Corporate Governance Variables with Data Sources and Page Numbers 
YEAR 
COMPANY 
CODE DUAL1 COM1 BCP FBMs1 IDMA 
2002 AAH p8 pp8;13;20 p8 p14 n/a 
2003 AAH pp4;5;15;44 pp4;5;12;44 p4;5;15;44 p12 n/a 
2004 AAH pp6;7;20;23 pp6;7;20;23 pp6;7;20;23 p23 p23 
2005 AAH pp6;20;24;69 pp6;20;24 pp6;20;24 p27 p27 
2006 AAH pp6;26;86 pp6;26;85;86 pp6;85 p30 p30 
2002 AAS pp54;55;57;143 pp54;55;57 pp54;57 p58 p58 
2003 AAS pp4;37;43 pp37;38;43 pp37;43;44 pp42;43 p43 
2004 AAS pp4;5;15;16;66;68;189 pp4;5;15;16;68;69;70;189 pp4;5;15;16;68;189 pp72; pp72 
2005 AAS pp5;22;23;87;268 pp22;23;87;88;90;268 pp5;22;23;87;268 pp87;91 pp91 
2006 AAS pp6;7;9;20-21;95 pp6;7;9;20-21;95;98 pp6;7;9;20-21;95 pp95;100 pp95;100 
2002 ACI pp5-7;11;12;38 pp5-7;11;12 pp5-7;11;12 p12 p12 
2003 ACI pp6-7;15;19 pp6-7 pp6-7;15;44 pp8-9 p9 
2004 ACI pp18-19;25 pp18-19;50 pp18-19;25;50 pp21 p21 
2005 ACI pp6-7;8;9;13;17;47 pp6-7;8;9;13;48 pp6-7;8;9;13;47 pp8-9 p9 
2006 ACI pp6-7;10;32;33;56 pp6-7;9;33;57 pp6-7;8;10;33;56 pp6-7;33-34 p34 
2002 ADV pp2;3;6;16;21 pp2;3;6;16;21;23 pp2;3;6;16;21 p16 p16 
2003 ADV pp2;3;6-7;16;21 pp2;3;6-7;16 pp2;3;6-7;16;21 p16 p16 
2004 ADV pp10;28 pp6;7;10;28 pp10;28 p28 p28 
2005 ADV pp9;01-02;06-07 pp9;01-02;06 pp9;01-02;06-07 pp9;01-02 p02 
2006 ADV pp09-10;01;06;43 pp09-10;01;06;43 pp09-10;01;06;43 p01 p01 
2002 AEC pp6;10;34 pp6;10;34;40;82-83 pp6;10;34;82-83 n/a n/a 
2003 AEC pp9;15;43;19;52;88-89 pp12;43;47;88-89 pp9;43;88 pp43;47 pp43;47 
2004 AEC pp6-7;10-11;17;35 pp6-7;35;95-96 pp7;10;35;95-96 pp36;39 pp36;39 
2005 AEC pp11;17;54;110-112;63 pp48;54;110-112 pp11;48;54 pp49;54 pp54 
2006 AEC pp11;17;114 pp91 pp11;17;114 pp93;101 pp101 
2002 AFI pp03;06 pp30;41;43;90-92 pp03;41 p30 n/a 
2003 AFI pp8-9;17;38;51;102 pp8-9;38-39 pp13;51 pp38;39 p39 
2004 AFI pp08-09;013;025;040 pp08-09;013;031;043 pp011;040 pp028-031 p031 
2005 AFI pp06-07-013;021;038 pp06-07;012-013;026;030;041 pp013;038 pp026;030 p030 
2006 AFI pp06-07;08 pp06-07;10;22;26 pp06-07;08;22;26;34 pp22;26 pp26 
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Appendix 4: The Equilibrium-Variable Model - Variables Definitions and  
         Measurements 
Variable Acronym/Code Measurement 
1. Dependent/Financial  
Performance 
Accounting Measure: 
Return on Assets (%) 
 
 
 
Market Measure: Tobin’s Q 
 
FP 
 
ROA 
 
 
 
Q-RATIO 
 
 
 
     Operating profit (WC01250) of a firm 
divided by the book value of its total 
assets (WC02999) at the end of its 
financial year. 
     The ratio of a firm’s total assets 
(WC02999) minus its total book value of 
ordinary equity (WC03501+WC03451) 
plus total market value of equity (MV) 
divided by its total assets (WC02999) at 
the end of its financial year. 
DataStream items 
Accounting Variables: 
Capital expenditure 
Operating profit (993) 
Total assets (WS) 
Total debt 
Total sales (104) 
Total share capital and 
reserves (307) 
 
 
Market Variable: 
Market value 
 
 
WC04601 
WC01250 
WC02999 
WC03255 
WC01001 
(WC03501+ 
WC03451) 
 
 
 
MV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Internal Corporate   
Governance/Independent 
Board Structure 
Board size 
 
 
 
Non-executive directors (%) 
 
 
 
Role or CEO duality 
 
 
 
Board diversity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BSIZE 
 
 
 
NEDs 
 
 
 
DUAL 
 
 
 
BDIV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     The total number of directors on the 
board of a firm at the end of its financial 
year. Alternate/shadow directors are not 
counted as part of the board for the year. 
     The number of non-executive direct- 
ors divided by the total number of direct- 
ors on the board of a firm at the end of its 
financial year. 
     A binary number that takes the value 
of 1 if the roles of chairperson and CEO 
of firm are combined at the end of its 
financial year, 0 otherwise. 
      A binary number that takes the value 
of 1 if a firm’s board is composed of by 
at least 1 white, 1 non-white, 1 male and 
1 female at the end of its financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
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Frequency of board 
meetings 
FBMs 
 
 
     The total number of meetings held by 
a firm’s board of directors over a full 
financial year. 
3. Key Internal Board 
Committees 
Audit committee 
 
 
 
Nomination committee 
 
 
 
Remuneration committee 
 
 
 
Compliance/corporate 
governance committee 
 
 
ACOM 
 
 
 
NCOM 
 
 
 
RCOM 
 
 
 
CGCOM 
 
 
     A binary number that takes the value 
of 1 if a firm has an audit committee esta- 
blished at the end of its financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
     A binary number that takes the value 
of 1 if a firm has a nomination committee 
established at the end of its financial 
year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number that takes the value 
of 1 if a firm has a remuneration 
committee established at the end of its 
financial year, 0 otherwise. 
A binary number that takes the value of 
1 if a firm has a compliance/corporate go- 
vernance committee established at the 
end of its financial year, 0 otherwise.  
4. Ownership Structure 
Director Share- 
ownership (%) 
 
 
 
DTON 
 
 
 
      
The total number of ordinary shares 
held by all directors of the board of 
scaled by the total number of ordinary 
shares of a firm at the end of its financial 
year. 
5. Alternative Corporate   
Governance Mechanisms 
Block Shareholding (%) 
 
 
 
Institutional share- 
holding (%) 
 
 
 
 
Leverage (%) 
 
 
BLKSHDNG 
 
 
 
 
INSTHDNG 
 
 
 
 
LEV 
      
 
     The total number of ordinary shares 
held by shareholders with at least 5% 
holding divided by the total number of 
ordinary shares of a firm at the end of its 
financial year. 
     The total number of ordinary shares 
held by both financial and non-financial 
institutions scaled by the total number of 
ordinary shares of a firm at the end of its 
financial year.   
     The percentage of total debt (WC032-
55) to total assets (WC02999) of a firm at 
the end of its financial year. 
6. Controls 
Capital expenditure (%) 
 
 
 
Foreign-listing/Dual-listing 
 
 
CAPEX 
 
 
 
DUALLIST 
 
 
     The percentage of total capital expen- 
diture (WC04601) to total assets (WC0- 
2999) of firm at the end of its financial 
year. 
     A binary number that takes the value 
of 1 if a firm maintains a secondary 
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Capital Structure/ 
Gearing (%) 
 
 
Firm Size  
 
 
Sales Growth (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Audit firm size 
 
 
GEAR 
 
 
 
LNTA 
 
 
SGROWTH 
 
 
 
 
 
INDUST 
 
 
 
 
YD 
 
BIG4 
listing on a UK/US stock market at the 
end of its financial year, 0 otherwise 
     The percentage of total debt (WC032- 
55) to total ordinary equity (WC03501 + 
WC03501) of a firm at the end of its 
financial year. 
     Natural log of the book value of a 
firm’s total assets (WC02999) at the end 
of its financial year. 
     The percentage of the difference 
between current year’s sales (WC01001) 
and previous year’s sales (WC01001) 
divided by previous year’s sales 
(WC01001) of a firm at the end of its 
financial year. 
     A dummy variable for each of the 5 
industries: basic materials (BMAT), 
consumer goods (CGOODS), consumer 
services (CSERVICES), industrials (IN- 
DUSTRIALS) and technology (TECHN). 
     Five year dummies for each of the five 
years from 2002 to 2006 inclusive. 
     A dummy variable that takes a value of 
‘1’ if a sampled firm is audited by any of 
the big four auditing firms (namely, 
Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, 
KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers), 
zero otherwise.  
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Appendix 5 – 
A Normal Histogram of the Distribution of the SACGI 
 
                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The South African Corporate Governance Index (the SACGI - %) 
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